next generation researchers initiative

Next Generation Researchers Initiative

An ad hoc committee conducted a study examining the policy and programmatic steps that the nation can undertake to ensure the successful launch and sustainment of careers among the next generation of researchers in the biomedical and behavioral sciences, including the full range of health sciences supported by the NIH. The study examined evidence-based programs and policies that can reduce barriers to, and create more opportunities for, successful transitions to independent research careers. It also examinde factors that influence the stability and sustainability of the early stages of independent research careers. 

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The Next Generation of Biomedical and Behavioral Sciences Researchers: Breaking Through

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has developed the world's preeminent system for biomedical research, one that has given rise to revolutionary medical advances as well as a dynamic and innovative business sector generating high-quality jobs and powering economic output and exports for the U.S. economy. However, there is a growing concern that the biomedical research enterprise is beset by several core challenges that undercut its vitality, promise, and productivity and that could diminish its critical role in the nation's health and innovation in the biomedical industry.

Among the most salient of these challenges is the gulf between the burgeoning number of scientists qualified to participate in this system as academic researchers and the elusive opportunities to establish long-term research careers in academia. The patchwork of measures to address the challenges facing young scientists that has emerged over the years has allowed the U.S. biomedical enterprise to continue to make significant scientific and medical advances. These measures, however, have not resolved the structural vulnerabilities in the system, and in some cases come at a great opportunity cost for young scientists. These unresolved issues could diminish the nation's ability to recruit the best minds from all sectors of the U.S. population to careers in biomedical research and raise concerns about a system that may favor increasingly conservative research proposals over high-risk, innovative ideas.

The Next Generation of Biomedical and Behavioral Sciences Researchers: Breaking Through evaluates the factors that influence transitions into independent research careers in the biomedical and behavioral sciences and offers recommendations to improve those transitions. These recommendations chart a path to a biomedical research enterprise that is competitive, rigorous, fair, dynamic, and can attract the best minds from across the country.

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Next Generation Researchers Initiative

The NIH has launched the Next Generation Researchers Initiative to bolster support for early-stage and mid-career investigators to address longstanding challenges faced by researchers trying to embark upon and sustain independent research careers.

The NIH and its stakeholder community have for many years been concerned about the long-term stability of the biomedical research enterprise. Too many researchers vying for limited resources has led to a hypercompetitive environment. Many highly meritorious applications go unfunded. This has too often resulted in misaligned incentives and unintended consequences for talented researchers at all career stages who are trying to succeed and stay in science. The current environment is particularly challenging for many new- and mid-career investigators. Over the last several years, NIH has taken numerous steps to balance, strengthen, and stabilize the biomedical research workforce.

• Special Council Review Policy
• New Investigator/Early-Stage Investigator Policies
• Initiatives from the Advisory Council to the NIH Director
• Programs for Early-Stage Investigators
• New Funding Mechanisms for Sustained Research Funding (R35)

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NIH’s Next Generation Researchers Initiative

104 comments.

At the Advisory Committee to the Director meeting last week, NIH Principal Deputy Director Dr. Larry Tabak presented a new NIH initiative to strengthen the biomedical workforce. This presentation followed extensive discussions with stakeholders both here through this blog , at stakeholder meetings, and at NIH advisory council meetings over the last month. We heard unequivocal endorsements for supporting early-career and mid-career researchers given the hypercompetitive funding environment — a challenge we have addressed many times in our blog posts. However, many voiced concerns about our taking a formulaic approach to capping grant funding and called on us to be more direct in enabling greater support for the next generation of biomedical researchers.

