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  • Browse content in A - General Economics and Teaching
  • Browse content in A1 - General Economics
  • A10 - General
  • A11 - Role of Economics; Role of Economists; Market for Economists
  • A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
  • A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
  • A14 - Sociology of Economics
  • Browse content in A2 - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics
  • A20 - General
  • A29 - Other
  • A3 - Collective Works
  • Browse content in B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches
  • Browse content in B0 - General
  • B00 - General
  • Browse content in B1 - History of Economic Thought through 1925
  • B10 - General
  • B11 - Preclassical (Ancient, Medieval, Mercantilist, Physiocratic)
  • B12 - Classical (includes Adam Smith)
  • B13 - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Stockholm School)
  • B14 - Socialist; Marxist
  • B15 - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
  • B16 - History of Economic Thought: Quantitative and Mathematical
  • B17 - International Trade and Finance
  • B19 - Other
  • Browse content in B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925
  • B20 - General
  • B21 - Microeconomics
  • B22 - Macroeconomics
  • B23 - Econometrics; Quantitative and Mathematical Studies
  • B24 - Socialist; Marxist; Sraffian
  • B25 - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian
  • B26 - Financial Economics
  • B27 - International Trade and Finance
  • B29 - Other
  • Browse content in B3 - History of Economic Thought: Individuals
  • B30 - General
  • B31 - Individuals
  • Browse content in B4 - Economic Methodology
  • B40 - General
  • B41 - Economic Methodology
  • B49 - Other
  • Browse content in B5 - Current Heterodox Approaches
  • B50 - General
  • B51 - Socialist; Marxian; Sraffian
  • B52 - Institutional; Evolutionary
  • B53 - Austrian
  • B54 - Feminist Economics
  • B55 - Social Economics
  • B59 - Other
  • Browse content in C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
  • Browse content in C0 - General
  • C00 - General
  • C02 - Mathematical Methods
  • Browse content in C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General
  • C10 - General
  • C12 - Hypothesis Testing: General
  • C13 - Estimation: General
  • C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
  • C18 - Methodological Issues: General
  • C19 - Other
  • Browse content in C2 - Single Equation Models; Single Variables
  • C20 - General
  • C21 - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions
  • C22 - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes
  • C23 - Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
  • C25 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
  • Browse content in C3 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables
  • C30 - General
  • C32 - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models
  • C34 - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models
  • C38 - Classification Methods; Cluster Analysis; Principal Components; Factor Models
  • Browse content in C4 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics
  • C43 - Index Numbers and Aggregation
  • C44 - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
  • Browse content in C5 - Econometric Modeling
  • C50 - General
  • Browse content in C6 - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
  • C60 - General
  • C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
  • C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
  • C63 - Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling
  • C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
  • C67 - Input-Output Models
  • Browse content in C8 - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs
  • C82 - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Macroeconomic Data; Data Access
  • C89 - Other
  • Browse content in C9 - Design of Experiments
  • C90 - General
  • C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
  • C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
  • C93 - Field Experiments
  • Browse content in D - Microeconomics
  • Browse content in D0 - General
  • D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
  • D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
  • D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
  • Browse content in D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics
  • D10 - General
  • D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
  • D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
  • D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
  • D14 - Household Saving; Personal Finance
  • Browse content in D2 - Production and Organizations
  • D20 - General
  • D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
  • D22 - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
  • D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
  • D24 - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
  • D25 - Intertemporal Firm Choice: Investment, Capacity, and Financing
  • Browse content in D3 - Distribution
  • D30 - General
  • D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
  • D33 - Factor Income Distribution
  • D39 - Other
  • Browse content in D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
  • D40 - General
  • D41 - Perfect Competition
  • D42 - Monopoly
  • D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
  • D46 - Value Theory
  • Browse content in D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
  • D50 - General
  • D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
  • D57 - Input-Output Tables and Analysis
  • D58 - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
  • Browse content in D6 - Welfare Economics
  • D60 - General
  • D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
  • D62 - Externalities
  • D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
  • D64 - Altruism; Philanthropy
  • D69 - Other
  • Browse content in D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
  • D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
  • D72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
  • D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
  • Browse content in D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
  • D80 - General
  • D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
  • D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
  • D84 - Expectations; Speculations
  • D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
  • D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
  • D87 - Neuroeconomics
  • Browse content in D9 - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
  • D91 - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
  • Browse content in E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
  • Browse content in E0 - General
  • E00 - General
  • E01 - Measurement and Data on National Income and Product Accounts and Wealth; Environmental Accounts
  • E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
  • Browse content in E1 - General Aggregative Models
  • E10 - General
  • E11 - Marxian; Sraffian; Kaleckian
  • E12 - Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian
  • E13 - Neoclassical
  • E16 - Social Accounting Matrix
  • E17 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
  • Browse content in E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy
  • E20 - General
  • E21 - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
  • E22 - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
  • E23 - Production
  • E24 - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
  • E25 - Aggregate Factor Income Distribution
  • E26 - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
  • E27 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
  • Browse content in E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
  • E30 - General
  • E31 - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
  • E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
  • E37 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
  • Browse content in E4 - Money and Interest Rates
  • E40 - General
  • E41 - Demand for Money
  • E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
  • E43 - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
  • E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
  • E49 - Other
  • Browse content in E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
  • E50 - General
  • E51 - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
  • E52 - Monetary Policy
  • E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
  • Browse content in E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
  • E60 - General
  • E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
  • E62 - Fiscal Policy
  • E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
  • E64 - Incomes Policy; Price Policy
  • E65 - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
  • Browse content in F - International Economics
  • Browse content in F0 - General
  • F00 - General
  • F01 - Global Outlook
  • F02 - International Economic Order and Integration
  • Browse content in F1 - Trade
  • F10 - General
  • F11 - Neoclassical Models of Trade
  • F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
  • F13 - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
  • F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade
  • F15 - Economic Integration
  • F16 - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
  • F17 - Trade Forecasting and Simulation
  • F18 - Trade and Environment
  • Browse content in F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business
  • F20 - General
  • F21 - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
  • F22 - International Migration
  • F23 - Multinational Firms; International Business
  • Browse content in F3 - International Finance
  • F30 - General
  • F31 - Foreign Exchange
  • F32 - Current Account Adjustment; Short-Term Capital Movements
  • F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
  • F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems
  • F35 - Foreign Aid
  • F36 - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
  • F37 - International Finance Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
  • F39 - Other
  • Browse content in F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
  • F40 - General
  • F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics
  • F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
  • F43 - Economic Growth of Open Economies
  • F44 - International Business Cycles
  • F45 - Macroeconomic Issues of Monetary Unions
  • F47 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
  • Browse content in F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
  • F50 - General
  • F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
  • F53 - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
  • F54 - Colonialism; Imperialism; Postcolonialism
  • F55 - International Institutional Arrangements
  • F59 - Other
  • Browse content in F6 - Economic Impacts of Globalization
  • F60 - General
  • F61 - Microeconomic Impacts
  • F62 - Macroeconomic Impacts
  • F63 - Economic Development
  • F64 - Environment
  • F65 - Finance
  • Browse content in G - Financial Economics
  • Browse content in G0 - General
  • G00 - General
  • G01 - Financial Crises
  • Browse content in G1 - General Financial Markets
  • G10 - General
  • G11 - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
  • G12 - Asset Pricing; Trading volume; Bond Interest Rates
  • G13 - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
  • G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
  • G15 - International Financial Markets
  • G18 - Government Policy and Regulation
  • G19 - Other
  • Browse content in G2 - Financial Institutions and Services
  • G20 - General
  • G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
  • G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
  • G23 - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
  • G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
  • G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
  • Browse content in G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
  • G30 - General
  • G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
  • G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
  • G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
  • G35 - Payout Policy
  • G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
  • Browse content in G5 - Household Finance
  • G51 - Household Saving, Borrowing, Debt, and Wealth
  • Browse content in H - Public Economics
  • Browse content in H1 - Structure and Scope of Government
  • H10 - General
  • H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
  • H12 - Crisis Management
  • Browse content in H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
  • H20 - General
  • H22 - Incidence
  • H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
  • H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies
  • H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
  • Browse content in H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
  • Browse content in H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
  • H40 - General
  • H41 - Public Goods
  • Browse content in H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
  • H50 - General
  • H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
  • H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
  • H56 - National Security and War
  • Browse content in H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
  • H60 - General
  • H62 - Deficit; Surplus
  • H63 - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
  • H68 - Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt
  • Browse content in H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
  • H70 - General
  • H74 - State and Local Borrowing
  • H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
  • Browse content in I - Health, Education, and Welfare
  • Browse content in I0 - General
  • I00 - General
  • Browse content in I1 - Health
  • I10 - General
  • I12 - Health Behavior
  • I14 - Health and Inequality
  • I15 - Health and Economic Development
  • Browse content in I2 - Education and Research Institutions
  • I20 - General
  • I21 - Analysis of Education
  • I23 - Higher Education; Research Institutions
  • I24 - Education and Inequality
  • I26 - Returns to Education
  • Browse content in I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
  • I30 - General
  • I31 - General Welfare
  • I32 - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
  • I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
  • Browse content in J - Labor and Demographic Economics
  • Browse content in J0 - General
  • J00 - General
  • J01 - Labor Economics: General
  • J08 - Labor Economics Policies
  • Browse content in J1 - Demographic Economics
  • J10 - General
  • J13 - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
  • J15 - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
  • J16 - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
  • J18 - Public Policy
  • Browse content in J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor
  • J20 - General
  • J21 - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
  • J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
  • J23 - Labor Demand
  • J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
  • J26 - Retirement; Retirement Policies
  • J28 - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
  • J29 - Other
  • Browse content in J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
  • J30 - General
  • J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
  • J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
  • J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
  • J38 - Public Policy
  • Browse content in J4 - Particular Labor Markets
  • J40 - General
  • J41 - Labor Contracts
  • J42 - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
  • J44 - Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing
  • J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets
  • J46 - Informal Labor Markets
  • J48 - Public Policy
  • J49 - Other
  • Browse content in J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
  • J50 - General
  • J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
  • J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
  • J53 - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
  • J54 - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms; Employee Ownership
  • J58 - Public Policy
  • Browse content in J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers
  • J60 - General
  • J61 - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
  • J62 - Job, Occupational, and Intergenerational Mobility
  • J63 - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
  • J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
  • J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
  • J68 - Public Policy
  • J69 - Other
  • Browse content in J7 - Labor Discrimination
  • J71 - Discrimination
  • J78 - Public Policy
  • Browse content in J8 - Labor Standards: National and International
  • J80 - General
  • J81 - Working Conditions
  • J83 - Workers' Rights
  • J88 - Public Policy
  • Browse content in K - Law and Economics
  • Browse content in K0 - General
  • K00 - General
  • Browse content in K1 - Basic Areas of Law
  • K11 - Property Law
  • K12 - Contract Law
  • K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
  • Browse content in K2 - Regulation and Business Law
  • K20 - General
  • K21 - Antitrust Law
  • K22 - Business and Securities Law
  • K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
  • K25 - Real Estate Law
  • Browse content in K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law
  • K31 - Labor Law
  • K39 - Other
  • Browse content in K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
  • K40 - General
  • K41 - Litigation Process
  • K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
  • Browse content in L - Industrial Organization
  • Browse content in L0 - General
  • L00 - General
  • Browse content in L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
  • L10 - General
  • L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
  • L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
  • L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
  • L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
  • L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change; Industrial Price Indices
  • Browse content in L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
  • L20 - General
  • L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
  • L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
  • L23 - Organization of Production
  • L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
  • L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
  • L26 - Entrepreneurship
  • L29 - Other
  • Browse content in L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
  • L30 - General
  • L31 - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
  • L32 - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
  • L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
  • L39 - Other
  • Browse content in L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
  • L40 - General
  • L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
  • L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
  • Browse content in L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy
  • L50 - General
  • L52 - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
  • Browse content in L6 - Industry Studies: Manufacturing
  • L60 - General
  • L61 - Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics
  • L66 - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco; Wine and Spirits
  • L67 - Other Consumer Nondurables: Clothing, Textiles, Shoes, and Leather Goods; Household Goods; Sports Equipment
  • Browse content in L7 - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction
  • L78 - Government Policy
  • Browse content in L8 - Industry Studies: Services
  • L80 - General
  • L82 - Entertainment; Media
  • Browse content in L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
  • L97 - Utilities: General
  • L98 - Government Policy
  • Browse content in M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics
  • Browse content in M0 - General
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  • Browse content in M1 - Business Administration
  • M10 - General
  • M12 - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
  • M13 - New Firms; Startups
  • M16 - International Business Administration
  • Browse content in M2 - Business Economics
  • M21 - Business Economics
  • Browse content in M3 - Marketing and Advertising
  • M37 - Advertising
  • Browse content in M4 - Accounting and Auditing
  • M41 - Accounting
  • M49 - Other
  • Browse content in M5 - Personnel Economics
  • M51 - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
  • M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
  • M54 - Labor Management
  • M55 - Labor Contracting Devices
  • Browse content in N - Economic History
  • Browse content in N0 - General
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  • N01 - Development of the Discipline: Historiographical; Sources and Methods
  • Browse content in N1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations
  • N10 - General, International, or Comparative
  • N11 - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
  • N12 - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
  • N13 - Europe: Pre-1913
  • N14 - Europe: 1913-
  • N15 - Asia including Middle East
  • N17 - Africa; Oceania
  • Browse content in N2 - Financial Markets and Institutions
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  • N24 - Europe: 1913-
  • N25 - Asia including Middle East
  • N26 - Latin America; Caribbean
  • Browse content in N3 - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy
  • N30 - General, International, or Comparative
  • N32 - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
  • N34 - Europe: 1913-
  • Browse content in N4 - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
  • N43 - Europe: Pre-1913
  • Browse content in N5 - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment, and Extractive Industries
  • N50 - General, International, or Comparative
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  • N52 - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
  • N55 - Asia including Middle East
  • N7 - Transport, Trade, Energy, Technology, and Other Services
  • Browse content in N8 - Micro-Business History
  • N80 - General, International, or Comparative
  • Browse content in O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth
  • Browse content in O1 - Economic Development
  • O10 - General
  • O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
  • O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
  • O13 - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
  • O14 - Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology
  • O15 - Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
  • O16 - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
  • O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
  • O18 - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
  • O19 - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
  • Browse content in O2 - Development Planning and Policy
  • O20 - General
  • O23 - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
  • O24 - Trade Policy; Factor Movement Policy; Foreign Exchange Policy
  • O25 - Industrial Policy
  • Browse content in O3 - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
  • O30 - General
  • O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
  • O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
  • O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
  • O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
  • O35 - Social Innovation
  • O38 - Government Policy
  • O39 - Other
  • Browse content in O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity
  • O40 - General
  • O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
  • O43 - Institutions and Growth
  • O44 - Environment and Growth
  • O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
  • Browse content in O5 - Economywide Country Studies
  • O50 - General
  • O51 - U.S.; Canada
  • O52 - Europe
  • O53 - Asia including Middle East
  • O54 - Latin America; Caribbean
  • O55 - Africa
  • Browse content in P - Economic Systems
  • Browse content in P0 - General
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  • Browse content in P1 - Capitalist Systems
  • P10 - General
  • P11 - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
  • P12 - Capitalist Enterprises
  • P13 - Cooperative Enterprises
  • P14 - Property Rights
  • P16 - Political Economy
  • P17 - Performance and Prospects
  • Browse content in P2 - Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies
  • P20 - General
  • P21 - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
  • P25 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
  • Browse content in P3 - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
  • P30 - General
  • P31 - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
  • P32 - Collectives; Communes; Agriculture
  • P35 - Public Economics
  • P36 - Consumer Economics; Health; Education and Training; Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
  • P37 - Legal Institutions; Illegal Behavior
  • Browse content in P4 - Other Economic Systems
  • P40 - General
  • P41 - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
  • P46 - Consumer Economics; Health; Education and Training; Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
  • P48 - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
  • Browse content in P5 - Comparative Economic Systems
  • P50 - General
  • P51 - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
  • P52 - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies
  • Browse content in Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics
  • Browse content in Q0 - General
  • Q00 - General
  • Q01 - Sustainable Development
  • Browse content in Q1 - Agriculture
  • Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
  • Q18 - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
  • Browse content in Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
  • Q30 - General
  • Browse content in Q4 - Energy
  • Q41 - Demand and Supply; Prices
  • Q42 - Alternative Energy Sources
  • Q48 - Government Policy
  • Browse content in Q5 - Environmental Economics
  • Q50 - General
  • Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters; Global Warming
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Issue Cover

Article Contents

1. introduction, 2. paris purposes and the future we made, 3. the problem of unmaking, 4. conclusion: unmaking and is paris possible, conflict of interest statement, bibliography.

