evolution of the thesis

Think of yourself as a member of a jury, listening to a lawyer who is presenting an opening argument. You'll want to know very soon whether the lawyer believes the accused to be guilty or not guilty, and how the lawyer plans to convince you. Readers of academic essays are like jury members: before they have read too far, they want to know what the essay argues as well as how the writer plans to make the argument. After reading your thesis statement, the reader should think, "This essay is going to try to convince me of something. I'm not convinced yet, but I'm interested to see how I might be."

An effective thesis cannot be answered with a simple "yes" or "no." A thesis is not a topic; nor is it a fact; nor is it an opinion. "Reasons for the fall of communism" is a topic. "Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe" is a fact known by educated people. "The fall of communism is the best thing that ever happened in Europe" is an opinion. (Superlatives like "the best" almost always lead to trouble. It's impossible to weigh every "thing" that ever happened in Europe. And what about the fall of Hitler? Couldn't that be "the best thing"?)

A good thesis has two parts. It should tell what you plan to argue, and it should "telegraph" how you plan to argue—that is, what particular support for your claim is going where in your essay.

Steps in Constructing a Thesis

First, analyze your primary sources.  Look for tension, interest, ambiguity, controversy, and/or complication. Does the author contradict himself or herself? Is a point made and later reversed? What are the deeper implications of the author's argument? Figuring out the why to one or more of these questions, or to related questions, will put you on the path to developing a working thesis. (Without the why, you probably have only come up with an observation—that there are, for instance, many different metaphors in such-and-such a poem—which is not a thesis.)

Once you have a working thesis, write it down.  There is nothing as frustrating as hitting on a great idea for a thesis, then forgetting it when you lose concentration. And by writing down your thesis you will be forced to think of it clearly, logically, and concisely. You probably will not be able to write out a final-draft version of your thesis the first time you try, but you'll get yourself on the right track by writing down what you have.

Keep your thesis prominent in your introduction.  A good, standard place for your thesis statement is at the end of an introductory paragraph, especially in shorter (5-15 page) essays. Readers are used to finding theses there, so they automatically pay more attention when they read the last sentence of your introduction. Although this is not required in all academic essays, it is a good rule of thumb.

Anticipate the counterarguments.  Once you have a working thesis, you should think about what might be said against it. This will help you to refine your thesis, and it will also make you think of the arguments that you'll need to refute later on in your essay. (Every argument has a counterargument. If yours doesn't, then it's not an argument—it may be a fact, or an opinion, but it is not an argument.)

This statement is on its way to being a thesis. However, it is too easy to imagine possible counterarguments. For example, a political observer might believe that Dukakis lost because he suffered from a "soft-on-crime" image. If you complicate your thesis by anticipating the counterargument, you'll strengthen your argument, as shown in the sentence below.

Some Caveats and Some Examples

A thesis is never a question.  Readers of academic essays expect to have questions discussed, explored, or even answered. A question ("Why did communism collapse in Eastern Europe?") is not an argument, and without an argument, a thesis is dead in the water.

A thesis is never a list.  "For political, economic, social and cultural reasons, communism collapsed in Eastern Europe" does a good job of "telegraphing" the reader what to expect in the essay—a section about political reasons, a section about economic reasons, a section about social reasons, and a section about cultural reasons. However, political, economic, social and cultural reasons are pretty much the only possible reasons why communism could collapse. This sentence lacks tension and doesn't advance an argument. Everyone knows that politics, economics, and culture are important.

A thesis should never be vague, combative or confrontational.  An ineffective thesis would be, "Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe because communism is evil." This is hard to argue (evil from whose perspective? what does evil mean?) and it is likely to mark you as moralistic and judgmental rather than rational and thorough. It also may spark a defensive reaction from readers sympathetic to communism. If readers strongly disagree with you right off the bat, they may stop reading.

An effective thesis has a definable, arguable claim.  "While cultural forces contributed to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the disintegration of economies played the key role in driving its decline" is an effective thesis sentence that "telegraphs," so that the reader expects the essay to have a section about cultural forces and another about the disintegration of economies. This thesis makes a definite, arguable claim: that the disintegration of economies played a more important role than cultural forces in defeating communism in Eastern Europe. The reader would react to this statement by thinking, "Perhaps what the author says is true, but I am not convinced. I want to read further to see how the author argues this claim."

A thesis should be as clear and specific as possible.  Avoid overused, general terms and abstractions. For example, "Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe because of the ruling elite's inability to address the economic concerns of the people" is more powerful than "Communism collapsed due to societal discontent."

Copyright 1999, Maxine Rodburg and The Tutors of the Writing Center at Harvard University

Thesis Statements

What is a thesis statement.

Your thesis statement is one of the most important parts of your paper.  It expresses your main argument succinctly and explains why your argument is historically significant.  Think of your thesis as a promise you make to your reader about what your paper will argue.  Then, spend the rest of your paper–each body paragraph–fulfilling that promise.

Your thesis should be between one and three sentences long and is placed at the end of your introduction.  Just because the thesis comes towards the beginning of your paper does not mean you can write it first and then forget about it.  View your thesis as a work in progress while you write your paper.  Once you are satisfied with the overall argument your paper makes, go back to your thesis and see if it captures what you have argued.  If it does not, then revise it.  Crafting a good thesis is one of the most challenging parts of the writing process, so do not expect to perfect it on the first few tries.  Successful writers revise their thesis statements again and again.

A successful thesis statement:

• makes an historical argument
• takes a position that requires defending
• is historically specific
• is focused and precise
• answers the question, “so what?”

How to write a thesis statement:

Suppose you are taking an early American history class and your professor has distributed the following essay prompt:

“Historians have debated the American Revolution’s effect on women.  Some argue that the Revolution had a positive effect because it increased women’s authority in the family.  Others argue that it had a negative effect because it excluded women from politics.  Still others argue that the Revolution changed very little for women, as they remained ensconced in the home.  Write a paper in which you pose your own answer to the question of whether the American Revolution had a positive, negative, or limited effect on women.”

Using this prompt, we will look at both weak and strong thesis statements to see how successful thesis statements work.

While this thesis does take a position, it is problematic because it simply restates the prompt.  It needs to be more specific about how  the Revolution had a limited effect on women and  why it mattered that women remained in the home.

Revised Thesis:  The Revolution wrought little political change in the lives of women because they did not gain the right to vote or run for office.  Instead, women remained firmly in the home, just as they had before the war, making their day-to-day lives look much the same.

This revision is an improvement over the first attempt because it states what standards the writer is using to measure change (the right to vote and run for office) and it shows why women remaining in the home serves as evidence of limited change (because their day-to-day lives looked the same before and after the war).  However, it still relies too heavily on the information given in the prompt, simply saying that women remained in the home.  It needs to make an argument about some element of the war’s limited effect on women.  This thesis requires further revision.

Strong Thesis: While the Revolution presented women unprecedented opportunities to participate in protest movements and manage their family’s farms and businesses, it ultimately did not offer lasting political change, excluding women from the right to vote and serve in office.

Few would argue with the idea that war brings upheaval.  Your thesis needs to be debatable:  it needs to make a claim against which someone could argue.  Your job throughout the paper is to provide evidence in support of your own case.  Here is a revised version:

Strong Thesis: The Revolution caused particular upheaval in the lives of women.  With men away at war, women took on full responsibility for running households, farms, and businesses.  As a result of their increased involvement during the war, many women were reluctant to give up their new-found responsibilities after the fighting ended.

Sexism is a vague word that can mean different things in different times and places.  In order to answer the question and make a compelling argument, this thesis needs to explain exactly what  attitudes toward women were in early America, and  how those attitudes negatively affected women in the Revolutionary period.

Strong Thesis: The Revolution had a negative impact on women because of the belief that women lacked the rational faculties of men. In a nation that was to be guided by reasonable republican citizens, women were imagined to have no place in politics and were thus firmly relegated to the home.

This thesis addresses too large of a topic for an undergraduate paper.  The terms “social,” “political,” and “economic” are too broad and vague for the writer to analyze them thoroughly in a limited number of pages.  The thesis might focus on one of those concepts, or it might narrow the emphasis to some specific features of social, political, and economic change.

Strong Thesis: The Revolution paved the way for important political changes for women.  As “Republican Mothers,” women contributed to the polity by raising future citizens and nurturing virtuous husbands.  Consequently, women played a far more important role in the new nation’s politics than they had under British rule.

This thesis is off to a strong start, but it needs to go one step further by telling the reader why changes in these three areas mattered.  How did the lives of women improve because of developments in education, law, and economics?  What were women able to do with these advantages?  Obviously the rest of the paper will answer these questions, but the thesis statement needs to give some indication of why these particular changes mattered.

Strong Thesis: The Revolution had a positive impact on women because it ushered in improvements in female education, legal standing, and economic opportunity.  Progress in these three areas gave women the tools they needed to carve out lives beyond the home, laying the foundation for the cohesive feminist movement that would emerge in the mid-nineteenth century.

Thesis Checklist

When revising your thesis, check it against the following guidelines:

• Does my thesis make an historical argument?
• Does my thesis take a position that requires defending?
• Is my thesis historically specific?
• Is my thesis focused and precise?
• Does my thesis answer the question, “so what?”

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6.20: Video: Evolution of the Thesis Statement

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Previous pages established the importance of a working thesis statement early in the writing process. This working thesis is likely to be revisited and revised several times as the writing process continues.

After gathering evidence, and before starting to write the essay itself, is a natural point to look again at the project’s thesis statement. The following video offers friendly, appealing advice for developing a thesis statement more concretely.

A YouTube element has been excluded from this version of the text. You can view it online here: http://pb.libretexts.org/itcc/?p=298

• Video: Evolution of the Thesis Statement. Provided by : Lumen Learning. License : CC BY: Attribution
• How To Write A Killer Thesis Statement by Shmoop. Authored by : Shmoop. Located at : https://youtu.be/8wxE8R_x5I0 . License : All Rights Reserved . License Terms : Standard YouTube License

The evolutionary contingency thesis and evolutionary idiosyncrasies

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• Published: 21 March 2019
• Volume 34 , article number  22 , ( 2019 )

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• T. Y. William Wong   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-2750-7990 1  

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Much philosophical progress has been made in elucidating the idea of evolutionary contingency in a recent re-burgeoning of the debate. However, additional progress has been impaired on three fronts. The first relates to its characterisation: the under-specification of various contingency claims has made it difficult to conceptually pinpoint the scope to which ‘contingency’ allegedly extends , as well as which biological forms are in contention. That is—there appears to be no systematic means with which to fully specify contingency claims which has led to a tendency for authors to talk past each other. Secondly, on the matter of evidence, recent research has focused on the evidential import of (genuine) convergent evolution which is taken to disconfirm the evolutionary contingency thesis. However, there has been a neglect of convergent evolution’s converse: ‘evolutionary idiosyncrasies’ or the singular evolution of certain forms, which I argue is evidentially supportive of evolutionary contingency. Thirdly, evolutionary contingency has often been claimed to vary in degrees and that the debate, itself, is a matter of ‘relative significance’ (sensu Beatty). However, there has been no formal method of evaluating the strength of contingency and its relative significance in a particular domain. In this paper, I address all three issues by (i) proposing a systematic means of fully specifying contingency theses with the concept of the modal range . Secondly, I (ii) propose an account of evolutionary idiosyncrasies , investigate the explanations for their occurrences, and, subsequently, spell out their significance with respect to the evolutionary contingency thesis. Finally, having been equipped with the evidential counterpart to convergent evolution, I shall (iii) sketch a likelihood framework for evaluating, precisely on the basis of a sequence of opposing data, the strength and relative significance of evolutionary contingency in a particular domain. With this in hand, the relative observations of idiosyncrasies and convergences can be informative of the strength and relative significance of contingency in any particular domain.

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Introduction

The idea of evolutionary contingency has undergone a substantial resurgence in recent years with a number of contingency-theorists entertaining the modality of evolutionarily-derived biological forms. At present, there is no consensus as to what evolutionary contingency means other than to broadly suggest that certain evolved biological forms could have been otherwise . The suggestion is that there is an element of ‘chanciness’ (or some similar descriptor) to which forms would have actually evolved in the history of life. If evolutionary contingency were true, then as the story goes: had the ‘tape of life’ been replayed (from a different or the same starting point), the result would be an evolutionary menagerie bearing biological forms markedly different from the present ones. That is—instead of our ever so familiar birds, reptiles, and mammals, we would be left with forms ‘endlessly most beautiful’… should we find ourselves fortunate enough to remain.

The majority of recent papers have set out to propose etiological structures such as ‘casual dependence’, ‘path dependence’, or, ‘sensitivity to initial conditions’ that supposedly account for the modality of evolutionarily contingent forms (e.g. Beatty 2006 ; Desjardins 2011, 2016 ; Powell 2012 ; Sterelny 2005 ; Turner 2011 ). Certain biological forms are held to be contingent, or non-contingent, precisely because they are, or are not, at the end of a path dependent causal chain, for example. This inquisition into the relevant etiological structure for contingency is important because an advocate of the evolutionary contingency thesis (ECT) would assert that particular biological forms failed to robustly evolve because certain etiological conditions did not hold—e.g. the outcome was contingent because it was highly sensitive to initial conditions. However, aside from the question of which of the etiological structures best capture evolutionarily contingent dynamics, it is not clear which biological forms are meant to lack robustness and, furthermore, how far robustness is to extend —both of which makes conceptually grasping and empirically evaluating the thesis difficult. Despite the, now, frequent biological and philosophical discussions of the ECT, there has hitherto been no principled way of answering these two questions. Hence, there is a real need for some theoretical tools enabling one to fully spell out what the evolutionary contingency thesis amounts to. To this end, in “ The modal range ” section, I propose the idea of the modal range which allows contingency-theorists to relativise contingency claims to particular, more tractable, domains of interest.

The antithesis of the evolutionary contingency thesis—the robust view of life (RVL)—asserts (amongst other things) that certain biological forms are robustly realised which is to say that these forms are repeatedly realised across a number of evolutionary scenarios. Footnote 1 This view advocates that due to reasons of adaptive optimality or certain prevailing structural properties (sensu Sole and Goodwin 2001 ), certain forms are disposed to repeatedly evolve within some range of evolutionary scenarios. There is, however, a kind of phenomenon, seldomly investigated, that speaks against such repeatability. These are forms that, for one reason or another, have evolved uniquely . Often peculiar and distinctive, these forms constitute direct counter-examples to the robust view of life in that their evolution has been singular within the corresponding range. But their evidential role extends further than acting as mere counter-examples: the reasons for their singular evolution are informative of the way in which evolution has failed to be robust. Accordingly, one task of the present paper is to explicate what these reasons are and, more generally, investigate what these uniquely evolved forms— evolutionary idiosyncrasies —can say about the evolutionary contingency thesis.

Within the current evolutionary contingency literature, the bulk of the empirical evidence has been confined to ‘convergences’ which purportedly undermine the ECT by showing (i) that natural selection is ‘powerful’ enough to overcome historical encumbrances and, a fortiori , transcend individual phylogenetic constraints (e.g. Conway Morris 2003 ; Currie 2012a ; Powell 2012 ) or (ii) that there are structural properties (or functional constraints) of evolutionary systems that rigidly circumscribe the space of possible or probable forms (e.g. Sole and Goodwin 2001 ; Salazar-Ciudad et al. 2003 ; McGhee 2011 ; Brandon and McShea 2010 ). The latter refers to physical, chemical, functional, dynamical, or other aspects of an evolutionary system that dispose evolution towards certain forms. For example, certain chemical facts true within some evolutionary system may bound evolution towards particular RNA configurations within that system. In contrast to convergences, evolutionary idiosyncrasies, as we shall see, do just the converse: they demonstrate that (i) history fails to be a limiting factor in the determination of form (within an evolutionary system) and/or that (ii) there are limited structuralities that circumscribe the space of possible or probable forms (within an evolutionary system).

The term ‘evolutionary idiosyncrasies’ is non-standard and was first introduced as the title of the third chapter of Improbable Destinies where Losos ( 2017 ) provides an impressive catalogue of various evolutionary one - offs from the duck-billed platypus to the Hawaiian Alula plant. The platypus possesses, amongst its suite of peculiar traits, a leathery, electro-sensitive bill conducive for prey-searching whilst the Alula plant embodies the odd appearance of voluminous flowers at the top of a long and thick stalk, leading to its being known colloquially as ‘cabbage on a stick’. However, what makes idiosyncrasies evolutionarily interesting is not that they possess peculiar traits per se, but that their evolution has been a singular event. And, it is this singular evolution that I claim is at odds with the robust view of life and supportive of the ECT.

Despite the explicit intention of Improbable Destinies (Losos  2017 ) to evaluate the ECT, there is a noticeable paucity of investigation of the theoretical implications and/or philosophical significance of evolutionary idiosyncrasies with respect to the ECT . Nonetheless, Losos is to be commended for his pioneering step into a previously unrecognised area that is, as I argue in this paper, highly relevant for the ECT. Inspired by Losos’ lead, I consider possible explanations for the occurrence of idiosyncrasies and conclude that there are, exhaustively, four non-mutually-exclusive explanations which threaten the repeatability of form in one way or another.

The first explanation—(i) unique environments —asserts that certain forms evolved only once because the environmental conditions and/or selective pressures leading to that form has been unique. Secondly, (ii) natural selection may have been contingent or weak such that natural selection responds differently to the same environmental conditions as to lack consistency in its production of form or, fails to repeatedly produce the most superior form for a given environment. Thirdly, there may be (iii) multiple solutions to the same ecological problem (also known as Functional Equivalence) such that there are several equally-as-adaptive solutions that can evolve by natural selection. Fourthly, (iv) historicities , or difference-making historical events with a low objective probability of occurrence, such as genetic drift events or migration events may apply diversionary tendencies across evolutionary scenarios such that the same form does not repeatedly arise. As I consider these explanations in greater depth, it will become clear that they each undermine, at least, one of two necessary premises of the robust view of life: what I call, environment-trait uniformity and environmental regularity. As such, observations of idiosyncrasies speak against a robust view of life and, ipso facto , are supportive of the ECT.

In addition, I shall formally characterise the positive evidential link between idiosyncrasies and the ECT in quantitative terms as to lay the groundwork for, subsequently, sketching a likelihood framework for evaluating the ECT in light of a given body of evidence consisting of a sequence of opposing data: the presence of idiosyncrasies vis - à - vis convergences. The need for the likelihood framework is motivated by the two common assertions that evolutionary contingency is a matter of ‘relative significance’ (e.g. Beatty 1995 , 1997 , 2006 ) and that evolutionary contingency can vary by degrees (e.g. Powell 2012 ). Both assertions allegedly present methodological issues for evaluating the evolutionary contingency thesis (Ibid.; Beatty 1995 ; Powell and Mariscal 2015 ); the former in systematically evaluating and balancing opposing evidence, and the latter in quantifying contingency’s exact degree of strength.

However, the likelihood framework proffered here kills two birds with one stone. It offers a powerful, objective means with which to evaluate between various ECT’s of different strengths, and to do so precisely on the basis of opposing evidence. The two hypotheses hitherto encountered—the ECT and RVL—can be understood as absolute extremes at the polar ends of a ‘contingency spectrum’ which contains a number of intermediary hypotheses. I submit that by way of a likelihood function, one can compute the probability of a body of evidence (i.e. some number of idiosyncrasies and convergences) conferred by any contingency hypothesis on the spectrum. In this way, the relative proportions of idiosyncrasies versus convergences can be informative of how evolutionarily contingent a particular domain is: the more idiosyncrasies there are vis-à-vis convergences, the more evolutionarily contingent the domain is. Hence, the methodological pessimism associated with evolutionary contingency varying in degree or being a ‘relative significance’ dispute can be dissolved.

The plan is as follows: I begin by introducing the crucial notion of the modal range , so that contingency claims can be made precise with respect to what it means for a form to be robust or replicable. Following that, in “ Evolutionary idiosyncrasies and the Robust view of life ” section, I characterise evolutionary idiosyncrasies and illustrate the prima facie threat that they pose for the robust view of life. I, then, consider each of the four explanations for idiosyncrasies and explain how they each undermine the robust view of life. Moving on to the quantitative, in “ The likelihood framework and the contingency spectrum ” section, I advance two likelihood arguments (in the technical sense) to show that the likelihood ratio of idiosyncrasies in favour of the ECT (over the RVL) and the likelihood ratio of ‘convergences’ in favour of the RVL (over the ECT) are both above 1. Armed with these likelihood ratios which show the two phenomena’s direction of support on the contingency spectrum, I sketch a likelihood framework in which to evaluate the ECT given the idiosyncrasy-convergence dichotomy. In “ Evolutionary idiosyncrasies as differential evidence ” section, in order to demonstrate how idiosyncrasies can differ in their evidential strength , I consider certain statistical parameters, and draw a distinction between two different kinds of idiosyncrasies: divergent idiosyncrasies (DVI) and disparate idiosyncrasies (DPI), where the former is stronger evidence for the ECT than the latter. Moreover, both the evidential strength and the evidential target (i.e. which variant of the ECT) is also dependent on two conceptual dimensions in which idiosyncrasies can be defined and recognised. In this regard, I explain how an epistemic agent can adjust these dimensions to suit their respective epistemic projects.

The modal range

Contingency claims assert varying levels of robustness or repeatability for certain biological forms across an array of evolutionary scenarios. But, barring some indeterminist exceptions, Footnote 2 most contingency-theorists advocate that questions of evolutionary contingency are about the prevalence of biological forms amidst the variance of certain, important evolutionary conditions of epistemic interest. In other words, a biological form is robust if it invariantly evolves in a wide range of evolutionary scenarios where ( inter alia ) the initial conditions, geographical space, developmental generators, history, or, even nomological laws (may) differ between scenarios. Footnote 3 Some of these differences may be counterfactual such that what is of concern includes non-actual possibilities—for example, would a particular biological form still evolve in face of certain facts contrary to the actual world? In fact, contingency-theorists are often concerned with the evolution of forms in counterfactual scenarios (e.g. Beatty 1995 ; Conway Morris 2003 ; Beatty 2006 ; Powell 2012 ). As such, the range of scenarios need not be limited to the actual but can extend to the merely possible as well. For this reason, let us call the range of evolutionary scenarios under consideration for repeatability, the modal range .