For this reason, we have shifted our approach to a focused initiative to support early- and mid-career investigators. As described in a June 8 NIH Director’s statement , and in recognition of the call for such action in the 21st Century Cures Act , we are naming this effort the Next Generation Researchers Initiative. We will take a multi-pronged approach to increase the number of NIH-funded early-stage and mid-career investigators and stabilize the career trajectory of scientists. We describe these approaches on a new web page that we will continue to update. Our activities address both research workforce stability, and evaluation of our investments in research. In brief, NIH will:

• commit substantial funds from NIH’s base budget, beginning this year with about $210 million, and ramping to approximately $1.1 billion per year after five years (pending availability of funds) to support additional meritorious early-stage investigators and mid-career investigators
• create a central inventory and track the impact of NIH institute and center funding decisions for early- and mid-career investigators with fundable scores to ensure this new strategy is effectively implemented in all areas of research
• place greater emphasis on current NIH funding mechanisms aimed at early- and mid-career investigators
• aim to fund most early-career investigators with R01 equivalent applications that score in the top 25th percentile
• encourage multiple approaches to develop and test metrics that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of our research portfolio, and assess the impact of NIH grant support on scientific progress, to ensure the best return on investment

Applicants do not need to do anything special to be eligible for this funding consideration. Beginning this fiscal year, the NIH institute or center (IC) who would fund the grant will give your application special consideration for support if you are:

• an early-stage investigator (within 10 years of completing your terminal research degree or medical residency and have not previously received a substantial independent NIH research award) and receive a score in the top 25 th percentile (or an impact score of 35 if the application is not percentiled)
• are at risk of losing all support, or,
• are a particularly promising investigator currently supported by a single ongoing award (i.e, NIH will prioritize funding an additional concurrent  research project grant  award)

NIH ICs make funding decisions to support their mission, and this plan provides flexibility in how ICs will meet the NIH-wide goal of supporting highly scoring early-stage and mid-career researchers. Each IC will make its decisions about how it will prioritize funding to support this initiative.

As further details are announced, we will be updating the Next Generation Researchers Initiative web page with this information. In the meantime, we encourage you to read the NIH Director’s statement , and look at the Advisory Committee to the Director presentation and webcast recording .

We appreciate your feedback in addressing the very important issue of stabilizing the biomedical research workforce. Your comments to this blog (or via email , if preferred) are welcome. With the continued input from individuals at every career stage, as well as research institutions and other stakeholders, we can work together to make changes that ensure the long-term stability and strength of the U.S. biomedical research enterprise, and that advance science to improve health for all.

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These are excellent ideas. Much better than the previous attempts.

I particularly like that help will be given both to new investigators AND to struggling mid-career investigators.

However, will the 10 year time limit take into account various potential reasons for gaps? That is, will the 10 years be 10 physical years or 10 “work years”. For example, if someone takes 5 years off to raise (let’s be honest, usually her) kids, will that person have lost 5 years of their 10 year time limit?

Completely agree with this! Using years as exclusionary criteria is punitive for various reasons, one due to the known gender discrepancies w/mid career scientist trajectories and two, perhaps the investigator had other types of funding since the first R01 that supported their research program.

I had to take a year hiatus for a medical reason and NIH extended my status. You have to apply. See https://grants.nih.gov/policy/new_investigators/index.htm

(What I wish is that they make extensions for people working where they cannot apply for grants, no standing… i.e. Pharma!)

It is a great initiative by NIH. Also, wondering where small businesses fall into this program? Similar to academics, there are small businesses who would have got SBIR grants. They need to sustain the program.

Are there any opportunities in this program

This is a great idea in principle but it has 2 critical flaws, both revolving around the fact that the NIH budget is a zero sum game.. 1) If the money for this new program doesn’t come from NIH wealthy as it did in the proposed Grant Support Index,it risks simply rearranging the zero grant PIs, removing money from one small 1-2 grant lab to fund a different one. 2) By restricting the new funds to relatively junior folks, it risks creating an even larger pool of mid/senior folks who lose their 1 grant to provide the money for those who get a grant through this mechanism. If we don’t have a policy like the GSI or the NIGMS 750K policy which caps investigator funding, we’ll never make progress. Consider emailing Drs. Collins, Lauer and Lorsch to express your thoughts and consider signing the petition on this matter

This commenter is correct that this has potential to seriously harm current investigators with modest sized labs as it will certainly result in even lower pay lines in a flat funding climate. This initiative does not make sense without GSI, NIGMS type cap or all institutes adding a MIRA type program for those beyond 10 years with established long term productivity but who are not piling on awards. Petitions are now circulating to instead revisit rather than eliminate GSI. GSI was a more practical solution to broaden the research base at NIH while this proposal has serious potential for negative unintended consequences.

