statutory interpretation essay studocu

• Honour Code
• CSR Commitments
• Trademark Policy
• Authentication
• How to Cite
• Legal Executive

Case Summaries

• Jurisprudence
• Legal Writing
• Legal English

UOL Case Bank

• A-Level Law
• Exam Skills
• LLB Admissions
• PGDL / GDL Admissions
• MA Law Admissions
• MLaw Admissions
• LLM Admissions
• JD Admissions
• Law Schools
• Law Modules
• Study Skills
• Careers Advice
• Job Openings
• Internships

Approaches to Statutory Interpretation

Statutory interpretation is the process of determining the meaning and purpose of a law (statute) passed by a legislative body. There are several approaches to statutory interpretation, including:

Literal approach. This approach involves interpreting the words of a statute according to their ordinary and grammatical meaning, without considering the legislative intent or purpose behind the law. This approach is also known as the "plain meaning" or "textualist" approach.

Purposive approach. This approach considers the legislative intent and purpose behind the law, and seeks to interpret the statute in a manner that furthers its overall objective. This approach is also known as the "teleological" or "contextual" approach.

Golden rule approach. This approach is a modified form of the literal approach, and involves using the literal approach unless it leads to an absurd result. In such cases, the court may depart from the literal interpretation and adopt a purposive approach.

Mischief rule approach. This approach is based on the idea that the purpose of a statute is to remedy a particular mischief or defect in the law that existed prior to the passage of the statute. The court must interpret the statute in a manner that advances this remedial purpose.

Harmonious construction approach. This approach involves interpreting a statute in a manner that is consistent with other laws and the Constitution, and avoids interpreting it in a way that leads to an absurd or unjust result.

These are the main approaches to statutory interpretation used by courts which often adopt a combination of these approaches when interpreting a statute.

Check out our study notes for Legal System and Method to learn more about this topic.

Trusted by thousands of law students worldwide

All 30 law modules (best value), all 18 uol modules (uol international programme), sqe foundation package, pgdl / gdl law conversion, 12 qualifying llb modules (uol standard entry route), 9 qualifying llb modules (uol graduate entry route), first year llb modules (uol standard entry route), first year llb modules (uol graduate entry route), law exam guide, second year llb modules (uol standard entry route), second year llb modules (uol graduate entry route), third year llb modules (uol standard entry route), third year llb modules (uol graduate entry route), contract law, legal english and writing, legal executive package (level 6), certhe common law (uol international programme), graddip commercial law (uol international programme), graddip international law (uol international programme), where are our students from.

Yale University

Council of Europe

Baker Mckenzie 

University of Chicago

Columbia University

New York University

University of Michigan 

University College London (UCL)

London School of Economics (LSE)

King’s College London (KCL)

University of London

University of Manchester

University of Zurich

University of York

Brandeis University

University of Exeter

University of Sheffield

Boston University

University of Washington

University of Leeds

University of Law

Royal Holloway, University of London 

Birkbeck, University of London

SOAS, University of London

University of Kent

University of Hull

Queen’s University Belfast

Toronto Metropolitan University

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Your perfect companion for open-book and closed-book exams

Diagrams and charts.

Our carefully designed diagrams and charts will guide you through complex legal issues.

Clear and Succinct Definitions

Key concepts are concisely defined to help you understand legal topics quickly.

Statutory Provisions

Statutory provisions are provided side by side with legal concepts to help you swiftly locate the relevant legislation.

We have summarised important cases for you so that you don't need to read long and boring cases.

Rules and Exceptions

Rules and exceptions are clearly listed so that you know when a rule applies and when it doesn't.

Terminology

Legal terms and key concepts are explained at the beginning of each chapter to help you learn efficiently.

Case law is provided side by side with legal concepts so that you know how legal principles and precedents were established.

Law Essay Guide

You will learn essential law exam skills and essay writing techniques that are not taught in class.