The concept of the modal range is crucial in that it specifies the extent to which evolution is alleged to be contingent. To harken back to the introduction, it answers the question of how far robustness is to extend. A form is more-or-less robust within a specifically - defined modal range consisting of some evolutionary scenarios that may differ in certain respects. Contingency claims without a modal range index are not fully defined and are hence, difficult to conceptualise if not empirically evaluate. That is—contingency claims are defined in virtue of limiting the modal space (geographically, nomologically, historical, etc.) in which forms are alleged to be contingent. For example, if the modal range contains only evolutionary scenarios on Earth, then what is of concern is evolutionary contingency on Earth (e.g. Conway Morris 2003 ). Accordingly, then, for any question of evolutionary contingency, what is being asked is whether the evolutionary dynamics within some modal range are sufficient to result in the repeated evolution of certain forms within that range. A different modal range index entails a different contingency question and is likely to result in a different answer. In fact, the very same contingency-theorist (i.e. Vermeij 2006 ) may answer contingency questions in the affirmative for a modal range specifying early periods of life’s history—i.e. the Cambrian —yet vehemently deny contingency for later periods of life due to the sentiment that certain phenomena including (but not limited to) phylogenetic inertia or generative entrenchment will heavily constrain downstream possibilities (c.f. Shanahan 2011 ; Wimsatt 2001 ).

In general, the determination of the modal range is dependent on the demands of a contingency-theorist’s epistemic project. That is—if one were interested in the evolutionary contingency of some particular domain, then one ought to employ the appropriate modal range index as to track the relevant features of that domain and not of some other domain. Accordingly, given their respective epistemic goals, Conway Morris ( 2003 ) ought to consider the repeatability of forms within only evolutionary scenarios on Earth whilst Vermeij ( 2006 ) should take care to consider repeatability during the relevant time periods .

Nonetheless, due to the ambiguities afforded by a theoretically infinite number of modal range indices, one ought to be careful not to operationalise between two different senses of the ECT in any debate about the its truth, lest there be any argumentative cross-talk. Footnote 4 Moreover, when characterising a contingency-theorist’s view, it is imperative to refer to the modal range at hand. Exegetically, Gould has often been mistakenly portrayed as wholly denying the repeatability of form (e.g. McGhee 2011 , p. 271; see Powell and Mariscal ( 2015 ) for discussion). However, it is congruent with and, in fact, implied by Gould’s larger view of life that there will be some repeatability of form due to frozen, developmental constraints (Gould 1977 ; Gould and Lewontin 1979 ). To this end, Gould even points to a case of repeatability ( 2002 ): the repeated evolution of feeding appendages in the crustaceans due to certain developmental precursors (also discussed in Powell and Mariscal ( 2015 )). Importantly, Gould ( 1989 ) also claims that these developmental constraints could easily have been otherwise and hence, there is, undoubtedly, some contingency in this respect. The concept of the modal range allows one to recognise the nuances of Gould’s view. That is—Gould can be understood as denying the contingency of evolutionary forms for modal ranges with deep developmental entrenchments yet asserting contingency for modal ranges without such developmental entrenchments (probably, modal ranges upstream in history). Footnote 5 I shall, now, characterise evolutionary idiosyncrasies and outline the threat that they pose for the RVL.

Evolutionary idiosyncrasies and the robust view of life

To my knowledge, there has not yet been any formal definition of evolutionary idiosyncrasies (or equivalent Footnote 6 ) in the biological or philosophical literature. Although evolutionary oddities and peculiar biological forms are often cited (usually, to convey a sense of awe), a lack of an explicit formulation of this class of phenomena in the literature is not entirely surprising given that, historically, little theoretical significance has been attributed to them. However, as I argue that the existence of uniquely evolved biological forms in nature has considerable bearing to the ECT, this class of phenomena has sufficient theoretical significance to merit explicit formulation:

Evolutionary Idiosyncrasies : biological forms that are uniquely evolved (within some modal range Footnote 7 )

As such, evolutionary idiosyncrasies are defined by their singular evolution and not by the form’s uniqueness, per se. That is—there can be multiple instantiations of an idiosyncrasy: say, multiple platypus individuals, for example. The singular evolution of a form and its uniqueness are distinct notions and need not co-vary. Just as convergent evolution is defined by their having independent bouts of evolution rather than whether there are multiple instances of the form at hand, evolutionary idiosyncrasies (though uniquely evolved) can be multiply instantiated all the same. Conversely, if a form is unique, per se, in that it fails to be instantiated elsewhere in the modal range, it does not follow that the form is also an idiosyncrasy since the form may have evolved multiple times but has been, subsequently, reduced to a single instantiation. All in all, what matters is whether a form has independently evolved more than once as to be informative of the evolutionary dynamics, relevant to contingency, of a domain.

But even then, a caveat is in order: there are two conceptual complications with defining and recognising evolutionary idiosyncrasies. The first pertains to what it is that is supposed to be uniquely evolved. In other words, what is the subject of idiosyncrasy ? When it is said that a biological form Footnote 8 has uniquely evolved, is one referring to a particular trait like an electro-sensitive leathery bill, a particular species like the Hawaiian Alula, or, even a particular biological population ? A clear denotation of the subject of idiosyncrasy is required before its evolution can be even precluded elsewhere.

Furthermore, the determination of the subject of idiosyncrasy may also be plagued by the so-called grain issue . Just as almost always encountered with convergence, whether two forms are alike or different depends on the grain of the form’s description (Sterelny 2005 ; Currie 2012b ; Powell 2012 ). For example, some coarse-grained traits like predator avoidance is so broad as to have, undoubtedly, evolved across several evolutionary lineages. Yet, at the same time, a finer-grained trait—say camouflage —is likely to be less ubiquitous. An even finer-grained trait like a specific colour pattern of camouflage would be even less common. In general, coarse-grained resolutions yield fewer idiosyncrasies than fine-grained resolutions, ceterus paribus . Consequently, the number of idiosyncrasies (or whether there are any idiosyncrasies at all) appear to be a matter arbitrarily dependent on grain specification.

But note that the determination of the subject of idiosyncrasy and the grain of analysis, though related, are distinct. It is just that determining the subject of idiosyncrasy will involve taking a stand on the level of grain to invoke. This is because possible subjects of idiosyncrasy (i.e. traits, species, populations, etc.) are often amenable to different descriptions due to differences in resolution. For example, the fastest animal on Earth, the peregrine falcon possesses many traits. There is the coarse-grained trait of ‘being able to fly’, a finer-grained trait of ‘having wings’, and, an even finer-grained trait of having ‘pointed, stiff-feathered wings’. Yet, presumably, only the lattermost is a strong candidate for an idiosyncrasy. A different trait—say a pointed, loose - feathered - wing—is roughly at the same level of grain as the peregrine falcon’s stiff-feathered wing, but it is clearly a different subject of idiosyncrasy which may or may not be uniquely evolved. However, settling on any one of these traits to be the subject of idiosyncrasy will, at the same time, answer the question of grain: for example, the trait of having ‘pointed, stiff-feathered wings’ will simply have a, fine-grained, description at that level. Graining is merely a property of a subject of an idiosyncrasy. The point is that insofar as a subject of idiosyncrasy has been determined, the grain of analysis will also be given. The election of the grain is important only insofar as it is part and parcel of specifying the subject of idiosyncrasy.

Secondly, there is the question of the scope of uniqueness . Forms are idiosyncratic if and only if they are uniquely evolved, but what does it take to be uniquely evolved ? Let us say that Form A is uniquely evolved if and only if the same form has not evolved elsewhere . But, then, what does ‘elsewhere’ refer to? Are the forms to be considered ones found only on Earth or found beyond? Similarly, are forms in the ancient past or distant future to be considered? The widening of scope makes it less likely for any particular form to be uniquely evolved whilst narrowing the scope improves its chances.

These two complications present epistemic challenges in defining and recognising idiosyncrasies, but they do not undermine the concept, per se. That is—insofar as the subject of idiosyncrasy (including the grain of analysis), and the scope of uniqueness are specified, then there is very much a given number of idiosyncrasies in the world. For a ‘ theory of idiosyncrasies ’ then, it might be said that there are two conceptual dimensions in need of specification before idiosyncrasies are fully defined and thus, can be recognised. But the supposed conundrum is figuring out how, exactly, to specify these dimensions.

At this time, I respond briefly by pointing out that the specification of the subject of idiosyncrasy and the scope of uniqueness are wholly relative to the respective goals of individual epistemic agents and the nature of propositions they intend to make. This is because an alteration of either dimension will result in a shift of the evidential target of idiosyncrasies. For example, altering the scope of uniqueness shifts the variant of the ECT that is supported by idiosyncrasies since idiosyncrasies are now indicative of evolutionary singularity in a different modal range. That is—by altering the scope of uniqueness, idiosyncrasies are bouts of singular evolution in face of a different set of variances amongst evolutionary scenarios: perhaps, it is no longer singularity amongst scenarios with varying nomologies but varying histories. The independent variable(s) of the array has changed.

Recall that it is crucial in any debate about the contingency of evolution for the participants to hold fixed the modal range in which evolution is alleged to be contingent, lest there be argumentative cross-talk. So, suppose a contingency-theorist was interested in the evolutionary contingency of the terrestrial domain (i.e. on Earth). In this case, idiosyncrasies are evidentially relevant only if they are informative of the evolutionary dynamics of that domain . Any different—say if the scope of uniqueness of idiosyncrasies was extended to only one continent—then idiosyncrasies fail to be informative of the evolutionary dynamics (e.g. the power of natural selection or the existence of certain structuralities) present on Earth (barring extrapolation from continent to planet). As such, idiosyncrasies would not tell us about the wholesale repeatability of form on Earth, but only on one continent. Accordingly, if one were interested in the power of natural selection on Earth, then an Earth-wide scope of uniqueness would be appropriate. In other words, it is epistemically imperative that the scope of uniqueness of idiosyncrasies correspond to the modal range of the ECT variant in question. In a return to the topic of differential evidence in “ Evolutionary idiosyncrasies as differential evidence ” section, we shall see that an alteration of the subject of idiosyncrasy also shifts the evidential target. In general, taking a position on either of the two dimensions will not only affect the number of idiosyncrasies recognised but alter their evidential implications as well. Hence, the specification of the two conceptual dimensions depends on the epistemic demands of a contingency-theorist’s project.

In Improbable Destinies , Losos ( 2017 ) offers many examples of idiosyncrasies but, perhaps, most notable is the semi-aquatic duck - billed platypus , found only in eastern Australia. The platypus’ unique evolution is exemplified by the amalgamation of several peculiar features: its mammalian egg-laying, venomous spur, leathery bill, and prey-sensing electroreceptors. Losos’ point is that, as a whole , there has been no other species like the platypus. Footnote 9

There is tension between such cases of evolutionary idiosyncrasies and the robust view of life: if biological forms were robust in their evolution, then it would be striking that idiosyncratic forms like that of the platypus did not evolve more than once. This is because the robust view of life stipulates that the same evolutionary outcomes will repeatedly evolve within some modal range whilst idiosyncrasies assert, precisely, that there has been singular evolution within that modal range. Ceterus paribus , these are contradictory assertations.

The source of the tension stems from the fact that the robust view of life explains, in part, such repeatability by appealing to there being certain, definite environment - trait dyads : given any one environment, there is necessarily a given trait. Footnote 10 In other words, the robust view of life requires that certain evolutionary conditions necessarily lead to particular evolutionary outcomes. Footnote 11 This is either manifested by (i) a Hard Adaptationist sense of natural selection (Amundson 1994 ) that dictates that certain environmental pressures are met with the most superior solution (e.g. McGhee 2011 ; Powell 2012 ), or, (ii) that non-selective nomological aspects or the so-called structuralities of the environment dispose one particular outcome (e.g. McShea 1994 ; Sole and Goodwin 2001 ; Stayton 2008 ; Brandon and McShea 2010 ). But this environment - trait uniformity alone is not enough for robust repeatability since it is possible for same evolutionary conditions to fail to repeatedly exist within the modal range.

Accordingly, the remaining half of the explanation for robust repeatability is that there is, in fact, environmental regularity such that there are multiple instances of the same evolutionary environment within the modal range. Footnote 12 Putting these two parts together, the robust view of life says that a form, F 1 , is repeatedly realised in some modal range (say, within all Earth-like planets in the universe at all times) because (i) environment E 1 necessarily gives rise to form F 1 due to some evolutionary force (e.g. selection or drift), and (ii) environment E 1 can be widely found on Earth-like planets in the universe. Environment-trait uniformity and environmental regularity are two necessary premises (amongst others) that are required of the robust view of life in order to assert the repeatability of form. If, for instance, there was no environmental regularity within the modal range concerned then, despite the power of natural selection or functional constraints to dispose forms in certain environments, there would nonetheless be no repetition of form. Footnote 13 Alternatively, if certain environments do not guarantee particular forms, then despite an abundance of similar environments, the same form need not repeatedly result.

Accordingly, at a more fundamental level of analysis, the tension exists because observations of idiosyncrasies threaten the truth of the two premises of a robust view of life. That is—observations of idiosyncrasies provide reasons to dissolve the classical environment-trait dyad or reject that there are alternative histories with similar evolutionary conditions within the modal range. This is because the individual explanations for idiosyncrasies, themselves, logically contradict environment-trait uniformity and/or environmental regularity. To see this, let us now consider the four explanations in turn.

Explanations for evolutionary idiosyncrasies

Unique environments.

One obvious explanation for occurrences of idiosyncrasies is that the evolutionary environment in which an idiosyncrasy evolved was unique and so, it was no surprise that the idiosyncrasy evolved only once. In other words, the set of conditions that led to the evolution of an idiosyncrasy failed to be present elsewhere (within the modal range) such that the form, supposedly guaranteed by the environment, did not evolve elsewhere (within the modal range). Since an evolutionary environment (sensu lato Footnote 14 ) may be manifested by the set of selective pressures or non-selective nomological properties (i.e. structuralities sensu Sole & Goodwin), this could mean that the selective pressures were unique such that natural selection did not yield a similar form elsewhere or that the structuralities of the environment were unique such that a similar form did not result elsewhere. Footnote 15 (Or even that the amalgamation of both selective pressures and structuralities were unique.) In essence, a unique environment presents evolutionary conditions, not found elsewhere within the modal range, with which evolutionary forces are to operate. And so, it is no surprise that the result of these forces is a form that evolved only once within the modal range. Returning to the platypus example, perhaps, its evolution was one-off because the environmental conditions conducive to its evolution failed to be present elsewhere.

All in all, unique environments suffice to explain the occurrence of idiosyncrasies, but the existence of unique environments is logically opposed to the environmental regularity premise of the robust view of life. For obvious reasons, there cannot be both environmental regularity (i.e. more than one instance of the same environment) and a unique environment within a modal range. And so, if unique environments are to explain the occurrence of an idiosyncrasy within a modal range, then the robust view of life is false for that modal range.

Empirically, this sort of explanation is compelling. A recent review paper by Stuart et al. ( 2017 ) points outs that deviations from the expectation of ‘convergences’ is often a result of subtle environmental heterogeneity or subtle differences between environments. Other studies have a similar conclusion (e.g. Landry et al. 2007 ; Matthews et al. 2010 ; Moore et al. 2016 ). But this is not the only explanation for occurrences of idiosyncrasies.

Weak or contingent natural selection

Given that the natural habitat of the platypus (e.g. streams and ponds) appears to be ubiquitous on Earth (Losos 2017 , p. 88), Losos wonders why forms similar to the platypus could not be found elsewhere other than eastern Australia. In other words, for Losos, the evolutionary environment for the platypus is clearly not unique. His first gesture at resolving this curiosity is to point to the possibility that natural selection could be limited in its ability to generate the same form. That is—either natural selection is weak or contingent (he uses the word “unpredictable” in lieu of contingent Footnote 16 ). If natural selection were weak in the sense that it does not always succeed in resulting in the most superior solution, then identical evolutionary environments need not result in the same biological form under natural selection’s crank. For the advocate of the robust view of life, optimality reasons can explain why certain forms are robust (i.e. forms are robust because they are adaptive peaks) but such reasons must be coupled by some mechanism (i.e. hill climbing mechanism) that sufficiently ensures the evolution of the superior trait. Without the latter— if natural selection were ‘weak’ —then there is no reason to think that a trait will be robustly realised even if the trait in question were most superior.

As for Losos’ claim that idiosyncrasies can be explained by natural selection that is ‘contingent’, it is not clear what is exactly meant by this though one may surmise given his reference to random mutation and mutational order. Perhaps, natural selection is contingent in that natural selection is dependent on low probability events (often referred to as ‘chancy’ or ‘stochastic’ events) that generate the suite of genetic material made available and their ordering , like random mutation and mutational ordering (Mani and Clarke 1990 ), respectively. But if natural selection is contingent in this sense, then natural selection cannot guarantee a particular outcome given certain evolutionary environments; different outcomes may result depending on chancy precedents.

Accordingly, idiosyncrasies can occur despite any environmental regularity because natural selection failed to guarantee environment-trait uniformity due to either (i) selection’s limited ability to produce the most superior form or (ii) the chancy availability of genetic variance with which selection is dependent upon. Either way, an explanation of idiosyncrasy invoking weak or contingent natural selection dissolves the environment-trait dyad since certain evolutionary environments fail to guarantee particular outcomes.

But notice that explanations invoking the weakness or contingency of natural selection nonetheless ultimately rely on historical events. As above, natural selection is weak only because it at the mercy of past phylogenetic constraints and other historicities (c.f. Gould and Lewontin 1979 ). Likewise, natural selection is contingent only because it is dependent on the occurrence of prior historical events (e.g. random mutation) that supposedly lack counterfactual robustness. But this is no cause for concern for, as we shall see, the various explanations for idiosyncrasies are not mutually-exclusive and may work in tandem to undermine the RVL.

Furthermore, if what is meant by natural selection being contingent is that it fails to guarantee a particular outcome given certain environmental conditions, then there appears to be yet another way in which natural selection is contingent. This is because certain environmental conditions may leave open a choice of equally-as-effective design solutions (Arnold 1983 ; Beatty 2008 ). That is—on the basis of adaptive value alone, the solutions may be more-or-less indistinguishable from one another. Thus, natural selection cannot possibly favour one solution over another (whichever solution is reached must be due to non-adaptive factors). There may be multiple (equally adaptive) solutions to the same ecological problem—let us call this the Multiply Soluble Thesis (MST).

Multiple solutions to the same ecological problem

Darwin brushed past this very idea in considering the range of the orchid’s fertilisation mechanisms ( 1862 ). He noted that orchid fertilisation was facilitated by insects, but such a mechanism was, in principle, liable to lead to inbreeding which would incur substantial adverse fitness effects over time (Ibid.)—modern studies confirm this (e.g. Smithson 2006 ). At the same time, theoretical considerations stipulate that orchid fitness would increase by maximising reproduction. Thus, orchid fertilisation may be said to have (at least) two primary ecological problems: the maximisation of reproduction by cross-pollination and the avoidance of inbreeding.

But Darwin further noted that the various species of orchids were, for all intents and purposes, subjected to identical environments since they were open to visitation by the very same complement of insect species. Footnote 17 Yet orchids showed substantial diversity in their morphology in enlisting insects for cross-pollination. In the case of the Orchis mascula , there are two adhesive sacs of pollen masses suspended by thin elastic threads. The nectary of the Orchis mascula was in such a way that when an insect attempts to feed, it would undoubtedly brush past these sacs of pollen, thereby attaching the sacs to themselves, and, subsequently, bring pollen to its next destination (another Orchis mascula , perhaps). The Catasetum saccatum , on the other hand, violently launches pollen sacs downwards at insects when certain, elaborate triggers are activated. The point is that orchids exhibited multiple solutions to the same ecological problems. Footnote 18 In the modern ecological literature, this has been come to be known as the many-to-one mapping of form to function (e.g. Alfaro et al. 2004 ; Wainright et al. 2005 ; Thompson et al. 2017 ).

Losos too recognizes the idea of the MST and considers it as a candidate explanation for idiosyncrasies and, in particular, the unique evolution of the platypus. Although the environmental conditions in eastern Australia that gave rise to the platypus may be present elsewhere on Earth, the range of solutions may ultimately be underdetermined by the environmental conditions. That is—perhaps, other species with morphology distinct from the platypus could answer the same ecological demands to that of the platypus. And hence, the same form need not repeatedly evolve in the same environments. In this way, the environment-trait dyad is once again broken such that particular outcomes are no longer guaranteed by certain environments. Idiosyncrasies that are explained by the MST are opposed to the robust view of life in virtue of undermining environment-trait uniformity.

In demonstrating the MST, there are a host of empirical cases that document significant morphological diversity for the same function. For instance, Young et al. ( 2009 ) studied how a many-to-one mapping of form to function can lead to morphological diversity in shrews generating the same amount of jaw force. Similarly, the canonical stickleback studies (e.g. Wainright et al. 2005 ; Thompson et al. 2017 ) illustrate that the MST can apply selectively to feeding structures. These studies agree that the lower jaw structure of the threespine stickleback has exhibited a strong linear relationship with its function (i.e. lever ratio) or a one - to - one mapping of form to function . In other words, the MST is false for the lower jaw structure. However, two other structures of the threespine stickleback, the epaxial-buccal cavity and 4-bar structure show significant functional equivalence in their respective functions (as measured by ‘suction index’ or ‘kinematic transmission’). Thompson et al. ( 2017 ) further demonstrated that because of a many-to-one mapping of form to function, there was less repeated evolution of the latter two structures. Footnote 19 Putting aside methodological and grain issues, these studies extend plausibility to the MST.

Historicities

It is true that an explanation for idiosyncrasies based on the MST undermines the robust view of life by dissolving the environment-trait dyad. However, logically-speaking, the MST per se is not enough to entail the unique evolution of a form. Just as there is no positive reason to think that any one particular form will repeatedly evolve when there are equally adaptive alternatives (in design space), there is no positive reason to think that a different solution will arise at every evolutionary bout even when there are alternatives. Rather, there must be some reason for why it is that the same design solution was not elected even in the presence of alternatives.