This is an extremely valid point that the Council is ignoring. Someone on this message board pointed out that the Council is packed with multi-grant funded PIs (can you say conflict of interest?) so they don’t care if you rob Peter to to pay Paul, as long as the Peter is not any of them. The NIH has to put a cap on funding for each investigator just like certain branches of the VA allows only one Merit Award per investigator – without such a cap this problem will never be solved, and the rich PIs will continue to stay rich and get even richer at the expense of the vast majority of other capable PIs.

Completely and totally agree!

Really, the main people to email are the members of Congress who should represent you, and especially if your Senator or Congressperson is on the Appropriations Committee or, better yet, the relevant sub-committee. The original idea on a trade-off for how to mitigate the challenges of keeping a reasonable cohort of investigators to get first or second cycle of funding was not the crass disaster that this mutant version is, which needs to be stopped. Diverting awards away from the uber-funded (not just by NIH but by all sources) to help the next generation could be good (though I was not convinced the numbers added up . . .). As your comment and a few others point out rather politely and in a very understated way, abandonment of this approach while keeping the next generation feature (i.e., age discrimination) means that the money will come out of the pool that would have gone to 12th or 14th percentile people at the 3rd or 4th cycle in. So, great: it will sure inspire people to know that they need to find a new career at age 50 or 53 instead of earlier. [A good case of DC ‘kicking the can down the road’.] Go NIH! [The way this got knifed at the Council of Councils level and with input from the uber-funded at risk of having to devote more effort to a lesser number of awards is about what folks seem to have come to expect inside the Beltway. At this point, it takes a fair dose of wishful thinking to believe that email Drs. Collins or Lauer et alia will put the cart right again. For what little it is worth, I agree with the comments about “new investigator” and not just ESI, with the asterisk that NIH would and does need to refine the “new investigator” classification. When Klaus Rajewsky first moved to Boston, for instance, he was a “new investigator” by NIH terminology . . . .

Please tell me where I can sign the petition on this matter. Thanks

I would also like to sign the petition.

Look at for the petition entitled “Cap NIH funding for individual Investigators to save the future of biomedical science”

Please write to your senators about your concern. That is the only way to remedy this situation.

What about those of us that are New Investigators but not ESI? We are already not eligible for the R35 mechanism. Now we are being left out of this new initiative?

thanks for your consideration.

exactly. excessive obsession with “Early” but not “New” is puzzling. Include New Investigators into your mechanism.

and yes, its a zero sum game as someone mentioned. and any reform needs to start with Intramural NIH research programs- they have technicians on permanent positions earning >100K who can’t be fired. They have investigators with monetary equivalent of 5 or 10 R01 per year who are not productive (lab budgets of 1 mil- 6 mil per YEAR!)

Me three. I’m New but no longer Early Stage; so I don’t clearly fit into either of the categories outlined in the blog. I’ve managed to produce quality research without NIH funding so far–which has given my lab a very efficient metabolism, but it sure would be nice to get a three-course meal…

I agree as well. This current policy clearly leaves a gaping hole for new investigators who are not ESIs. As others have mentioned, women are particularly affected by this, since women often take non-linear career paths for a variety of reasons (e.g., family care, lack of support in academia, lower salaries). In addition, given the “leaky pipeline” in STEM careers, it would be particularly advantageous for NIH to do everything they can to reduce gender inequality. One of which could be focusing on this ESI/new investigator issue.

Agree, I am not sure if I can apply as Early. I finished my residence program in 2000, but I got my PhD in 2015.

The focus on ESIs is a major problem for all the reasons outlined above. Many highly productive researchers will be excluded from this initiative. In my case, I’ve had an R03 and now have a K award but will likely lose ESI status prior to getting my first R01. How can NIH consider me neither “early career” or “mid-career”?