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Electric vehicles: the future we made and the problem of unmaking it

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Jamie Morgan, Electric vehicles: the future we made and the problem of unmaking it, Cambridge Journal of Economics , Volume 44, Issue 4, July 2020, Pages 953–977, https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/beaa022

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The uptake of battery electric vehicles (BEVs), subject to bottlenecks, seems to have reached a tipping point in the UK and this mirrors a general trend globally. BEVs are being positioned as one significant strand in the web of policy intended to translate the good intentions of Article 2 of the Conference of the Parties 21 Paris Agreement into reality. Governments and municipalities are anticipating that a widespread shift to BEVs will significantly reduce transport-related carbon emissions and, therefore, augment their nationally determined contributions to emissions reduction within the Paris Agreement. However, matters are more complicated than they may appear. There is a difference between thinking we can just keep relying on human ingenuity to solve problems after they emerge and engaging in fundamental social redesign to prevent the trajectories of harm. BEVs illustrate this. The contribution to emissions reduction per vehicle unit may be less than the public initially perceive since the important issue here is the lifecycle of the BEV and this is in no sense zero-emission. Furthermore, even though one can make the case that BEVs are a superior alternative to the fossil fuel-powered internal combustion engine, the transition to BEVs may actually facilitate exceeding the carbon budget on which the Paris Agreement ultimately rests. Whether in fact it does depends on the nature of the policy that shapes the transition. If the transition is a form of substitution that conforms to rather than shifts against current global scales and trends in private transportation, then it is highly likely that BEVs will be a successful failure. For this not to be the case, then the transition to BEVs must be coordinated with a transformation of the current scales and trends in private transportation. That is, a significant reduction in dependence on and individual ownership of powered vehicles, a radical reimagining of the nature of private conveyance and of public transportation.

According to the UK Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT), the Tesla Model 3 sold 2,685 units in December 2019, making it the 9th best-selling car in the country in that month (by new registrations; in August, a typically slow month for sales, it had been 3rd with 2,082 units sold; Lea, 2019; SMMT, 2019 ). As of early 2020, battery electric vehicles (BEVs) such as the new Hyundai Electric Kona had a two-year waiting list for delivery and the Kia e-Niro a one-year wait. The uptake of electric vehicles, subject to bottlenecks, seems to have reached a tipping point in the UK and this transcends the popularity of any given model. This possible tipping point mirrors a general trend globally (however, see later for quite what this means). At the regional, national and municipal scale, public health and environmentally informed legislation are encouraging vehicle manufacturers to invest heavily in alternative fuel vehicles and, in particular, BEVs and plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEVs), which are jointly categorised within ‘ultra-low emission vehicles’ (ULEVs). 1 According to a report by Deloitte, more than 20 major cities worldwide announced plans in 2017–18 to ban petrol and diesel cars by 2030 or sooner ( Deloitte, 2018 , p. 5). All the major manufacturers have or are launching BEV models, and so vehicles are becoming available across the status and income spectrum that has in the past determined market segmentation. According to the consultancy Frost & Sullivan (2019) , there were 207 models (143 BEVs, 64 PHEVs) available globally in 2018 compared with 165 in 2017.

In 2018, the UK government published its Road to Zero policy commitment and introduced the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 , which empowers future governments to regulate regarding the required infrastructure. Road to Zero announced an ‘expectation’ that between 50% and 70% of new cars and vans will be electric by 2030 and the intention to ‘end the sale of new conventional petrol and diesel cars and vans by 2040’, with the ‘ambition’ that by 2050 almost all vehicles on the road will be ‘zero-emission’ at the point of use ( Department for Transport, 2018 ). Progress towards these goals was to be reviewed 2025. 2 However, on 4 February 2020, Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced that in the run-up to Conference of the Parties (COP)26 in Glasgow (now postponed), Britain would bring forward its 2040 goal to 2035. The UK is a member of the Clean Energy Ministerial Campaign (CEM), which launched the EV30@30 initiative in 2017, and its Road to Zero policy commitments broadly align with those of many European countries. 3 Norway has longstanding generous incentives for BEVs ( Holtsmark and Skonhoft, 2014 ) and 31% of all cars sold in 2018 and just under 50% in the first half of 2019 in Norway were BEVs. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), Norway is the per capita global leader in electric vehicle uptake ( IEA, 2019A ). 4

BEVs, then, are being positioned as one significant strand in the web of policy intended to translate the good intentions of Article 2 of the COP 21 Paris Agreement into reality (see Morgan, 2016 ; IEA, 2019A , pp. 11–2). Clearly, governments and municipalities are anticipating that a widespread shift to electric vehicles will significantly reduce transport-related carbon emissions and, therefore, augment their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to emissions reduction within the Paris Agreement. And, since the BEV trend is global, the impacts potentially also apply to countries whose relation to Paris is more problematic, including the USA (for Trump and his context, see Gills et al. , 2019 ). However, matters are more complicated than they may appear. Clearly, innovation and technological change are important components in our response to the challenge of climate change. However, there is a difference between thinking we can just keep relying on human ingenuity to solve problems after they emerge and engaging in fundamental social redesign to prevent the trajectories of harm. BEVs illustrate this. In what follows we explore the issues.

The aim of this paper, then, is to argue that it is a mistake to claim, assert or assume that BEVs are necessarily a panacea for the emissions problem. To do so would be an instance of what ecological economists refer to as ‘technocentrism’, as though simply substituting BEVs for existing internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles was sufficient. The literature on this is, of course, vast, if one consults specialist journals or recent monographs (e.g. Chapman, 2007 ; Bailey and Wilson, 2009 ; Williamson et al. , 2018 ), but remains relatively under-explored in general political economy circles at a time of ‘Climate Emergency’, and so warrants discussion in introductory and indicative fashion, setting out, however incompletely, the range of issues at stake. To be clear, the very fact that there is a range is itself important. BEVs are technology, technologies have social contexts and social contexts include systemic features and related attitudes and behaviours. Technocentrism distracts from appropriate recognition of this. At its worse, technocentrism fails to address and so works to reproduce a counter-productive ecological modernisation: the technological focus facilitates socio-economic trends, which are part of the broader problem rather than solutions to it. In the case of BEVs, key areas to consider and points to make include:

Transport is now one of, if not, the major source of carbon emissions in the UK and in many other countries. Transport emissions stubbornly resist reduction. The UK, like many other countries, exhibits contradictory trends and policy claims regarding future carbon emissions reductions. As such, it is an error to simply assume prior emissions reduction trends will necessarily continue into the future, and the new net-zero goal highlights the short time line and urgency of the problem.

Whilst BEVs are, from an emissions point of view, a superior technology to ICE vehicles, this is less than an ordinary member of the public might think. ‘Embodied emissions’, ‘energy mix’ and ‘life cycle’ analysis all matter.

There is a difference between ‘superior technology’ and ‘superior choice’, the latter must also take account of the scale of and general trend growth in vehicle ownership and use. It is this that creates a meaningful context for what substitution can be reasonably expected to achieve.

A 1:1 substitution of BEVs for ICE vehicles and general growth in the number of vehicles potentially violates the Precautionary Principle. It creates a problem that did not need to exist, e.g. since there is net growth, it involves ‘emission reductions’ within new emissions sources and this is reckless. Inter alia , a host of fallacies and other risks inherent to the socio-economy of BEVs and resource extraction/dependence also apply.

As such, it makes more sense to resist rather than facilitate techno-political lock-in or path-dependence on private transportation and instead to coordinate any transition to BEVs with a more fundamental social redesign of public transport and transport options.

This systematic statement should be kept in mind whilst reading the following. Cumulatively, the points stated facilitate appropriate consideration of the question: What kind of solution are BEVs to what kind of problem? And we return to this in the conclusion. It is also worth bearing in mind, though it is not core to the explicit argument pursued, that an economy is a complex evolving open system and economics has not only struggled to adequately address this in general, it has particularly done so in terms of ecological issues (for relevant critique, see especially the work of Clive Spash and collected, Fullbrook and Morgan, 2019 ). 5 Since we assume limited prior knowledge on the part of the reader, we begin by briefly setting out the road to the current carbon budget problem.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was created in 1992. Article 2 of the Convention states its goal as, the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ ( UNFCCC, 1992 , p. 4; Gills and Morgan, 2019 ). Emissions are cumulative because emitted CO 2 can stay in the atmosphere for well over one hundred years (other greenhouse gases [GHGs] tend to be of shorter duration). Our climate future is made now. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) collates existent models to produce a forecast range and has typically used atmospheric CO 2 of 450 ppm as a level likely to trigger a 2°C average warming. This has translated into a ‘carbon budget’ restricting total cumulative emissions to the lower end of 3,000+ Gigatonnes of CO 2 (GtCO 2 ). In the last few years, climate scientists have begun to argue that positive feedback loops with adverse warming and other climatological and ecological effects may be underestimated in prior models (see Hansen et al. , 2017 ; Steffen et al. , 2018 ). Such concerns are one reason why Article 2 of the UNFCCC COP 21 Paris Agreement included a goal of at least trying to do better than the 2°C target—restricting warming to 1.5°C. This further restricts the available carbon budget. However, current Paris Agreement country commitments stated as NDCs look set to exceed the 3,000+ target in a matter of a few short years ( UNFCCC, 2015 ; Morgan, 2016 , 2017 ).

Since the industrial revolution began, we have already produced more than 2,000 GtCO 2 . Total annual emissions have increased rather than decreased over the period in which the problem has been recognised. The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) publishes periodic ‘emissions gap’ reports. Its recent 10-year summary report notes that emissions grew at an average 1.6% per year from 2008 to 2017 and ‘show no signs of peaking’ ( Christensen and Olhoff, 2019 , p. 3). In 2018, the 9th Report stated that annual emissions in 2017 stood at a record of 53.5 Gigatonnes of CO 2 and equivalents (GtCO 2e ) ( UNEP, 2018 , p. xv). This compares to less than 25 GtCO 2 in 2000 and far exceeds on a global basis the level in the Kyoto Protocol benchmark year of 1990. According to the 9th Emissions Gap Report, 184 parties to the Paris Agreement had so far provided NDCs. If these NDCs are achieved, annual emissions in 2030 are projected to still be 53 GtCO 2e . However, if the current ‘implementation deficit’ continues global annual emissions could increase by about 10% to 59 GtCO 2e . This is because current emissions policy is not sufficient to offset the ‘key drivers’ of ‘economic growth and population growth’ ( Christensen and Olhoff, 2019 , p. 3). By sharp contrast, the IPCC Global Warming of 1.5 ° C report states that annual global emissions must fall by 45% from the 2017 figure by 2030 and become net zero by mid-century in order to achieve the Paris target ( IPCC, 2018 ). According to the subsequent 10th Emissions Gap Report, emissions increased yet again to 55.3 GtCO 2e in 2018 and, as a result of this adverse trend, emissions need to fall by 7.6% per year from 2020 to 2030 to achieve the IPCC goal, and this contrasts with less than 4% had reductions begun in 2010 and 15% if they are delayed until 2025 ( UNEP 2019A ). Current emissions trends mean that we will achieve an additional 500 GtCO 2 quickly and imply an average warming of 3 to 4°C over the rest of the century and into the next. We are thus on track for the ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ that the COP process is intended to prevent ( UNFCCC, 1992 , p. 4). According to the 10th Emissions Gap Report, 78% of all emissions derive from the G-20 nations, and whilst many countries had recognised the need for net zero, only 5 countries of the G-20 had committed to this and none had yet submitted formal strategies. COP 25, December 2019, meanwhile, resulted in no overall progress other than on measurement and finance (for detailed analysis, see Newell and Taylor, 2020 ). As such, the situation is urgent and becoming more so.

Problems, moreover, have already begun to manifest ( UNEP 2019B , 2019B ; IPCC 2019A , 2019B ). Climate change does not respect borders, some countries may be more adversely affected sooner than others, but there is no reason to assume that cumulative effects will be localised. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that they will be manageable based on our current designs for life. In November 2019, several prominent systems and climate scientists published a survey essay in Nature highlighting nine critical climate tipping points that we are either imminently approaching or may have already exceeded ( Lenton et al. , 2018 ). In that same month, more than 11,250 scientists from 153 countries (the Alliance of World Scientists) signed a letter published in BioScience concurring that we now face a genuine existential ‘Climate Emergency’ and warning of ‘ecocide’ if ‘major transformations’ are not forthcoming ( Ripple et al. , 2019 ). We live in incredibly complex interconnected societies based on long supply chains and just in time delivery–few of us (including nations) are self-sufficient. Global human civilisation is extremely vulnerable and the carbon emission problem is only one of several conjoint problems created by our expansionary industrialised-consumption system. Appropriate and timely policy solutions are, therefore, imperative. Cambridge now has a Centre for the Study of Existential Risk and Oxford a Future of Humanity Institute (see also Servigne and Stevens, 2015 ). This is serious research, not millenarian cultishness. The Covid-19 outbreak only serves to underscore the fragility of our systems. As Michael Marmot, Professor of epidemiology has commented, the outbreak reveals not only how political decisions can make systems more vulnerable, but also how governments can, when sufficiently motivated, take immediate and radical action (Harvey, 2020). To reiterate, however, according to both the IPCC and UNEP, emissions must fall drastically. 6

Policy design and implementation are mainly national (domestic). As such, an initial focus on the UK provides a useful point of departure to contextualise what the transition to BEVs might be expected to achieve.

The UK is a Kyoto and Paris signatory. It is a member of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The UK Climate Change Act 2008 was the world’s first long-term legally binding national framework for targeted statutory reductions in emissions. The Act required the UK to reduce its emissions by at least 80% by 2050 (below the 1990 baseline; this has been broadly in line with subsequent EU policy on the subject). 7 The Act put in place a system of five yearly ‘carbon budgets’ to keep the UK on an emissions reduction pathway to 2050. The subsequent carbon budgets have been produced with input from the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), an independent body created by the 2008 Act to advise the government. In November 2015, the CCC recommended a target of 57% below 1990 levels by the early 2030s (the fifth carbon budget). 8 Following the Paris Agreement’s new target of 1.5°C and the IPCC and UNEP reports late 2018, the CCC published the report Net Zero: The UK’s contribution to stopping global warming ( CCC, 2019 ). 9 The CCC report recognises that Paris creates additional responsibility for the UK to augment and accelerate its targets within the new bottom-up Paris NDC procedure. The CCC recommended an enhanced UK net-zero GHG emissions target (formally defined in terms of long-term and short-term GHGs) by 2050. This included emissions from aviation and shipping and with no use of strategies that offset or swap real emissions. In June 2019, Theresa May, then UK Prime Minister, committed to adopt the recommendation using secondary legislation (absorbed into the 2008 Act—but without the offset commitment). So, the UK is one of the few G-20 countries to, so far, provide a formal commitment on net zero, though as the UNEP notes, a commitment is not itself necessarily indicative of a realisable strategy. The CCC responded to the government announcement:

This is just the first step. The target must now be reinforced by credible UK policies, across government, inspiring a strong response from business, industry and society as a whole. The government has not yet moved formally to include international aviation and shipping within the target , but they have acknowledged that these sectors must be part of the whole economy strategy for net zero. We will assist by providing further analysis of how emissions reductions can be delivered in these sectors through domestic and international frameworks. 10

The development of policy is currently in flux during the Covid-19 lockdown and whilst Brexit reaches some kind of resolution. As noted in the Introduction section, however, May’s replacement, Boris Johnson has signalled his government’s commitment to achieving its statutory commitments. However, this has been met with some scepticism, not least because it has not been clear what new powers administrative bodies would have and over and above this many of the Cabinet are from the far right of the Conservative Party, and are on record as climate change sceptics or have a voting record of opposing environmentally focussed investment, taxes, subsidies and prohibitions (including the new Environment Secretary, George Eustice, formerly of UKIP). The policy may and hopefully will change, becoming more concrete, but it is still instructive to assess context and general trends.