This brings us to the fourth explanation for idiosyncrasies: difference-making historical events with low objective chance of occurrence. Let us call this historicities. Footnote 20 Even if there were several equally-adaptive solutions to the same ecological problem, whichever form natural selection or genetic drift produces depend upon certain preceding historical events like random mutations or their ordering. For example, if the necessary complement of genetic variation for the evolution of wings did not arise through random mutation then there can be no such evolution of wings. In this way, low probability historical events such as historicities limit the directionality of an evolutionary population’s movement through adaptive space. Alternatively, historical factors may place an evolutionary population initially closer to one peak than another and thereby, increasing its probability of climbing the closer peak.

Historicities relevant to the ECT encompass many phenomena and can be biological or non-biological. Biological historicities include ( inter alia ) random mutation, mutational order, migration events, and phylogenetic constraints due to ancestry. Certain migration events with low objective chance of occurrence such as ones prompted by volcanic eruption may result in gene flow into a population with significant outcome difference making effects. In this regard, the empirical literature has demonstrated that differential gene flow due to differential migration resulted in significant phenotypic divergences of the lake-stream stickleback (Hendry and Taylor 2004 ) and, indeed, other organisms (Hendry 2017 ).

Famously due to Gould ( 1989 ), one commonly discussed historicity in the contingency literature has been historical events that severely circumscribe downstream outcomes via the generation of phylogenetic constraints. Indeed, one principal argument in Wonderful Life (1989) was that the survivors of Cambrian extinction could have easily been otherwise such that the phylogenetic constraints (e.g. bauplan ) of our vertebrate clade, which descended from the reigning survivors of a supposedly indeterminate sampling event (i.e. Cambrian Extinction), had a low objective probability of occurrence. According to Gould (Ibid.), extant vertebrates could easily have had different body plans and hence, be markedly different. The thrust of this argument comes from the low objective probabilities of the survival events during the Cambrian such that replaying the Cambrian period would undoubtedly or, more accurately, probably result in a different surviving menagerie. In general, on account of the low probability of phylogenetic events, evolutionary systems within a modal range are probable to have different phylogenetic constraints. This is because it is, by definition, relatively improbable for the same low probability phylogenetic event to occur in more than one evolutionary system. Thus, there is a probabilistic expectation that different evolutionary systems are to have different phylogenetic constraints. And, for this reason, idiosyncrasies may result since the form is improbable to evolve again in alternative evolutionary systems.

Non-biological events include ( inter alia ) asteroid impacts, global climate change, and certain perturbations stemming from outside the evolutionary system. Despite their non-biological nature, the key is that these historical events are difference-making to the evolutionary outcome and have a low objective probability of occurrence—e.g. they are ‘chancy’, ‘stochastic’, or ‘random’. Without the latter, it is possible for the same historical events to occur ubiquitously within a modal range as for the same forms to repeatedly evolve.

An explanation of idiosyncrasies founded in historicities can undermine the environment-trait uniformity premise of the robust view of life through its interaction with natural selection: an environment fails to guarantee a specific form because certain historicities such as random mutation limited natural selection. Alternatively, the environmental regularity premise can be undermined by historicities, such as asteroid impacts or volcanic eruptions, that occur in some but not all environments, thereby introducing differences amongst environments in a modal range. That is—historicities may, sometimes, produce unique environments within a modal range (though they need not Footnote 21 ). In the former case, natural selection is limited in virtue of historicities (i.e. mutation events) whilst in the latter, an environment is unique due to historicities (i.e. asteroid impact or volcanic eruption).

Having considered the four explanations for idiosyncrasies, it is helpful to consider their effects in terms of Simpson’s ( 1944 ) adaptive landscape metaphor (not to be confused with Wright’s earlier adaptive landscape of gene frequencies ). Recall that the MST asserts that there are multiple equally-as-adaptive solutions to the same environmental problem. This can be understood as the prevalence of several equally-as-high peaks on the adaptive landscape. Footnote 22 So, one explanation for the occurrence of idiosyncrasies is that there were several adaptive peaks, each encompassing a distinct solution, on the landscape.

However, whichever peak is sought can highly depend on historical factors: either those that determined the starting conditions on the adaptive landscape or those that influence the directionality of movement (e.g. the generation of genetic variation upon which natural selection can act) across the adaptive landscape. On the adaptive landscape, if natural selection is, indeed, weak or contingent, then there is a limitation in the directionality of movement across the topographical space. In other words, the supposed hill-climbing mechanism is limited. But again, such a limitation would be ultimately due to historical events such as random mutation or drift events.

Lastly, the topography of an adaptive landscape is, itself, a manifestation of the environment. That is—the ridges and contours are determined by the environmental conditions. Hence, unique topographies correspond to unique environments. A unique environment can, then, be understood to provide a unique topography on which evolutionary forces act. All in all, the adaptive landscape metaphor is meant to emphasise that the four explanations for idiosyncrasies are not mutually-exclusive and may, sometimes, work in tandem to explain particular bouts of idiosyncrasies: even if there are many peaks, whichever adaptive solution is sought can depend on the details of natural selection and/or historical factors. Likewise, the determination of the topography (i.e. environment), itself, is sometimes dependent on the historicities.

The likelihood framework and the contingency spectrum

Thus far, I have argued that each of the four explanations of idiosyncrasies undermine at least one of two necessary premises for the robust view of life and, as such, idiosyncrasies are evidence against the robust view of life. Moreover, since the RVL and ECT are contradictory views, evolutionary idiosyncrasies also serve as evidence for the ECT. But how might we invoke idiosyncrasies as evidence in further analyses?

In this section, I sketch a likelihood framework in which to evaluate contingency hypotheses in light of a body of evidence. More specifically, I model the idiosyncrasy-convergence dichotomy as Bernoulli processes and I define a likelihood function that will yield, from a given a set of data (i.e. observations of idiosyncrasies vis-à-vis convergences), a likelihood distribution for all of the hypotheses on the ‘contingency spectrum’. In other words, for any given set of observations consisting of some number of idiosyncrasies and some number of convergences, one can compute the likelihood (in the technical sense) of various hypotheses that differ in the degree of contingency that they assert. Subsequently, one can also determine which hypothesis has the maximum likelihood (via maximum likelihood estimation methods Footnote 23 ). That is—even if a number of contingency hypotheses is consistent with the data, there will nonetheless be one hypothesis that confers the greatest probability on the data. And, according to the Law of Likelihood (see later), this hypothesis is one that is best evidentially supported by the data.

For the proponents of Bayesianism, one can further derive the posterior probability mass function (pmf) by applying this likelihood function to some appropriate prior distribution. Quite powerfully, this would, then, yield the conditional probability of any ECT hypothesis in light of the evidence; however, this Bayesian inference would nonetheless be severely limited by the determination of the priors (where uniformity may not be appropriate) and the quality/quantity of the data. Footnote 24 Regardless, the merit of the likelihood function stands on its own and is found in the function’s ability to produce different likelihoods for a range of hypotheses that correspondingly differ in their assertion of the degree of contingency for some modal range or domain.

Evolutionary contingency is said to vary in degrees (e.g. Beatty 1995 , 2006 ; Powell 2012 ; Turner 2011 ). By that, it is meant that different domains may exhibit different levels of evolutionary contingency; there may be some domains where contingency reigns strongly whilst there may be other domains where robustness is the norm. In domains where contingency is strong, biological forms are less repeatable or less robust than in domains where contingency is weak. Accordingly, I submit that we can understand the RVL and ECT as extremes on the polar ends of a contingency spectrum with an infinite number of intermediary hypothesis in the middle (see Fig.  1 ).

Contingency spectrum

Recall that the ECT denies that there is any repeatability within a modal range such that all forms within that range are idiosyncrasies. Conversely, the RVL says that there is repeatability and that there are no idiosyncrasies at all. Both of these hypotheses are radical in the degree of contingency they assert and no actual contingency-theorist advocates either of them. Rather, the more plausible hypotheses lie in the intermediate, and it is just that contingency-theorists disagree on which of the intermediary hypotheses is true. As mentioned, fortunately, likelihood functions provide a means of evaluating between the various hypotheses on the spectrum—or, in other words, evaluating the strength of contingency—given some appropriate data. But what is considered appropriate data, and, furthermore, what would the data be supportive of?

The previous section showed that evolutionary idiosyncrasies are evidence against the RVL and are evidence for the ECT. It seems that idiosyncrasies point towards the ECT. However, there is a different kind of observation that seems to point in exactly the opposite direction. These are observations of ‘convergences’ which have had much discussion in the contingency literature. Roughly put, convergences are the repeated evolution of the same form from sufficiently independent taxa/species/lineages/starting points. Footnote 25 I shall reconstruct these points in probabilistic terms as to adhere with the likelihood framework. I do this by advancing two likelihood arguments to show that ‘idiosyncrasies’ evidentially favour the ECT (over the RVL), and ‘convergences’ evidentially favour the RVL (over the ECT). In other words, I shall show that (i) the probability of idiosyncrasies given the ECT is higher than the probability of idiosyncrasies given the robust view of life, and (ii) the probability of convergences given the RVL is higher than the probability of convergences given the ECT.

The first argument can be depicted in the terms of comparative likelihoods, where ‘IDIO’ refers to observations of evolutionary idiosyncrasies and ‘RVL’ refers to the robust view of life:

(IE1) Pr (IDIO | ECT) > Pr (IDIO | RVL)

If the left-hand term is greater than the right-hand term, then the likelihood ratio in favour of the ECT is above 1. Then, according to Hacking’s (1965) ‘Law of Likelihood’ or, in the form more common today (i.e. Sober 2008 ), observations of idiosyncrasies count as evidence for the ECT (over the RVL) :

Law of Likelihood Footnote 26 : An observation O evidentially supports (is in favour of) H 1 over H 2 if and only if Pr (O | H 1 ) > Pr (O | H 2 ) (Sober 2008 )

Evolutionary idiosyncrasies, as defined, are biological forms that have uniquely evolved such that they have not evolved elsewhere within the modal range. If the ECT were true of some modal range such that there is little or no repeatability within that range, it would not be a surprise that there are idiosyncrasies within that modal range. However, if the RVL were true such that there is much repeatability, then the existence of idiosyncrasies which, by definition, defy repeatability would be a surprise. Therefore, (IE1) is true, and idiosyncrasies favour the ECT over the RVL.

On the other hand, convergences or the independent origination of the same form would not be a surprise if the RVL were true. This is because the RVL stipulates that there are cases of repeated evolution of the same form within a modal range. However, if the ECT were true such that there was little or no repetition of form, then one would not expect convergences. So, IE2 is also true such that convergences favour the RVL over the ECT:

(IE2) Pr (CONV | RVL) > Pr (CONV | ECT) [‘CONV’ refers to convergences]

It is now clear which ends of the contingency spectrum, these two phenomena point towards. Observations of idiosyncrasies push us towards the right of the contingency spectrum (viz. towards the ECT), and observations of convergences should push us towards the left of the contingency spectrum (viz. towards the RVL). Footnote 27 Now, suppose that one were interested in the degree of contingency (and, a fortiori , the truth of contingency) in some domain, and had observed some number of idiosyncrasies and some number of convergences. In this case, one might ask for the comparative evidential support , by the data observed, for all of the hypotheses on the contingency spectrum. And, to answer this question, one would need to compute the likelihood of every hypothesis given the data (implicit, here, is the Law of Likelihood). This can be done by way of a likelihood function. Furthermore, one might wish also to determine which hypothesis has the greatest likelihood in which case there exists maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) methods. The thesis with the greatest likelihood is the one best supported by the evidence.

A simple likelihood function can be, without difficulty, defined under certain idealised conditions and assumptions. Footnote 28 Firstly, both observations of idiosyncrasies and convergences must occur within the same modal range . After all, evidence for or against contingency in some domain is irrelevant for evaluation of the ECT in another domain. Secondly, observations of idiosyncrasies and convergences must be commensurable. By this, I take it that, at least, idiosyncrasies and convergences must be specified at the same level of analysis and to the same scope of uniqueness. Recognising the convergence of coarse-grained trait like agricultural farming hardly counts against an idiosyncrasy about specific mechanisms of feeding structures. Thirdly, we might want to assume (for arithmetic simplicity, though we need not Footnote 29 ) that idiosyncrasies and convergences have the same ‘evidential weight’ such that one observation of idiosyncrasies counts exactly against one instance of convergences, and vice versa. That is—the difference in likelihoods of the ECT and the RVL given idiosyncrasies, and the difference in likelihoods of the RVL and ECT are identical Footnote 30 :

(Evidential Weight) Pr (IDIO | ECT) - Pr (IDIO | RVL)  =  Pr (CONV | RVL) – Pr (CONV | ECT)

If Evidential Weight is true, then the ECT will raise the probability of any instance of idiosyncrasies by just the same amount as the RVL will raise the probability of any instance of convergences. In other words, idiosyncrasies and convergences push towards opposite sides by, exactly, the same amount. Fourthly, we assume mutual independence between all the observations. If these four conditions hold, then a binomial likelihood function can be defined to yield a likelihood distribution. Let us define this likelihood function by way of example.

Suppose that some researchers were interested in the evolutionary contingency of the South American continent. They make a total of 100 observations that consists of 64 idiosyncrasies and 36 convergences. If we understand the sequence of idiosyncrasies and convergences as a sequence of binary events, then modelling the data as a binomial distribution is appropriate since the observations are independent Bernoulli processes. Let the sequence of events serving as our data be: x i  = {x 1 ,…, X (n) }, whereby an idiosyncrasy is denoted by 1 and a convergence is denoted by 0. In our sample, the sequence might thus be coded as ‘1, 1, 0, 1, 0,… n’ such that total of 1′s is 64 and total of 0′s is 36. (Of course, there are many sequences in which the data contains 64 idiosyncrasies and 36 convergences; this is accounted for by the binomial coefficient of ‘n choose x’). The likelihood function for a binomial distribution is given by:

Likelihood Function (Binomial Distribution) :

A binomial distribution has a single parameter, θ, which, in our running example, specifies the probability of the next observation being an idiosyncrasy given the data (i.e. Pr (Idio (n) |Data) = θ). And, naturally, the probability of the next observation being a convergence would be θ C  = 1 − θ. In general, this likelihood function would generate a likelihood value for θ given a body of evidence consisting of some number of idiosyncrasies versus some number of convergences. Plugging in the values from the example yields:

Likelihood Function (n = 100, 64 idiosyncrasies, 36 convergences):

This function outputs a likelihood for various θ’s ranging from 0 to 1. In other words, it tells us the likelihood of hypotheses that specify, from 0 to 1, the probability of next observation being an idiosyncrasy given the body of data. For example, the hypothesis that states that probability of the next observation being an idiosyncrasy (given the data) is 0.5 has the likelihood of 7.8861e-31. We can illustrate the function in the form of a graph (Fig.  2 ).

Likelihood distribution for 64 idiosyncrasies and 36 convergences

But how does the value of θ relate to the degree of contingency? As mentioned, the value of θ specifies the probability that the next observation will be an idiosyncrasy given the data. For example, if θ = 0.50, then there is a 50% probability that the next observation is an idiosyncrasy within the modal range. This is tantamount to saying that evolutionary contingency is true to a degree of 0.5. When the ECT is said to vary in degrees, it is meant that there are different levels of repeatability (or robustness) within a domain. So, if contingency were to reign absolutely supreme in some domain, then the probability of the next observation being an idiosyncrasy is 1.0 (and a convergence is 0) in domain. In other words, contingency is so strong in that domain that the probability of getting any idiosyncrasies is certain (and convergences is 0). A hypothesis with the θ of 1.0 thus corresponds to an ECT hypothesis that specifies contingency to the maximum. We can denote the absolute ECT (the hypothesis on the far right of the spectrum with a θ of 1.0) as ECT (1.0) . A milder ECT—say ECT (0.8) —would have a θ of 0.8 and the RVL would have a θ of 0. In general, then, the probability that the next observation is an idiosyncrasy given some ECT hypothesis is: for any n and θ, Pr (IDIO (n) |ECT (θ) ) = θ.

Given the likelihood function in our running example, we now have the likelihoods of various hypotheses and their corresponding evidential support by the data. However, how do we determine which hypothesis has the highest likelihood given the data? In order to determine the maximum likelihood estimate, we need to find the derivative of the likelihood function with respect to θ and set it equal to 0. Accordingly, the maximum likelihood estimator is \(\frac{x}{n}\) (see “ Appendix ” for workings). So, the hypothesis with the maximum likelihood in the example is \(\frac{64}{100} = \, 0.64\) , and ECT (0.64) has the highest likelihood given the data (this result is also quite intuitive). In other words, the hypothesis that makes the data most probable is an ECT that specifies contingency to degree of 0.64. Now, of course, a different hypothesis—say ECT (0.22) —is also compatible with the data, but its likelihood would be significantly less than ECT (0.64) . Comparatively speaking, given the Law of Likelihood, the body of evidence (i.e. 64 idiosyncrasies and 36 convergence) evidentially favours ECT (0.64) over ECT (0.22) . In fact, the data most evidentially supports ECT (0.64).

Lastly, the likelihood function has the virtue of increased accuracy as there is more data. The likelihood profile will be ‘wide’ for small sample sizes but become increasingly ‘narrower’ as there is more data. And, as there is more data, one can increasingly be more confident in probabilistically ruling out certain hypotheses on account of their comparative likelihoods. In the figure below, for example, as there is more data, the tail ends of the probability distribution become almost, probabilistically, impossible (Fig.  3 ).

Wide versus narrow likelihood profiles

As I see it, the likelihood function is quantitively powerful, but it is only just a modest claim about comparative likelihoods. It provides a means of evaluating hypotheses on the contingency spectrum given a single body of evidence and under certain conditions (as with any statistical model) . So, whilst the likelihood function may be correct, one may still reject the ECT by denying that there are, in fact, any true instances of idiosyncrasies. Such a strategy does not challenge the likelihood model itself but challenges the inputs (i.e. the data) of the model. In this way, the model is only as good as the evidence—false observations will hinder the effectiveness of the model.

Vermeij ( 2006 ), for example, severely doubts that there are true instances of unique evolution and attributes the purported singular evolution of 23 idiosyncrasies documented in the biological literature as due to ‘information loss over time’ (e.g. missing fossil data and the like). However, to be fair, Vermeij operates on an almost impossible standard of unique evolution. He requires that a trait’s evolution be singular in all time and all place. So, at best, Vermeij’s conclusion may be true of only an ECT that is indexed to all of time and space which is, plausibly, false. Contingency-theorists ought to count the number of idiosyncrasies, appropriately defined in their two dimensions, and convergences in a particular domain to determine the truth of contingency in that domain. If there turns out to be no idiosyncrasies at all, but lots of convergences, there one has the answer to the contingency question.

Secondly, it is important to be aware of what can be inferred from the likelihoods which is merely a tool for comparing hypotheses (i.e. ECT (θ) ) given a single body of evidence and does not represent Pr (ECT (θ) ) or Pr (ECT (θ) | IDIO & CONV). However, under a Bayesian framework, the likelihood ratio is equal to the Bayes factor (in favour of the ECT) and thus, is a component in the calculation of the conditional posterior probability. That is—one can take the product of the likelihood and the prior distribution to produce a posterior probability mass/density function for the ECT. Nonetheless, there would remain an issue of determining the prior probabilities—I leave this task and their century-long quibble to the Bayesians.

Evolutionary idiosyncrasies as differential evidence

As established in “ Explanations for evolutionary idiosyncrasies ” section, idiosyncrasies undermine the robust view of life and support the ECT. However, evolutionary idiosyncrasies can differ in their degree of support for the ECT depending on certain statistical parameters revolving around their usage and a distinction between two different kinds of idiosyncrasies. Moreover, as mentioned at the outset, evolutionary idiosyncrasies can be defined and recognised according to two conceptual dimensions. An adjustment of either of these dimensions will shift idiosyncrasies’ evidential implications.

Firstly, the statistical power of arguments invoking idiosyncrasies can vary. This can be illustrated by a numbers game : suppose there is a series of evolutionary scenarios (varying or identical scenarios) where an idiosyncrasy arose. That is—within the series of evolutionary scenarios, there is a particular form that evolved only once. It would seem then that the greater number evolutionary scenarios—or alternative histories—in which the idiosyncrasy could evolve, the greater the support for the ECT. The thrust of this claim is found in the fact that given so many opportunities for a particular form’s evolution, it evolved only once (where as the number of opportunities increases, the argumentative power increases).

Take, for example, Lenski’s now infamous long term evolutionary experiment (LTEE). E. coli was known to metabolize only glucose as an energy source. However, when Lenski and his team grew twelve initially identical populations of E. coli , one of these populations soon evolved aerobic citrate usage (a peculiarity for E. coli with some microbiologists even going as far as deeming it contrary to the very definition of E. coli ; e.g. Koser 1924 ; Scheutz et al. 2005 ) at around the 30, 000 generation mark.

However, one can imagine a qualitatively similar experiment to that of Lenski’s with the only difference being that instead of 12 identical populations, there were 12,000. If aerobic citrate usage still evolved only once despite a ten-thousand-fold increase in evolutionary opportunity, then this idiosyncrasy would have greater evidential strength for the ECT than an idiosyncrasy that arose from a lesser number of evolutionary opportunities ( ceteris paribus ). Thus, arguments from idiosyncrasies may do well to consider the number of alternative histories in which the idiosyncrasies could have evolved.

This is particularly important given that there appears to be, within the literature, certain contingency questions that are associated with a ‘n = 1’ sampling issue. By a sampling issue, I mean that due to inappropriate sample size or structure, certain inferences about wider-regularities simply cannot be made. For example, one type of contingency question may ask whether the same biological forms are expected to evolve under different nomological systems (e.g. Beatty 1995 ). That is—if the laws governing evolutionary dynamics were different, would the same forms still evolve? However, given that we are privy to the only one nomology of our actual world, it is difficult to observe the existence of idiosyncrasies and convergences in alternative nomological systems Footnote 31 and hence, certain contingency questions may be a statistical non-starter in this respect. In other words, a radically wide modal range such as one across nomological systems may be prone to the so-called coverage error. Footnote 32

Secondly, a distinction can be made between two different kinds of idiosyncrasies: disparate idiosyncrasies (DPI) and divergent idiosyncrasies (DVI), whereby the latter has greater evidential strength for the ECT. In any modal range, divergent idiosyncrasies occur when two species share deep developmental homologues and yet arrive at distinct evolutionary outcomes of which at least one is uniquely evolved within the modal range. It demonstrates not only the unique evolution of an outcome but that evolutionary forces were sufficient to overcome phylogenetic and/or developmental constraints. In Lenski’s experiment, for example, the populations were initially identical and, as such, had presumably identical developmental generators. It can then be inferred that any idiosyncratic outcome is then a divergence from similar starting points in developmental space. Divergent evolution is similar to parallel evolution in that there are shared developmental resources, but unlike parallel evolution in that divergences result in different outcomes rather than same outcome.