Problem Question Guide

We will show you how to answer problem questions step by step to achieve first-class results.

Structured Explanations

Complex legal concepts are broken down into concise and digestible bullet point explanations.

Legal Research

You will learn legal research techniques with our study guide and become a proficient legal researcher.

Exam-focused

All essential concepts, principles, and case law are included so that you can answer exam questions quickly.

• American Express

By using this website, you agree to our use of cookies. We use cookies to provide necessary site functionality and provide you with a great experience.

Post A Comment

Flag comment.

Are you sure you'd like to flag this comment as inappropriate?

Thank you for commenting

Your comment is awaiting moderation, and will be published as soon as it has been approved

Delete Comment

You're logged in as the blog owner. Would you like to delete this comment?

Your message has been successfully sent

Your form has been submitted. Please check your email for a copy of your responses. If you're accepted, you'll receive an email with a link to checkout.

Could not add item to cart

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

• We're Hiring!
• Help Center

Impact of EU membership & the Human Rights Act 1998 on English statutory interpretation

A discussion on how membership of the European Union and S3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 have influenced the approach of the English judiciary to statutory interpretation.

Related Papers

Danilo Leonardi

Peter Skrandies

Philippe Kuhn

The interpretative obligation of the UK courts pursuant to s.3(1) of the HRA 1998 has greatly expanded the ambit of statutory interpretation as a method of protecting human rights in this jurisdiction. The framers of the Act, fully cognisant of the difficulty of reconciling the seemingly competing aims of domestic legal protection of human rights and continued parliamentary sovereignty, introduced a delicate mechanism in sections 3 and 4 to achieve both objectives. It will be argued that the House of Lords’ seminal decision in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza has served to rather clearly demarcate the outer boundary of what is ‘possible’ under s.3(1), after clear differences in judicial opinion had emerged. Bearing that in mind, notable human rights cases concerning sentencing and terrorism law will be used to demonstrate that there are situations in which a section 4 declaration of incompatibility is the only appropriate option. Overall, s.3(1) has significantly enhanced judicial protection of human rights without the courts having usurped the role of Parliament. Whether this balance can be maintained as the senior judiciary change depends on the extent to which the precedents that have been set will be followed, which is likely as the HRA jurisprudence matures further.

Eleonora Camela

University of Cambridge Working Paper

Christopher Sargeant

This article discusses the current jurisprudence from UK Courts and Tribunals under section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998, particularly the duty to take into account any relevant judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights or its associated bodies when determining a question concerning a Convention Right. It argues that the current practice of domestic Judges of deferring to the views of the Strasbourg Court and following its approach even when considering it manifestly incorrect is unsatisfactory and ought to be replaced by a more flexible approach which recognises the original intent of Parliament to create a legislative instrument to be understood within the traditions of the British State.

Shifan Tariq

Human rights as a discipline has entered into a colossal era, where everyone seems to emphasize its importance; may it be global or domestic. In fact, it is largely attributable to the post-WWII reconciliation efforts of the world powers. A rather recent addition to this, is Regional organizations , such as the European Union, which engages itself in protecting the interests of the people within its ambit. The UK is also a member to this union since 1973. Herein ,they devise polices & articulate dialogue between member states, so that they can define standards & make way for those laws that are applicable within their region. One such common initiative was the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) ] – 1950. Member states were to give supremacy to the EU laws over their local legislations, so as to ensure that member states do not put up any local enactments in contravention to the ECHR. This ideally should gives the judiciary its right to strike down inconsistent legislation`s , when there is a conflict between national laws & the ECHR. However, it remains a fact of argument is many EU states, especially in the UK where the Parliamentary supremacy remains an integral part of the democratic system of governance, Wide spread uncertainty remains on whether the EU laws should remain supreme within the UK. It should also be noted that the UK Parliament had passed the European Communities Act in 1972, which meant that , the country choose to bring EU laws into the English laws. As a result of which all existing human rights laws within the UK were to interpreted as per ECHR. But the problem becomes much more critical when considering the English laws that were enacted after passing the Act & still remained inconsistent with the EU laws. The English Courts have conflicting views on how the situation as, what was mentioned above should be handled. Different judges have taken different approaches. So the ultimate question of protecting human rights inculcated within the provisions of the ECHR, remains at the hands of the judges. Therefore it becomes so important for every law abiding citizen in UK to know the plight of its human rights laws & if at all there has been a compromise of its legislative supremacy.