The UK has one of the best records in the world on reducing emissions. However, given full context, this is not necessarily a cause for congratulation or confidence. It would be a mistake to think that emissions reduction exhibits a definite rate that can be projected from the past into the future. 11 This applies both nationally and globally. Some sources of relative reduction that are local or national have different significance on a global basis (they are partial transfers) and overall the closer one approaches net zero the more resistant or difficult it is likely to become to achieve reductions. The CCC has already begun to signal that the UK is now failing to meet its existent budgets. This follows periods of successive emissions reductions. According to the CCC, the UK has reduced its GHG emissions by approximately one-third since 1990. ‘Per capita emissions are now close to the global average at 7–8 tCO 2 e/person, having been over 50% above in 2008’ ( CCC, 2019 , p. 46). Other analyses are even more positive. According to Carbon Brief, emissions have fallen in seven consecutive years from 2013 to 2019 and by 40% compared with the 1990 benchmark. Carbon Brief claim that since 2010 the UK has the fastest rate of emissions reduction of any major economy. However, it concurs with the CCC that future likely reductions are less than the UK’s carbon budgets and that the new net-zero commitment requires: amounting to only an additional 10% reduction over the next decade to 2030. 12

Moreover, all analyses agree that the reduction has mainly been achieved by reducing coal output for use in electricity generation (switching to natural gas) and by relative deindustrialisation as the UK economy has continued to grow—manufacturing is a smaller part of a larger service-based economy. 13 And , the data are based on a production focussed accounting system. The accounting system does not include all emissions sources. It does not include those that the UK ‘imports’ based on consumption. UK consumption-based emissions per year are estimated to be about 70% greater than the production measure (for different methods, see DECC, 2015 ). 14 If consumption is included, the main estimates for falling emissions change to around a 10% reduction since 1990. Moreover, much of this has been achieved by relatively invisible historic transitions as the economy has evolved in lock-step with globalisation. That is, reductions have been ones that did not require the population to confront behaviours as they have developed. No onerous interventions have been imposed, as yet . 15 However, it does not follow that this can continue, since future reductions are likely to be more challenging. The UK cannot deindustrialise again (nor can the global economy, as is, simply deindustrialise in aggregate if final consumption remains the primary goal), and the UK has already mainly switched from coal energy production. Emissions from electricity generation may fall but it also matters what the electricity is being used to power. In any case, future emissions reductions, in general, require more effective changes in other sectors, and this necessarily seems to require everyone to question their socio-economic practices. Transport is a key issue.

As a ‘satellite’ of its National Accounts, the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) publishes Environmental Accounts and these data are used to measure progress. Much of the data refer to the prior year or earlier. In 2017, UK GHG emissions were reported to be 566 million tonnes CO 2 e (2% less than 2016 and, as already noted about one-third of the 1990 level; ONS, 2019 ). The headline accounts break this down into four categories (for which further subdivisions are produced by various sources) and we can usefully contrast 1990 and recent data ( ONS, 2019 , p. 4):

Top 4 sectors for GHG emissions in the UK1990 MtCO e2017 MtCO e
Electricity supply217100
Manufacturing18086
Household142144
Transport & storage6683
Total for all sectors794566

The Environmental Accounts’ figures indicate some shifting in the relative sources of emissions over the last 30 years. As we have intimated, electricity generation and manufacturing have experienced reduced emissions, though they are far from zero; household and transport, meanwhile, have remained stubbornly high. Moreover, the accounts are also slightly misleading for the uninitiated, since transport refers to the industry and not all transport. Domestic car ownership and use are part of the household sector, and it is the continued dependence on car ownership that provides, along with heating and insulation issues, one of the major sources of the persistently high level of household emissions. The UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (DBEIS) provides differently organised statistics and attributes cars to its transport category and uses a subsequent residential category rather than household category. The Department’s statistical release in 2018 thus attributes a higher 140 MtCO 2 e to transport for 2016, whilst the residential category is a correspondingly lower figure of approximately 106 MtCO 2 e. The 140 MtCO 2 e is just slightly less than the equivalent figure for 1990, although transport achieved a peak of about 156 MtCO 2 e in 2005 ( DBEIS, 2018 , pp. 8–9). As of 2016, transport becomes the largest source of emissions based on DBEIS data (exceeding energy supply) whilst households become the largest in the Environmental Accounts. In any case, looking across both sets of accounts, the important point here is that since 1990 transport as a source of emissions has remained stubbornly high. Transport emissions have been rising as an industrial sector in the Environmental Accounts or relatively consistent and recently rising in its total contribution in the DBEIS data. The CCC Net Zero report draws particular attention to this. Drawing on the DBEIS data, it states that ‘Transport is now the largest source of UK GHG emissions (23% of the total) and saw emissions rise from 2013 to 2017’ ( CCC, 2019 , p. 48). More generally, the report states that despite some progress in terms of the UK carbon budgets, ‘policy success and progress in reducing emissions has been far from universal’ ( CCC, 2019 , p. 48). The report recommends ( CCC, 2019 , pp. 23–6, 34):

A fourfold increase by 2050 in low carbon (renewables) electricity

Developing energy storage (to enhance the use of renewables such as wind)

Energy-efficient buildings and a shift from gas central heating and cooking

Halting the accumulation of biodegradable waste in landfills

Developing carbon capture technology

Reducing agricultural emissions (mainly dairy but also fertiliser use)

Encouraging low or no meat diets

Land management to increase carbon retention/absorption

Rapid transition to electric vehicles and public transport

As we noted in the Introduction section, the UK Department for Transport Road To Zero document stated a goal of ending the sale of conventional diesel- and petrol-powered ICE vehicles by 2040. The CCC suggested improving on this:

Electric vehicles. By 2035 at the latest all new cars and vans should be electric (or use a low-carbon alternative such as hydrogen). If possible, an earlier switchover (e.g. 2030) would be desirable, reducing costs for motorists and improving air quality. This could help position the UK to take advantage of shifts in global markets. The Government must continue to support strengthening of the charging infrastructure, including for drivers without access to off-street parking. ( CCC, 2019 , p. 34)

The UK government’s response to these and other similar suggestions has been to bring the target date forward to 2035 and to propose that the prohibition will also apply to hybrids. However, the whole is set to go out to consultation and no detail has so far (early 2020) been forthcoming. In its 11 March 2020 Budget, the government also committed £1 billion to ‘green transport solutions’, including £500 million to support the rollout of the electric vehicle charging infrastructure, whilst extending the current grant/subsidy scheme for new electric vehicles (albeit at a reduced rate of £3000 from £3500 per new registration). It has also signalled that it may tighten the timeline for sales prohibition further to 2030. 16 As a policy, much of this is, ostensibly at least, positive, but there is a range of issues that need to be considered regarding what is being achieved. The context of transition matters and this may transcend the specifics of current policy.

3.1 BEV transition: life cycles?

The CCC is confident that a transition to electric vehicles can be a constructive contribution to achieving net-zero emissions by mid-century. However, the point is not unequivocal. The previously quoted CCC communique following the UK government’s commitment to implement Net Zero uses the phrase ‘credible UK policies, across government, inspiring a strong response from business, industry and society as a whole’, and the CCC report places an emphasis on BEVs and a transition to public transport. The relative dependence between these two matters (and see Conclusion). BEVs are potentially (almost) zero emissions in use. But they are not zero emissions in practice. Given this, then the substitution of BEVs for current carbon-powered ICEs is potentially problematic, depending on trends in ownership of and use of powered vehicles (private transportation). These points will become clearer as we proceed.

BEVs are not zero emission in context and based on the life cycle. This is for two basic reasons. First, a BEV is a powered vehicle and so the source of power can be from carbon-based energy supply sources (and this varies with the ‘energy mix’ of electricity production in different countries; IEA, 2019A , p. 8). Second, each new vehicle is a material product. Each vehicle is made of metals, plastics, rubber and so forth. Just the cabling in a car can be 60 kg of metals. All the materials must be mined and processed, or synthesised, the parts must be manufactured, transported and assembled, transported again for sale and then delivered. For example, according to the SMMT in 2016, only 12% of cars sold in the UK were built in the UK and 80% of those built in the UK were exported in that year. Some components (such as a steering column) enter and exit the UK multiple times whilst being built and modified and before final assembly. Vehicle manufacture is a global business in terms of procuring materials and a mainly regional (in the international sense) business in terms of component manufacture for assembly and final sales. Power is used throughout this process and many miles are travelled. Moreover, each vehicle must be maintained and serviced thereafter, which compounds this utilisation of resources. BEVs are a subcategory of vehicles and production locations are currently more concentrated than for vehicles in general (Tesla being the extreme). 17 In any case, producing a BEV is an economic activity and it is not environmentally costless. As Georgescu-Roegen (1971) noted long ago and ecologically minded economists continue to highlight (see Spash, 2017 ; Holt et al. , 2009 ), production cannot evade thermodynamic consequences. In terms of BEVs, the primary focus of analysis in this second sense of manufacturing as a source of contributory emissions has been the carbon emissions resulting from battery production. Based on current technology, batteries are heavy (a significant proportion of the weight of the final vehicle) and energy intensive to produce.

Comparative estimates regarding the relative life cycle emissions of BEVs with equivalent fossil fuel-powered vehicles are not new. 18 Over the last decade, the number of life cycle studies has steadily risen as the interest in and uptake of BEVs have increased. Clearly, there is great scope for variation in findings, since the energy mix for electricity supply varies by country and the assumptions applied to manufacturing can vary between studies. At the same time, the general trend over the last decade has been for the energy mix in many countries to include more renewables and for manufacturing to become more energy efficient. This is partly reflected in metrics based on emissions per $GDP, which in conjunction with relative expansion in service sectors are used to establish ‘relative decoupling’. So, given that both the energy mix of power production and the emissions derived from production can improve, then one might expect a general trend of improved emissions claims for BEVs in recent years and this seems to be the case.

For example, if we go back to 2010, the UK Royal Academy of Engineering found that technology would likely favour PHEVs over BEVs in the near future because the current energy mix and state of battery technology indicated that emissions deriving from charging were typically higher for BEVs than an average ordinary car’s fuel consumption—providing a reason to persist with ICE vehicles or, more responsibly, choose hybrids over pure electric ( Royal Academy of Engineering, 2010 ). Using data up to 2013, but drawing on the previous decade, Holtsmark and Skonhoft (2014) come to similar conclusions based on the most advanced BEV market—Norway. Focussing mainly on energy mix (with acknowledgement that a full life cycle needs to be assessed) they are deeply sceptical that BEVs are a significant net reduction in carbon emissions ( Holtsmark and Skonhoft, 2014 , pp. 161, 164). Neither the Academy nor Holtsmark and Skonhoft are merely sceptical. The overall point of the latter was that more needed to be done to accelerate the use of low or no carbon renewables for power infrastructure (a point the CCC continues to make). This, of course, has happened in many places, including the UK. That is, acceleration of the use of renewables, though it is by no means the case government can take direct credit for this in the UK (and there is also evidence on a global level that a transition to clean energy from fossil fuel forms is much slower than some data sources indicate; see Smil, 2017A , 2017B ). 19 In terms of BEVs, however, recent analyses are considerably more optimistic regarding emissions potential per BEV (e.g. Hoekstra, 2019 ; Regett et al. , 2019 ). Research by Staffell et al. (2019) at Imperial for the power corporation, Drax, provides some interesting insights and contemporary metrics.

Staffell et al. split BEVs into three categories based on conjoint battery and vehicle size: a 30–45 kWh battery car, equivalent to a mid-range or standard car; a heavier, longer-range, 90–100 kWh battery car, equivalent to a luxury or SUV model; and a 30–40 kWh battery light van. They observe that a 40-litre tank of petrol releases 90–100 kgCO 2 when burnt and the ‘embodied’ emissions represented by the manufacture of a standard lithium-ion battery are estimated at 75–125 kgCO 2 per kWh. They infer that every kWh of power embodied in the manufacture of a battery is, therefore, approximately equivalent to using a full tank of petrol. For example, a 30 kWh battery embodies thirty 40-litre petrol tank’s worth of emissions. The BEV’s are also a source of emissions based on the energy mix used to charge the battery for use. The in-use emissions for the BEV are a consequence of the energy consumed per km and this depends on the weight of car and efficiency of the battery. 20 They estimate 33 gCO 2 per km for standard BEVs, 44–54 gCO 2 for luxury and SUVs and 40 gCO 2 for vans. In all cases, this is significantly less than an equivalent fossil-fuel vehicle.

The insight that the estimates and comparisons are leading towards is that the battery embodies an ‘upfront carbon cost’ which can be gradually ‘repaid’ by the saving on emissions represented by driving a BEV compared with driving an equivalent fossil fuel-powered vehicle. That is, the environmental value of opting for BEVs increases over time. Moreover, if the energy mix is gradually becoming less carbon based, this effect is likely to improve further. Based on these considerations, Staffell et al. estimate that it may take 2–4 years to repay the embodied emissions in the battery for a standard BEV and 5 to 6 for the luxury or SUV models. Fundamentally, assuming 15 years to be typical for the on-the-road life expectancy of a vehicle, they find lifetime emissions for each BEV category are lower than equivalent fossil-fuel vehicles.

Still, the implication is that BEVs are not zero emission. Moreover, the degree to which this is so is likely to be significantly greater than a focus on the battery alone indicates. Romare and Dahlöff (2017) , assess the life-cycle of battery production (not use), and in regard of the stages of battery production find that the manufacturing stages account for about 50% of the emissions and the mining and processing stages about the same. They infer that there is significant scope for further emissions reductions as manufacturing processes improve and the Drax study seems to confirm this. However, whilst the battery may be the major component, as we have already noted, vehicle manufacture is a major process in terms of all components and in terms of distance travelled in production and distribution. It is also worth noting that the weight of batteries creates strong incentives to opt for lighter materials for other parts of the vehicle. Most current vehicles are steel based. An aluminium vehicle is lighter, but the production of aluminium is more carbon intensive than steel, so there are also further hidden trade-offs that the positive narrative for BEVs must consider. 21

The general point worth emphasising here is that there is basic uncertainty built into the complex evolving process of transition and change. There is a basic ontology issue here familiar in economic critique: there is no simple way to model the changes with confidence, and in broader context confidence in modelling may itself be a problem here when translated into policy, since it invites complacency. 22 That said, the likely direction of travel is towards further improvements in the energy mix and improvements in battery technology. Both these may be incremental or transformational depending on future technologies (fusion for energy mix and organics and solid-state technologies for batteries perhaps). 23 But one must still consider time frames and ultimate context. 24 The context is a carbon budget and the need for radical reductions in emissions by 2030 and net zero by mid-century. Consider: if just the battery of a car requires four years to be paid back then there is no significant difference in the contribution to emissions from the vehicle into the mid 2020s. For larger vehicles, this becomes the later 2020s, and each year of delay in transition for the individual owner is another year closer to 2030. Since transport is (stubbornly) the major source of emissions in the UK and a major source in the world, this is not irrelevant. BEVs can readily be a successful failure in Paris terms. This brings us to the issue of trends in vehicle ownership and substitutions. This also matters for what we mean by transition.

3.2 Substitutions and transformations: successful failure?

There are many ways to consider the problem of transition. Consider the ‘Precautionary Principle’. This is Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration: ‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary principle shall be widely applied by the States [UN members] according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’ (UNCED). Assuming we can simply depend on unrealised technology potentially violates the Principle. Why is this so? If BEVs are a source of net emissions, then each new vehicle continues to contribute to overall emissions. The current number of vehicles to be replaced, therefore, is a serious consideration, as is any growth trend. Here, social redesign rather than merely adopting new technology is surely more in accordance with the Precautionary Principle. BEVs may be sources of lower emissions than fossil fuel-powered vehicles, but it does not follow that we are constrained to choose between just these two options or that it makes sense to do so in aggregate, given the objective of radical and rapid reduction in emissions. If time is short and numbers of vehicles are large and growing then the implication is that substitution of BEVs should (from a precautionary point of view) occur in a context that is oppositional to this growing trend. That is, the goal should be one of reducing private car ownership and use, and increasing the availability, pervasiveness and use of public transport (and alternatives to private vehicle ownership). This is an issue compounded by the finding that there is an upfront carbon cost from BEVs. Some consideration of current vehicle numbers and trends in the UK and globally serve to reinforce the point.

The UK Department for Transport publishes annual statistics for vehicle licensing. According to the 2019 statistical release for 2018 data, there were 38.2 million licensed vehicles in Britain and 39.4 million including Northern Ireland ( Department for Transport, 2019 ). Vehicles are categorised into cars, light goods vehicles, heavy goods vehicles, motorcycles and buses and coaches. Cars comprised 31.5 million of the total (82%) and the total represented a 1.2% increase in the year 2017. There is, furthermore, a long-term year-on-year trend increase in vehicles since World War II and over the last 20 years that growth (the net change as new vehicles are licensed and old vehicles taken off the road) has averaged 630,000 vehicles per year ( Department for Transport, 2019 , p. 7). This is partly accounted for not only by population growth, and business growth, but also by an increase in the number of vehicles per household. According to the statistical release, 2.9 million new vehicles were registered in 2018, and though this was about 5% fewer than 2017 the figure remained broadly consistent with long-term trends in numbers and still represented growth (contributing to the stated 1.2% increase). 25 Of the total new registrations in 2018, 2.3 million were cars and 360,000 were light goods vehicles. Around 2 million has been typical for cars.