This initiative disadvantages anyone who had had to make career/family compromises – i.e., mostly women. While ESI timelines do adjust for maternity leave, they don’t account for the fact that many women take a non-linear path in other ways that slow their time from PhD to R01.

A fairer and more effective approach would be to focus on NEW INVESTIGATORS, not just ESIs and those who already have an R01.

I completely sympathize and agree with all of you who have concerns over this artificial “10 year post PhD” boundary for offering ESI designation. And leaving “new investigators” to fend for themselves with the established and several as mentioned above “uber-funded” PIs.

In my case, due to health issues of child and other family complications, I had to delay my entry into independent academic position. And the NIH tells me that I do not “count” as the fragile and tenuous early career scientist.

This feels very discriminatory, and contrary to their desire to diversify and reduce observed attrition from graduating PhDs to faculty stage due to motherhood/ or other family responsibilities that has been observed. Of course this applies to both genders, so I should say attrition due to parenthood or other family obligations that preclude starting independent career.

With these policies, it appears that the NIH is basically telling us “we don’t care about you because you happened to have a different, and in our view, an imperfect course to get to your final career goal”.

Is this not discrimination (basis of age, gender, personal circumstance etc.)? Perhaps that is a loaded work (discrimination) … but certainly this seems to be a selection process that will certainly leave a group of people out for no reason other than it took them >10 yrs to make it to faculty position. A very arbitrary cut off that would have no correlation to that individuals’s ability or capacity to do impactful science.

I think there could be one simple metric; something to the effect of – ‘did you start your independent lab four (3-5?) year ago or less?’ If yes, you qualify for New Investigator. This would include ESI and non-ESI, but first timers. In my world-view, this would be a much more reasonable and fair system. A lot of foundation grant use this simple metric and allow more people to be equally competitive for the funding.

Something for all of us discuss with our respective State Representatives.

I think this is great! But in the mean time grant/award cap still needs to be implemented!

1) “Early-stage” should reflect the true status of one’s career, rather than one’s age.

2) With an increase in competitiveness and as a result the number of years needed to get an independent faculty position (of course, depends on schools / disciplines / individuals), defining “early-stage” as within 10 years from the completion of one’s terminal degree is a little out of touch with the current reality.

3) For some schools / disciplines, one may need a longer postdoc (6-8 years is very common these days) before getting an independent position; for some other schools / disciplines, one may only need 2-3 years. This means for the longer postdoc, one only has a few years left to be eligible for this early-stage benefit; and for the shorter postdoc, one has 7-8 years. How do you balance this variability?

4) If a person does very well and is able to quickly rise to an Associate level with tenure but is still within 10 years from completion of their terminal degree, should this individual still be considered “early-stage”?

One approach to avoid these inconsistencies is to be inclusive and help out all the investigators that truly need help — those who have never received a R01 and those who are struggling to get their first R01 renewed in order to keep the lab alive (assuming they are all considered as “next generation researchers”?) — regardless of their age or rank.

“4) If a person does very well and is able to quickly rise to an Associate level with tenure but is still within 10 years from completion of their terminal degree, should this individual still be considered “early-stage”?”

this one is easy, it is extremely difficult to become an Associate without getting R01, no? Once you got R01, you are not “early” or “new” anymore according to the rules.

Not necessarily. Perhaps this is the case in Bio; in Psych departments one can often get by on NSF or even smaller funds, depending on the type of research one does.

Regarding 2) above, I believe that there is some flexibility in the definition. “within 10 years of completing your terminal research degree or medical residency”. Terminal research degree may include a post doctoral training. This definition would help resolve the issue raised in cases of lengthy post doctoral training.

This proposal should absolutely include NEW Investigators (per NIH definition) as well. As people above said, it often takes a long time to do postdoc. Otherwise this will only be helpful to Early investigators and Mid-career investigators who already have funding.

You will leave New Investigators out in cold…..