Disparate idiosyncrasies occur when two species with different developmental resources evolve distinct outcomes of which at least one is uniquely evolved. Disparate evolution is almost trivial in that it is not surprising that two different developmental starting points result in two different biological outcomes of which at least one is uniquely evolved within the modal range. It, however, serves as our contrast class to DVI.

This distinction between the two kinds of idiosyncrasies mirrors the CE versus PE distinction in that the division is based on whether there are shared developmental homologues (see Table  1 ). Interestingly, both distinctions attempt to tease apart two different sets of modalities: (i) the historical + nomological, and (ii) the merely nomological. That is—whereas genuine CE is the repetition of a form due solely to nomological considerations, PE is the result of both the historical and nomological. Footnote 33

The distinction between divergent and disparate idiosyncrasies is meant to highlight the difference in the evidential role and strength that these idiosyncrasies play for the ECT. For instance, divergent idiosyncrasies answer adaptive hypotheses whilst disparate idiosyncrasies do not: instances of divergent idiosyncrasies show that phylogenetic constraints have been overcome since two species that were located closely in developmental space have now arrived at two different outcomes.

The distinction also shows that divergent and disparate idiosyncrasies are accounted for by different explanations. An explanation of divergent idiosyncrasy would appeal to natural selection being weak or contingent. On the other hand, divergent idiosyncrasies cannot appeal to historicities since its outcome descended from the similar starting points. Similarly, the strength of natural selection would be an irrelevant explanation for cases of disparate evolution: when two species with different developmental generators arrive at distinct outcomes, the strength of natural selection (whether weak or strong) cannot be inferred. This is owing to the fact that both weak and strong natural selection is consistent with the result that disparate evolution occurred. In these ways, divergent and disparate idiosyncrasies are accounted for by different explanations.

Thirdly, as previously mentioned, there are two conceptual dimensions in defining and recognising idiosyncrasies whereby an adjustment in any of these dimensions will result in a shift of idiosyncrasies’ evidential target. In the remainder of this section, I will explain how a contingency-theorist can adjust these dimensions to suit their respective epistemic projects, so that any subsequently observed idiosyncrasy will be evidentially relevant to a particular contingency thesis of their concern.

Recall that the scope of uniqueness refers to the range of conditions (e.g. time, geographical space, or, nomology) in which an idiosyncrasy can obtain. As such, observations of idiosyncrasies defined with a considerably narrow scope of uniqueness will inform only the evolutionarily contingent dynamics of a correspondingly narrow modal range. This is to say that idiosyncrasies are informative only of an evolutionary contingency thesis with a modal range index that corresponds to the scope of uniqueness. Hence, if an epistemic agent adjusts the scope of uniqueness that they take idiosyncrasies to have, then any such recognised idiosyncrasies are supportive of an ECT with a different modal range index. So, if a contingency-theorist were specifically interested in the body morphologies of aquatic, swimming creatures within our galaxy (e.g. McGhee 2011 ), then they ought to look for uniquely evolved body morphologies within the right scope—namely, across all planets within the galaxy . Counting the number of idiosyncrasies with an ill-defined scope (say, of a different galaxy) will be evidentially mismatched.

Similarly, adjusting the subject of idiosyncrasy will also shift the evidential target of idiosyncrasies. One way to adjust the subject of idiosyncrasy is to invoke a different grain of analysis. But to elect a particular level of grain and to count the idiosyncrasies present at that level is informative of only evolutionary contingency that occurs at that level. For example, suppose a contingency-theorist counted certain extremely, fine-grained idiosyncrasies such as specific colour patterns of mimicry. That is—they looked at all cases of mimicry within a modal range and considered whether there were uniquely evolved colour patterns. Some colour patterns might genuinely be non-contingent since there may be robust reasons for their occurrence such as their need to resemble certain universal patterns in nature. Others colour patterns might genuinely be idiosyncratic—a one - off evolutionary event due to some of the aforementioned explanations. However, at this level of analysis, such fine-grained observations would inform only contingency questions about the repeatability at the level of colour patterns and says nothing about the coarser-grained regularity of Batesian or Mullerian mimicry. That is—the grain of idiosyncrasies must also correspond to the grain of the evolutionary contingency thesis in question.

Conversely, having an extremely coarse-grained resolution of idiosyncrasies will not only entail that few idiosyncrasies will be found, but that any such observations of idiosyncrasies will be supportive of only an equally coarse-grained ECT. Take predator avoidance, for example. This trait—on account of its coarse-grained characterisation—is likely to be multiply realisable. That is—specific physiology conducive for quick getaways from lurking predators, camouflage coats to conceal oneself, or, high intelligence may be considered ‘predator avoidance’ all the same. So, it is unlikely that genuine idiosyncrasies can be found at the level of ‘predator avoidance’. However, if genuine idiosyncrasies can be found at this level, then it would be supportive of a specific contingency thesis and one that is rather strong (and interesting)—i.e. the thesis that ‘predator avoidance’ is evolutionarily contingent trait. My contrasting of fine-grained versus coarse-grained resolutions is not to suggest that invoking certain levels of analysis are epistemically questionable endeavours, but merely that electing the grain of analysis is highly dependent on the epistemic agent’s interests since the grain of analysis is evidentially specific. So, when defining the grain of idiosyncrasy, consider the corresponding grain of the ECT that is of concern.

But instead of merely adjusting the grain of a trait, suppose that the subject of idiosyncrasy was, now, a particular species . This would be informative of only the evolutionary contingency of species and not traits. That is—it answers contingency questions about whether species are likely to be repeatedly found. Losos’s ( 2017 ) recognition of the platypus as an idiosyncrasy may be a good example of recognising species to be the subject of idiosyncrasy. This is because the striking features of the platypus, such as the mammalian egg laying, are not, themselves, uniquely evolved. After all, it is widely known that the echidna are mammalian creatures that also lay eggs. However, the platypus, as a whole, with its full complement of traits may plausibly be uniquely evolved. If Losos is right such that the platypus qua species is an idiosyncrasy, then the platypus may be an evolutionarily contingent form, after all, though its traits may not.

Like the scope of uniqueness, there must also be a match between the subject of idiosyncrasy and the subject of the ECT. Evolutionary contingency theses can differ in the subject that they take to be evolutionarily contingent. Theoretically, certain ECT’s refer to evolutionarily contingent traits whilst others can refer to evolutionarily contingent species, populations, etc. And so, in order for idiosyncrasies to be relevant to the contingency thesis in question, their subjects must correspond.

Despite the title of this paper, there is not the one evolutionary contingency thesis, but an infinite number as differentiated by its modal range, subject (including grain), and, then, its degree of strength. Whichever variant of the ECT is of concern is dependent on the epistemic agent’s interests and the full specifications of the thesis, but the evidence—whether idiosyncratic or convergent—ought to also have the corresponding dimensions in order to be empirically tractable for the thesis at hand.

The concept of evolutionary idiosyncrasies, although previously overlooked, is crucial for making progress in the debate about evolutionary contingency. Not only do idiosyncrasies serve as evidence in support of evolutionary contingency, but they can be invoked in further analyses to be pitted against convergences in order to pinpoint the relative significance and/or strength of contingency in a particular domain. Additionally, explanations for their occurrences are informative of the way in which evolutionary dynamics have failed to robustly produce biological forms. Thus, to preclude a consideration of this newfound concept would be a detriment to any contingency-theorist who wishes to determine the truth of evolutionary contingency.

By way of ending, I should say that none of these audacious praises is to imply that their occurrences are a given for that is very much an empirical matter. Rather, the point is that the presence of idiosyncrasies, or lack thereof , in a modal range can be telling of the truth of contingency. If a thoroughly exhaustive search results in nil idiosyncrasies observed, then evolution might, after all, be truly robust and replicable… for a particular modal range, anyways.

As such, robustness is understood, precisely, in terms of a form’s repeatability. This is legitimate as robustness and repeatability are two sides of the same coin. In the philosophical literature, evolutionary contingency has primarily referred to the robustness of form (e.g. Sterelny 2005 ; Powell 2012 ) whilst, in the biological literature, it has often been about the repeatability of form (e.g. Vermeij 2006 ; Lenormand et al. 2009 ). Moreover, the more repeated a form is, the more robust the form is, and vice versa.

For example, Beatty ( 2016 , 2017 ) thinks that no initial differences need to exist between alternative replays of the tape of life in order for there to be different biological outcomes. Differences will naturally accumulate over time between ‘replays’ in an indeterminist universe. Contingency questions, then, can even be about the prevalence of form amongst a series of initially identical evolutionary scenarios. (If, however, evolutionary scenarios are coarse-grained enough to contain ‘hidden variables’, then such a position need not oppose causal determinism).

Naturally, some ranges set impossibly high standards for empirical evaluation. For example, it is difficult to determine the repeatability of forms in systems with nomologies inconsistent with the actual world, especially given that our empirical observations seem to inform only actual nomology. After all, our observations are privy to only the actual world. This pertains to the issue known as modal empiricism. Conversely, other ranges may be extremely narrow as to ask uninteresting questions.

There are, of course, some modal range indices that are ‘nested’ within other indices such that any disagreement may not necessarily be argumentative cross-talk.

Or to use Sterelny’s ( 2005 ) term, Gould may be asserting ‘conditional inevitability’ whereby the condition is the developmental constraints: certain forms necessarily follow when those constraints are present.

The closest, extant concepts are ‘evolutionary novelties’ and ‘apomorphies’ (c.f. Pigliucci 2008 ; Hennig 1966 )—both of which do not capture a sense of singularity in a form’s evolution.

Like the ECT, evolutionary idiosyncrasies can also vary by being indexed to different modal ranges. However, what matters in considering their evidential import is whether this index (of time/space/possibility/etc.) is appropriate to capture an adequate sample size of alternative histories in order to infer certain propositions about the way evolution works. See ensuing discussion on the scope of uniqueness .

I mean ‘form’ in a very loose sense as to encompass almost any biological outcome of interest. As we shall see, this laissez-faire attitude is important for a contingency-theorist’s framing of their epistemic project.

Depending on the scope of uniqueness, the platypus may be an inapt example of an evolutionary idiosyncrasy as there are closely-related and similar, albeit extinct, species such as the Obdurodon or Ornithorhynchus. Perhaps, it was the common ancestor to these three species that was the idiosyncrasy. Nonetheless, regardless of any difficulty in pinpointing idiosyncrasies, the conceptual point for their significance still stands.

As a note aside, it is, sometimes, tricky to define the environment-trait dyad. As per Brandon ( 1990 ), environments are always relative to an organism. So, whilst two organisms may seem to occupy the same environment, they may nonetheless be exposed to subtle differences in environmental pressures. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this reminder.

Historically, this idea has had strong support by evolutionary biologists due, in part, to a battery of statistical tests confirming significant correlation between environment and phenotype for individual taxons (e.g. Gittleman 1981 ; Felsenstein 1985 ; Felsenstein 2004 ; Hansen et al. 2008 ). However, Kluge ( 2005 ) argues that little can be inferred from this correlation. The correlation has also been met with much push-back from claims cautioning an overshoot of its implications (e.g. environment-trait correlation does not show adaptationism), stemming from the ‘internalists’ and the like.

Millstein (2000) has made the point that even in the face of natural selection, the macroevolutionary pattern will be stochastic if lineages were driven by a wide array of selective pressures that are unrelated or, at least, random with respect to each other. Brandon and McShea ( 2010 ) made a similar point.

Logically, there is one exception whereby the same form can answer many environmental demands. This is the converse of the multiple solutions to the same ecological problem and may be exhibited by phenomena such as ‘environmental plasticity’. However, as we shall see, if the MST is true, then this exception cannot apply.

The sense of ‘evolutionary environments’ vary widely in the philosophical and biological literature. My operationalisation of it here is in contrast to, for example, Losos’ ( 2011 ) more restrictive sense where an evolutionary environment comprises solely of selective pressures without inclusion of any structuralities .

As we know from Lewontin ( 1983 ), organisms are often part of the environment and can constitute as selective pressures in an environment. Thus, an environment may be unique or fail to be unique because of the constellation of biotic creatures present. So, the phenomenon of competitive exclusion can be subsumed under the explanation of unique environments: a form did not repeatedly evolve (in an initially unique environment) because a similar form has already taken its place, thereby changing the selective environment.

Exegetically, it does not appear that Losos refers to ‘unpredictability’ in the epistemic sense. In order to avoid conflation with a distinct, epistemological notion about what one can know about natural selection, I shall take Losos as referring to the ‘contingency’ of natural selection in its ability to yield robust forms.

Of course, Darwin may have been operating with a coarse-grained 19th century lens here. But this does not take away from the example’s point.

Perhaps, Darwin’s lens might have been too coarse, after all. Finer-grained lenses might lead one to think that the ecological problems encountered by the Orchis mascula and Catasetum saccatum are not the same. Since the two species must evolve a means of avoiding inbreeding, they might do well to evolve different morphology as to specialise in different insect species. The salient question for whether orchids do, in fact, share the same ecological problems is: are the different orchid species truly visited by the same complement of insects?

Their study used the term ‘parallelism’ but their definition did not have encompass a developmental component. So, for consistency, I take it they meant ‘repeated evolution’ or ‘convergence’, more broadly.

I follow Desjardins’ terminology ( 2016 ).

Historicities and unique environments are distinct concepts although they often come hand-in-hand (they are not mutually-exclusive, after all). As already mentioned, historicities can constitute as chance events in migration or extinction resulting in differential genetic availability and, subsequently, idiosyncrasies, without ever producing a unique environment.

Notice that as the number of equally-as-high peaks reaches infinity, it is akin to the adaptive landscape being absolutely ‘flat’ whereby genetic drift would completely take over.

In this case, there is (fortunately) a closed-form analytic solution available since I am modelling the ‘contingency trials’ as Bernoulli processes: e.g. # of idiosyncrasies/total observations.

There is a litany of papers on this issue across various disciplines. So, I shall not rehearse the points here. See Howson and Urbach ( 1989 ) for what I take to be the definitive guide on Bayesianism.

There are numerous discussions on what it takes to be sufficiently independent. See Currie ( 2012b ), Powell ( 2012 ), Powell and Mariscal ( 2014 ), and Pearce ( 2012 ). Of considerable importance is the ‘parallelism-convergence distinction’ that alleges that some commonly cited instances of ‘convergences’ are actually instances of parallel evolution which fail to inform the contingency debate on account of their superficial independence. Rather, ‘genuine convergent evolution’ ought to be our evidence (Powell 2012 ; Powell and Mariscal 2014 ).

According to Sober ( 2008 ), this law also offers a “quantitative element” (Ibid.) that allows one to infer the degree of support O can offer H 1 over H 2 . But this is extraneous to our current concerns here, especially given our present inability to quantify, exactly, the likelihoods. We can recognize only their directions of inequality.

Due to the assumption of Evidential Weight, it is assumed that they the two observations push in opposite directions by the same amount . See trailing discussion.

This is not to say that a likelihood function cannot be produced given unideal conditions. For example, even if individual observations were not mutually independent, one can just tediously calculate the joint probability of (x 1 , …, x (n) | θ) instead of individual terms P (x i |θ). Secondly, observations of idiosyncrasies and convergences are assumed to be one-dimensional here. If they are not, then we can code our observations according to d-dimensions. Thirdly, observations are taken to be binary in that they are either idiosyncratic or convergent, but it is sometimes suggested that convergences are spectral (Hall 2007 ). If the real-world observations are not binary, then we can model using other distribution models such as a Gaussian instead of a Binomial distribution and employ probability density functions instead of probability mass functions. This allows us to differentiate between different degrees of idiosyncrasies and convergences. Regardless, there currently exists no good graded account of convergences and/or idiosyncrasies. All in all, in my binomial model here, I am assuming an idiosyncrasy-convergence dichotomy. If this assumption is false, then it is just that a different model would be appropriate.

The likelihood framework does not depend on the truth of this assumption. If the assumption were false such that observations of convergences and idiosyncrasies are weighted differently, then we would merely need to incorporate the right weighting. To this end, we can denote a ‘weighting ratio’ of idiosyncrasies versus convergences as LD i /LD c  =  y . If y  = 1, then the weightings of idiosyncrasies and convergences are the same (and Evidential Weight is true). If y < 1, then convergences are weighted heavier than idiosyncrasies. Accordingly, we can additionally take the product of y and the ratio of \(\frac{x}{n}\) to arrive at the θ with the maximum likelihood as to incorporate uneven weighting. There is, at present, no good argument for differential weighting of idiosyncrasies vs. convergences. So, I assume Evidential Weight.

There is some debate over whether it is the ‘likelihood differences’, ‘likelihood ratios’ or some other measure that captures evidential weight (c.f. Eells and Fitelson 2002 ). For my point here, it does not matter which is correct insofar as the evidential weight of idiosyncrasies and convergences are equal.

Some extrapolation about similar or nomologically-consistent systems may be possible but nonetheless difficult.

The modal range may help in this respect by allowing the partitioning of a large series of evolutionary scenarios into individual lots of samples.

Recall that one of the major criticisms propelled against ‘convergences’ by the likes of Currie ( 2012b ), Pearce ( 2012 ), Powell ( 2012 ), Powell and Mariscal ( 2015 ) was that instances of PE fail to constitute truly independent alternative histories of life due to shared developmental homologues, and thus, instances of PE are nonetheless privy to the same historical constraints whereas genuine CE escaped historical constraints to demonstrate true independent convergence. In the terms of my present analysis, PE fails to demonstrate repeated evolution across evolutionary systems in the modal range.

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Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Azita Chellapoo, Adrian Currie, Adrian Erasmus, Tim Lewens, Jacob Stegenga, and Pablo Zendejas Medina for their always intriguing discussions and/or comments concerning many of the ideas in this paper. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions in fine-tuning this paper.

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Appendix: Deriving the maximum likelihood estimator

Binomial likelihood function:

To find the maximum likelihood in a binomial distribution (when there are no saddles or minimum’s), set the derivative of the likelihood function with respect to θ to 0 (i.e. set the gradient to 0). However, it is quicker/easier to find dy/dx of the log of likelihood function which is:

Dy/dx of the log of likelihood function:

Now, set equal to 0 and re-arrange:

Therefore, maximum likelihood estimator:

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Wong, T.Y.W. The evolutionary contingency thesis and evolutionary idiosyncrasies. Biol Philos 34 , 22 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-019-9684-0

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A literature review of the history and evolution of corporate social responsibility

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There is a long and varied history associated with the evolution of the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). However, a historical review is missing in the academic literature that portrays the evolution of the academic understanding of the concept alongside with the public and international events that influenced the social expectations with regards to corporate behavior. The aim of this paper is to provide a distinctive historical perspective on the evolution of CSR as a conceptual paradigm by reviewing the most relevant factors that have shaped its understanding and definition, such as academic contributions, international policies and significant social and political events. To do so, the method used is a comprehensive literature review that explores the most relevant academic contributions and public events that have influenced the evolutionary process of CSR and how they have done so. The findings show that the understanding of corporate responsibility has evolved from being limited to the generation of profit to include a broader set of responsibilities to the latest belief that the main responsibility of companies should be the generation of shared value. The findings also indicate that as social expectations of corporate behavior changed, so did the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility. The findings suggest that CSR continues to be relevant within the academic literature and can be expected to remain part of the business vocabulary at least in the short term and as a result, the authors present a plausible future for CSR that takes into consideration its historical evolution. Finally, this paper gives way for future academic research to explore how CSR can help address the latest social expectations of generating shared value as a main business objective, which in turn may have practical implications if CSR is implemented with this in mind.

Introduction

The current belief that corporations have a responsibility towards society is not new. In fact, it is possible to trace the business’ concern for society several centuries back (Carroll 2008 ). However, it was not until the 1930’s and 40’s when the role of executives and the social performance of corporations begun appearing in the literature (Carroll 1999 ) and authors begun discussing what were the specific social responsibilities of companies. In the following decades, the social expectations towards corporate behavior changed and so did the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The aim of this article is to find out which have been the main factors and/or events that have influenced the evolutionary process of CSR and how they have shaped the understanding of the concept. This will allow to recognize CSR as a concept that reflects the social expectations of each decade and be able to explore if it will remain relevant in the near future.

This review focuses on the most relevant academic publications and historical events that have influenced the evolution of CSR as a conceptual paradigm. The review begins with the historical roots of social responsibility and then explores the early stages of the formal and academic writing about the social responsibilities of corporations and goes through its evolution to the latest understanding of CSR. Considering that the history of CSR is long and vast, it is necessary to point out that this article focuses on publications that have provided an original perspective and understanding to the concept of CSR along with the most significant papers with regards to the evolution of the social expectations of corporate behavior (see Appendix for additional recommended readings). Along with these papers, the review takes into consideration articles that have been cited the most and can be considered as significant contributors to the evolution of the concept as well as publications that provide new definitions and frameworks. It is relevant to point out that this paper will focus on the development of CSR as a definitional construct and will not explore in detail alternative concepts that emerged in the late twentieth century.

This article reviews the key historical events that played a role in the evolution of CSR. In particular, the paper focuses on events that influenced to a certain extent corporations to assume broader social responsibilities Accordingly, this article focuses on the relevant inputs to the definitional construct of the concept, most of which are of Anglo-American character, but it also considers that the growing attention on CSR has been influenced by specific calls for better business practices, such as the European CSR Strategy. As such, this paper does not portray the entire literature on the subject but highlights the key factors that shaped the evolution of CSR. Accordingly, the authors provide a summary of the evolution of the concept through a chronological timeline that allows the reader to follow the history of CSR by pointing out the most relevant academic contributions as well as the most significant events that played a role in shaping it as a conceptual paradigm.