The point to take from these metrics is that numbers are large and context matters. Cars represent 31.5 million emission sources and there are 39.4 million vehicles in the UK. Replacing these 1:1 reproduces an emissions problem. Replacing them in conjunction with an ownership growth trend exacerbates the emissions problem that then has to be resolved. If around 2 million new cars are registered per year then the point at which the BEVs amongst these new registrations can be assumed to begin payback for embodied emissions prior to the point at which they become net sources of reduced (and not zero ) emissions is staggered over future years based on the rate of switching. There are then also net new vehicles. Given there are 31.5 million cars to be replaced over time (plus net growth), there is a high likelihood of significant transport emissions up to and beyond 2030. The problem, of course, is implicit in the Department for Transport policy commitment to end sales of petrol and diesel vehicles by 2035 and ensure all vehicles are zero-emission in use by 2050. Knowingly committing to this ingrained emission problem, given we have already recognised the urgency and challenge of the carbon budget and the ‘stubbornness’ of transport emissions, is not prudent, if alternatives exist . It is producing a problem that need not exist purely because enabling car ownership and use is a line of least resistance in policy terms (it requires the least change in behaviour and thus provokes limited opposition). It is also worth noting that the UK, like most countries, has an ‘integrated’ transport policy. However, the phrasing disguises the relative levels of investment between different modes of transport. Austerity politics may have resulted in declining road quality in the UK but, in general terms, the UK is still committed to heavy investment in and expansion of its road system. 26 This infrastructure investment not only seems ‘economically rational’, but it is also a matter of relative emphasis and ‘lock-in’. The future policy is predicated on the dominance of road use and thus vehicle use.

The crux of the matter here is how we view political expedience. Surely this hinges on the consequences of policy failure. That is, the failure to implement an effective policy given the genuine problem expressed in the goal of 1.5 or 2°C. ‘Alternatives’ may seem unrealistic, but this is a matter of will and policy—of rational social design rather than impossibility. The IPCC and other sources suggest that achieving the Paris goals requires mobilisation of a kind not previously seen outside of wartime. Policy can pivot on this quite quickly, even if perhaps this can seem unlikely in 2020. Climate events may make this necessary and popular pressure and opinion may be transformed. This is currently uncertain. Positions on this may yet move quite quickly.

Lock-in also implies an underlying sociological issue. This is important to consider regarding simply opting for substitution without greater emphasis on reduction. Even if substitution occurs smoothly, it places greater pressure on areas of reduction over which we have less control as societies and involves an orientation that has further potential policy consequences that cannot be readily quantified and which increase the overall uncertainty regarding NDCs. As any modern historian, urban geographer or sociologist will attest, car ownership has been imbricate with the development and design—the configuration—of modern societies, and it has been deeply integrated into identity. Cars are social technologies and philosophers also have much to say about this sociality in general (e.g. Faulkner and Runde, 2013 ; Lawson, 2017 ). Cars are more than merely convenient; they are sources of autonomy and status (e.g. John Urry explored the sociology of ‘automobility’; see, Dennis and Urry, 2009 ). As such, the more that environmental and transport policy validate the car, then the more that the car is normalised through socialisation for the citizen, perhaps leading to citizens being more prepared to countenance locked-in harms (congestion, etc.) prior to change, in turn, making it less likely (sub)urban spaces are redesigned in ways predicated on the absence of (or severe limits to) private transport. The trend in many countries over the car era has been that building roads leads to more car use, which leads to congestion, which leads to more roads (especially in concentrated zones around [sub]urban spaces).

According to the UK Ordnance Survey, Britain has increased its total road surface by 132 square miles over the decade since 2010 (a 9% increase). According to the UK Department for Transport, vehicle traffic increased by 0.8% in 2019 (September to September) to 330.1 billion miles travelled and car travel, as a subset, increased to 258 billion miles (a 1.5% increase). 27 The 11 March 2020 Budget seems to confirm the trend. Whilst it commits around £1 billion to ‘green transport solutions’, this is in the context of a £27 billion announced investment in roads, including upgrading and a proposed 4,000 miles of new road. As the Green Party MP, Caroline Lucas, noted there is a basic disconnect here, since this seems set to increase the UK’s dependence on private transport, when it makes more sense to begin to curtail that dependence, given how significant the UK’s transport emissions are. 28 So, within the various tensions in policy, there seems to be a tendency to facilitate techno-political lock-in or path-dependence on private transportation. As Mattioli et al. (2020) argue, the multiple strands of policy and practice that maintain car dependence contribute to ‘carbon lock-in’. The systemic consequences matter both for the perpetuation of fossil fuel vehicle use in the short term and, given they are not net zero for emissions, powered vehicles in the longer term. Not only does this matter in the UK, but it also matters globally. All the issues stated are reproduced globally. Moreover, in some ways, they are compounded for countries where widespread car ownership is relatively new.

3.3 The fallacy of composition, problems that need not exist and resource risk

Estimates vary for the global total number of vehicles. According to Wards Intelligence, the global total was 1.32 billion in 2016 ( Petit, 2017 ). Extrapolated estimations imply that the total likely increased to more than 1.5 billion in 2019. In 1976, the figure was 342 million and in 1996, 670 million, so the trend implies an approximate doubling every 20 years, which if it continued would imply a figure approaching 3 billion by end of the 2030s. Clearly, it is problematic to simply extrapolate a linear trend, but it is not unreasonable to assume a general trend of growth. Observed experience is that many ‘developed’ country middle-class households have accommodated more than one car per household. This is classically the case in the USA. In 2017, the USA, with a population of 325.7 million in that year, reported a total of 272.5 million registered vehicles compared with 193 million in 1990 ( Statista, 2019A ). In any case, the world population is still growing, incomes are growing and many countries are far from a position of one car per household. China with a population of 1.3 billion overtook the USA in the total number of registered vehicles around 2016 to 2017, with 300.3 million registered vehicles in March of 2017 (Zheng, 2017). Growth is rapid and the China Traffic Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security reported a total of 325 million registered vehicles, December 2018, an increase of 15.56 million in the year ( China Daily , 2018 ). The People’s Republic is now the world’s largest car market and the number of registered cars increased to 240 million in 2018 ( Statista, 2019B ). India too has rapidly growing car ownership and on a lesser scale this is replicated across the developing world.

For our purposes, two well-known concepts and a further resource dependence risk seem to apply here. First, there is patently a ‘fallacy of composition’ issue. That is, the assumption that many can do what few previously did without changing the conditions or producing different (adverse) consequences than arose when only a few adopted that behaviour or activity. Those consequences are climatological and ecological. It remains the case that we are socialised to desire and appreciate cars and it remains a fact that private transport can be extremely convenient. It can also, given the commentary above, appear hypocritical to be suggesting shifting to a far greater reliance on public transport, since this implicitly involves denying to developing country citizens a facet of modernity enjoyed previously by developed country citizens. But this is a distraction from the underlying collective interest in reduced car ownership and use. It denies the basic premise that a Precautionary Principle applies to all and that societies that are not yet car dependent have the opportunity to avoid a problem, rather than have to manage it via either moving straight to private transport BEVs or a transition from fossil fuel-powered ICEs to BEVs with all that entails in terms of ingrained emissions. Policy may be mainly domestic, but climate change is global and aggregate effects do not respect borders, which brings us to a second concept or risk that may be exacerbated.

Second, a ‘quasi-Jevons’ effect’ may apply. Growth of vehicle use is a problem of resource use and this is a thermodynamic and emissions problem. However, it is, as we have noted, also the case that battery technology and energy mix for BEVs are improving. So, this may involve significant declines in relative cost, which in turn may create a tendency for BEV ownership to accelerate which could exacerbate net growth in numbers of vehicles. Net growth could ironically be to the detriment of emissions savings. Whether this is so, depends, in part, on what kind of overall transport policy countries adopt and whether consumers, corporations and markets are allowed to be the arbiter of which area of transport dominates. It also depends, in part, on what materials are required for future batteries. Current technology implies massive increases in costs based on securing sources of lithium and cobalt as battery demand rises. So even if a Jevons’ effect is avoided, a different issue may apply. Resource procurement is a Precautionary Principle issue since effective BEVs at the kind of numbers necessary to substitute for all vehicles seem to require technological transformation—without it, multiple problems apply whilst emissions remain ingrained.

For example, when the UK CCC announced its 2035 recommendation to accelerate the BEV transition, members of the Security of Supply of Mineral Resources (SSMR) project wrote a research note to the CCC (Webster, 2019). They pointed out that the current total European demand for cobalt is 19,800 tonnes and that producing the batteries to replace 2.3 million cars in the UK (in accordance with contemporary statistics for new registrations) would require 15,600 tonnes. The UK would also need 20,000 tonnes of lithium, which is 45% of the current total European demand. If we replicate this ramping up of demand across Europe and the globe for vehicles, recognising that there are other growing demands for the minerals and metals (including batteries for other purposes) then it seems unlikely that supply can respond, unless dependence on lithium and cobalt (and other constituents) falls sharply as technology changes. Clearly, the problem is also contingent on the uptake of BEVs. Over recent years, there has, in fact, been an oversupply of the main materials for battery production because several of the main mining corporations anticipated that battery demand would take off faster than it actually has. For example, global prices of cobalt, nickel and lithium carbonate have increased significantly over the last decade but have fallen in 2018 to the end of 2019. However, industry analysis indicates that current annual global production is the equivalent of about 10 million standard BEVs based on current technology, and as the previous statistics on global vehicle numbers (see also next section) indicate, this is far less than transition via substitution would seem to require in the next decade. 29

Shortages and price rises, therefore, are if not inevitable, at least likely. Currently, about 60% of the cost of a BEV is the battery and 80% of that 60% (about 50% of the vehicle) is the cost of battery materials. It is, therefore, important to achieve secure supply and stable costs. The further context here is the issue of UK domestic battery capacity. In 2013, the government created the Advanced Propulsion Centre (APC) with a 10 year £500 million investment commitment matched by industry. The APC’s remit is to address supply chain issues for electric vehicles. Not unexpectedly, the APC quickly identified lack of domestic battery production capacity as a major impediment. In response in 2016 another government initiative, Innovate UK set up the Faraday Battery Challenge to encourage domestic capacity and innovation. The Battery Industrialisation Centre was then set up in Coventry, to attract manufacturers in the supply chain for BEVs to locate there, focussed around a centre of research excellence. However, the APC has no control over the global supply and prices of battery materials, the investment and location decisions of battery manufacturers or the necessary infrastructure for BEVs to be a feasible technology. 30 For example, according to the APC, if domestic BEV demand were 500,00 per year by 2025, then the UK would need three ‘gigafactories’. Battery manufacture is currently dominated by LG Chem and Samsung in South Korea, CATL in China and Panasonic in Japan. None of these have current plans to build a gigafactory in the UK. In any case, there is a further problem here which raises a whole set of environmental and ethical issues explored in ecological circles under the general heading ‘extractivism’ (see, e.g. Dunlap, 2019 ). As time goes by, the UK and the world may become dependent on high price supplies of materials drawn from unstable or hostile regimes (the Democratic Republic of Congo, etc.), which is a risk in many ways (and a likely source of Dutch disease—the ‘resource curse’—for unstable regimes). So, not placing a relative emphasis on substituting BEVs for ICEs and not endorsing the current vehicle growth trend (which is different as a suggestion than rejecting BEVs entirely) avoid multiple problems and risks.

It is also worth noting that simple market decisions can have a further collective adverse consequence based on individual consumer preference and reasoning, which may also affect BEVs in the short term. Many current BEVs have smaller or low efficiency batteries and thus short ranges. These favour urban use for short journeys, but most people own cars with a view also to range further afield. As such, it seems likely that until the technology is all long range (and the charging infrastructure is pervasive) many consumers, if the choice exists and income allows, will own BEVs as an additional vehicle, not a replacement vehicle. 31 This may be a short-term issue, given the regulatory changes focussed from 2030 to 2040 in many countries. But, again, from a Paris point of view, taking the IPCC 1.5°C and UNEP Emissions Gap reports into consideration, this matters. This brings us to a final issue. What is the actual take-up of BEVs (and ULEVs)? How rapid is the transition? In the Introduction section, I suggested that the UK had reached a tipping point and that this mirrored a general trend globally. This, however, needs context.

3.4 How many electric vehicles?

The data emerging in recent years and stated in the Introduction section are a step-change, but as a possible tipping point it begins from a low base and BEVs (the least emitting of the low emission vehicles) are a subset, albeit a rapidly expanding one, of ULEVs. According to the UK Department for Transport statistical release for 2018, there were 200,000 ULEVs registered in total, of which 63,992 ULEVs were newly registered in that year ( Department for Transport, 2019 , p. 4). 93% of the total registrations were cars and the total constitutes a 39% increase on the year 2017 total and a 20% increase in the rate of registration—there were just 9,500 ULEVs at the beginning of 2010 (so, about 20 times greater in a decade). However, the 2018 data mean that ULEVs accounted for just 0.5% of all licensed vehicles and were still only 2.1% of all new registrations in that year. Preliminary data available early 2020 indicate continued growth with almost 38,000 new BEV registrations in 2019, a 144% year-on-year increase. As a recent UK House of Commons Briefing Paper notes, however, the government prefers to emphasise the percentage changes in take-up rather than the percentages of the absolute numbers or the absolute numbers themselves ( Hirst, 2019 ). The International Energy Agency (IEA) places the UK in its leading countries list by ULEV and BEV market share (measured by the percentage of total annual registration): Norway dominates, followed by Iceland, Sweden, the Netherlands and then a significant drop-off to a trailing group including China, the USA, Germany, the UK, Japan, France, Canada and South Korea. However, the market share in this trailing group is less than 5% in every case (see appended Figure 1 ). China, given its size (and because of the urgency of its urban air quality problems and its capacity for authoritarian implementation), dominates the raw numbers in terms of total ULEVs and BEVs. All this notwithstanding, the IEA confirms the general point that up-take is accelerating, but the base is low and so achieving total ULEV or BEV coverage is some way off:

The global electric car fleet exceeded 5.1 million in 2018, up by 2 million since 2017, almost doubling the unprecedented amount of new registrations in 2017. The People’s Republic of China… remained the world’s largest electric car market with nearly 1.1 million electric cars sold in 2018 and, with 2.3 million units, it accounted for almost half of the global electric car stock. Europe followed with 1.2 million electric cars and the United States with 1.1 million on the road by the end of 2018 and market growth of 385000 and 361000 electric cars from the previous year. Norway remained the global leader in terms of electric car market share at 46% of its new electric car sales in 2018, more than double the second-largest market share in Iceland at 17% and six-times higher than the third-highest Sweden at 8%. In 2018, electric buses continued to witness dynamic developments, with more than 460000 vehicles on the world’s road, almost 100000 more than in 2017…In freight transport, electric vehicles (EVs) were mostly deployed as light-commercial vehicles (LCVs), which reached 250000 units in 2018, up 80000 from 2017. Medium truck sales were in the range of 1000–2000 in 2018, mostly concentrated in China. ( IEA, 2019A , p. 9)

Over the next few years, it seems likely we will see rapid changes in these metrics. There is a great deal of discussion in policy analysis regarding bottlenecks and impediments and these, of course, are also important (consumer uncertainty, ‘range anxiety’, availability of sufficient infrastructure for charging and so on). 32 However, as everything argued so far indicates regarding transition and trends, underlying the whole is the conditionality of success and the potential for failure, involving avoidable ingrained emission and risks. There is a basic difference between a superior technology and a superior choice since the latter is a socio-economic matter of context: of rates of change, scales and substitutions. Ultimately, this creates deep concerns in terms of achieving the Paris goals. The IEA explores two forecast scenarios for the uptake of ULEVs. Both involve a projection of annual ULEV sales and total stock to 2030 ( IEA, 2019A ). First a ‘New Policies’ Scenario. This takes the current policy commitments of individual countries and extrapolates. By 2030, the scenario projects global ULEV sales at 23 million in that year and a total stock of 130 million. This is considerably less than 30% of all vehicles now and in 2030. Second, the EV30@30 Scenario. This assumes an accelerated commitment that adopts the @30 goals (notably 30% annual sales share for BEVs by 2030; IEA, 2019A , pp. 29–30). By 2030, the scenario projects global ULEV sales at 43 million in that year and a total stock of 250 million. Again, this is less than 30% of all vehicles now and in 2030.