Alice Donald

Conor Foley

A paper written, with Keir Starmer for Amnesty International in 1998, reviewing the significance of the incorporation of the European Convention into British law by the first term Labour government, with recommendations for how this could be integrated into a human rights-based foreign policy

Global Jurist

European human rights protection, ensured by the European Convention and Court of Human Rights, is declared to be universal and inclusive, protecting not only citizens of Europe but also anybody residing within the jurisdiction of the signatory countries. This article challenges this declaration and argues, with the help of some examples from the case law, that European human rights protection is based on the defined concepts of European-ness that exclude the perceived non-European within the Convention and the Court system.

Maša Marochini

The European Convention Human Rights system, despite being the most effective system in providing individual protection of civil and political rights, is currently facing numerous problems. One of the biggest problems is the European Court of Human Rights overload. The expansion of the Court's caseload can be attributed to a combination of several factors one of which is the extensive judicial interpretation of Convention rights to a variety of claims, which at the inception of the system states were not initially intent upon addressing. As a human rights treaty where numerous provisions have been drafted with a lack of precision the Convention is subject to interpretation that is done by the Court since the judges have to interpret and define law in concrete situations, and not just apply it. For that reason the Court has developed numerous principles of interpretation of the Convention and this paper looks at the most important ones. The interpretative principles of the Court can be divided in two groups, related to the direction in which the judicial creativity led. The first group represents judicial self-restraint principles of interpretation where the judges used one of the four following principles: intentionalism, textualism, margin of appreciation or the doctrine of fourth instance. On the other side, the judicial activist methods of interpretation, as used by the judges’ of the Court are the living instrument doctrine or evolutive interpretation, the doctrine of effectiveness or innovative interpretation, and the doctrine of an autonomous concept. This paper will look at all those principles as well as at the negative consequences of the inconsistency of their use.

RELATED PAPERS

Drug Discoveries & Therapeutics

Temsiri Suwan

luiza kraft

Dr. Neeraj M Srivastava

Proceedings of the 8th International Scientific Conference - FINIZ 2021

Jelena Gajić

American Journal of Physiology-Gastrointestinal and Liver Physiology

BITE: Recipes for Remarkable Research

Alison Williams

Chemical Physics

Rainer Kimmich

Journal of Water and Environment Technology

Tasuku Kato

Urología colombiana

RODOLFO VARELA

International Journal for Information Security Research

Dr Funminiyi Olajide, PhD, MBA, MSc, MBSC, AFSsoc, MACFE, FBCS, FHEA (United Kingdom)

IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science

mutia elida

The American Journal of Digestive Diseases

Jean Rambaud

TURKISH JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICS

Vincent BEJA

Jungle World

Julian Kuppe

Public Health Nutrition

Sandra Martelli

Oral Surgery, Oral Medicine, Oral Pathology and Oral Radiology

Oscar Fernando Munoz Chavez

Jacques Sauvé

Prostaglandins & Other Lipid Mediators

Smaragdi Antonopoulou

International Journal of Bioassays

balaji more

Journal of Functional Foods

Antonio Trani

Frontiers in Plant Science

Adriana Ciurli

1：1制作utk学位证书 田纳西大学毕业证电子版学位证书

RELATED TOPICS

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024

Statutory Interpretation as Argumentation

• First Online: 03 July 2018

Cite this chapter

• Douglas Walton 7 ,
• Giovanni Sartor 8 , 9 &
• Fabrizio Macagno 10  

1294 Accesses

5 Citations

1 Altmetric

This chapter proposes a dialectical approach to legal interpretation, consisting of three dimensions: (1) a formalization of the canons of interpretation in terms of argumentation schemes; (2) a dialectical classification of interpretive schemes; and (3) a logical and computational model for comparing the arguments pro and contra an interpretation. The traditional interpretive maxims or canons used in both common and civil law are translated into defeasible patterns of arguments, which can be evaluated through sets of corresponding critical questions. These interpretive argumentation schemes are classified in general categories and a distinction is drawn between schemes supporting and rebutting an interpretation. This framework allows conceiving statutory interpretation as a dialectical procedure consisting in weighing arguments pro and contra an interpretation. This procedure is formalized and represented computationally through tools from formal argumentation systems.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

• Available as PDF
• Read on any device
• Instant download
• Own it forever
• Available as EPUB and PDF
• Compact, lightweight edition
• Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
• Free shipping worldwide - see info
• Durable hardcover edition

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

In Sartor chapter 3, part II, this volume, on “ Defeasibility in Law ,” a semantics based on labeling, which is equivalent to the extension based semantic here presented, was adopted.

Alexy, R., and R. Dreier. 1991. Statutory interpretation in the federal republic of Germany. In Interpreting statutes. A comparative study , ed. N. MacCormick, and R. Summers. Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Google Scholar  

Araszkiewicz, M. 2013. Towards systematic research on statutory interpretation in ai and law. In Proceedings of JURIX 2014: The 27th annual conference on legal knowledge and information systems , ed. R. Hoekstra, 15–24. Amsterdam: IOS Press.

Atlas, J.D. 2005. Logic, meaning, and conversation . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Book   Google Scholar  

Atlas, J.D. 2008. Presupposition. In The handbook of pragmatics , ed. L. Horn, and G. Ward, 29–52. Oxford: Blackwell.

Atlas, J.D., and S. Levinson. 1981. It-clefts, Informativeness and logical form: Radical pragmatics (Revised Standard Version). In Radical Pragmatics , ed. P. Cole, 1–62. New York: Academic Press.

Bezuidenhout, A. 1997. Pragmatics, semantic undetermination and the referential/attributive distinction. Mind 423: 375–409.

Article   Google Scholar  

Butler, B. 2016. Law and the primacy of pragmatics. In Pragmatics and law: Philosophical perspectives , ed. A. Capone, and F. Poggi, 1–13. Cham: Springer.

Carston, R. 2002. Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication . Oxford: Blackwell.

Carston, R. 2013. Legal texts and canons of construction: A view from current pragmatic theory. In Law and language: Current legal issues , vol. 15, ed. M. Freeman, and F. Smith, 8–33. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter   Google Scholar  

Cross, R. 2005. Statutory interpretation , ed. J. Bell, and G. Engle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Damele, G. 2014. Analogia legis and analogia Iuris: An overview from a rhetorical perspective. In Systematic approaches to argument by analogy , ed. H. Ribeiro, 243–256. Amsterdam: Springer.

Dascal, M. 2003. Interpretation and understanding . Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Dascal, M., and J. Wróblewski. 1988. Transparency and doubt: Understanding and interpretation in pragmatics and in law. Law and Philosophy 72: 203–224.

Gizbert-Studnicki, T. 1990. the burden of argumentation in legal disputes. Ratio Juris 31: 118–129.

Gordon, T. 2010. An overview of the carneades argumentation support system. In Dialectics, dialogue and argumentation. An examination of douglas Walton’s theories of reasoning and argument , ed. C. Reed, and C. Tindale, 145–156. London: College Publications.

Gordon, T., and D. Walton. 2009a. Legal reasoning with argumentation schemes. In Proceedings of the 12th international conference on artificial intelligence and law , ed. C. D. Hafner, 137–146, New York: ACM.