The main contribution of this paper is a structured historical review that is accompanied with a chronological timeline of the evolution of CSR. Accordingly, the article contributes to the literature by exploring how the societal expectations of corporate behavior of each period have influenced the understanding and definitional construct of CSR. Furthermore, this article contributes to the literature on CSR by providing an innovative review of the evolution of the concept that contextualizes its development with a connection to the wider changes happening in each period. This paper also contributes to the current understanding of CSR by including a review of the development of CSR in the early twenty-first century, a period that has not been reviewed as much as earlier periods of the development of the concept.

Research method

The formal publications and literature on CSR begun as early as the 1930’s and continues to be relevant among academic journals, business magazines, books, and reports from international bodies as well as from non-governmental organizations and associations. This means that the literature on the subject is broad and a specific method is needed to achieve a comprehensive review. Given these aspects, the research was carried out following a systematic literature review (SLR) as understood by Okoli and Schabram ( 2010 ) who built on from Fink’s ( 2005 ) definition of a research literature review to define it as a systematic, explicit, comprehensive and reproducible method. The motivation for following a SLR is because it is commonly used to summarize the existing literature and identify gaps, to describe the available body of knowledge to guide professional practice, to identify effective research and development methods, to identify experts within a given field and to identify unpublished sources of information (Fink 2005 ; Okoli and Schabram 2010 ).

The extensive nature of the CSR literature required to limit the scope of the research to thematic areas directly related to the evolution and history of the concept and also limited to publications of academic or institutional character considering that they have already undergone a rigorous peer review that indicates a suitable quality for this SLR. The initial search was conducted for published journal articles using the search words “corporate social responsibility”, “history of CSR” and “evolution of CSR” on the online databases of Science Direct, ProQuest and Web of Science along with the search engine of Google Scholar. The searches were made within the search windows of the website of each database in the titles, abstracts and body of the articles and the results were provided in order of relevance. The first selection was limited to the titles of the publications and was followed by a review of the keywords and abstracts of the preferred articles. To determine the suitability of some of the articles it was necessary to review their introduction and scope. The next step in the selection of articles was focused on their quality and relevance which was determined by reviewing the level of impact factor of the journal of publication as well as the amount of citations the article has had, looking specifically for a high impact factor for each individual paper. Each article was then reviewed to determine its relevance for the research. Some articles pointed to additional references outside the initial search scope which were then searched online for their review. This included business magazines, books, and reports from international bodies and non-governmental organizations and associations. These references were reviewed and selected according to their pertinence and contribution for this paper. Following this systematic strategy allowed to review published journal articles with high impact factors along with publications of relevance mentioned by the authors of such articles. Some publications with regards to CSR had to be excluded from this review because they did not contribute directly to the evolution of the concept but we believe they are of interest in the CSR literature and thus they are listed in Appendix . Finally, the paper is structured in a way that each section corresponds to a particular period making it easier to follow the evolutionary process of CSR.

Historical roots of social responsibility

For Chaffee ( 2017 ), the origins of the social component in corporate behavior can be traced back to the ancient Roman Laws and can be seen in entities such as asylums, homes for the poor and old, hospitals and orphanages. This notion of corporations as social enterprises was carried on with the English Law during the Middle Ages in academic, municipal and religious institutions. Later, it expanded into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the influence of the English Crown, which saw corporations as an instrument for social development (Chaffee 2017 ). In the following centuries, with the expansion of the English Empire and the conquering of new lands, the English Crown exported its corporate law to its American colonies where corporations played a social function to a certain extent Footnote 1 (Chaffee 2017 ).

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Christian religious philosophy and approach to the abiding social context were seen as a response to the moral failure of society, which was visible in terms of poverty of the overall population in the English Empire and some parts of Europe (Harrison 1966 ). This religious approach gave way to social reforms and to the Victorian philanthropy which perceived a series of social problems revolving around poverty and ignorance as well as child and female labor (Carroll 2008 ; Harrison 1966 ). The religious roots of the Victorian social conscience gave Victorian Philanthropists a high level of idealism and humanism, and by the late 1800’s, the philanthropic efforts focused on the working class and the creation of welfare schemes with examples that could be seen in practice both in Europe as in the United States of America (USA) (Carroll 2008 ; Harrison 1966 ). A clear case was the creation of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), a movement that begun in London in 1844 with the objective of applying Christian values to the business activities of the time, a notion that quickly spread to the USA (see: Heald 1970 ).

During the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, the creation of welfare schemes took a paternalistic approach aimed at protecting and retaining employees and some companies even looked into improving their quality of life (Carroll 2008 ; Heald 1970 ). For Heald ( 1970 ), there were clear examples that reflected the social sensitivity of businessmen, such as the case of Macy’s in the USA, which in 1875 contributed funds to an orphan asylum and by 1887 labeled their charity donations as Miscellaneous Expenses within their accounting books, and the case of Pullman Palace Car Company which created a model industrial community in 1893 with the aim of improving the quality of life of its employees.

Also during this period, there was a growing level of urbanization and industrialization marked by large-scale production. This brought new concerns to the labor market such as: new challenges for farmers and smalls corporations to keep up with the new interdependent economy, the creation of unions of workers looking for better working conditions, and a middle class worried for the loss of religious and family values in the new industrial society (Heald 1970 ). As a response to these new challenges, and with the aim of finding harmony between the industry and the working force, some business leaders created organizations for the promotion of values and improvement of the working conditions. Such was the case of the Civic Federation of Chicago, an organization created to promote better working conditions and where religious values merged with economic objectives with a sense of civic pride (Heald 1970 ).

By the 1920’s and early 1930’s, business managers begun assuming the responsibility of balancing the maximization of profits with creating and maintaining an equilibrium with the demands of their clients, their labor force, and the community (Carroll 2008 ). This led to managers being viewed as trustees for the different set of external relations with the company, which in turn translated into social and economic responsibilities being adopted by corporations (Carroll 2008 ; Heald 1970 ). Later, with the growth of business during World War II and the 1940’s, companies begun to be seen as institutions with social responsibilities and a broader discussion of such responsibilities began taking place (Heald 1970 ). Some early examples of the debate of the social responsibilities of corporations can be found in The Functions of the Executive by Barnard ( 1938 ) and the Social Control of Business by Clark ( 1939 ).

1950’s and 1960’s: the early days of the modern era of social responsibility

It was not until the early 1950’s that the notion of specifically defining what those responsibilities were was first addressed in the literature and can be understood as the beginning of the modern definitional construct of Corporate Social Responsibility. In fact, it was during the 1950’s and 1960’s that the academic research and theoretical focus of CSR concentrated on the social level of analysis (Lee 2008 ) providing it with practical implications.

The period after World War II and the 1950’s can be considered as a time of adaptation and changing attitudes towards the discussion of corporate social responsibility, but also a time where there were few corporate actions going beyond philanthropic activities (Carroll 2008 ). Perhaps the most notable example of the changing attitude towards corporate behavior came from Bowen ( 1953 ), who believed that the large corporations of the time concentrated great power and that their actions had a tangible impact on society, and as such, there was a need for changing their decision making to include considerations of their impact.

As a result of his belief, Bowen ( 1953 ) set forth the idea of defining a specific set of principles for corporations to fulfill their social responsibilities. For him, the businessman ’s Footnote 2 decisions and actions affect their stakeholders, employees, and customers having a direct impact on the quality of life of society as a whole (Bowen 1953 ). With this in mind, Bowen defined the social responsibilities of business executives as “the obligations of businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society” (Bowen 1953 , p. 6). As Carroll ( 2008 ) explains, it seems that Bowen ( 1953 ) was ahead of his time for his new approach to management which aimed at improving the business response to its social impact and by his contributions to the definition of corporate social responsibility. Furthermore, the relevance of Bowen’s approach relies on the fact that this was the first academic work focused specifically on the doctrine of social responsibility, making Bowen the “Father of Corporate Social Responsibility” (Carroll 1999 ).

After Bowen, other authors were concerned with corporate behavior and its response to the social context of the time. For example, in the book Corporation Giving in a Free Society published in 1956, Eells ( 1956 ) argued that the large corporations of the time were not living up to their responsibility in a time of generalized inflation. In a similar way, with the book A moral philosophy for management published in 1959, Selekman ( 1959 ) explored the evolution of the moral responsibility of corporations as a response to the labor expectations of the time.

These early explorations of CSR as a definitional construct, along with the social context of the time, gave way to a growing interest of scholars to define what CSR was and what it meant (Carroll 2008 ). Naturally, it is understandable that the interest in CSR during 1960’s was influenced by growing awareness in society and social movements of the time. However, it is necessary to point out that the effect of this growing interest was perhaps more visible in the USA, which is why some examples of the following sections might seem to center on this particular country.

Some of society’s main concerns during this period revolved around rapid population growth, pollution, and resource depletion (Du Pisani 2006 ) and were accompanied with social movements with respect to the environment and human and labor rights (Carroll 1999 ). At the same time, books such as The Silent Spring by Carson ( 1962 ) and The Population Bomb by Ehrlich ( 1968 ) begun raising questions with regards to the limits of economic growth and the impact that society and corporations were having on the environment.

During the 1960’s there was also a new social context marked by a growing protest culture that revolved mainly around civil rights and anti-war protests. In the case of the USA, the protests transformed from being student-led sit-ins, walk-outs and rallies, to more radical political activism which, in most cases, saw business corporations as an integral part of the “establishment” they wanted to change (Waterhouse 2017 ). These protests put pressure on companies that, in the protestors’ view, represented the “establishment” (i.e. banks and financial institutions as well large scale corporations) but had a strong focus on those with direct links to war. An example is the case of the Dow Chemical Company which produced napalm used in the Vietnam War and as a result faced constant protests and accusations (Waterhouse 2017 ).

Accordingly, during the 1960’s scholars approached CSR as a response to the problems and desires of the new modern society. A notable example of this period was Keith Davis ( 1960 ), who explained that the important social, economic and political changes taking place represented a pressure for businessmen to re-examine their role in society and their social responsibility. Davis ( 1960 ) argued that businessmen have a relevant obligation towards society in terms of economic and human values, and asserted that, to a certain extent, social responsibility could be linked to economic returns for the firm (Carroll 1999 ; Davis 1960 ). The significance of Davis’ ideas is that he indicated that the “social responsibilities of businessmen need to be commensurate with their social power” (p. 71) and that the avoidance of such would lead to a decrease of the firm’s social power (Davis 1960 ).

Other influential contributors of the time were Frederick ( 1960 ), McGuire ( 1963 ) and Walton ( 1967 ). Frederick ( 1960 ) saw the first half of the twentieth century as an intellectual and institutional transformation that changed the economic and social thinking and brought with it an increased economic power to large scale corporations. To balance the growing power of businessmen, Frederick ( 1960 ) proposed a new theory of business responsibility based on five requirements: 1) to have a criteria of value (in this case for economic production and distribution), 2) to be based on the latest concepts of management and administration, 3) to acknowledge the historical and cultural traditions behind the current social context, 4) to recognize that the behavior of an individual businessmen is a function of its role within society and its social context, and, 5) to recognize that responsible business behavior does not happen automatically but on the contrary, it is the result of deliberate and conscious efforts; then McGuire ( 1963 ), who reviewed the development of business institutions and observed changes in the scale and type of corporations, changes in public policies, and regulatory controls for businesses as well as changes in the social and economic conditions of the time. As a response to these changes, McGuire ( 1963 ) argued that the firm’s responsibility goes beyond its legal and economic obligations, and that corporations should take an interest in politics, the social welfare of the community, and the education and happiness of its employees; and Walton ( 1967 ), who explored the ideological changes taking place during the 1950’s and 60’s which were reflected in public policies, some of which saw corporations as potential contributors to the improvement of the social and economic conditions of the time (see: Walton 1967 ; Walton 1982 ). Accordingly, he provided a definition of social responsibility with which he acknowledged the relevance of the relationship between corporations and society.

It is relevant to point out that even when some scholars begun applying a wider scope to the social responsibilities of corporations, there were others who were skeptical of the notion of CSR. Notably, Milton Friedman, a renowned economist and later a Nobel laurate in economics (1976), gave in 1962 a particular perspective of the role of corporations in a free capitalist system in which firms should limit to the pursuit of economic benefits (see: Friedman 1962 ). Friedman would further explore this notion in the article The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits published in (Friedman 1970 ) in which he sees CSR activities as an inappropriate use of company’s resources that would result in the unjustifiable spending of money for the general social interest.

Even when the social context of the 1960’s was, to some extent, reflected in the academic approach to CSR, its practical implementation remained mostly with a philanthropic character (Carroll 2008 ). Nonetheless, by the end of the decade the overall social context was reflected in the form of a strong pressure on corporations to behave according to the social expectations of the time, most of which were vividly expressed in protests and environmental and antiwar campaigns (Waterhouse 2017 ).

The 1970’s: CSR and management

The antiwar sentiment, the overall social context, and a growing sense of awareness in society during the late 1960’s translated into a low level of confidence in business to fulfill the needs and wants of the public (Waterhouse 2017 ). In fact, the low level of confidence in the business sector reached a significant point when in 1969 a major oil spill in the coast of Santa Barbara, California led to massive protests across the USA and eventually resulted in the creation of the first Earth Day celebrated in 1970. During the first Earth Day, 20 million people across the USA joined protests to demand a clean and sustainable environment and to fight against pollution, which was caused mainly by corporations (e.g. oil spills, toxic dumps, polluting factories and power plants) (Earth Day 2018 ). The first Earth Day influenced the political agenda of the USA in such a significant manner that it played a role in pushing forward the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by the end of 1970 (Earth Day 2018 ) and translated into a new regulatory framework that would later influence corporate behavior and create additional responsibilities for corporations.

It is equally important to mention that in the year 1970 there was a recession in the USA that was marked by a high inflation and very low growth followed by a long energy crisis (Waterhouse 2017 ). As a response to this context, and as a result of the social movements of the 1960’s and early 1970’s, the federal government of the USA made significant advances with regards to social and environmental regulations. The most notable examples were the creation of the EPA, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), all of which addressed and formalized to some extent, the responsibilities of businesses with regards to the social concerns of the time (Carroll 2015 ).

Similarly, two relevant contributions from the early 1970’s that responded to the social expectations of the time came from the Committee for Economic Development (CED) of the USA, first with the publication of A New Rationale for Corporate Social Policy which explored to what extent it is justified for corporations to get involved in social problems (Baumol 1970 ) and then with the publication of the Social Responsibilities of Business Corporations which explored the new expectations that society begun placing on the business sector (Committee for Economic Development 1971 ). These publications are of relevance because they advanced the public debate around CSR by acknowledging that “business functions by public consent, and its basic purpose is to serve constructively the needs of society – to the satisfaction of society” (Committee for Economic Development 1971 , p. 11).

As Carroll ( 1999 ) and Lee ( 2008 ) point out, these publications reflect a new rationale with regards to the roles and responsibilities of corporations. Furthermore, the Committee for Economic Development ( 1971 ) acknowledged that the social contract between business and society was evolving in substantial and important ways and specifically noted that: “Business is being asked to assume broader responsibilities to society than ever before and to serve a wider range of human values. Business enterprises, in effect, are being asked to contribute more to the quality of American life than just supplying quantities of goods and services. Inasmuch as business exists to serve society, its future will depend on the quality of management’s response to the changing expectations of the public” (Committee for Economic Development 1971 , p. 16).

The Club of Rome, formed in 1968 by a group of researchers that included scientists, economists and business leaders from 25 different countries, published in 1972 the report The Limits to Growth (World Watch Institute n.d. ), a study led by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) which questioned the viability of continued growth and its ecological footprint (The Club of Rome 2018 ). The report became of relevance for the international community because it brought the attention towards the impact of population growth, resource depletion and pollution, and pointed out the need of responsible business practices and new regulatory frameworks.

The 1970’s saw the creation of some of today’s most renowned companies with respect to social responsibility. Such is the case of the Body Shop, which was created in 1976 in the United Kingdom and Ben & Jerry’s founded in 1978 in the USA. Whether as a response to the new social expectations, a new regulatory framework, or due to a first-mover strategy, these are two notable examples of companies that begun formalizing and integrating policies that addressed the social and public issues of the time, and as a result the 1970’s entered into what Carroll ( 2015 , p. 88) called an era of “managing corporate social responsibility”. This meant that the term Corporate Social Responsibility became increasingly popular which resulted in its use under many different contexts and to such an extent that its meaning became unclear, and as a consequence it meant something different for everybody (Sethi 1975 ; Votaw 1973 ).

For instance, for Preston and Post ( 1975 ), corporations have a public responsibility that is limited by clear boundaries, meaning that anything outside is not an obligation for the firm and explained that going beyond those limits offers no clear direction for achieving the company’s main goals and can translate into an inefficient re-orientation of activities. In fact, Preston and Post stated that companies are not responsible for improving social conditions or addressing social problems and argued that a firm’s responsibility extends only to the direct consequences of their decisions and activities in which they engage (Preston and Post 1975 ). A different perception came from Sethi ( 1975 ), for whom social responsibility entails that corporate behavior should be coherent with the social norms, values and expectations, and as a result it should be prescriptive.

The unrestricted use of the term Corporate Social Responsibility during the 1970’s created an uncertainty with regards to its definition. This lasted until 1979, when Carroll proposed what is arguably the first unified definition of Corporate Social Responsibility stating that: “The social responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time” (Carroll 1979 , p. 500). Even when Carroll’s ( 1979 ) approach to social responsibility corresponded to the discussion on corporate behavior of the time, and was mainly driven by the social movements of the 1960’s and the new legislations in the USA, its relevance relies on the fact that his definition builds on from the work of other scholars (including the CED) to provide a clear and concise conceptualization that could be applicable under any context, which was not the case of previous definitions of CSR (see previous definitions from: Davis 1973 ; Frederick 1960 ; M. Friedman 1962 ; McGuire 1963 ; Walton 1967 ). Another relevant contribution of Carroll’s understanding of CSR is that it does not see the economic and social objectives as incompatible trade-offs but rather as an integral part of the business framework of total social responsibility (Lee 2008 ).

During the 1970’s, the understanding of CSR was influenced by social movements and new legislations. This was reflected in the academic publications which provided companies with an approach that looked into how to comply with the new responsibilities that have been given to them by the new legislations that now covered environmental aspects as well as product safety, and labor rights (Carroll 2008 ). This gave way to the 1980’s where the discussion revolved on the ways for implementing CSR.

The 1980’s: the operationalization of CSR

During the 1970’s, there were a growing number of legislations that attended the social concerns of the time and gave a broader set of responsibilities to corporations. By contrast, during the 1980’s the Reagan and Thatcher administrations brought a new line of thought into politics with a strong focus on reducing the pressure on corporations and aiming to reduce the high levels of inflation that the USA and the United Kingdom (UK) were facing (see: Feldstein 2013 ; Wankel 2008 ). For Reagan and Thatcher, the growth and strength of the economies of their countries depended on their ability to maintain a free market environment with as little as possible state intervention (Pillay 2015 ). To do so, Reagan’s main economic goals focused on reducing the regulations on the private sector complemented with tax reductions (Feldstein 2013 ).

With governments reducing their role in regulating corporate behavior, managers were faced with a need to answer to different interest groups that still expected corporations to fulfill the social expectations of the time. Notably, the reduced regulatory framework led scholars to look into business ethics and the operationalization of CSR as a response to groups such as shareholders, employees and consumers, and the term stakeholder became common (Carroll 2008 ; Wankel 2008 ). However, scholars also begun looking into alternative or complementary concepts to CSR, some of which include corporate social performance, corporate social responsiveness, and stakeholder theory and management (Carroll 2008 ). For the purpose of this paper we will continue to focus our attention on the development of CSR as a definitional construct.

In 1980, Thomas M. Jones ( 1980 ) was arguably the first author to consider CSR as a decision making process that influence corporate behavior. Jones’ ( 1980 ) contribution gave way to a new area of debate around CSR which focused more on its operationalization than on the concept itself. This translated into the creation of new frameworks, models, and methods aimed at evaluating CSR from an operational perspective. Some notable examples of the 1980’s came from Tuzzolino and Armandi ( 1981 ), who presented a need-hierarchy framework through which the company’s socially responsible performance can be assessed based on five criteria (profitability, organizational safety, affiliation and industry context, market position and competitiveness, and self-actualization); Strand ( 1983 ), who proposed a systems model to represent the link between an organization and its social responsibility, responsiveness and responses and who identified internal and external effects of company’s behavior; Cochran and Wood ( 1984 ), who used the combined Moskowitz list Footnote 3 , a reputation index, to explore the relation between CSR and financial performance; and Wartick and Cochran ( 1985 ) who reorganized Carroll’s understanding of CSR (1979) into a framework of principles, processes, and social policies.

Perhaps the best way to understand the operationalization approach to CSR during the 1980’s is by keeping in mind that during this time there were new societal concerns. Notably, these concerns can be observed in a series of events that reflected the approach of the international community towards sustainable development and to a certain extent, to corporate behavior. The most relevant include: the creation of the European Commission’s Environment Directorate-General (1981), the establishment of the World Commission on Environment and Development chaired by the Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland (1983), the Chernobyl nuclear disaster (1986), the publication of the report Our Common Future presented by the Brundtland Commission which provided a definition of sustainable development (1987), the United Nations (UN) adoption of the Montreal Protocol (1987), and the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (1988).

Even when these events did not relate directly to CSR, and hence did not influence directly the evolution of the concept, they reflected a growing sense of awareness of the international community with regards to environmental protection and sustainable development, and indirectly to corporate behavior. In fact, for Carroll ( 2008 ), the most relevant societal concerns and expectations of corporate behavior during the 1980’s revolved around “environmental pollution, employment discrimination, consumer abuses, employee health and safety, quality of work life, deterioration of urban life, and questionable/abusiveness practices of multinational corporations” (p. 36). As Carroll ( 2008 ) explained, this context gave way for scholars to begin looking into alternative themes, and during the 1980’s the concepts of business ethics and stakeholder management became part of the business vocabulary being part of a wider discussion around the corporate behavior of the time.

The 1990’s: globalization and CSR

During the 1990’s, significant international events influenced the international perspective towards social responsibility and the approach to sustainable development. The most relevant include: the creation of the European Environment Agency (1990), the UN summit on the Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro which led to the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the adoption of Agenda 21 and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1992), and the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol (1997). The creation of these international bodies and the adoption of international agreements represented international efforts for setting higher standards with regards to climate-related issues and, indirectly to corporate behavior (see: Union of Concerned Scientists 2017 ).