The figures, of course, are highly conditional, but the point is clear, even the best-case scenario currently being anticipated has ULEVs and BEVs as a minority of all vehicles in 2030—and 2030 is a key year for achieving Paris, according to the October 2018 IPCC 1.5°C report. Moreover, it is notable that the projections assume continuous growth in the number of vehicles (and so continuous growth in ICE vehicles) and the major areas of numerical growth in BEVs continue to be China, so some significant part of the anticipated total will be new ingrained emissions that arguably did not need to exist. 33 Again, this is highly conditional but it at least creates questions regarding what is being ‘saved’ when the IEA claims that the New Policies Scenario results in 2.5 million barrels a day less demand for oil in 2030 and the EV30@30 Scenario 4.3 million barrels a day ( IEA, 2019A , p. 7). 34 Less of more is not a saving in an objective sense, if this is a preventable future, and it is not a rational way to set about ‘saving’ the planet. It remains the case, of course, that this is better than nothing, but it is deeply questionable whether in policy terms any of this is the ‘best that can be done’. As stated in the Introduction section, technocentrism distracts from appropriate recognition of this. At its worse, technocentrism fails to address and so works to reproduce a counter-productive ecological modernisation: the technological focus facilitates socio-economic trends, which are part of the broader problem rather than solutions to it. The important inference is that there are multiple reasons to think that greater emphasis on social redesign and less private transport avoids successful failure and is more in accordance with the Precautionary Principle.

I ended the introduction to this essay by stating that we would be exploring the foregrounding question: What kind of solution are BEVs to what kind of problem? It should be clearer now what was meant by this. Ultimately, the balance between private and public transport matters if the Paris goals are to be achieved. Equally clearly, this is not news to the UK CCC or to any serious analyst of electric vehicles and the transport issue for our climatological and ecological future (again, e.g. Chapman, 2007 ; Bailey and Wilson, 2009 ; Williamson et al. , 2018 ; Mattioli et al. , 2020 ). At the same time, the context and issues are not widely understood and the problems are often understated, at least in so far as, discursively, most weight is placed on stating progress in achieving a transition to ULEVs and BEVs. This is technocentric. Despite its general concerns and careful critical stance, the CCC is also partly guilty of this. For example, Ewa Kmietowicz, Transport Team Leader of the CCC Secretariat, refers to the UK Road to Zero strategy as a ‘lost opportunity’, and the CCC identifies a number of shortfalls in the strategy. 35 However, the general thrust of the CCC position is to focus on a rapid transition to BEVs and to overcoming bottlenecks. 36 Broader feasibility is subsumed under general assumptions about continued economic expansion and expansion of the transport system. So, there is more of a situation of complementarity (with caveats) between public and private transport, and the whole becomes an exercise in types of investment within expansionary trends, rather than a more radical recognition of the fundamental problems that we ought to think about avoiding. It is also worth noting that many of the major advocates of BEVs are industry organisations. The UK Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, for example, are not unconcerned but they are not impartial either; they have a vested interest in the vehicle industry and its growth. For industry, ULEVs and BEVs are an opportunity before they are a solution to a problem. There are, however, recognitions that a rethink is required. These range from direct activism, such as ‘Rocks in the Gearbox’ (along the lines of Extinction Rebellion), to analysis from establishment think tanks, such as the World Economic Forum 37 , and statements from government oversight committees. For example, the UK Commons Science and Technology Committee (CSTC) not only endorses the CCC 2035 accelerated BEV target but also states more explicitly:

In the long-term, widespread personal vehicle ownership does not appear to be compatible with significant decarbonisation. The Government should not aim to achieve emissions reductions simply by replacing existing vehicles with lower-emissions versions. Alongside the Government’s existing targets and policies, it must develop a strategy to stimulate a low-emissions transport system, with the metrics and targets to match. This should aim to reduce the number of vehicles required, for example by: promoting and improving public transport; reducing its cost relative to private transport; encouraging vehicle usership in place of ownership; and encouraging and supporting increased levels of walking and cycling. ( CSTC, 2019 )

This, as Caroline Lucas suggests, speaks to the need to coordinate public and private transport policy more effectively and clearly, and there is a need for broader informed debate here. In political ecological circles, for example, there is a growing critique of the tensions encapsulated in the concept of an ‘environmental state’ (see Koch, 2019 ). That is the coordination and coherence of environmental imperatives with other policy concerns. State-rescaling and degrowth and postgrowth work highlight the profound problems that are now starting to emerge as states come to terms with the basic mechanisms that have been built into our economies and societies (see also Newell and Mulvaney, 2013 ; Newell, 2019 ). 38 New thinking is required and this extends to the social ontology and theory we use to conceptualise economies (see Spash and Ryan, 2012 ; Lawson, 2012 , 2019 ) and political formations (see Bacevic, 2019 ; Patomäki, 2019. Covid-19 does not change this ( Gills, 2020 ).

In transport terms, there are many specific issues to consider. Some solutions are simple but overlooked because we are always thinking in terms of sophisticated innovations and inventions. However, we do not need to conform to the logics of ‘technological fixes’, that we somehow think will enable the impossible, to perhaps see some scope in ‘fourth industrial revolution’ transformations ( Center for Global Policy Solutions, 2017 ; Morgan, 2019B ). For example, public transport may also extend to a future where no individual owns a range extensive powered vehicle (perhaps just local scooters for the young and mobility scooters for the infirm) and instead a system operates of autonomous fleet vehicles that are coordinated by artificial intelligence with logistics implemented through Smartphone calendar access booking systems—and coordination functions could maximise sharing, where vehicles could also be (given no drivers are involved) adaptable connective pods that chain together to minimise congestion and energy use. This seems like science fiction now, and perhaps a little ridiculous, but a few years ago so did the Smartphone. And the technology already exists in infancy. Such a system could be either state-funded and run or private partnership and franchise, but in either case, it radically redraws the transport environment whilst working in conformity with the geography of living spaces we have already developed. Will is what is required and if the outcome of COP24 ( UNFCCC, 2018 ) and COP25 ( Newell and Taylor, 2020 ) with limited progress towards the Paris goals persists, then it seems likely that emissions will accumulate rapidly in the near future and the likelihood of a serious climate event with socio-economic consequences rises. At that stage, more invasive statutory and regulatory intervention may start to occur as the carbon budget becomes a more urgent target. Prohibitions, transport rationing and various other possibilities may then be on the agenda if we are to unmake the future we are currently writing and, to mix metaphors, avoid a road to nowhere.

None declared

Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for extensive and useful comment—particularly regarding the systematic statement of issues in the Introduction section and for additional useful references. Jamie Morganis Professor of Economic Sociology at Leeds Beckett University, UK. He coedits the Real-World Economics Review with Edward Fullbrook. RWER is the world’s largest subscription based open access economics journal. He has published widely in the fields of economics, political economy, philosophy, sociology, and international politics. His recent books include: Modern Monetary Theory and its Critics (ed. with E. Fullbrook, WEA Books, 2020), Economics and the ecosystem (ed. with E. Fullbrook, WEA Books, 2019); Brexit and the political economy of fragmentation: Things fall apart (ed. with H. Patomäki, Routledge, 2018); Realist responses to post-human society (ed. with I. Al-Amoudi, Routledge, 2018); Trumponomics: Causes and consequences (ed. with E. Fullbrook, College Publications, 2017); What is neoclassical economics? (ed., Routledge, 2015); and Piketty’s capital in the twenty-first century (ed. with E. Fullbrook, College Publications, 2014).

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Global electric car sales and market share, 2013–18.

Global electric car sales and market share, 2013–18.

Source : IEA (2019, p. 10).

ULEV refers to vehicles that emit less than 75 gCO 2 per km. This essentially means BEVs, PHEVs, range-extended (typically an auxiliary fuel tank) electric vehicles, fuel cell (non-plug-in) electric vehicles and hybrid models (non-plug in vehicles with a main fuel tank but whose battery recharges and which drive short distances in electric mode).

Note, there is little sign of legislative and regulatory detail to plans as of early 2020. Furthermore, there is a difference between acknowledging that the uptake of alternatively fuelled vehicles, including BEVs, is growing and drawing the inference that UK government policy (channelled primarily via the Department for Transport) is as effective as it might be (see Environmental Audit Committee, 2016 ; National Audit Office, 2019 and also later discussions).

CEM is coordinated by the IEA and is an initiative lead by Canada and China (but including a steadily growing number of signatory countries). The EV30@30 initiative aims to achieve a 30% annual sales share for BEVs by 2030.

IEA headline statistics include plug-in hybrids so 2018 becomes 46% for Norway (IEA, 2019A, p. 10).

For example, Spash (2020) and Spash and Ryan (2012) . One might also note the work of John O’Neill at Manchester University. Perhaps the most prominent ‘realist’ working on transport and ecology is Petter Naess, at Norwegian University of Life Sciences.

The UNEP 9th Report calls for a 55% reduction by 2030.

The initial rationale in 2008 was that to achieve a maximum limit of 2°C warming global emissions needed to fall from the levels at that time to 20–24 GtCO 2 e with an implied average of 2.1–2.6 t CO 2 per capita on a global basis in 2050. This translated to a 50–60% reduction to the then global total. Since UK emissions were above average per capita, the UK reduction required was estimated at about 80%. Given that emissions then increased and atmospheric ppm has risen the original calculations are now mainly redundant.

For the work of the CCC, see: https://www.theccc.org.uk/about/ .

The report also provides useful context regarding the UN sustainable development goals ( CCC, 2019 : p. 66) and CCC thinking on growth and economics ( CCC, 2019 : pp. 46–7).

https://www.theccc.org.uk/2019/06/11/response-to-government-plan-to-legislate-for-net-zero-emissions-target/ .

And further methodological issues apply in economics (see; Morgan and Patomäki, 2017 ; Nasir and Morgan, 2018 ; Morgan, 2019A ).

For a full analysis, see https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-uks-co2-emissions-have-fallen-29-per-cent-over-the-past-decade . The Carbon Brief analysis omits shipping and aviation. As the campaign group Transport and Environment notes UK shipping was responsible for 14.4 MtCO 2 , which is the third highest in Europe (after the Netherlands and Spain) and shipping is exempt from tax on fossil fuels under EU law. See p. 20: https://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/publications/Study-EU_shippings_climate_record_20191209_final.pdf .

UK coal use for energy supply reduced by approximately 90% from 1990 to 2017 and in 2019 amounted to just 2% of the energy mix and in 2019 the UK went two weeks without using any coal at all for power production (the first time since 1882); 1990 to 2010 natural gas use steadily increased from a near-zero base but has declined since 2010 as use of renewables has grown. Coal use in manufacturing has decreased by 75% from 1990 to 2017 ( ONS, 2019 ). As noted, some assessments place the reduction in total emissions at around 40% based on other metrics and the tabulated figures I provide indicate yet another percentage— all however are trend decreases indicative of a general direction of travel.

‘Embedded emissions’ or the UK carbon footprint is addressed by the UK Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). To be clear, there is a whole set of further issues that one might address in regard of measurement of emissions—how they are attributed and what this means (where created, where induced through demand, which state, what corporation and so different ‘Cartesian’ claims regarding the significance of location are possible), and this is indicative of the conflict over representation and partition of responsibility (so whilst the climate does not care about borders, they have infected measurement and policy). There is no scientifically neutral way to achieve this, merely different sets of criteria with different consequences (I thank an anonymous referee for extended comment on this, see also Taylor, 2015 ; who argues that adaptation politics produces a focus on governance within existing political and economic structures based on borders, etc.).

Congestion charges in London or a plastic bag tax do not meet this threshold.

This is supported, for example, by The Climate Group’s EV100 initiative: a voluntary scheme where corporations commit to making electric the ‘new normal’ of their vehicle fleets by 2030 (recognising that over half of annual new registrations are owned by businesses) https://www.theclimategroup.org/project/ev100 .

Until recently Tesla had one main production centre in California. However, it now also has a $5 billion factory in Shanghai and plans for a factory in Berlin. Tesla is currently the world’s largest producer of BEVs (368,000 units in 2019), followed by the Chinese company BYD Auto (195,000 units in 2019). Tesla was founded in July 2003 by Martin Eberhard and Mark Tarpenning in response to General Motors scrapping its EV programme (as unprofitable). Elon Musk joined as a HNWI first-round investor in February 2004 (he put in $6.5 m of the total $7.5 m and became chairman of the Tesla board); Eberhard was initially CEO but was removed and replaced by Musk in 2007 and Tarpenning left in 2008. Tesla floated on the Nasdaq in June 2010 at $17 per share and exceeded $500 per share for the first time in January 2020. Tesla is the USA’s most valuable car manufacturer by market capitalisation (worth more than Ford and GM combined).

The European Commission’s collaborative research forum JEC has been producing ‘well-to-wheels’ analyses of energy efficiency of different engine technologies since the beginning of the century. The USA periodically publishes the findings of its GREET model (the Greenhouse gases Regulated Emissions and Energy use in Transportation model). See https://greet.es.anl.gov .

For example, since 1985 according to Carbon Brief global coal use in power production measured in terawatt hours only reduced in 2009 and 2015 (though it seems likely to do so in 2019); China notably continues to build coal-fired power plants though the rate of growth of use has slowed. (According to the IEA Coal report, 2019, China consumed 3,756 million tonnes of coal in 2018 (a 1% increase) and India 986 million tonnes (a 5% increase). Renewables are a growing part of an expanding global energy system.

https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-global-coal-power-set-for-record-fall-in-2019 .

Staffell et al . observe that the British electricity grid produces an average 204 gCO 2 per kWh in 2019 and a standard petrol car emits 120–160 gCO 2 per km.

This is a point made by Richard Smith. There are, of course, alternatives to aluminium. One should also note that manufacturers are responding to consumer preference by increasing the average size of models and this is increasing the weight and resource use. In February 2020, for example, Which Magazine analysed 292 popular car models and found that they were on average 3.4% or 67 kg heavier than older models and this was offsetting some of the efficiency gains for emissions.

And the argument this is leading to is that it makes far greater sense to default to greater dependence on prudential social redesign, rather than optimistic technocentrism, behind which is techno-politics.

For discussion of battery technology and scope for improvement, see Manzetti and Mariasiu (2015) and Faraday Institution (2019) . Currently, most BEVs use lithium-ion phosphate, nickel-manganese cobalt oxide or aluminium oxide batteries. Liquid electrolyte constituents require containment and shielding. Specifically, a battery creates a flow of electrons from the positive electrode (the cathode made of a lithium metal oxide, etc. from the previous list) through a conducting electrolyte medium (lithium salt in an organic solution) to a negative electrode (the anode made typically of carbon, since early experiment with metals tended to produce excess heating and fire). This creates a current. Charging flows to the anode and discharge oxidises the anode which must then be recharged. The batteries are relatively low ‘energy density’ and can be a fire hazard when they heat. Given the chemical constituents, battery disposal is also a significant environmental hazard (see IEA, 2019A: pp. 8, 22–3). A ‘solid-state’ battery uses a specially designed (possibly glass or ceramic) solid medium that allows ions to travel through from one electrode to another. The solid-state technology is in principle higher energy density, much lighter and more durable. The implication is higher kWh batteries with greater range, charging capacity and durability and efficiency. Jeremy Dyson has reportedly invested heavily in solid-state technology and though his proposed own brand BEV is not now going ahead, reports indicate the battery technology investment will continue.

One might also consider hydrogen battery technology. Hydrogen fuel cell technology for vehicles is different than BEV. The vehicle has a tank in the rear for compressed cooled gas, which supplies the cell at the front of the car whilst driving. Refuelling is a rapid pumping process rather than a long wait. The gas has two possible origins: natural gas conversion where ‘steam methane reformation’ separates methane into hydrogen and CO 2 or water electrolysis, where grid AC electricity is converted to DC, which is applied to water and using a membrane splits it into hydrogen and waste oxygen. Currently, over 95% of hydrogen is from the former. Major investors in hydrogen technology are Shell (for natural gas conversion), IMT Power (in partnership with Shell) for water conversion and Toyota whose Mirai model is hydrogen powered.

Though fewer new cars were registered than in previous years, this significant metric for the total number of vehicles is the cumulative number of registrations (taking into account cars no longer registered). There are, however, some underlying issues: uncertainty regarding the status of diesel cars and problems of availability, cost and trust in BEVs seems to be causing many people in the UK to delay buying a new car; the expansion of Uber meanwhile has had a generational and urban effect, reducing car ownership as an aspiration amongst the young.

And re aviation, a new runway at Heathrow between 2026 and 2050.

See: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/852708/provisional-road-traffic-estimates-gb-october-2018-to-september-2019.pdf .

See: https://greenworld.org.uk/article/budget-deeply-disappointing-says-caroline-lucas

For example, global production of cobalt in 2018 was 120,000 tonnes, and production of about 2 million BEVs currently requires around 25,000 tonnes, so 10 million BEVs would require all of the current output. Cobalt traded at more than US$90,000 per ton 2018 but had fallen to around US$30,000 at the end of 2019.