Gordon, T., and D. Walton. 2009b. Proof Burdens and Standards. In Argumentation in artificial intelligence , ed. I. Rahwan, and G. Simari, 239–258. Berlin: Springer.

Gordon, T., and D. Walton. 2011. A formal model of legal proof standards and burdens. In 7th Conference on argumentation of the international society for the study of argumentation (ISSA 2010) , ed. F. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, A. Blair, and G. Mitchell, 644–655. Amsterdam: Sic Sat.

Gray, C.B. 2013. The philosophy of law: An encyclopedia, Vol. I–II . London and New York: Routledge.

Hage, J. 1996. A theory of legal reasoning and a logic to match. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4: 199–273.

Hage, J. 1997. Reasoning with rules . Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Horn, L. 1995. Vehicles of meaning: Unconventional semantics and unbearable interpretation. Washington University Law Quarterly 73: 1145–1152.

Jaszczolt, K. 2005. Default semantics . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kecskes, I. 2008. Dueling contexts: A dynamic model of meaning. Journal of Pragmatics 3: 385–406.

Kecskes, I. 2013. Intercultural pragmatics . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kecskes, I., and F. Zhang. 2009. Activating, seeking, and creating common ground: A socio-cognitive approach. Pragmatics and Cognition 2: 331–355.

Macagno, F. 2015. A means-end classification of argumentation schemes. In Reflections on theoretical issues in argumentation theory , ed. F. van Eemeren, and B. Garssen, 183–201. Cham: Springer.

Macagno, F. 2017. Defaults and inferences in interpretation. Journal of Pragmatics 117: 280–290.

Macagno, F., and A. Capone. 2016. Interpretative disputes, explicatures, and argumentative reasoning. Argumentation 4: 399–422.

Macagno, F., G. Sartor, and D. Walton. 2012. Argumentation schemes for statutory interpretation. In Argumentation 2012. International conference on alternative methods of argumentation in law , eds. J. Šavelka, M. Araszkiewicz, M. Myška, T. Smejkalová, and M. Škop, 63–75. Brno: Masarykova univerzita.

Macagno, F., and D. Walton. 2011. Reasoning from paradigms and negative Evidence. Pragmatics and Cognition 1: 92–116.

Macagno, F., and D. Walton. 2014. Emotive language in argumentation . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Macagno, F., and D. Walton. 2015. Classifying the patterns of natural arguments. Philosophy and Rhetoric 1: 26–53.

Macagno, F., and D. Walton. 2017. Arguments of statutory interpretation and argumentation schemes. International Journal of Legal Discourse 1: 47–83.

Macagno, F., D. Walton, and G. Sartor. 2018. Pragmatic maxims and presumptions in legal interpretation. Law and Philosophy . 37(1): 69–115. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-017-9306-4 .

MacCormick, N. 2005. Rhetoric and the rule of law . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

MacCormick, N., and R. Summers (eds.). 1991. Interpreting statutes: A comparative study . Dartmouth: Aldershot.

Miller, G. 1990. Pragmatics and the maxims of interpretation. Wisconsin Law Review : 1179–1227.

Pollock, J. 1995. Cognitive carpentry . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Prakken, H. 2010. An abstract framework for argumentation with structured arguments. Argument and Computation 2: 93–124.

Prakken, H., and G. Sartor. 1996. A dialectical model of assessing conficting arguments in legal reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4: 331–368.

Reiter, R. 1980. A Logic for default reasoning. Artificial Intelligence 1–2: 81–132.

Rotolo, A., G. Governatori, and G. Sartor. 2015. Deontic defeasible reasoning in legal interpretation: Two options for modelling interpretive arguments. In Proceedings of the 15th international conference on artificial intelligence and law , 99–108, New York, ACM.