The 1990’s were no exception to the growing interest in CSR, and in fact, it was during this decade that the concept gained international appeal, perhaps as the result of the international approach to sustainable development of the time in combination to the globalization process taking place. As Carroll ( 2015 ) explained, during the 1990’s the globalization process increased the operations of multinational corporations which now faced diverse business environments abroad, some of them with weak regulatory frameworks. For these global corporations it meant new opportunities that came along with a rising global competition for new markets, an increased reputational risk due to a growth in global visibility, and conflicting pressures, demands, and expectations from the home and the host countries (Carroll 2015 ).

Many multinational corporations understood that being socially responsible had the potential to be a safe pathway to balance the challenges and opportunities of the globalization process they were experiencing and as a result, the institutionalization of CSR became stronger (Carroll 2015 ). The most notable example of the institutionalization of CSR was the foundation in 1992 of the association Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) which initially included 51 companies with the vision of a becoming a “force for positive social change - a force that would preserve and restore natural resources, ensure human dignity and fairness, and operate transparently” (Business for Social Responsibility 2018 , para. 2).

The European Commission (EC) also played a relevant role in encouraging the implementation of CSR and begun promoting it as early as 1995 when 20 business leaders adopted the European Business Declaration against Social Exclusion in response to the EC’s call to combat social exclusion and unemployment (CSR Europe n.d. ). This resulted 1 year later, in the launch of the European Business Network for Social Cohesion (later renamed CSR Europe) which gathered business leaders with the aim of enhancing CSR within their organizations (CSR Europe n.d. ).

Even when the institutionalization of CSR grew stronger in the 1990’s, the concept itself didn’t evolve as much (Carroll 1999 ). Nevertheless, there are three contributions to CSR that are relevant to point out: Donna J. Wood ( 1991 ), driven by what she saw as a need for a systematical integration of conceptual aspects into a unified theory, built on the models of Carroll ( 1979 ) and Wartick and Cochran ( 1985 ) to create a model of Corporate Social Performance (CSP). Wood ( 1991 ) defined three dimensions of CSP: first, the principles of Corporate Social Responsibility, which include legitimacy (institutional level), public responsibility (organizational level), and managerial discretion (individual level). Second, she defined the processes of corporate social responsiveness as environmental assessment, stakeholder management, and issues management. Third, she specified the outcomes of corporate behavior as social impacts, social programs, and social policies. As a result, Wood’s model (1991) was broader and more comprehensive than the ones presented earlier by Carroll ( 1979 ) and Wartick and Cochran ( 1985 ), and its relevance relies on its contextualization of aspects of CSR within the business-social interaction by emphasizing explicitly the outcomes and performance of firms (Carroll 1999 ).

Also in 1991, Carroll ( 1991 ) presented the “Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility” with the aim of providing a useful approach to CSR for the executives that needed to balance their commitments to the shareholders with their obligations to a wider set of stakeholders which originated from the new governmental bodies and regulations of the USA, mainly from the establishment of the EPA, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) (Carroll 1991 ). With the Pyramid of CSR, Carroll ( 1991 ) represented what he defined as the four main responsibilities of any company: 1) the economic responsibilities which are the foundation for the other levels of the pyramid; 2) the legal responsibilities of the firm; 3) the ethical responsibilities that shape the company’s behavior beyond the law-abiding duties, and; 4) the philanthropic responsibilities of the corporation with regards to its contribution to improve the quality of life of society. Besides the graphical representation of CSR in terms of responsibilities , Carroll ( 1991 ) asserted that a firm should be a good corporate citizen , a concept that he would develop further at the end of the 1990’s (see: Carroll 1998 ).

The third notable contribution of the 1990’s to the concept came from Burke and Logsdon ( 1996 ), who aimed to find evidence to link CSR to a positive financial performance of the firm, and by doing so they were arguably the first to evaluate the benefits of the strategic implementation of CSR. For them, CSR can be used with a strategic approach with the aim of supporting the core business activities and as a result improve the company’s effectiveness in achieving its main objectives (Burke and Logsdon 1996 ).

Moreover, Burke and Logsdon ( 1996 ) identified five dimensions of strategic CSR which, for them, are essential for achieving the business objectives as well as for value creation:1) centrality, which represents how close or fit is CSR to the company’s mission and objectives; 2) specificity, which represents the ability to gain specific benefits for the firm; 3) proactivity, in terms of being able to create policies in anticipation of social trends; 4) voluntarism, explained as the discretionary decision making process that is not influenced by external compliance requirements, and; 5) visibility, which refers to the relevance of the observable and recognizable CSR for internal and external stakeholders (Burke and Logsdon 1996 ). Furthermore, Burke and Logsdon ( 1996 ) argued that the implementation of strategic CSR through these five dimensions would translate into strategic outcome in the form of value creation that can be identifiable and measurable, but limited to economic benefits for the firm.

Another key contribution to the debate around corporate behavior came from the concept of “The Triple Bottom Line”, first conceived by Elkington in 1994 as a sustainability framework that balances the company’s social, environmental and economic impact. Later, Elkington ( 1998 ) explained that the way to achieve an outstanding triple bottom line performance (social, environmental, and economic) is through effective and long-term partnerships between the private and public sectors, and also among stakeholders. The triple bottom line concept became popular in the late 1990’s as a practical approach to sustainability and it has remained relevant in the CSR discussion because it indicates that corporations need to have socially and environmental responsible behavior that can be positively balanced with its economic goals. Footnote 4

As mentioned before, the globalization process of the 1990’s increased the global reach of multinational corporations and capitalism expanded rapidly, which meant that corporations began having concerns with regards to competitiveness, reputation, global visibility and an expanded network of stakeholders (Carroll 2015 ). This gave way to alternative subjects such as stakeholder theory (see: Donaldson and Preston 1995 ; Freeman 1994 ), corporate social performance (see: Swanson 1995 ), and corporate citizenship (see: Carroll 1998 ). The introduction of new themes, even when almost all of them were consistent with, and built on the existing CSR definitions and understanding (Carroll 1999 ), created an uncertainty with regards to the definition of CSR to the extent that the concept ended up having “unclear boundaries and debatable legitimacy” (Lantos 2001 , p. 1). This meant that by the end of the 1990’s there was a lack of a globally accepted definition of CSR (Lantos 2001 ), which was accompanied by a social and institutional impetus for making companies become good corporate citizens (see: Carroll 1998 ).

2000’s: recognition and implementation of CSR

The decade of the 2000’s is divided in two sections due to the amount of relevant events around CSR. The first section is focused on the recognition and expansion of CSR and its implementation, while the second section is focused on the strategic approach to CSR provided by the academic publications of the time.

The debate around CSR has been brought forward several times by public figures. Footnote 5 Such was the case of President Reagan who, with the aim of stimulating the economy and generating economic growth in the 1980’s, called upon the private sector for more responsible business practices and emphasized that corporations should take a leading role in social responsibility (Carroll 2015 ). During the 1990’s, it was President Clinton who brought the attention towards the notion of corporate citizenship and social responsibility with the creation of the Ron Brown Corporate Citizenship Award for companies that were good corporate citizens (Carroll 1998 ).

However, it was not until 1999 that CSR gained global attention with the landmark speech of then Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, who at the World Economic Forum said: “I propose that you, the business leaders gathered in Davos, and we, the United Nations, initiate a global compact of shared values and principles, which will give a human face to the global market” (United Nations Global Compact n.d. , para. 5). As a result, the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) was launched on July 2000 gathering 44 global companies, 6 business associations, and 2 labor and 12 civil society organizations (United Nations Global Compact n.d. ). Notably, the idea behind the creation of the UNGC was to create an instrument that would fill the gaps in governance of the time in terms of human rights and social and environmental issues and to insert universal values into the markets (United Nations Global Compact n.d. ).

Perhaps the most notable achievement of the UNGC was the definition of ten principles that guide the corporate behavior of its members, who are expected to incorporate them into their strategies, policies and procedures with the aim of creating a corporate culture of integrity with long term aims (United Nations Global Compact n.d. ). Even when the UNGC was never directly linked to CSR, it can be understood that the ten principles, with their focus on human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption, brought the global attention towards social responsibility.

It was also in the year 2000 when the United Nations adopted the Millennium Declaration with its eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and set the international agenda for the following 15 years. Even when the MDGs and the debate around them was not directly linked to CSR, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) pointed it out as a framework for the UN – private sector cooperation with the aim of achieving its goals (Murata n.d. ) and as a result the global recognition of the concept became stronger.

The promotion of CSR as a distinct European strategy begun 1 year after the adoption of the MDGs and the creation of the UNGC, when the EC presented a Green Paper called Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility (2001) which derived from the new social expectations and concerns of the time, including the growing concern about the environmental impact of economic activities (Commission of the European Communities 2001 ). Notably, the Green Paper presented a European approach to CSR that aimed to reflect and be integrated in the broader context of international initiatives such as the UNGC (Commission of the European Communities 2001 ). This was the first step towards the European Strategy on CSR adopted in 2002 and since then, the EC has led a series of campaigns for promoting the European approach to CSR which derives from the understanding that CSR is: “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society and outlines what an enterprise should do to meet that responsibility” (European Commission 2011 , para. 2).

Between 2001 and 2004 the EC held a series of conferences for discussing CSR (“What is CSR” in Brussels, “Why CSR” in Helsinki, and “How to promote and implement CSR” in Venice) which resulted in its adoption as a strategic element for the Plan of the General Direction of Business of the European Commission (Eberhard-Harribey 2006 ). Accordingly, in 2005 the EC launched the “European Roadmap for Businesses – Towards a Competitive and Sustainable Enterprise” that outlined the European objectives with regards to CSR for the following years (CSR Europe n.d. ). In practical terms, these events translated into a unified vision and understanding of CSR that would be promoted around European businesses.

In 2011, the EC published the renewed European Union (EU) strategy for CSR for the years 2011–2014 followed by a public consultation in 2014 with regards to its achievements, shortcomings, and future challenges. The 2014 consultation showed that 83% of the respondents believed that the EC should continue engaging in CSR policy and 80% thought that CSR played an important role for the sustainability of the EU economy (European Commission 2014a ). In 2015, the EC held a multi-stakeholder forum on CSR which concluded that the Commission should continue to play an important role in the promotion of CSR and help embed social responsibility into company’s strategies (European Commission 2015 ).

In 2015, CSR Europe launched the Enterprise 2020 Manifesto which aimed to set the direction of businesses in Europe and play a leading role in developing an inclusive sustainable economy (CSR Europe 2016 ) and can be understood as a response to the EU Strategy on CSR as well as to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The Manifesto is perhaps the most relevant contribution from CSR Europe in the second half of the 2010’s mainly because it has a strategic approach that aims to ensure value creation for its stakeholders through the 10,000 companies reached through its network (CSR Europe 2016 ). The Manifesto focuses on the generation of value on five key areas: 1) societal impact through the promotion of responsible and sustainable business practices; 2) membership engagement and satisfaction which is meant to guarantee the continuity in the work of CSR Europe to achieve its mission and societal impact; 3) financial stability; 4) employee engagement focused on the investment of individual development as well as organizational capacity, and; 5) environmental impact assessment to determine areas of improvement (CSR Europe 2016 ).

The global recognition of CSR has also been influenced by international certifications designed to address social responsibility. Such is the case of the ISO 26000 which history can be traced to 2002 when the Committee on Consumer Policy of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) proposed the creation of CSR guidelines to complement the quality and environmental management standards (ISO 9001 and ISO 14001) (ISO n.d.-a ). A working group led by Brazil and Sweden collaborated with stakeholders and National Standards Bodies for a period of 5 years (2005–2010) and came up with the approved ISO 26000 – Social Responsibility in September 2010 (ISO n.d.-a ).

The development of the ISO 26000 is of relevance for the CSR movement not only because it serves as a guideline for the way in which businesses can operate in a socially responsible way, but more so because it was developed by 450 experts of 99 countries and 40 international organizations and so far it has been adopted by more than 80 countries as a guideline for national standards (ISO n.d.-b , n.d.-c ).

2000’s: strategic approach to CSR

Beyond the institutional and public influence in the implementation of CSR, the 2000’s saw relevant contributions to the concept through the academic literature. In the early years of the twenty-first century, Craig Smith ( 2001 ) explained that corporate policies had changed as a response to public interest and as a result this often had a positive social impact. This meant that the scope of social responsibility (from a business perspective) was now inclusive to a broader set of stakeholders and a new definition was set forward: “Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to the obligations of the firm to its stakeholders – people affected by corporate policies and practices. These obligations go beyond legal requirements and the firm’s duties to its shareholders. Fulfillment of these obligations is intended to minimize any harm and maximize the long-run beneficial impact of the firm on society” (Smith 2001 , p. 142).

Smith’s definition of CSR (2001) gave hints of the need of making CSR part of a company’s strategic perspective in order to be able to fulfill its long term obligations towards society. This was reaffirmed by Lantos ( 2001 ) that same year, who pointed out that during the twenty-first century society would demand corporations to make social issues part of their strategies (see also: Carroll 1998 ).

In fact, Lantos ( 2001 ) built on from Smith’s definition of CSR and included strategic considerations to his own understanding of the concept concluding that: “CSR entails the obligation stemming from the implicit ‘social contract’ between business and society for firms to be responsive to society’s long-run needs and wants, optimizing the positive effects and minimizing the negative effects of its actions on society” (Lantos 2001 , p. 9). Accordingly, Lantos ( 2001 ) explained that CSR can become strategic when it is part of the company’s management plans for generating profits, which means that the company would take part in activities that can be understood as socially responsible only if they result in financial returns for the firm and not necessarily fulfilling a holistic approach such as the triple bottom line.

The way Lantos ( 2001 ) explained the boundaries of CSR was arguably the first time the term strategic was inherently linked to CSR. Since then, the literature on CSR begun including strategic traits to the concept and some academics (see: Husted and Allen 2007 ; Porter and Kramer 2006 ; Werther and Chandler 2005 ) begun using the term Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility (SCSR). During the early 2000’s, Freeman ( 2001 ) and A. L. Friedman and Miles ( 2002 ) provided a new perspective to stakeholder theory which reinforced the belief that corporations should be managed in the benefit of a broader set of stakeholders. Freeman ( 2001 ) argued that corporations have a responsibility towards suppliers, consumers, employees, stockholders and the local community and as a result should be managed accordingly while A. L. Friedman and Miles ( 2002 ) defined that the relation between corporations and their stakeholders is dynamic and has different levels of influence on the firm. With this new perspective, Freeman ( 2001 ) and A. L. Friedman and Miles ( 2002 ) contributed to the CSR evolution by reinforcing the belief that corporations are responsible to a broader set of stakeholder than before.

Marrewijk ( 2003 ) presented an overview of the concepts of CSR and Corporate Sustainability in which he recognized this novel perspective towards CSR. Marrewijk ( 2003 ) explained this new societal approach to CSR as a strategic response to the new corporate challenges which, as he explained, are an outcome of the evolution of the roles and responsibilities of each sector of society [emphasis added]. For Marrewijk ( 2003 ), firms respond to their challenges by adopting different levels of integration of CSR into a company’s structure, a topic that is still discussed in the literature.

Accordingly, Marrewijk ( 2003 ) gave five interpretations to his concept of Corporate Sustainability, which he recognized as the contemporary understanding of CSR. These interpretations can be understood as the level of integration of CSR into the company’s policies and structure. The holistic interpretation provided by Marrewijk ( 2003 ) is perhaps the most relevant for the purpose of this paper because it represents the full integration of CSR motivated by the search for sustainability in the understanding that companies have a new role within society and consequently have to make strategic decisions to adapt to its social context.

The strategic response that companies make to their evolving social context was further explored by Werther and Chandler ( 2005 ) who, with their first work published together, focused on the implementation of strategic CSR as part of brand management in order to achieve and maintain legitimacy in a context of globalized brands. The relevance of their work relies on the emphasis placed on the shift of social responsibility by transforming “CSR from being a minimal commitment … to becoming a strategic necessity” (Werther and Chandler 2005 , p. 319).

Furthermore, Werther and Chandler ( 2005 ) claimed that an effective integration of SCSR must come from a “genuine commitment to change and self-analysis” (p. 322) and must be done with a top-down approach throughout the company’s operations for it to translate into a sustainable competitive advantage. Even when their approach to SCSR focused mainly on the competitiveness and legitimacy of companies, their main contribution comes from explicitly claiming CSR as a strategic necessity and thus making it indispensable for any corporation.

One year afterwards, Porter and Kramer ( 2006 ) built on the notion that companies can achieve a competitive advantage through SCSR and explained that corporations can address their competitive context through a strategic approach that results in the creation of shared value in terms of benefits for society while improving the firm’s competitiveness. For Porter and Kramer ( 2006 ), a company should first look inside out to map the social impact of its value chain and identify the positive and negative effect of its activities on society and then focus on the ones with the greatest strategic value. Then, the firm should look outside in to understand the influence of their social context on their productivity and on the execution of its business strategy (Porter and Kramer 2006 ). This way, corporations would be able to understand its interrelationship with their social environment and be able to adapt its business strategies (Porter and Kramer 2006 ).

The work of Porter and Kramer ( 2006 ) provided a new understanding of SCSR as a way to maximize the interdependence between business and society through a holistic approach to the company’s operations and offered an explanation of the advantages of using SCSR as a holistic business framework instead of a limited goal-oriented perspective. In fact, Porter and Kramer ( 2006 ) argued that if CSR is used without a holistic approach and only focused on certain objectives (e.g. CSR used as a tool for achieving the social license to operate, or for achieving and maintaining a reputational status, or for addressing stakeholder satisfaction) it limits the company’s potential to create social benefits while supporting their business goals.

The notion of creating value through SCSR was reinforced by Husted and Allen ( 2007 ) who performed a survey of Spain’s largest firms by number of employees with the aim of finding out the main strategic dimensions that companies consider essential for generating value through SCSR. To do so, Husted and Allen ( 2007 ) built on four of the five dimensions of strategic CSR established by Burke and Logsdon ( 1996 ) to then provide their own definition of SCSR as the company’s ability to: “1) provide a coherent focus to a portfolio of firm resources and assets (centrality); 2) anticipate competitors in acquiring strategic factors (proactivity); 3) build reputation advantage through customer knowledge of firm behavior (visibility); 4) ensure that the added value created goes to the firm (appropriability)” (Husted and Allen 2007 , p. 596). It is important to highlight that Husted and Allen ( 2007 ) left out the concept of voluntarism proposed by Burke and Logsdon ( 1996 ) from their definition of strategic CSR but pointed out its relevance as a key dimension in CSR for the creation of value.

Based on the five dimensions of CSR established by Burke and Logsdon ( 1996 ), Husted and Allen ( 2007 ) surveyed 110 top managers of Spain’s largest companies and found out that visibility, appropriability, and voluntarism were considered the main strategic dimensions of CSR that can be linked to the creation of value (even when voluntarism is not part of their definition of SCSR). Their findings show that visibility, in terms of the presence of CSR on the media as well as a positive image of the company, can be linked to the creation of value through increased customer loyalty and the attraction of new customers, as well as developing new areas of opportunity for products and markets (Husted and Allen 2007 ). With regards to appropriability, the way in which the company manages to retain the value created, Husted and Allen ( 2007 ) pointed out that the surveyed companies designed their CSR policies with the aim of creating value, but such value seems to be limited to the economic benefits of the companies themselves and not necessarily for all their stakeholders. Finally, Husted and Allen ( 2007 ) acknowledged voluntarism, the strategic management of socially-oriented policies going beyond legal requirements, as a key aspect for the creation of value. Nevertheless, their findings show that the surveyed firms were not implementing CSR policies beyond the legal requirements which might be the consequence of the intangibility and immeasurability of such activities (Husted and Allen 2007 ).

Furthermore, the most relevant contributions provided by Husted and Allen ( 2007 ) to the concept of SCSR are twofold: first, SCSR generates new areas of opportunity through the constant drive for creating value, which in turns results in innovation. Second, implementing SCSR with the aim of creating value is inevitably linked to social demands. However, Husted and Allen ( 2007 ) pointed out that the surveyed companies looked into the generation of value with a perspective limited the economic benefits of the corporations themselves and not necessarily for all their stakeholders which raises the question if those companies were in fact implementing CSR with a holistic approach.

The belief of achieving competitive advantage and creating value through SCSR was further developed by Heslin and Ochoa ( 2008 ) who claimed that even when SCSR practices are most effective when they are tailor made, they still follow common principles. To prove their hypothesis, Heslin and Ochoa ( 2008 ) analyzed 21 exemplary CSR practices and observed that seven common principles guide the strategic CSR approach of the selected companies: cultivate the needed talent, develop new markets, protect labor welfare, reduce the environmental footprint, profit from by-products, involve customers, and green the supply chain.

The relevance of the principles proposed by Heslin and Ochoa ( 2008 ) comes from the belief that companies can improve their business opportunities while they provide benefits to the social context in which they operate. For instance, to cultivate the needed talent is explained as the need of companies to foster and retain qualified and skilled employees which result in better and more stable career opportunities (Heslin and Ochoa 2008 ). Likewise, the strategic relevance of the protection of labor welfare relies not only on the prevention of child labor but on the creation of innovative solutions for the company-specific social context Footnote 6 (Heslin and Ochoa 2008 ).

The exemplary SCSR practices presented by Heslin and Ochoa ( 2008 ) provide an insight of the potential benefits of SCSR for creating shared value, for the companies themselves, their stakeholders, and the social context in which the firms operate. Based on the work of Heslin and Ochoa ( 2008 ), it would seem that at least for some of the globally renowned companies, the belief of generating shared value became a driver for integrating global and complex issues into the company’s SCSR policies. Then, by the end of the 2000’s SCSR was understood as having the potential for generating shared value and for addressing social concerns.

2010’s: CSR and the creation of shared value

The concept of creating shared value was further developed by Porter and Kramer ( 2011 ) who explained it as a necessary step in the evolution of business and defined it as: “policies and operating practices that enhance the competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions in the communities in which it operates. Shared value creation focuses on identifying and expanding the connections between societal and economic progress” (Porter and Kramer 2011 , p. 2).