In the UK, the current daily consumption of petrol and diesel for road transport is about 125 million litres or about 45 billion litres per year. So, BEVs are essentially substituting for this scale of energy use, shifting demand to electricity generation. National Grid attempted to model this in 2017. Their forecast (highly contingent obviously) suggests that if all cars sold by 2040 were BEVs and thus the car market was dominated by BEVs by 2050 and if most vehicles were charged at peak times in 2050 then an additional 30 gigawatts of electricity would be required. This is about 50% greater than the current peak winter demand in 2017. This was widely reported in the press. This best/worst case, of course, does not allow for innovative solutions such as off-peak home charging pioneered by Ovo and other niche suppliers. However, even with such solutions, there will still be a net increase in required capacity from the system. This has been estimated at about 10 new Hinckley power stations.

One possible long-term solution currently in development is toughened solar panel devices that can be laid as a road or car park surfaces, enabling contact recharging of the vehicle (in motion or otherwise). There are, however, multiple problems with the technology so far.

For example, analysis from Capital Economics suggests a three-way charging split is likely to develop: home recharging is likely to dominate, followed by an on-route charging model (substituting for current petrol forecourts at roadside) and destination recharging (given charging is slower than filling a fuel tank it makes sense to transform car parks at destinations into charging centres—supermarkets, etc.). They estimate UK demand at 25 million BEV chargers by 2050 of which all but 2.6 million will be home charging. As of early 2020, there were 8,400 filling stations which might be fully converted. Tesco has a reported commitment to install 2,400 charging points. These are issues frequently reported in the press.

This point can also be made in other ways. Not only does the emissions saving relate to net new sources of cars, but the contrast is also in terms of trend changes in the size of vehicle. According to the recent IEA World Energy Outlook report ( IEA, 2019B ), the number of SUVs is increasing and these consume around 25% more fuel than a mid-range car. If current growth trends continue (SUVs are 42% of new sales in China, 30% in India and about 50% in the USA), the IEA projects that the take-up of ICE SUVs will more than offset any marginal gains in emissions from the transition to BEVs.

It is also the case that the projected ‘savings’ from ULEVs are likely inaccurate. Following the EU, most countries adopted (and manufacturers report using) the Worldwide Harmonised Light Vehicle Test Procedure (WLTP). This became mandatory in the UK from September 2018. The WLTP is the new laboratory defined test for car distance-energy metrics. Vehicles are tested at 23°C, but without associated use of A/C or heating. Though claimed to as realistic than its predecessors, it is still basically unrealistic. Temperature range for ULEVs has significant consequences for battery performance and for use of on-board services, so real distance travelled per unit of energy is liable to be less. For similar reasons, ICEs will also travel less distance per litre of fuel so this is not a comparative gain for ICEs, it is likely a comparative loss to all of us if we rely on the figures.

See https://www.theccc.org.uk/2018/07/10/road-to-zero-a-missed-opportunity/ .

See https://www.theccc.org.uk/2018/07/10/governments-road-to-zero-strategy-falls-short-ccc-says/ .

See https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/08/shared-avs-could-save-the-world-private-avs-could-ruin-it/ .

For practical network initiatives, see, for example, https://climatestrategies.org .

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The new car batteries that could power the electric vehicle revolution

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Electric vehicles charge in a car park in the United Kingdom, which will ban the sale of petrol and diesel cars in 2035. Credit: Chris Ratcliffe/Bloomberg/Getty

There’s a revolution brewing in batteries for electric cars. Japanese car maker Toyota said last year that it aims to release a car in 2027–28 that could travel 1,000 kilometres and recharge in just 10 minutes, using a battery type that swaps liquid components for solids. Chinese manufacturers have announced budget cars for 2024 featuring batteries based not on the lithium that powers today’s best electric vehicles (EVs), but on cheap sodium — one of the most abundant elements in Earth’s crust. And a US laboratory has surprised the world with a dream cell that runs in part on air 1 and could pack enough energy to power aeroplanes.

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1. Introduction

2. materials and methods, 3. results and discussion, 3.1. analysis of the communities.

  • Grid-to-vehicle (G2V) is used in internal chargers.
  • Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) uses bidirectional integrated chargers and allows distributed energy control to share stored energy. However, V2X is vulnerable to cyber–physical attacks and instability caused by time delay. There are proposals to solve this by using cyber resilience techniques, authentication protocols, and delay-tolerant techniques, through which the resilience of the V2X system to cyber–physical attacks and time delays can be increased.
  • Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) uses the energy stored in the battery for the grid connection to provide services to the grid (active power demand regulation, reactive power compensation, peak shaving and valley filling of load demand, frequency and voltage regulation, harmonic compensation of grid current, improved reliability, and stability and efficiency of the system, among others).
  • Vehicle-for-grid (V4G) is a special case of the V2G mode of operation to compensate harmonics in the line current and inject reactive power to improve the voltage profile of the system; it allows the G2V/V2G mode, and the remaining energy not used in this mode can only be used for reactive and harmonic power compensation during the V4G mode.
  • Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) is used to exchange charging energy between EVs, where EV owners can sell their surplus energy to other EV owners. This functionality can also be realized by V2V for EVs connected to smart homes and car parks.
  • Vehicle-to-home (V2H) implements the V2G modes to provide a backup supply for connected loads in the home (connected appliances in a smart home) and V2V.
  • Vehicle-to-load (V2L) is used to ensure a continuous supply to critical loads that cannot be left without power in case of main grid failure such as military sites, hospitals, data centers, etc. It is implemented as a special case of the V2H and V2V modes of operation for electric vehicle chargers.

3.2. Analysis of Authors and Documents on the Topic of EVs

3.3. future perspectives and challenges.

  • Optimized charging techniques are required to balance charging time and battery life and also to incorporate additional protection to balance battery temperature during the charging process in order to avoid battery degradation [ 58 ]. Battery heating is a serious problem in the case of external charging, as external charging to increase the efficiency of charging stations mainly depends on the selection of power converter topologies [ 119 ].
  • The latest generation of EVs have the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) mode of operation. Extensive research in the domain of power density, power level, converter topologies, and control techniques related to the V2X system is required to expand its commercialization. The implementation of the V2X system has an important role to play in future EVs [ 60 ].
  • Among the technical challenges of future EVs is the coordination between different emerging charging technologies such as V2X, V2G, and VG4 [ 60 ].
  • The modes of operation between G2V and V2G must solve the following challenges: transformer ageing, battery degradation and energy loss, harmonic distortion, voltage profile deterioration, and charging curve variation [ 119 ].
  • Successful communication techniques are required, in which a communication link is created between charging and EV systems. Communication vulnerability (cyber-attack) and communication delay are among their challenges. In addition, it is recommended to integrate various vehicular communication technologies such as wireless access to meet the communication needs of various use cases [ 120 ].
  • The challenges facing the fast charging station are to achieve good overall efficiency, reduced harmonics, low capital operating cost, and an efficient control algorithm to control the charging current [ 58 ].
  • The challenges of the wireless charging station to be solved optimally are the design of the coils, the selection of a suitable compensation network, and the ability to transfer high power over a long distance [ 58 ]. Standardized wireless charging systems across different types of charging infrastructure and different classes of electric vehicles also require technological improvements [ 59 ].
  • A global standard for chargers and connectors is required to make energy transfer more efficient and to standardize the associated systems. Currently there are standards depending on the country and vehicle model; if we want to make progress with EVs we must try to homogenize the criteria for selecting associated standards. Vehicle manufacturers must also agree to use a charging connector standard, although new EVs usually come with dual-connector models depending on the charging mode of operation. The standardization of charging systems and their connectors is a gap that remains to be solved [ 58 ].
  • Charging times are long, from 3 to 12 h, although 80% can be charged in 30 min when using a fast charger. Public fast chargers are still rare in many cities due to their high investment cost. By having fast charging stations along the roadside, fast charging could play an important role in expanding the range of electric vehicles [ 121 ].
  • The incorporation of autonomous driving technologies (ADT) in EVs is stimulating for the vehicle sharing industry and EV car sharing. Remaining challenges include planning the size of a fleet, vehicle relocation strategies such as mixed relocation strategies based on operators and users, vehicle route optimization, and government management policies to increase user demand such as parking fees and subsidy strategies.
  • Research should be done to consider the spatial and temporal distribution of demand and the influence of dynamic demand-responsive pricing schemes for car sharing including EVs. In addition, subsidies may be the key to EV utilization for passengers with a car sharing platform, such as Uber. How to design subsidy mechanisms to promote EV sharing in a competitive environment, incorporating uncertainties in last-minute bookings, charging levels, driver choice behaviors, and energy prices in the models, are issues that need to be resolved. This topic raises many issues for future research [ 122 ].
  • Regarding batteries and new charging technology, a battery exchange or leasing market has emerged. The battery leasing model may be more successful than the battery swap model during the early stages of EV adoption because the initial capital costs (land, building a facility, and maintaining a battery inventory) are much higher than the cost of installing a charging station [ 122 ]. The study of productive leasing models is based on a standardization of batteries that would limit battery stocking.
  • Charging infrastructure can be a productive market, but there are investment and planning issues for charging infrastructure that need to be addressed in the face of the growing number of electric vehicles on the market [ 123 ], mainly due to the lack of government regulations and subsidies to support these infrastructures. In addition, this business requires standardization of the infrastructures and optimal planning of their location.
  • Many of the potential markets still require profitable short-term business models.
  • The social and market acceptability of a different technology than the conventional one is an issue that needs to be addressed. Increased acceptance of EV technology would enable mass production and could make the technology more economically viable for the consumer [ 58 ].
  • Research on new batteries that have higher capacity, higher energy density, better safety, more efficient battery management, longer life cycles, and that are environmentally friendly [ 60 ].
  • Higher capacity batteries will encourage the adoption of faster and more powerful charging methods, as well as improved wireless charging technology.
  • The energy management system needs improvements to decrease costs and increase the life cycle of batteries; the trend in recent research is hybrid energy systems, but their commercialization requires robustness, low computational complexity, real-time control, accuracy, and overall optimization of the energy management system.
  • Studies initially used life cycle assessment (LCA) as a method of assessing the environmental impacts of emerging technologies such as EVs, but it is insufficient to consider the economic and social impacts. Few studies assess socio-economic indicators at the macro level, except for life cycle cost analysis. Many studies link CO2 emission reduction as a precursor to driving EV expansion, but secondary effects, macroeconomic impacts, and impacts related to the global supply chain need to be considered as a comprehensive approach to help decision making in the event of conflicts in technology deployment [ 124 ].
  • Another remaining challenge is the recycling of batteries, which, as noted, have toxic materials. If batteries are not carefully designed with end-of-life management in mind, dependence will simply shift from one non-renewable source (oil) to others (rare earth metals), which is an important issue for further study for the world’s green revolution [ 124 ].
  • One remaining challenge is the coupling of the motor and battery for driving conditions and performance requirements (cost, efficiency, driving dynamics, and driving comfort).
  • The selection of a power coupling architecture, together with the optimization of both the appropriate component size according to the architecture employed and the control strategy, will be the subject of future research. Although there are many examples of energy-efficient control strategies in the literature, they should be investigated to achieve dynamic coordinated control of the mode switching process, as it has a significant impact on vehicle handling and ride comfort [ 125 ].
  • Efficiency improvement of the permanent-magnet synchronous motors (PMSM). Among the losses in this class of motors are copper losses, iron losses, friction losses, and dispersion losses. Iron losses have not been considered in previous works; however, several studies have found iron loss to be an important component of the total losses [ 126 ]. Therefore, ignoring iron losses will overestimate motor efficiency. Pei et al. (2022) point that copper losses and iron losses are greatly dependent on control strategies [ 127 ], and in the near future the PMSM efficiency optimization strategy with time-varying parameters should be studied.
  • Increase the power density of the motor. This can be achieved through three approaches: increasing the speed of the motor; the use of new materials in the magnetic circuit, winding insulation, etc.; or the application of new technologies to the motor production [ 128 ].
  • Direct torque control (DTC) has been used traditionally, but it results in large torque fluctuation. To solve the torque ripple problem, efforts are dedicated in the literature to overcome these issues and various improved methods are being proposed. One of them is to calculate the effective voltage vector action time in real time to guarantee the minimum torque ripple for current torque error [ 129 ]. Nasr et al. (2022) proposed a DTC strategy based on an effective duty ratio regulation to improve the torque performance in terms of the steady-state error and the ripple [ 130 ].
  • In general, manufacturers are further converging on permanent-magnet motor designs for their superior efficiency and power density, but the sustainability of the permanent magnets depends on the recovery and recycling methods for these magnets in the automotive error [ 131 ]. Nasr et al. (2022) proposed a DTC strategy based on an effective duty-ratio regulation to improve the torque performance in terms of the steady-state error and the ripple [ 132 ].
  • Interactions of EV charging operations with the grid must be considered to improve grid stability. In addition, a rigorous assessment of the environmental and economic impacts of large-scale charging infrastructure could help the development of the dynamic wireless power transfer (DWPT) [ 60 ].
  • Charging infrastructure optimized according to an assumable forecast of the EV fleet and the distribution grid. Different studies have been conducted using AI-based algorithms, but decisions still need to be made not only on EV charging needs and the grid, but also considering the habits of EV users.
  • The EV Market Study Community has identified several niche markets among which the optimal distribution of battery swapping stations (BSS), as well as the charging infrastructure, must consider the habits of EV users. Battery swapping is an efficient charging alternative and BSS can serve not only for battery swapping but also as an auxiliary backup supply for the distribution network.
  • V2G technology has an outstanding challenge such as cyber security for smooth operation and to ensure network security. Network security and integrity for secure and seamless data transfer from electric vehicles to the grid. Another drawback is battery degradation. Although research is being done on methods to solve this such as battery swapping, which requires standardization of batteries and infrastructure for swap management [ 133 ].
  • Regulatory policies on energy market prices, so that owners can consider the EV investment and its profitability by using the sale of their energy surplus to the distribution grid or planning loads in off-peak hours of the distribution grid.
  • Research focused on the integration of electric vehicles (EVs) powered by renewable energy sources is currently a viable option to combat climate change and advance the energy transition [ 104 , 121 ].

4. Conclusions

Author contributions, data availability statement, conflicts of interest.

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Click here to enlarge figure

Indexed NameH-
Index
Citation CountDocument CountCountryUniversityFirst Publication (Year)
Gogotsi, Y.180160,412936United StatesDrexel University2005
Dai, L.14886,083662United StatesCase Western Reserve University2006
Blaabjerg, F.148113,0372912DenmarkAalborg Universitet2005
Beck, H.139100,3271460SwitzerlandUniversity of Bern2007
Liu, J.13880,785496ChinaBeijing Forestry University2014
Amine, K.13662,151680United StatesStanford University2016
Chapín, F.135100,129432United StatesUniversity of Alaska Fairbanks2005
Chen, J.13463,266583ChinaNankai University2005
Aurbach, D.13171,805738IsraelBar-Ilan University2010
Poor, H.13078,6312150United StatesPrinceton University2013
Liu, H.12964,4881206AustraliaUniversity of Wollongong2005
Dou S.12875,3071875AustraliaUniversity of Wollongong2014
Sun, Y.12764,493702South KoreaHanyang University2013
Liu, M.12654,155732United StatesGeorgia Institute of Technology2005
Gao, H.12346,696719ChinaHarbin Institute of Technology2005
Gao, F.12346,696719ChinaNanjing Agricultural University2009
Kuss, M.11646,395337ItalyIstituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare, Sezione di Pisa2007
Giannakis, G.11452,7281153United StatesUniversity of Minnesota Twin Cities2010
Cho, J.11448,489389South KoreaUlsan National Institute of Science and Technology2005
Wong, C.11452,2411570United StatesGeorgia Institute of Technology2005
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Novas, N.; Garcia Salvador, R.M.; Portillo, F.; Robalo, I.; Alcayde, A.; Fernández-Ros, M.; Gázquez, J.A. Global Perspectives on and Research Challenges for Electric Vehicles. Vehicles 2022 , 4 , 1246-1276. https://doi.org/10.3390/vehicles4040066

Novas N, Garcia Salvador RM, Portillo F, Robalo I, Alcayde A, Fernández-Ros M, Gázquez JA. Global Perspectives on and Research Challenges for Electric Vehicles. Vehicles . 2022; 4(4):1246-1276. https://doi.org/10.3390/vehicles4040066

Novas, Nuria, Rosa M. Garcia Salvador, Francisco Portillo, Isabel Robalo, Alfredo Alcayde, Manuel Fernández-Ros, and Jose A. Gázquez. 2022. "Global Perspectives on and Research Challenges for Electric Vehicles" Vehicles 4, no. 4: 1246-1276. https://doi.org/10.3390/vehicles4040066

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Electric Vehicles

Abstract – This paper gives a mini overview of the recent research and works in the sector of electric vehicles. The paper describes the main part of electric vehicles and their work. The major components are battery, motor, charger, steering, and braking. The paper finally shows basic concepts of electric vehicles with working. There are electric buses in the main focus of this paper. The solar system also can be used for electric busses and this is described in this paper.