Sartor, G., D. Walton, F. Macagno, and A. Rotolo. 2014. Argumentation schemes for statutory interpretation: A logical analysis. In Frontiers in artificial intelligence and applications , ed. R. Hoekstra, 11–20. Amsterdam: IOS Press.

Schauer, F. 1987. Precedent. Stanford Law Review 39: 571–605.

Sinclair, M. 1985. Law and language: The role of pragmatics in statutory interpretation. University of Pittsburgh Law Review 46: 373–420.

Smolka, J., and B. Pirker. 2016. International law and pragmatics. An account of interpretation in international law. International Journal of Language and Law 5: 1–40.

Soames, S. 2008. Philosophical Essays, vol. 1. Natural language: What it means and how we use it . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sperber, D., and D. Wilson. 1986. Relevance: Communication and cognition . Oxford: Blackwell.

Tarello, G. 1980. L’interpretazione della legge . Milan: Giuffrè.

Verheij, B. 2008. About the logical relations between cases and rules. In Legal Knowledge and information systems. JURIX 2008: The 21th annual conference , ed. E. Francesconi, G. Sartor, and D. Tiscornia, 21–32. Amsterdam: IOS Press.

Walton, D. 1995. Argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning . Mahwah, N.J.: Routledge.

Walton, D. 2004. Abductive reasoning . Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Walton, D. 2010. Similarity, precedent and argument from analogy. Artificial Intelligence and Law 3: 217–246.

Walton, D. 2015. Goal-based reasoning for argumentation . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Walton, D., and T. Gordon. 2005. Critical questions in computational models of legal argument. In Argumentation in artificial intelligence and law, IAAIL workshop series , ed. P. Dunne, and T. Bench-Capon, 103–111. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers.

Walton, D., F. Macagno, and G. Sartor. 2014. Interpretative argumentation schemes. In JURIX 2014: The 27th annual conference , ed. R. Hoekstra, 21–22. New York: IOS Press.

Walton, D., C. Reed, and F. Macagno. 2008. Argumentation schemes . New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wilson, D. 2005. New directions for research on pragmatics and modularity. Lingua 8: 1129–1146.

Wilson, D., and D. Sperber. 2004. Relevance theory. In Handbook of pragmatics , ed. L. Horn, and G. Ward, 607–632. Oxford: Blackwell.

Download references

Acknowledgement

Fabrizio Macagno would like to thank the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia for the research grants no. IF/00945/2013, PTDC/IVC-HFC/1817/2014, and PTDC/MHC-FIL/0521/2014. Douglas Walton would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for Insight Grant 435-2012-0104.

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

University of Windsor, Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric (CRRAR), Windsor, ON, Canada

Douglas Walton

Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche, Università di Bologna, Bologna, Italy

Giovanni Sartor

European University Institute, Florence, Italy

IFILNOVA, Instituto de Filosofia da Nova, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal

Fabrizio Macagno

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Fabrizio Macagno .

Editor information

Editors and affiliations.

Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche and CIRSFID, Università di Bologna, Bologna, Italy

Giorgio Bongiovanni

Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA

Gerald Postema

CIRSFID, Università di Bologna, Bologna, Italy

Antonino Rotolo

Department of Law, European University Institute, Florence, Italy

Department of Law, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain

Chiara Valentini

University of Windsor, Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric (CRRAR), Windsor, Ontario, Canada

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer Nature B.V.

About this chapter

Walton, D., Sartor, G., Macagno, F. (2018). Statutory Interpretation as Argumentation. In: Bongiovanni, G., Postema, G., Rotolo, A., Sartor, G., Valentini, C., Walton, D. (eds) Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9452-0_18

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9452-0_18

Published : 03 July 2018

Publisher Name : Springer, Dordrecht

Print ISBN : 978-90-481-9451-3

Online ISBN : 978-90-481-9452-0

eBook Packages : Religion and Philosophy Philosophy and Religion (R0)

Share this chapter

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research