For Porter and Kramer ( 2011 ), the need for Creating Shared Value (CSV) is in part the result of the conventional narrow-viewed business strategies which usually don’t take into account the broad factors that influence their long term success. Notably, Porter and Kramer ( 2011 ) place CSR into this category seeing it as an outdated and limited concept that has emerged as a way for improving company’s reputation, and as a consequence, they claim that CSV should replace CSR.

Perhaps Porter and Kramer’s ( 2011 ) most relevant contribution comes from the claim that “the purpose of the corporation must be redefined as creating shared value” (p. 2) and by pointing out that the first step to do so is the identification of the societal needs as well as the benefits or harms that the business embodies through its products. Accordingly, Porter and Kramer ( 2011 ) established three ways for creating shared value: by reconceiving products and markets, by redefining productivity in the value chain, and by creating supportive industry clusters where the company operates.

Even when Porter and Kramer ( 2011 ) did not contribute directly to the concept of CSR, they called for a change in the business strategies which, in their opinion, should now focus on generating shared valued as a main objective. This perspective of the creation of shared value is evident on what Leila Trapp ( 2012 ) called the third generation of CSR, which she explained as the moment in which corporations reflect their concerns about social and global issues on their activities, even when some of those concerns might not be directly linked to their core business. Even when this might seem similar to the philanthropic responsibilities of companies, defined as the fourth level of the Pyramid of CSR proposed by Carroll ( 1991 ), it is in fact rooted on a different understanding of the roles of corporations within their social context.

For Carroll ( 1991 ), companies which engage on activities to improve the social context in which they operate are doing so with a philanthropic perspective that is discretionary and voluntary, and as a result, this perspective is less relevant than the other three categories proposed in the Pyramid of CSR. In contrast, Trapp ( 2012 ) built on the historical understanding of CSR proposed by Marrewijk ( 2003 ) to explain what she called the third generation of CSR as an outcome of the evolution of the roles and responsibilities of each sector of society in which the private, public and social sectors have become increasingly interdependent. Then, the third generation of CSR proposed by Trapp ( 2012 ) can be understood as the result of corporations acknowledging and assuming their new roles and responsibilities towards society.

Trapp ( 2012 ) exemplified the third generation of CSR through a case study of Vattenfall, the Swedish state-owned energy company that in 2008 launched a CSR-backed stakeholder engagement campaign focused on climate change mitigation. The case study showed that even when Vattenfall’s campaign addressed clear social and global issues (climate change), it still reflected typical business objectives (in this case creating an interest in the company’s environmental effort and creating a brand image linked to the fight to climate change that would be a first-mover competitive advantage) (Trapp 2012 ). With this, Trapp ( 2012 ) contributed to the concept of CSR by exemplifying the new roles and responsibilities that corporations are willing to take in order to generate shared value.

In the third edition of Chandler and Werther’s book Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility (2013), the authors acknowledged the relevance of creating shared value, a constant in the previous editions, and highlighted its significance by modifying the subtitle of the book from Stakeholders in a Global Environment to the new version Stakeholders, Globalization, and Sustainable Value Creation . In fact, in the third edition of the book Chandler and Werther ( 2013 ) claim that SCSR has the potential for generating sustainable value and that the first step to do so is by identifying the social problems for which the company can create a market-based solution in an efficient and socially responsible way.

Later, in the fourth and most recent edition of the book, Chandler ( 2016 ) reflects on the evolution of CSR and its growing acceptance as central to the company’s strategic decision making as well as to their day-to-day operations. What is evident from this edition, is that Chandler ( 2016 ) understands the generation of sustainable value as one of the main objectives of SCSR. In fact, the subtitle of the fourth edition, Sustainable Value Creation , summarizes Chandler’s ( 2016 ) new perspective on SCSR in which “value creation cannot be avoided…[instead] it must be embraced” (p. xxvii). A key aspect to point out is that Chandler ( 2016 ) builds from the work of Porter and Kramer ( 2006 ) to conclude that “the firm creates the most value when it focuses on what it does best, which is defined by its core operations” (p. 250).

A key contribution from Chandler and Werther ( 2013 ) is their definition of SCSR which is the result of their exploration of CSR and their pragmatic approach to its effective implementation. Chandler and Werther ( 2013 ) defined SCSR as: “The incorporation of a holistic CSR perspective within a firm’s strategic planning and core operations so that the firm is managed in the interests of a broad set of stakeholders to achieve maximum economic and social value over the medium to long term.” (p. 65). In the fourth edition of the book, Chandler ( 2016 ) presents a slightly modified definition which reflects his new perspective on the generation of value: “The incorporation of a holistic CSR perspective within a firm’s strategic planning and core operations so that the firm is managed in the interests of a broad set of stakeholders to optimize value [emphasis added] over the medium to long term” (Chandler 2016 , p. 248).

Perhaps Chandler and Werther’s (2006; 2010; 2013) most valuable contribution comes from their particular perspective on the implementation of Strategic CSR, which in the fourth edition of the book written by Chandler ( 2016 ) builds from the previous publications to encompass five major components instead of the four proposed in previous editions: first, the complete incorporation of the CSR perspective into the company’s strategic planning process and their corporate culture; second, the understanding that all the company’s actions are directly related to the core operations; third, the belief that companies seek to understand and be responsive to their stakeholders’ needs, which means that the incorporation of a stakeholder perspective is a strategic necessity; fourth, the company passes from a short term perspective to a mid and long term planning and management process of the firm’s resources which is inclusive of its key stakeholders, and; fifth (the new component), firms aim to optimize the value created (Chandler 2016 ; Chandler and Werther 2013 ).

The new component of SCSR, the optimization of value , reinforces Chandler’s ( 2016 ) updated perspective in which the maximization of profit, or tradeoffs, is no longer an acceptable objective. Instead, companies should aim at optimizing value over the long term by focusing on their areas of expertise and by doing so there would be a reorientation of efforts towards the creation of shared value instead of profit maximization (Chandler 2016 ). To do so, an essential aspect of SCSR is the integration of the five components into a corporate framework that sets the parameters for the decision making process as well as their integration into the corporate culture with clear guiding values (Chandler 2016 ). This reflects Chandler’s ( 2016 ) belief that SCSR should be part of the day-to-day operations in order for it to be successful, a notion constantly highlighted by him through his articles and books. Then, the explicit call for the full immersion of SCSR into a company’s corporate culture, decision making process, and day-to-day operations is yet another relevant contribution from Chandler and Werther’s work (Chandler 2016 ; Chandler and Werther 2013 ).

In 2015, Carroll resumed his work on CSR with an overview of the evolution of the concept which complemented his literature review of 1999 and of 2010 (see: Carroll 1999 ; Carroll and Shabana 2010 ), but this time he looked at the competing and complementary concepts that have become part of the modern business vocabulary. Carroll ( 2015 ) reviewed the concepts of stakeholder engagement and management, business ethics, corporate citizenship, corporate sustainability, and the creation of shared value and concluded that all of them are interrelated and overlapping. Notably, Carroll ( 2015 ) pointed out that all of these concepts have been incorporated into CSR which is the reason why he defines it as the benchmark and central piece of the socially responsible business movement (see: Chandler and Werther 2013 ; Heslin and Ochoa 2008 ; Trapp 2012 ).

The year 2015 can be considered as the most relevant in the decade because the 15 years to follow after it will be marked by the Paris Agreement, the launch of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the adoption of seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which represent a “shared vision of humanity and a social contract between the world’s leaders and the people” (Ban 2015 , para. 1). Even when the SDGs do not represent any commitments for the private sector, the countries that adopt them will have to create specific policies and regulations that will translate into pressure for firms to implement new business practices or to improve their current ones. This is particularly relevant considering that the SDGs cover a wide range of areas, from climate change to the eradication poverty and hunger, as well as the fostering of innovation and sustainable consumption. Beyond that, the SDGs are interconnected, which means that addressing one particular goal can involve tackling issues of another one (UNDP 2018 ).

Considering that the SDGs do not represent any commitments for the private sector, it is relevant to mention that the EU law, through the Directive 2014/95/EU, requires large companies of public interest (listed companies, banks, insurance companies, and other companies designated by national authorities as public-interest entities) to disclose non-financial and diversity information beginning on their 2018 reports and onwards (European Commission 2014b ; n.d. ). The Directive is of interest to this paper because it derives from the European Parlamient’s acknowledgement of the vital role of the divulgation of non-financial information within the EC’s promotion of CSR and as a result can be expected to have an impact on the expansion of CSR reporting within the EU as well as with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).

This context presents an opportunity for CSR and SCSR to continue growing in terms of conceptualization and implementation, mainly because businesses can adopt it as a strategic framework with the objective of creating shared value (see: Chandler 2016 ). The expansion is particularly notable within the academic literature where it is possible to see that since 2010 the number of academic publications around CSR has increased considerably (see Table  1 ). As can be seen in Table 1 , in the case of Science Direct, the publications more than doubled from 1097 in the year 2010 to 2845 in 2017 (2.59 times) while in Web of Science they almost quadrupled passing from 479 to 1816 in the same years (3.79 times). In the case of ProQuest the publications increased considerably from 2010 to 2016 passing from 5715 to 8188, but decreased to 5670 in 2017. It is also important to notice that the years 2015 and 2016 had the highest amount of publications around CSR this far. It is also relevant to observe that the number of publications declined after 2015 for Science Direct and after 2016 for Proquest, while for Web of Science the amount kept growing.

The increase in the number of publications is not necessarily linked to the launch of the SDGs, but it shows that the concept has remained relevant after the year 2015, when the Paris Agreement called for a change from business as usual to new business frameworks. A key point to mention is that looking into the newest academic publications available since 2015 it is possible to see that most of these revolve around the implementation of CSR and its impact on specific areas of performance in some way related to the SDGs but do not necessarily contribute to the definitional construct or the evolution of the concept (for example see: Benites-Lazaro and Mello-Théry 2017 ; Chuang and Huang 2016 ; Kao et al. 2018 ).

The aim of this paper is to provide a distinctive historical perspective on the evolution of CSR as a conceptual paradigm through a literature review of the academic contributions to the concept as well as the most relevant factors that have shaped its understanding and definition. As the review shows, the development of the modern understanding of CSR as a definitional construct is long and varied and can be traced as far back to the 1930’s when the debate around the social responsibilities of the private sector begun. However, it was in the 1950’s when Bowen ( 1953 ) defined what those responsibilities were by explaining that the social responsibility of business executives was to make decisions according to the values of society and provided what was perhaps the first academic definition of CSR. During the 1960’s, the academic literature brought forward a new understanding of the concept in which it acknowledged the relevance of the relationship between corporations and society (see: Davis 1960 ; Frederick 1960 ; Walton 1967 ), yet, this perspective remained limited to concerns of employee satisfaction, management and the social welfare of the community and focused mainly on the generation of economic profit.

The 1970’s were influenced by the social momentum of the time in which there was a growing sense of awareness with regards to the environment and human and labor rights which led to higher social expectations of corporate behavior. As a result, a new rationale was brought forward by the Committee for Economic Development ( 1971 ) of the USA based on the premise that the social contract between business and society was evolving and that the private sector was expected to assume broader social responsibilities than before. As a consequence, CSR became increasingly popular during the 1970’s but remained discretionary and with a limited focus on aspects such as waste management, pollution and human and labor rights. Its growing popularity led to the unrestricted use of the term CSR under different contexts and by the end of the decade the concept became unclear and meant something different for everyone.

Perhaps the first unified definition of CSR was presented in 1979 by Carroll ( 1979 ), who placed specific responsibilities and expectations (economic, legal, ethical and discretionary) upon corporations and who understood the economic and social objectives of firms as an integral part of a business framework and not as incompatible aspects. This gave way to the debate around the operationalization of CSR during the 1980’s and into the early 1990’s which brought forward a new understanding of the concept as a decision making process (see: Jones 1980 ) and was accompanied by the proposal of models and frameworks for its implementation (see: Cochran and Wood 1984 ; Strand 1983 ; Tuzzolino and Armandi 1981 ). In 1991, Carroll ( 1991 ) presented the “Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility” to represent what he defined as the four main responsibilities of any company and explicitly placing specific responsibilities on corporations. It was also during this period when the adoption of international agreements on sustainable development reflected, to a certain extent, a growing a sense of awareness with respect to the impact of corporate behavior (e.g. the creation of the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1983, the UN adoption of the Montreal Protocol in 1987, the creation of the IPCC in 1988, the creation of the European Environmental Agency in 1990 and the UN summit on the Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro which translated into the adoption of the Agenda 21 and the UNFCCC in 1992). This represented a change in the understanding of CSR and as a result, international organizations and companies alike saw CSR as a way to balance the challenges and opportunities of the time and its institutionalization begun spreading globally.

In 1996, Burke and Logsdon ( 1996 ) argued that the strategic use of CSR can result in identifiable and measurable value creation in the form of economic benefits for the firm and presented an innovative perspective that gave way to the debate around the strategic implementation of CSR during the late 1990’s. It was also during this period that alternative subjects gained attention such as stakeholder theory, corporate social performance and corporate citizenship, and even when they were consistent with the prevailing CSR understanding, their use created an uncertainty with regards to the definition of CSR and by the end of the decade the concept lacked a globally accepted definition and unclear boundaries (as explained by Lantos 2001 ).

In the year 2000, the adoption of the MDGs and the creation of the UNGC gave a new dimension to the understanding of social responsibility in which broader responsibilities were placed on corporations, mainly in terms of human and labor rights, environment, anti-corruption and sustainable development. As a result, international institutions, such as the EC, saw in CSR a pathway for addressing the new corporate challenges, which translated into a wider recognition of the concept during the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The definitions of CSR of the 2000’s reflected the belief that corporations had a new role in society in which they need to be responsive to social expectations and should be motivated by the search for sustainability, which meant they would have to make strategic decisions to do so (see: Husted and Allen 2007 ; Porter and Kramer 2006 ; Werther and Chandler 2005 ). This opened the discussion around the benefits of strategic CSR and by the early 2010’s it was believed that companies can generate shared value while improving the firm’s competitiveness through a holistic implementation of SCSR.

In the decade of the 2010’s, the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals adopted in 2015, reflected a new social contract in which corporations are expected to play a relevant role in the global efforts to achieve the SDGs. Since then, the literature around CSR has focused on its implementation and its impact on specific areas of performance which can be linked to a certain extent to the SDGs while the understanding of CSR has remained centered on its potential to generate shared value.

At this point in the paper, it is relevant to visualize the most significant academic contributions to the evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility as a conceptual paradigm. To do so, Fig.  1 provides a chronological timeline that highlights the publications that have played a relevant role in modifying the understanding and definition of CSR. It is important to notice that the figures are based on this literature review and do not attempt to represent all the contributions to the evolution of the academic understanding of CSR but only to provide a visual synthesis.

Evolution of the academic understanding of CSR. Source: Developed by the authors as a synthesis of the academic literature

As can be seen in Fig. 1 , the social responsibilities placed upon corporations have evolved from being merely acknowledged in the early publications to being explicitly defined. Perhaps more relevant is the fact that the discussion around what those responsibilities are still continues to this day. Another key aspect that can be visualized with Fig. 1 is that the understanding of CSR evolved from being a personal decision of businessmen in the 1950’s to be understood as decision making process in the 1980’s and to be perceived as a strategic necessity by the early 2000’s. Notably, the purpose of existence of corporations has also evolved from being limited to the generation of economic profits in the 1950’s and 60’s to the belief that business exists to serve society as pointed out in the 1970’s and to the belief in the 2010’s that the purpose of corporations should be to generate shared value.

With Figs.  2 and 3 it is possible to visualize the evolution of CSR from a holistic perspective. The relevance of these figures comes from placing the events that played a significant role in shaping the understanding of CSR within the evolutionary process of the concept, some of them linked to the sustainable development agenda. This graphic synthesis of the evolutionary process of CSR is helpful for observing that the CSR understanding has been influenced by academic publications, governmental decisions (such as the creation of legislations and entities), social movements, public figures, and international movements. More so, from this graphic representation it is possible to observe that the understanding of social responsibility is dynamic and responds to social expectations of corporate behavior.

Visual history of CSR (Part 1 of 2). Source: Developed by the authors based on this literature review. Note: the size of the circles is a subjective representation of the level of influence each aspect had on the evolution of CSR. Hence, a bigger circle represents a higher level of influence

Visual history of CSR (Part 2 of 2). Source: Developed by the authors based on this literature review. Note: the size of the circles is a subjective representation of the level of influence each aspect had on the evolution of CSR. Hence, a bigger circle represents a higher level of influence

The aim of this paper was to provide a distinctive historical perspective on the evolution of CSR which was fulfilled through an exhaustive literature review that shows that the definition and concept of Corporate Social Responsibility has evolved from being limited to the generation of profits to the belief that companies should focus on generating shared value. From the review, it would seem that the evolution of the concept can be linked not only to academic contributions, but also to society’s expectations of corporate behavior. Even when this is not entirely evident across the history of the concept, there are specific cases in which the understanding of CSR clearly reflects the social expectations of the time. A notable example is the publication of A New Rationale for Corporate Social Policy and the Social Responsibilities of Business Corporations by the Committee for Economic Development ( 1971 ) of the USA which were followed by the creation of governmental institutions as a clear response to the social momentum and social demands of corporate behavior of the time. Since then, the definitions and understanding of CSR evolved for the most part in a pragmatic way according to social expectations. For example, during the 1990’s society placed broader responsibilities upon corporations when the international community adopted international agreements with regards to sustainable development and as a response, the debate around CSR centered on its strategic implementation to address the social concerns of the time but still with a limited focus on the economic benefits of the firm. In a similar way, during the early 2000’s the debate around SCSR reflected the new roles and responsibilities placed on corporations by the international community which called on the private sector to play a role in addressing the MDGs and by 2006 it was believed that SCSR could help companies achieve a competitive advantage through the creation of shared value. This belief, of creating shared value through SCSR, is perhaps the most relevant example of how the understanding of CSR reflects the social expectations of the time. The way in which Porter and Kramer ( 2011 ) proposed the creation of shared value to become the main purpose of corporations seems to be fitting to the social expectations of corporate behavior of the 2010’s as well as by those set later by the SDGs adopted in 2015.

From this review it is possible to see ties between some of the events of the sustainable development agenda and the evolution of CSR. These ties are not evident along all the history of CSR, but can be clearly seen in two specific and relevant cases, both of them cases in which events influenced the understanding and evolution of CSR: 1) In the early 1970’s the federal government of the USA established the EPA, the CPSC, the EEOC and the OSHA through which it addressed and formalized to some extent, the social and environmental responsibilities of businesses in response to the social concerns of the time. Years later, Carroll ( 1991 ) presented the Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility with the objective of providing business executives a pragmatic approach to their new obligations to a wider set of stakeholders, obligations that originated from the creation of the EPA, CPSC, EEOC and OSHA. It is then evident that one of the most significant contributions to the literature, Carroll’s Pyramid of CSR, was a direct response to the creation of governmental bodies and regulations, which responded to the social expectations of the time. 2) The promotion of CSR as a specific European strategy begun with the publishing in 2001 of the Green Paper called Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility which intended to reflect the broader context of international initiatives, particularly in line with the UNGC. Then, it is clear that the UNGC had a direct influence on the Green Paper which later became the basis for the European Strategy on CSR adopted in 2002 which in turn played a role in shaping the perception and implementation of CSR in Europe. Perhaps these two examples are isolated cases in which specific international events had a direct influence on the understanding and implementation of CSR, but they show that the evolution of CSR can be influenced by international events and not only by academic contributions.

Conclusions

The theoretical contributions of this paper to the literature on CSR begin by providing a distinct historical review of the evolution of the academic understanding of the concept along with the public and international events that played a role in shaping social expectations with regards to corporate behavior. A key contribution comes from the chronological timeline established through the paper with which it is possible to observe the way the concept evolved, an aspect that can be clearly visualized through the figures presented by the authors. As a literature review, the paper is limited to the academic publications that refer directly to CSR as well as to information regarding those events that have influenced to some extents the social expectations of corporate behavior. The findings show that there is a link between social expectations of corporate behavior and the way in which CSR is understood and implemented and opens room for future research. From this review it is possible to see that the literature on CSR seems to be lacking specific research with regards to how to address the core business activities through CSR and seems to point out a reason why CSR can be implemented only partially and even may raise questions about its potential benefits. Beyond that, this paper has practical contributions that can be used as the basis for exploring how CSR can address the latest social expectations of generating shared value as a main business objective, which can translate into practical implications if CSR is implemented with the objective of creating shared value, a topic that only few authors have discussed.

Future of CSR

The amount of recent publications revolving around CSR is vast and it seems that the probable future scenario for CSR presented by Archie B. Carroll in 2015 still prevails. In this scenario Carroll ( 2015 ) foresees an increase in: stakeholder engagement, prevalence and power of ethically sensitive consumers, the level of sophistication of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), employees as a CSR driving-force, along with increased CSR activity up, down, and across the global supply chain. With regards to the concept itself, Carroll ( 2015 ) expects CSR to continue its transactional path but to have a limited transformational evolution. While this scenario seems plausible and highly probable, perhaps it would be necessary to add to it that even when CSR is still relevant and its implementation keeps expanding, at least in the literature, there are competing frameworks and new concepts that might slow the global expansion and implementation of CSR and even shift the public interest towards new areas. Some of these concepts are Corporate Sustainability, Corporate Social Performance, Creation of Shared Value, Corporate Citizenship, Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility, Environmental Social and Governance Criteria, among others. However, it is relevant to highlight Archie B. Carroll’s ( 2015 ) work on the competing and complementary frameworks of CSR in which he concluded that all of them are interrelated and overlapping and pointed out that all of these concepts have already been incorporated into CSR, which is an aspect that is sometimes overlooked. Only time will tell if the institutionalization of CSR continues to expand or if the interest shifts towards other concepts.

The future of CSR will also have to take into consideration the latest technological advances and their role as part of new business frameworks and strategies. The adoption and adaptation to new digitalization processes and tools, as well as the incorporation of Artificial Intelligence into the business environment are relevant challenges not only for the CSR debate, but for corporations in general. In this sense, business frameworks will have to adapt and evolve in order to embrace the latest tools, but they will need to do so through an overarching and holistic framework that is based on the principles of social responsibility in a way that it combines the notions of sustainability, the generation of shared value, and the belief that companies can redefine their purpose to do what is best for the world .