Keywords – Electric vehicle, motor, braking system, battery systems, hybrid system

 I.   INTRODUCTION

Electrical vehicle (EV) based on electro mechanical system. No, any internal combustion engine is used for torque development. All the power which is used is electric power as the energy source. In the electric vehicle main power source is electricity which is stored in the battery. The advantage of the highly efficient in power conversion through its proposition system of electric motor. Now in the world, there are several situations in which we cannot tolerate the environment that why we need to reduce carbon emission. In the sector of the automobile, there is a lot of petroleum used and therefore a lot of carbon emissions are occurring in the environment [1]. Electric busses work on the electricity from the power grid and also can work on the solar plates. There is a battery that can be charged and then used. All the car manufacturers have to develop at least one model in hybrid electric vehicles for the reduction in the carbon footprint. France and Japan are the countries who totally close the production of petrol vehicles by 2030. This is one more step toward pollution control and the improvement in electrical vehicles for a clean environment [2]. The table shows the various types of EVs. Image 1 shows the first electric vehicle in 1943-35 (America).

Types of EVs

Hybrid EVs

Battery EVs

Fuel Cell EVs

Solar Cell

Energy System

Battery

Ultra-Capacitor

ICE Generator Unit

Battery

Ultra-Capacitor

Fuel Cell

Solar Cell

Propulsion

Electric motor drive

Internal combustion engines

Electric motor drives 

Electric motor drives 

Electric motor drives 

Major issues

Managing multiple energy sources

Battery and battery management

Fuel cell cost

Fuel processor

Solar Cell cost

                                                                         Table 1

recent research papers on electric vehicles

II.  MAIN COMPONENTS

There are many components in electric vehicles, some main ones are spark ignited, traction system, thermal cooling system, DC/DC converter, power electronics control, battery, motor, storage, braking system etc. [3]. Image 2 shows the main components of the electric busses. There are various parts with different function and working shown in the figure.

recent research papers on electric vehicles

DC to DC converter: A full-bridge DC/DC converter is the frequently implemented converter for fuel-cell power conditioning when electrical isolation is needed. Full bridge DC to DC converter is suitable for high-power electrical transmission because switch voltage is not high and current are also not high [3,5].  Electric Motor Generator : Electric vehicle drive system for plug-in hybrid vehicles the integrated motor-generator set provides electric propulsion for the vehicle in its function as a motor, while work as a generator it converts mechanical braking energy into electrical energy, that is college regenerative braking system.  Regenerative Braking system : In the battery-powered electric vehicle system, regenerative braking is the conversion of the electric vehicle's kinetic energy into chemical energy stored in the electric battery system, where it can be used to drive the vehicle.   Recharge Station : In these stations, busses can be charged by an electrical charging system and it will convert electrical supply power into battery storage power. Battery Packs : In this battery packs are arranged and this will provide the power to the motor. Which can be charged by the recharge station. The capacity of the battery is for the 120 km distance which can be charged in 1.5 hours (nearly). Solar Cell : Solar cells can be used in an emergency for electric busses. When there is charging not available cell can work for small distances. It can be mounted on the top of the buses and it will charge through the solar system. There is a lot of space on the bus which can be utilized. The solar cell efficiency formula is shown below.  

recent research papers on electric vehicles

III.  The Motor

There are a number of motors available for electric vehicles: DC motors, Induction motors, DC brushless motors, Permanent magnetic synchronous motors and Switched reluctance motors.

recent research papers on electric vehicles

1.   2. Induction motor: It’s a very popular Alternate Current motor. It also has a large market share in controlled speed drive applications such as AC, elevator, or escalator. There are various higher power electric vehicles, for more than 10kW. 

recent research papers on electric vehicles

5.  Switched reluctance motor: This motor specification is also good for the use of electric and hybrid vehicles. It has variable reluctance that why this machine [14].  IV.  Conclusion

This paper discusses the basics of electric vehicles and the development of electric vehicles, especially electric buses. The electric vehicle is very useful for the reduction of carbon emission and the change of climate. Consumption of petroleum is also reduced due to the use of that. The paper first describes the main components of electric vehicles, it then extends the description of the components with uses.  The paper provides a mini overview of electric vehicles.   Acknowledgment The author acknowledges the support of various references which is very useful for this paper. References [1] Chikhi, F. El Hadri, A. Cadiou, J.C. “ ABS control design based on wheel-slip peak localization”. Proceedings of the Fifth International Workshop on Robot Motion and Control, Publication Date: 23-25 June 2005, pp.73- 77  URL: http://sersc.org/journals/index.php/IJAST/article/download/14920/7565/ [2] Beier, J. et  al, “Integrating on-site Renewable Electricity Generation into a Manufacturing System with Intermittent Battery Storage from Electric Vehicles”, Procedia CIRP, Vol. 48, 2016, pp. 483-488. [3] Rahman, K.M.; Fahimi, B.; Suresh, G.; Rajarathnam, A.V.; Ehsani, M., “Advantages of switched reluctance motor applications to EV and HEV: design and control issues”, IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, Vol. 36, Issue 1, Jan.-Feb. 2000, pp. 111 – 121. [4] K W E Cheng; “Recent Development on Electric Vehicles”, 3rd International Conference on Power Electronics system and it's application, 2009 [5] M.J. Bradley & Associates. 2013. “Electric Vehicle Grid Integration in the U.S., Europe, and China.” [6] Chan, C.C. (1996), Chau, K.T., Jiang, J.Z., Xia, W., Zhu, M., and Zhang, R., Novel permanent magnet motor drives for electric vehicles. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, Vol. 43, pp. 331-339. [7] B Smith, M. and J. Castellano. 2015. “Costs Associated with Non-Residential Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment.” [8] C Clint, J., B. Gamboa, B. Henzie, and A. Karasawa. 2015. “Considerations for Corridor Direct Current Fast Charging Infrastructure in California.” [9] Chan, C.C., Jiang, J.Z., Chen, G.H., and Chau, K.T., Computer simulation and analysis of a new polyphase multipole motor drive. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, Vol. 40, 1993, pp. 570-576. [10] Zhan, Y.J., Chan, C.C., and Chau K.T., A novel sliding-mode observer for indirect position sensing of switched reluctance motor drives, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, Vol. 46, 1999, pp. 390-397. [11] Nunes, P., M.C. Brito and T. Farias, “Synergies between electric vehicles and solar electricity penetrations in Portugal,” 2013 World Electric Vehicle Symposium and Exhibition, 2013, pp. 1-8. [12] Mwasilu, F. et  al., “Electric vehicles and smart grid interaction: A review on vehicle to grid and renewable energy sources integration”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Vol. 34, 2014, pp. 501-516 [13] Ates, M.N. et al., “In Situ Formed Layered-Layered Metal Oxide as Bifunctional Catalyst for Li-Air Batteries”, Journal of the Electrochemical Society, Vol 163, No. 10, 2016, pp. A2464-A2474 [14] Tuffner, F. and M. Kintner-Meyer, Using Electric Vehicles to Meet Balancing Requirements Associated with Wind Power, U.S. Department of Energy Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 2011

Abhas Kumar Singh was born in Ambikapur (Surguja) Chhattishgarh, India. He received the 3 Year Diploma in Electrical Engg. from Govt. Polytechnic College Ambikapur India, in 2007 and the B.Tech. degree in Electrical and Electronics Engineering from Shri Shankaracharya College of Engg. & Tech. Bhilai, India, in 2010. He did M. Tech. in Power System from the National Institute of Technology, Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, India. He has published a number of research papers in various journals and conferences. He also published a book. He is a Life member of ISROSET, a Member of IAENG, a Member of IACSIT, and a reviewer of many international journals. He is awarded the young scientist award in Nov 2020 by VDGOOD Professional Association.  

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Jayawant Yadav , Devanshoo Shukla , Prathamesh Karvir; Electrical vehicle past, presents and future - A review. AIP Conf. Proc. 22 August 2024; 3178 (1): 070010. https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0229521

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An increase in the use of vehicles in our daily lives has led to a big issue of different environmental issues in our day-to-day lives from which everyone has to suffer in a far greater amount. One of them is the air pollution that has arisen due to the blind use of petrol, diesel, and other fuel vehicles. Due to the increasing demand for vehicles in different transportation sectors, many different and innovative steps are being taken to tackle this problem, and one of them is the electric vehicle. In this literature, there is general information about environmental, economic, and practical aspects. As seen by current and potential users of electric vehicles, the history of electric vehicles and the increasing interest of people day by day in electric vehicles have been discussed here. It also provides significant insights about the future steps that would be taken in this sector to make this technology more affordable, comfortable, usable, and many more.

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How Americans view electric vehicles

A row of electric vehicles charge at a public station in San Ramon, California, in 2023. (Smith Collection/Gado via Getty Images)

About four-in-ten Americans (38%) say they’re very or somewhat likely to seriously consider an electric vehicle (EV) for their next vehicle purchase, according to a recent Pew Research Center survey .

Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand Americans’ views on electric vehicles. We surveyed 10,329 U.S. adults from May 30 to June 4, 2023.

Everyone who took part in the survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way, nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology .

Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology .

A bar chart showing that Democrats, younger adults and urban residents are more open to purchasing an electric vehicle.

Half of U.S. adults say they are not too or not at all likely to consider purchasing an EV, while another 13% say they do not plan to purchase a vehicle. The share of the public interested in purchasing an EV is down 4 percentage points from May 2022.

Over the past year, the Biden administration has announced a range of measures aimed at increasing EV adoption, including tax credits for EV buyers and emissions limits for car manufacturers. Major automakers are increasing EV production , and electric vehicles’ share of all new U.S. car sales rose sharply over the past two years, to 8.5%.

Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents, younger adults, and people living in urban areas are among the most likely to say they would consider purchasing an EV. The 9% of U.S. adults who currently own a hybrid or electric vehicle are also particularly likely to consider an EV for their next purchase. A majority of this group (68%) says they are very or somewhat likely to seriously consider it.

Among those who would consider purchasing an EV, about seven-in-ten say helping the environment (72%) and saving money on gas (70%) are major reasons why. A small share (12%) cite keeping up with the latest trends in vehicles as a major reason.

Expectations for future electric vehicle infrastructure  

One potential obstacle to greater EV adoption is the availability of public charging stations.

A bar chart showing that Americans have low levels of confidence that the U.S. will build necessary EV infrastructure.

Currently, most EV owners charge their vehicles at home . Some who have used public chargers find that they are unreliable or limited in number. In September 2022, the Biden administration set aside $5 billion to create a network of EV charging stations .

Americans express limited confidence that the country will build the necessary infrastructure to support large numbers of EVs on the roads. Some 17% say they are extremely or very confident this will happen, while 30% are somewhat confident. And 53% are not too or not at all confident.

Republicans and GOP leaners are especially likely to doubt that the U.S. will build the charging stations and infrastructure needed to support EVs: 74% say they have not too much or no confidence at all in this. By comparison, 34% of Democrats and Democratic leaners say the same.

A bar chart showing that people who are confident U.S. will build charging infrastructure are more likely to consider an EV purchase.

Americans who are confident the country will build the necessary infrastructure are more likely than others to say they would consider purchasing an EV.

Among those who are extremely or very confident that the U.S. will build the infrastructure needed to support EVs, 68% say they would be at least somewhat likely to consider purchasing an EV.

Just 19% of those who are not too or not at all confident in future EV infrastructure say they are at least somewhat likely to consider purchasing an EV.

Views on phasing out gasoline cars and trucks

Line charts showing that support for phasing out new gasoline vehicles by 2035 has decreased over the past 2 years.

Accelerating the transition to EVs is a central part of President Joe Biden’s climate agenda. The administration has proposed new emission limits for automakers that would reduce the number of gas-powered cars and trucks they could sell. Some states have gone further, with plans to ban new gas-powered car sales by 2035. 

However, the idea of phasing out the production of new gas-powered vehicles by 2035 faces more public opposition than support. About six-in-ten Americans (59%) say they oppose this, while 40% favor it.

The share of Americans who favor phasing out gas-powered vehicles has declined 7 points since 2021. Support is down among both Democrats and Republicans.

A bar chart showing that 73% of Republicans say they would be upset if the U.S. stopped making new gasoline vehicles.

Currently, a majority of Democrats (64%) favor phasing out production of gas-powered vehicles by 2035, but 84% of Republicans oppose this.

Partisans also have different emotional reactions to the idea of ending gas-powered vehicle production. A clear majority of Republicans (73%) say they would feel upset about it, but views among Democrats are more mixed. Some 37% say they would feel excited, while 43% would feel neutral and 20% would be upset.

Note: This is an update to a post originally published June 3, 2021. Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology .

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Majority of Americans support more nuclear power in the country

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World's most effective climate policies identified in new study

Mix of carrots and sticks tends to work better than single policies, research finds.

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Countries around the world have implemented carbon pricing, electric vehicle incentives and thousands of other policies in an effort to cut carbon emissions and slow climate change. But which ones actually work? A new global study has uncovered 63 of the most effective policies, and found some helpful patterns.

Felix Pretis, a Canadian-based co-author of the study published today in Science , said the research offers both hope and pointers to drive more effective climate action.

"There's a whole set of policies that have already led to significant reductions," said Pretis, an associate professor of economics at the University of Victoria "There are definitely success stories we can turn to."

One was a big drop in the U.K.'s emissions from electricity with a combination of carbon pricing, subsidies for renewable energy and a coal phase-out plan. The U.S. cut transportation emissions with a mix of tax incentives and subsidies for EVs and tighter standards on carbon emissions.

A notable Canadian example was a drop in industrial carbon emissions with carbon pricing and emissions cap-and-trade policies.

All 63 success stories have been compiled into a searchable online dashboard that the researchers hope will help policy makers.

White wind turbine with axle far to the right and one turbine taking up most of the frame with blue sky in the background

The study uncovered some key patterns about what works best. First of all, mixes of policies that include both incentives to reduce carbon emissions and deterrents to generating emissions tended to be more effective than single policies, such as incentives, carbon pricing or regulations, alone. Secondly, it found that carbon pricing was more effective in the industrial and electricity sector, dominated by businesses, than in the building and transportation sector, where individual consumers make decisions about their homes and cars and mixes of "carrots" and "sticks" were key.

How researchers figured out which policies work

Human-caused climate change is driven mainly by burning fossil fuels, which releases heat-trapping carbon emissions into the atmosphere. Under the Paris Agreement on climate change, many countries, including Canada, have implemented policies to cut emissions and eventually reach net zero emissions (where they are absorbing as many emissions as they emit.)

Pretis said the problem is "we really lack an understanding of which ones work."

Many past studies have tried to uncover the effect of individual policies, but have looked at only a small fraction of 1,500 policies around the world.

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Why the federal carbon tax is 'a very emotional policy' for Canadians

Pretis and collaborators in Germany and the U.K., led by Annika Stechemesser at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Research in Germany, took a different approach.

They started with a database of climate policies in 41 countries managed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which divided them into four sectors: industry, electricity, transport and buildings.The researchers used computer algorithms to look for big emissions drops — larger than 4.5 per cent — in those sectors and countries, while filtering out economic fluctuations such as the COVID-19 pandemic. They compared the timing of those emissions drops to the implementation of 1,500 climate policies listed in a database between 1998 and 2022 and used statistics to link them.

The 63 successful policies identified led to emissions reductions of between 0.6 billion and 1.8 billion metric tonnes.

The researchers said implementing some of those policies in other countries before 2030 could significantly cut countries' emissions and help them get closer to meeting their emissions targets.

Carbon pricing works for developed countries – but not developing ones

Jennifer Winter is an economics professor at the University of Calgary whose research is also focused on climate policy.

She said the approach used by Pretis and his colleagues was novel and interesting, and she appreciated that the paper included both developed economies and developing ones, which are less studied.

The new study found that carbon pricing didn't work as well for developing countries.

View from high up of colourful crowd, umbrellas, single-storey buildings with corrugated roofs, racks for clothing and jewelry in street.

The researchers said that was consistent with other research showing incentives and disincentives that rely on pricing don't work well without "liberalized markets."

Pretis said in lower-income countries, economies are less formal, and there may not be anyone to calculate, collect or track things like carbon taxes.

For developed countries, the study found a combination of pricing, subsidies and regulation worked.

"What's quite interesting," Winter observed, "is that … all three types of emission reduction policies matter for reducing emissions."

Carbon pricing and incentives work together

She said the new study provides important evidence that climate policies are working.

"One of the most common questions I'm asked in interviews is 'Does carbon pricing work?'" she said. The new research is "evidence that yes, with the data we have available, emission pricing is resulting in emissions reductions. And we also now have evidence that the other policies introduced by governments to help reduce emissions are also resulting in emissions reductions."

Winter and some colleagues published a blog post Thursday on trends in climate policies within Canada , based on a national database of climate policies analogous to the OECD's international one. The database is a collaboration with the Canadian Climate Institute's 440 Megatonnes project, which tracks Canada's progress in cutting emissions.

It found that in Canada, policy "carrots" that incentivize voluntary action make up 71.5 per cent of policies, vastly outnumbering policy "sticks."

Stewart Elgie, an environmental law professor at the University of Ottawa and founder of Sustainable Prosperity, a sustainable economy think-tank, points out that the new study shows subsidies are most effective when combined with pricing, regulation or both.

"We're not going to reduce emissions unless we use both carrots and sticks," he said.

He said he thought the way the study was done was "really clever" and it's probably the most comprehensive study of climate policies and their impacts worldwide to date, with some important insights.

"First, we're making progress in the fight against climate change," he said. "We're on the right path … but we need to keep going. We need to keep bringing in the types of policies that are underway [in other countries] right now, and we need to stick with carbon pricing as the foundation of our climate policies."

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Science, Climate, Environment Reporter

Emily Chung covers science, the environment and climate for CBC News. She has previously worked as a digital journalist for CBC Ottawa and as an occasional producer at CBC's Quirks & Quarks. She has a PhD in chemistry from the University of British Columbia. In 2019, she was part of the team that won a Digital Publishing Award for best newsletter for "What on Earth." You can email story ideas to [email protected].

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Electric Vehicles Are Key to Winning the Climate Fight

China's rapid adoption of new energy vehicles is helping to accelerate the global energy transition..

Every summer is a reminder of the urgency of climate change. Last July, the global average temperature rose to a record high. This summer, floods, hurricanes, and extreme high temperatures again ring warning bells about the most imminent and grave threat to humanity. Accordingly, the most effective way to limit global warming should be a top priority for the global agenda. And from that imperative, we can celebrate the progress of global electric vehicle (EV) industry, especially the new milestone China recently hit — an EV adoption rate of more than 35 percent.

To transition away from fossil fuels, as announced and reaffirmed last year at COP28 in Dubai, the world needs to use clean electricity as its major power source, and also electrify end uses. This means electrifying transportation.

The development of China’s EV industry

Transportation accounts for about 10 percent of China’s national carbon emissions. That number is decreasing with China’s growing use of EVs. China’s EV sales have experienced super-fast growth in the past decade, since its first climate commitment in 2009 in Copenhagen, and the country has become the world’s largest EV market. In 2023, China accounted for 63.5 percent of the world’s new energy vehicle sales. EVs took off around 2020, with a rapid growth in sales. There were 1.37 million new energy vehicles (primarily EVs) sold in 2020. In 2023, the number had soared to 9.50 million, even though purchasing subsidies were starting to be phased out in 2016 and were completely done by 2022.The high penetration rate of new energy vehicles in China stems from its large production capacity and cost effectiveness, which functions as a solid foundation for serving the country’s 1.4 billion consumers.

However, another critical concern is supplying enough clean electricity to every EV. Fortunately, China is moving fast to realize its renewable power target. In its Nationally Determined Contributions, China pledged to reach at least 1,200 gigawatts of installed solar and wind capacity by 2030. According to projections by the China Electricity Council, China will have more than 1,300 gigawatts of installed wind and solar capacity by the end of 2024, meeting its NDC target six years ahead of schedule. China is marching toward its goal to primarily establish a new power system around 2030. More EVs on the road backed by a green power system dominated by renewable energy would then be a significant contribution to China’s decarbonization.

It is even more exciting to see that efficiency is continuing to improve in all energy-related sectors as the wave of digitalization and distribution mutually supports each sector’s energy transition. EVs can play a larger role than just transportation in the new energy system. For example, “grid-building-EV” interaction and integration technology has become an important practice for demand-side response, in which EVs and batteries have great potential to serve as energy storage and load-shifting measures for a renewable-rich power system, where energy supply can be intermittent.

Lowering the carbon footprint of EVs

Beyond the adoption and utilization of EVs, the automobile industry has been actively involving upstream suppliers’ carbon emissions into the whole vehicle life-cycle carbon footprint management scope. Such action helps a lot to clarify “who is dirtier,” when comparing carbon emissions between EVs and traditional internal-combustion engine (ICE) vehicles. According to an evaluation of 13 car models by the China Automotive Technology and Research Center (CATARC), the life-cycle carbon footprint of an EV is significantly lower — 37.8 percent less carbon emissions — than that of an ICE vehicle in China.

Driven by the whole life-cycle carbon footprint control exercise, major emissions resources of EVs are further being identified and the first movers are taking actions to calculate and mitigate their emissions. According to CATARC, 42.6 percent of an EV’s emissions come from materials and components, especially carbon-intensive parts such as steel, aluminum, and lithium batteries. Leading automakers such as Geely and Great Wall Motor have committed to so-called Scope 3 decarbonization actions.

With an increasingly lower-emissions automotive value chain, upstream and downstream changes can be further mobilized to achieve cross-sector triple wins. China’s first low-emissions steel produced by direct reduced iron technologies from Hebei Iron and Steel were provided to BMW for car manufacturing in 2023, an exciting example of using low-emissions materials in cars.

Scaling the market

To further strengthen the whole supply chain and neutralize the green premium, consumers are playing a much more critical role by sending the correct market signals. Utilizing the vehicle life-cycle carbon footprint evaluation tool, CATARC launched the Automobile Leader Program to offer incentives on the consumer side where car models with the lowest life-cycle emissions are rewarded with better market exposure. This is a great example of consumer-focused actions with positive impacts in both the near term and longer term.

And the impacts can be huge. So far market scale has been the key factor effectively driving the growth of China’s EV industry, and it will still be a major driving force to bolster it in the future. There are more than 400 million middle-income people in China and they represent the scale of potential EV consumers. In 2023, China consumed almost all its EV production, which demonstrates a high confidence to fully utilize its EV manufacturing capacity, clearly illustrating that “overcapacity” is not issue.

The policy signal on full life-cycle carbon footprint control is also a big milestone. The Chinese government issued an implementation plan to accelerate product-level emissions management in May, aiming at finishing the development of 100 green accounting methods for major products (including new energy vehicles) by 2027 and promoting them to international standards. The plan also recommends the application of carbon labels for vehicles to differentiate the low-carbon product market.

The urgency of combating climate change needs the world to move faster to advance the energy transition in all sectors, and calls for more clean power and more EVs on the road. China’s highly efficient and solid performing EVs bring good news to the world where strong alignment on this urgency exists. China can provide the world with cleaner, high-quality and affordable vehicles, which are essential for the global energy transition, to help the world achieve the climate goals at a faster pace.

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  2. Technical Analysis and Research on the Endurance of Electric Vehicles

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  3. Research & Advancement in Electric Vehicle Technology

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  5. (PDF) ELECTRIC AND HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES

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  6. (PDF) Electric Vehicles in India: A Literature Review

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COMMENTS

  1. Trends in electric vehicles research

    In this paper, we have studied the scholarly research trends by analysing patterns of document co-referencing of the period 1990-2021. Our results show several interesting trends, gaps, and need for future development of EV research, industry, and policy. ... This shift towards electric vehicles will create new challenges and opportunities in ...

  2. A Review on Electric Vehicles: Technologies and Challenges

    Electric Vehicles (EVs) are gaining momentum due to several factors, including the price reduction as well as the climate and environmental awareness. This paper reviews the advances of EVs regarding battery technology trends, charging methods, as well as new research challenges and open opportunities. More specifically, an analysis of the worldwide market situation of EVs and their future ...

  3. Electric vehicles: the future we made and the problem of unmaking it

    1. Introduction. According to the UK Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT), the Tesla Model 3 sold 2,685 units in December 2019, making it the 9th best-selling car in the country in that month (by new registrations; in August, a typically slow month for sales, it had been 3rd with 2,082 units sold; Lea, 2019; SMMT, 2019).As of early 2020, battery electric vehicles (BEVs) such as ...

  4. The rise of electric vehicles—2020 status and future expectations

    Kempton W and Letendre S 1997 Electric vehicles as a new power electric utilities source for electric utilities Transp. Res. A 2 157-75. Crossref; Google Scholar; Kempton W and Tomić J 2005 Vehicle-to-grid power implementation: from stabilizing the grid to supporting large-scale renewable energy J. Power Sources 144 280-94. Crossref

  5. World Electric Vehicle Journal

    This systematic review paper examines the current integration of artificial intelligence into energy management systems for electric vehicles. Using the preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses (PRISMA) methodology, 46 highly relevant articles were systematically identified from extensive literature research.

  6. The new car batteries that could power the electric vehicle ...

    Source: Adapted from G. Harper et al. Nature 575, 75-86 (2019) and G. Offer et al. Nature 582, 485-487 (2020) Today, most electric cars run on some variant of a lithium-ion battery. Lithium is ...

  7. PDF Charging the Future: Challenges and Opportunities for Electric Vehicle

    Electric vehicles (EVs) have advanced significantly this decade, owing in part to decreasing battery costs. Yet EVs remain more costly than gasoline fueled vehicles over their useful life. This paper analyzes the additional advances that will be needed, if electric vehicles are to sig-nificantly penetrate the passenger vehicle fleet. Battery Prices

  8. A review of electric vehicle technology: Architectures, battery

    Electric vehicles are a relatively green area with much potential for research. Recently, several research papers have been published in this area to present the new research and challenges to mature EV technology to the next level. ... Electric vehicles have become prone to cyber-attacks due to the advancement of the various technologies ...

  9. Energy and battery management systems for electrical vehicles: A

    Despite the availability of alternative technologies like "Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles" (PHEVs) and fuel cells, pure EVs offer the highest levels of efficiency and power production (Plötz et al., 2021).PHEV is a hybrid EV that has a larger battery capacity, and it can be driven miles away using only electric energy (Ahmad et al., 2014a, 2014b).

  10. Global Perspectives on and Research Challenges for Electric Vehicles

    This paper describes the characteristics of worldwide scientific contributions to the field of electric vehicles (EVs) from 1955 to 2021. For this purpose, a search within the Scopus database was conducted using "Electric Vehicle" as the keyword. As a result, 50,195 documents were obtained through analytical and bibliometric techniques and classified into six communities according to the ...

  11. Adoption of Electric Vehicles: Purchase Intentions and Consumer

    The transformation of the market for electric vehicles is reflected in sales at the same rate. In 2021, global sales of electric vehicles will reach an all-time high of 6.75 million, up 108% from the previous year. The market proportion of electric vehicles increased from 0.2% in 2012 to 8.3% in 2013 due to record-breaking sales.

  12. New technologies for optimal scheduling of electric vehicles in

    The rise of artificial intelligence, blockchain, and other innovative technologies has enriched research on optimal scheduling of electric vehicles. To reveal the latest developments in electric vehicle optimal scheduling studies, this paper summarises the application of state-of-the-art technologies, including deep learning, deep reinforcement ...

  13. Recent Research and Progress in Batteries for Electric Vehicles

    If the driver wants to switch to another model after driving 200,000 km, then the battery is still almost new and has a high resale value, which further reduces the overall costs of the vehicle. 6 Outlook 6.1 New Engineering Concepts. The CTP technology is obviously not the last step in improvement of the electric car by engineering.

  14. PDF A Review on Electric Vehicles: Technologies and Challenges

    Abstract: Electric Vehicles (EVs) are gaining momentum due to several factors, including the price reduction as well as the climate and environmental awareness. This paper reviews the advances of EVs regarding battery technology trends, charging methods, as well as new research challenges and open opportunities.

  15. Wireless charging technologies for electric vehicles: Inductive

    2.4.1 Challenges associated with stationary inductive charging for electric vehicles Power transfer efficiency. Inductive charging systems for electric vehicles often encounter energy losses during the charging process, primarily due to factors such as distance between the charging pad and the vehicle, alignment, and electromagnetic interference.

  16. A review on barrier and challenges of electric vehicle in India and

    The Society of Indian Automobile (SIAM) along with other automobile manufacturers aim in achieving selling of hundred percent pure EVs (battery electric and fuel cell vehicles) for intra-city public transport fleets by 2030 [90].Under this scheme, i) 40% of new electric vehicle sale is expected to put on the market by 2030 and ii) 60% of new ...

  17. Recent Research and Progress in Batteries for Electric Vehicles

    The sodium ion battery is currently emerging as a potential alternative to the LIB. Li-air and Li−S batteries are not ready for application in cars, yet. A potential future candidate is the solid-state battery, which shall benefit from the use of a safe Li metal anode, delivering higher capacities and rate capabilities.

  18. The current research on electric vehicle

    In 21st century, Electric vehicle(EV) as a green transportation tool, EV has won great attention from researchers, leading to a series of intensive and extensive studies. With the development of high-storage battery and EV, the number of the EV will rise dramatically, so that the random charging and discharging behavior will bring new challenges to safe and stable operation of power grids. The ...

  19. Charging System for Electric Vehicles

    The previous decade has seen significant advances in Electric Vehicle (EV) innovations, driven basically by new improvements in numerous frameworks, be it charging systems, control systems, or battery management systems. Now, EV innovation has arrived at the stage by where practically all vehicle manufacturers are occupied with significant innovative work projects related to EV's. Effective ...

  20. Electric Vehicles

    June 2021. Electric Vehicles. Electric Vehicles. Abstract - This paper gives a mini overview of the recent research and works in the sector of electric vehicles. The paper describes the main part of electric vehicles and their work. The major components are battery, motor, charger, steering, and braking. The paper finally shows basic concepts ...

  21. Electrical vehicle past, presents and future

    As seen by current and potential users of electric vehicles, the history of electric vehicles and the increasing interest of people day by day in electric vehicles have been discussed here. ... A Review Paper on Identifying Relative Vehicle," pp. 1, 2, ... electric vehicle in united states a new model forecasts to 2030," centre for ...

  22. Analysis of cell balancing of Li-ion batteries with dissipative and non

    The passive method disposes of some electric charge from overcharge cell through resistor elements until matches to the state of charge (SoC)the reference or voltage reference (Amin et al., 2017). compare to the previous paper, an internal resistance of MOSFET is used as balancing resistance besideusiing resistor elements to dispose of over charged cells.

  23. (PDF) Recent development on electric vehicles

    This paper provides a comprehensive overview of recent advancements in autonomous electric vehicles (AEVs) within the specified region. It elaborates on the progress and comparative analysis of ...

  24. How Americans view electric vehicles

    A row of electric vehicles charge at a public station in San Ramon, California, in 2023. (Smith Collection/Gado via Getty Images) About four-in-ten Americans (38%) say they're very or somewhat likely to seriously consider an electric vehicle (EV) for their next vehicle purchase, according to a recent Pew Research Center survey.

  25. World's most effective climate policies identified in new study

    A new global study has identified 63 of the most effective, and found some patterns. ... electric vehicle incentives and more than 1,000 other policies in an effort to cut carbon emissions and ...

  26. 2024-01-5075: Preliminary Design of Permanent Magnet Motor Using

    The global attention toward electric vehicles is growing tremendously, mainly because of environmental issues in recent years. There has been a significant increase in the development of hybrid and pure electric vehicles as they are considered as an effective solution for reducing the carbon footprint. ... There is a lot of research happening ...

  27. New trends in electric motors and selection for electric vehicle

    ORIGINAL RESEARCH PAPER. ... The research proposes a new sinusoidal pulse width modulation (PWM) strategy in a way that the two carriers of the six-phase inverter are out of phase during four-pole operation and are in phase during two-pole operation. ... The recent trends in electric vehicles have shown the use of direct-drive motors and in ...

  28. Electric Vehicles Are Key to Winning the Climate Fight

    In 2023, the number had soared to 9.50 million, even though purchasing subsidies were starting to be phased out in 2016 and were completely done by 2022.The high penetration rate of new energy vehicles in China stems from its large production capacity and cost effectiveness, which functions as a solid foundation for serving the country's 1.4 ...

  29. China has spent at least $230 billion to build its EV industry, new

    China spent $230.8 billion over more than a decade to develop its electric car industry, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

  30. Electric vehicle sales to 'accelerate' once petrol and diesel car ban

    New research has found that confidence in electric vehicles among drivers has grown massively in recent years, although there are still several barriers to entry. There are expectations that ...