Chaffee ( 2017 ) goes into detail to explain the evolution of corporations under the English Crown and also their evolution in the USA where they became subject of legislatures after the Revolutionary War but still kept relatively social functions.

During the 1940’s, 50’s and 60’s, business executives and corporate managers were commonly referred to as businessmen (see Carroll 1999 ) .

The Moskowitz list is a reputation index developed during the early 1970’s by Milton Moskowitz to rate the social performance of a number of firms.

As 2018 marks 25 years since the creation of the Triple Bottom Line, Elkington ( 2018 ) reviewed the concept in the Harvard Business Review in June 2018 and concluded that there is a need for a new radical approach to sustainability that can tackle the challenges of pace and scale needed. In the same article, Elkington ( 2018 ) points out to the B Corporations (commonly known as B Corps) as an example of firms that now approach business with a dedication to do what is “best for the world” (Elkington 2018 , para. 15).

The debate around the participation of corporations in global governance has brought forward the term Corporate Political Responsibility . For example, Tempels et al. ( 2017 ), build on from the concept of corporate citizenship to argue that corporations and governments share the responsibility to tackle societal problems. Furthermore, they see corporations as responsible for helping or pushing governments to fulfill its responsibilities towards society. Another perspective comes from Djelic and Etchanchu ( 2017 ), who contextualized the political role of CSR by exploring different historical periods to conclude that corporations have played relevant social and political roles. With their historical contextualization, they argue that there is no clear separation between the responsibilities of business and state, and as a result, they consider Friedman’s ( 1962 ) approach to the CSR to be a limited a perspective that “is far from describing a natural state of things” (Djelic and Etchanchu 2017 , p. 658)

To exemplify the principle of protection of labor welfare, Heslin and Ochoa ( 2008 ) briefly present the case of Levi Strauss which was faced with the legal and social challenges of employing children under the age of 15 in Bangladesh. A solution based merely on compliance and simplicity would have been to fire all those children, but as a result of analyzing the social context, Levi Strauss observed that these children were in most cases the only way of income for their families and hence the company decided to send them to school while still paying them their regular wages and providing them with a job after completing their education (Heslin and Ochoa, 2008 ).

Abbreviations

Business for Social Responsibility

Committee for Economic Development (USA)

Consumer Product Safety Commission (USA)

Corporate Social Responsibility

Creating shared value

European Commission

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (USA)

Environmental Protection Agency (USA)

European Union

Global Reporting Initiative

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

International Organization for Standardization

Millennium Development Goals

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (USA)

Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility

Sustainable Development Goals

United Kingdom

United Nations

United Nations Development Programme

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

United Nations Global Compact

United States of America

Young Men’s Christian Association

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Acknowledgements

First, we want to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions which were fundamental for the final version of this article. We also want to thank the editors for their assistance throughout the review process.

We are grateful and acknowledge that this research was made possible by the support of the Mexican National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT for its abbreviation in Spanish) which granted a 36 month scholarship to ML to conduct his PhD at the University of Iceland.

Availability of data and materials

The data that support the findings of Table 1 is available from the three online data bases consulted (Science Direct, ProQuest and Web of Science) according to the considerations mentioned for the creation of the table. The rest of the data generated or analyzed during this study is included in this published article.

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Mauricio Andrés Latapí Agudelo, Lára Jóhannsdóttir & Brynhildur Davídsdóttir

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This paper is derived from ML’s work towards a PhD in Environment and Natural Resources at the University of Iceland. As such, ML performed a literature review of the history and evolution of CSR. Dr. LJ being the main advisor for ML’s PhD and Dr. BD being the secondary advisor, contributed by guiding the direction of the article through comments, suggestions, information and literature and by contributing in the drafting and revising the work to achieve the academic quality required for a PhD at the University of Iceland. Dr. LJ has provided the overall review. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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Correspondence to Mauricio Andrés Latapí Agudelo .

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ML is a PhD student in the Environment and Natural Resources graduate program at the University of Iceland. His current research focuses on the impact of SCSR on the energy sector, in particular on the energy efficiency and environmental performance of energy companies.

Dr. LJ is a professor at the Faculty of Business Administration at the University of Iceland. LJ has published in the areas of CSR, sustainable business models and environmental sustainability. Among her activities, LJ is a Fulbright Arctic Initiative Scholar.

Dr. BD is a professor of Environment and Natural Resources in the Faculties of Life and Environmental Sciences and Economics at the University of Iceland. BD has published in areas of sustainable energy, sustainable development and ecological economics. Among her occupations, BD is the book review editor for the journal Ecological Economics, Director of the University of Iceland Arctic Initiative and sits on the boards of several foundations, institutes and private companies.

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The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

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Recommended readings

After having done an exhaustive literature review on CSR and its evolution it has been a challenge to select which contributions should be left out of this paper. With this in mind, we would like to bring the attention of the reader towards the following publications: The Functions of the Executive by Barnard ( 1938 ) along with The Functions of the Executive at 75: An Invitation to Reconsider a Timeless Classic by Mahoney and Godfrey ( 2014 ); the Social Control of Business by Clark ( 1939 ); the Social responsibilities of business corporations published by the Committee for Economic Development ( 1971 ); the Green Paper: Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility published by the Commission of the European Communities ( 2001 ) which was the first step towards the European Strategy for CSR; Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theory of the Firm Perspective by McWilliams and Siegel ( 2001 ); the search for a definition of CSR by Dahlsrud ( 2008 ) with How corporate social responsibility is defined: an analysis of 37 definitions ; then The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility by Crane ( 2008 ) which provides a summary of CSR history and points out relevant contributions to the concept; the literature review and analysis of the institutional, organizational, and individual levels of CSR provided by Aguinis and Glavas ( 2012 ) with What We Know and Don’t Know About Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review and Research Agenda ; the case study of reporting initiatives from a CSR perspective presented by Avram and Avasilcai ( 2014 ) through their Business Performance Measurement in Relation to Corporate Social Responsibility: A conceptual Model Development ; the internal and external drivers behind SCSR rationale for the maritime transportation sector presented by Latapí ( 2017 ) in his unpublished master thesis; and, Capturing advances in CSR: Developed versus developing country perspectives by Jamali and Carroll ( 2017 ).

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Latapí Agudelo, M.A., Jóhannsdóttir, L. & Davídsdóttir, B. A literature review of the history and evolution of corporate social responsibility. Int J Corporate Soc Responsibility 4 , 1 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40991-018-0039-y

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Yale college 2024: meet some of the graduates.

Top row, left to right, Nathan Chen, Awa Cisse, and Rohan Krishnan. Second row, left to right, Olivia Sally, Max Hammond, and Mirabel Nguyen.

Here, Yale News spotlights a few of the exceptional members of the Yale College Class of 2024, a group whose accomplishments and contributions have strengthened the Yale campus and the world beyond.

Selected from nominations submitted by residential college heads and deans, these outstanding students include poets and physicists, pianists, and environmentalists, even an Olympic gold medal winner.  One arrived on campus with visions of becoming a neurosurgeon, but soon found his calling as a writer. Another, who came to Yale through the Eli Whitney Students Program, returned to her native Senegal with other Yale scientists waging a long-term battle on malaria. When they weren’t in the classroom, they were assisting migrant communities, creating new curricula for schoolchildren, or looking to prove long-held physics theories.

We hope this small but impressive sample offers a sense of the creativity, compassion, and resilience of the undergraduate Class of 2024.

Nicole Alleyne

For Nicole Alleyne, the human body is a versatile instrument — a maker of music, a channel to the past, a tool for learning, and a link to the land. She has tapped into these potentials while inspiring others to do the same through her academic and extracurricular pursuits at Yale College and beyond.

In her capstone project at Yale, Alleyne reimagined outdoor education with a focus on connecting Black students to the land.  She also she did fieldwork for a “land-based pedagogy” project during a gap year, leading a natural science curriculum for 5th-graders in Oregon.

“ Something that is totally missing in traditional education is treating students’ bodies as active parts and interlocutors in their learning experience,” she said. “For instance, when learning about plant species, we were using our senses. We were looking or touching, smelling. … Your body has all of these tools in order to learn about the world. How can we use our bodies and these gifts in ways we might not be able to do in the classroom?”

Read more about Nicole Alleyne

Nathan Chen

Nathan Chen always knew his Yale career would be split in two: when he arrived in the fall of 2018, the figure skater already had the 2022 Winter Olympics in his sights, and would need to take time off to prepare and compete.

While on campus, the demands of training meant that his days were packed, with classes in the morning and rink time in the afternoon. And even as he carried a full course load, he embarked on a remarkable competitive winning streak. He continued to dominate the sport during two years of leave from Yale, reaching the summit of the sport with a gold medal in men's single figure skating at the Beijing Olympics in 2022. Then came a whirlwind few months that included talk show appearances and a tour with Stars on Ice.

Yet when he returned to Yale that fall, it was with a renewed sense of excitement at becoming a student again —   and discovering some of the experiences he’d missed the first time around. 

Read more about Nathan Chen

There’s a word that carries deep cultural meaning in Awa Cisse’s native Senegal; Téranga , which comes from the Wolof language, connotes the values of selflessness and generosity, and the importance of giving back to one’s community.

For Cisse, the word téranga isn’t just a reminder of her Senegalese roots, it’s a sort of guidepost for how she wants to live her life.

As a young, girl she frequented hospitals for a variety of reasons and developed an appreciation for  just how many people it takes to provide patient care.  “There is this whole ecosystem of care, from the people who greet you at the front door to those who assist you when you’re leaving,” said Cisse, who came to Yale as part of the Eli Whitney Students Program.

“ Every single piece of the puzzle is important, and it all helps make everything work. This is what inspired me to pursue a life in health care.”

Read more about Awa Cisse

Drop in on Amy Cohen and chances are you’ll find her creating something beautiful: an architectural frame, a laser-cut puzzle, a strawberry cake, an oil painting. The mechanical engineering student’s online portfolio also displays a music box, a ceramic bowl, even a menorah made of hex nuts.

“ My grandfather bought me an Erector Set when I was little — sort of foreshadowing that I’ve always loved making things,” said Cohen.

She chose her major because it combined math and design — “two things I really like.” While completing a professionally accredited track with a near-perfect GPA, she worked with the acclaimed Hatfield Group as a structural engineering intern.  Meanwhile, the mechanical engineering department, recognizing her enthusiasm for the field, chose her as an undergraduate representative for committee and recruitment work.

“ It’s a small major — we’ve all had many classes together, so I’d say it feels like family,” Cohen said. “And I'm lucky to have several professors who have really taken an interest in helping me far beyond what was required in their class.”

Read more about Amy Cohen

Ben Everett-Lane

Ben Everett-Lane’s academic journey has been driven by a deep curiosity about others — and a desire to connect.

When he learned that in 2012 some residents on the Connecticut shoreline decided to stay in their homes despite the threat of Hurricane Sandy, he became fascinated with how they reached this decisions. It would become the topic of his undergraduate thesis.

“ How people perceive and behave around climate change is meaningful to me, because fundamentally, we don’t need more science to prove that climate change exists — there’s clearly some disconnect between the science and the way that we perceive it and interact with it,” he said. “I’m interested in being a person who’s able to re-analyze, communicate, and work with different groups of people around climate change to tackle these knowledge gaps.”

Read more about Ben Everett-Lane

Laura Guerra-Lopez

Growing up in Miami, Laura Guerra-Lopez would pepper her parents with questions about their native Venezuela, the once-democratic nation that was by then mired in political and economic chaos.

Looking back, Guerra-Lopez is grateful for the frank, but age-appropriate way her parents included her in those dinnertime conversations.  “They would have real conversations,” she said. “They would tell me about what was going on, but they introduced things in a way that was not so devastating that I turned away from it.”

Those interactions with her parents, and their closeness as a family in a new country where they had no other relatives, ignited her passion for social justice and serving the immigrant community.

Read more about Laura Guerra-Lopez

Max Hammond

Over the winter, Max Hammond gave more time than usual to the piano — about eight hours a day, up from his long-term average of about five. He was applying to conservatories and aiming to impress.

The mathematics major from Los Angeles also took care to provide for his customary allotment of nightly rest: “I can’t function without eight or nine hours,” he said.

The extra keyboard and pillow time paid off: Hammond, a past winner of Yale’s Sharp Prize for “most outstanding performer in the junior class,” was accepted at six top music conservatories. After Yale, he’ll enroll at Julliard as a master’s degree candidate in solo piano performance, in tune with his pursuit of a career as a recitalist steeped in but hardly confined to the classical music cannon.

“ I want to figure out what’s next in classical music,” he said.

Read more about Max Hammond

Rohan Krishnan

Supporting refugee students as they navigated their new lives in New Haven was just one of many ways Rohan Krishnan made global connections during his time at Yale.

He came to campus committed to helping young migrants succeed academically — a cause he became passionate about while performing community service as a high school student. Beyond that, he was simply eager to experience as many new people, subjects, and activities as time would allow, thinking “the sky’s the limit.”

Still, he was amazed by the multitude of Yale’s offerings.

“ Never would I have imagined that I would meet world leaders, take courses with several former U.S. ambassadors, or tackle a real-world foreign policy issue,” said Krishnan, who majored in global affairs.

Read more about Rohan Krishnan

Alyssa Michel

Before arriving at Yale four years ago, Alyssa Michel imagined that college life would be something like an extension of her high school years. An engaged student in high school, involved in 20 or so clubs, she expected her time at Yale would involve similar pursuits.

“ I thought that if I swam in high school, then I would swim in college. Or if I did journalism in high school, I would have to do journalism in college,” said Michel. “What I didn’t expect is that you can do whatever you want. And, especially at a place like Yale, when you do something, it becomes your baby, and you invest a lot of time into it.”

This realization opened up many new worlds to Michel — including podcasting, gardening, teaching,  and even launching a business inspired by her grandmother’s traditional sorrel recipe.

Read more about Alyssa Michel

Grace Miller

As a Yale sophomore, Grace Miller began working as a student tutor in the Department of Economics. Helping her peers grasp the principles and intricacies of macroeconomics made her realize she that has a passion for education.

A year later, she began working as an intern three days a week at Common Ground High School, a public charter school in New Haven, serving as an aide in an outdoor leadership class and freshman algebra, chaperoning overnight camping trips, and running an afterschool program. And for her senior thesis, the economics major, who also completed the Education Studies Scholars Intensive Certificate, conducted an analysis of the effects of public school district mergers in Vermont.

Next year, she will teach in Chattanooga, Tennessee’s public school system.

Read more about Grace Miller

John Nguyen

John Nguyen entered Yale with plans to become a neurosurgeon. Instead, he found his calling as a writer.

As a high school student in St. Paul, Minnesota, he had been laser-focused on STEM subjects. But after taking some English classes at Yale he discovered a new love for reading and writing — with the support of a community of humanists that included a Nobel Prize-winning poet.  

He decided to major in English and developed such a fondness for poetry that he started writing poems on his own. Last year Nguyen was selected to represent Yale in the annual Connecticut Poetry Circuit, a statewide competition of college student poets.

“ I’d never encountered such community in any other space.”

Read more about John Nguyen

Mirabel Nguyen

Mirabel Nguyen came to Yale having never visited the campus. In fact, she’d barely seen any photographs before arriving in New Haven for the first time. But when selecting a college, she was determined not to be swayed by beautiful scenery anyway; she wanted to choose a school solely on its academic merits.

Nguyen was determined to excel academically and busy herself with extracurricular activities.  But after finally arriving at Yale, she began to develop more holistic goals.

“ I learned that it’s so much more than academic and extracurricular excellence that matters to me,” Nguyen said. “It’s the relationships that I’ve been building with people that show me how to be a better person.”

Read more about Mirabel Nguyen

Olivia Sally

If you had asked Olivia Sally a year ago where she’d be after graduating from Yale, she would have answered that she would be in law school. But a conversation with Mira Debs last spring changed everything.

Sally had just dipped into the icy waters of the Madison Surf Club as part of a polar plunge event at the invitation of her teacher, Debs, executive director of Yale's Education Studies Program. While chatting over post-plunge tacos, Debs mentioned the life-changing experience she had as a Rhodes Scholar, and asked Sally whether she’d considered applying for a similar fellowship.

After eventually applying for, and receiving, a Marshall Scholarship, Sally decided to pursue a Master of Education and Master of Public Policy during two years in the UK, the first member of the Yale Education Studies Program.

Read more about Olivia Sally

Barkotel Zemenu

Barkotel Zemenu is a believer in the revelatory nature of relationships.

At the most fundamental level, he says, relationships between unseen particles form the scaffolding upon which the universe flourishes; on a more human level, relationships between people — especially when speaking a common language — make the experience of living deeply fulfilling.

Zemenu immersed himself in both kinds of relationships at Yale. He excelled in physics, focusing largely on research and development for a detector that may one day prove the existence of a theorized nuclear process called neutrinoless double beta decay, spoke at scientific conferences nationally and internationally, and conducted research on multiple continents.

In a way, however, Zemenu says his treasures lie elsewhere.  “I did not expect college to be the place where academics stopped being my life’s top priority,” he said. “It was a place where I would find far more surpassing joy in the depth of my relationships, living with a fundamental others-centeredness.”

Read more about Barkotel Zemenu

Yale’s 323rd Commencement events to be held May 19 and 20

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In Farr Lecture, Yale’s Peter Aronson reflects on serendipity

Cynthia Zarin’s new novel weaves memories of winter

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Chapter 5: Thesis Statements, Introductions, and Conclusions

Evolution of the thesis statement.

Previous pages established the importance of a working thesis statement early in the writing process. This working thesis is likely to be revisited and revised several times as the writing process continues.

After gathering evidence, and before starting to write the essay itself, is a natural point to look again at the project’s thesis statement. The following video offers friendly, appealing advice for developing a thesis statement more concretely.

• Video: Evolution of the Thesis Statement. Provided by : Lumen Learning. License : CC BY: Attribution
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Thesis Defense: Philaphon Sayavong, Yi Cui Group

Capturing the Effects of Interphasial Evolution on Li Metal Battery Performance

Lithium-ion batteries has revolutionized portable electronic devices and are now expanding into the transportation sector. Electric vehicles can significantly mitigate emissions in the transportation sector, especially when powered by renewable energy sources from the grid. However, scaling up to long-haul and heavy-duty transportation requires batteries with higher energy density. One solution to address this challenge is to replace the current anode material with lithium metal, which has the potential to significantly increase the energy density of lithium batteries. Despite recent improvements, lithium metal anodes still face challenges with low cyclability. The two major capacity fading mechanisms that result in low cycle life include 1.) isolation of electroactive lithium metal deposits from the current collector and 2.) continuous reduction of the electrolyte with electroactive surfaces in the anode to form the solid electrolyte surface (SEI) layer. The SEI layer is the most important but least understood battery component, where its function is to prevent parasitic reactions between lithium metal and the electrolyte. One aspect of the SEI layer that is not well understood is how its evolution affects capacity degradation in Li metal batteries. In this dissertation, I will discuss the complex role of SEI dynamics on the performance of lithium metal batteries. I will show how the SEI layer degrades, and how this can not only result in capacity degradation, but also capacity recovery during battery cycling and aging. The insights outlined in this dissertation have the potential to aid advancements in the fields of liquid electrolyte and materials engineering, contributing to enhanced performance of Li metal batteries in the future.

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Mom delivers baby in car hours before defending her Rutgers doctoral thesis

• Updated: May. 08, 2024, 3:05 p.m. |
• Published: May. 08, 2024, 11:30 a.m.

Tamiah Brevard-Rodriguez delivered her son, Enzo, hours before defending her dissertation at the Rutgers-New Brunswick Graduate School of Education. Nick Romanenko/Rutgers University

• Tina Kelley | NJ Advance Media for NJ.com

Giving birth and defending a doctoral dissertation could easily be considered among the most stressful items on a bucket list. For Tamiah Brevard-Rodriguez, it was all in a day’s work. One day’s work.

She even grabbed a shower in between.

On March 24, Brevard-Rodriguez, director of Aresty Research Center at Rutgers University, was finishing up preparations for her doctoral defense the next day. Eight months pregnant with her second child, she didn’t feel terrific, but she persisted.

She was trying to hone down to 20 minutes her remarks on “The Beauty Performances of Black College Women: A Narrative Inquiry Study Exploring the Realities of Race, Respectability, and Beauty Standards on a Historically White Campus.” The Zoom link had gone out to family, friends, and colleagues for the defense, scheduled for 1 p.m. the next day.

“Operation Dissertation before Baby,” as she called it, was a go.

But at 2:15 a.m. on March 25 her water broke, a month and a day early.

As the contractions came closer and closer, her wife drove her down the Garden State Parkway, trying to get to Hackensack Meridian Mountainside Medical Center in Montclair before Baby Enzo showed up.

But the baby was faster than a speeding Maserati and arrived in the front seat at 5:55 a.m., after just three pushes. He weighed in at 5-pounds 12-ounces, 19 inches long, and in perfect health for a baby four weeks early.

“I did have to detail her car afterward,” the new mom said of her wife.

Brevard-Rodriguez was feeling so good after the birth that she decided against asking to reschedule her thesis defense.

“I had more than enough time to regroup, shower, eat and proceed with the dissertation,” she said. She had a quick nap, too. The doctors and nurses supported her decision and made sure she had access to reliable wifi at the hospital.

She gave her defense with a Rutgers background screen. When she learned she had passed, she dropped the fake background, and people could see Brevard-Rodriguez in her maternity bed, and Enzo in her wife’s arms.

“I said, ‘You guys missed the big news,’ and they just fell out,” said Brevard-Rodriguez, who waited for the reveal because she didn’t want extra sympathy from her dissertation committee.

Melina Mangin, chair of the Educational Theory, Policy & Administration Department at the Graduate School of Education, was astounded.

“Tamiah had delivered a flawless defense with zero indication that she had just given birth,” she said. “She really took the idea of productivity to the next level!”

Finishing her doctorate in education and having her last child were fitting 40th birthday presents to herself, Brevard-Rodriguez said. She turned 40 in November and returns to work in late August.

Stories by Tina Kelley

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Tina Kelley may be reached at [email protected] .

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