My situation (not uncommon)- after PhD defense I stayed for 1.5 year to finish more PhD manuscripts, apply and interview for postdoc, accept offer, relocate

Then 6 years of postdoc- mouse, long term work. Postdoc fellowship and Career development award. 2 first author papers which are cited 1300 and 450 times (just to show that I was not a slouch and did not waste 6 years). Interviews for faculty position.

Again, when I start my faculty position, its already 7.5 years after PhD. Establishment of mouse colony, first results. By the time 10 years kick in, I have applied for all young PI awards (got some) and thing like NIH Innovator (was competitive but did not get). First 2 R01 are not funded and now to be left out in cold…? I am sure I am not alone with this problem.

This initiative will also dramatically short recruitment strategies, changing from hire of well published, interview process vetted external candidates with start ups to internal promotion of people to some “instructor” “research track” position hoping that they will score R01 with 25% funding rate and without much investment from the department until they will get the grant.

INCLUDE NEW INVESTIGATORS!

And before any cap for awards is considered, take another look at Intramural NIH Program.

It is nice to see such an effort from the NIH. But I fail to understand the exclusion of the New Investigators here. I totally support the call for including the New Investigators. In this current proposisition the New Investigators are at the most disadvantageous position as their applications will be UNFAIRLY treated equal to well established NIH funded investigators including those who have multiple R01s.

I’m in the same boat as others who have commented — past 10 years of PhD, limping along with short-term foundation and small research grants (K02/R21/R03/R56), yet to receive an R01. You are missing a very important group of mid-career investigators with this initiative. And, sadly, I am afraid this same group of people are under-represented with respect to having a voice (unlike the entrenched PIs that so vehemently opposed the initial plan). These may also be investigators who are struggling against any number of biases (like coming from institutions that aren’t high tier research institutions). What’s the point in excluding them? If they are still focused on making a career in research DESPITE the disadvantages of having to string together multiple small grants to get by and are scoring in the top 25% of R01 applications, why would you think they would not be good candidates to support as mid-career investigators? Why not just allocate extra resources toward ANYONE who scores in the top 25% that currently has 0 or is nearing the end of 1 R01-equivalent?

I agree with others that this plan has a very real risk of causing negative consequences for a big chunk of mid-career investigators (including me, at 51).

Actually, what the program of help should look like in my opinion, is the following:

1) make it 1-2-3 system. You are getting your first R01 with 12% extra. second R01 with 8% extra. 3rd R01- 4% extra- that’s the idea (exact %% can be figured out). That takes care of early , new and mid-career investigators.

got 2-3 R01 at the same time? good for you- you got enough money to run robust program, publish good and compete in the future without extra help.

less lucky or need only 1 R01 at a time? Then such program can give you preferential funding rates for 15 years then (3 consecutive R01). after 15 years in the business probably you do not need as much help….

2) no age restrictions (illegal), time after PhD (for that you already have early MIRA and NIH Innovator) or caps on senior investigators (these guys get peer reviewed, why punish productivity after peer review)?

Way to go – this would avoid many potential problems such as variabilities, inconsistencies, restrictions, discriminations, and negative impact on career paths – and fair to all investigators regardless of their age and rank

Absolutely agree. Brilliant idea!

As stated by others, this leaves New Investigators who are not ESI out in the cold. Please include us. The 10 year post PhD rule is arbitrary. It does not account for those of us (mostly women) with non-traditional career trajectories, while simultaneously increasing the perks afforded to those who take a lock-step/ traditional path. This is increasing disparity, not reducing it!

I was also a single mom PI and went through postdoctoral and pharma with no chance of applying for funding but I needed that stability at first. When I entered academia I was no longer ESI due to the 10 year policy. When I questioned an NIH admin at a presentation last year …why New Investigators were being ignored, he said “why should we care about New Investigators?” New investigators are older …and I sense ageism as if a younger kid has more scientific promise and therefore deserves more funding.

Please include NEW INVESTIGATORS, not just ESI’s! Thanks

To point out the obvious, this decision by the Council to essentially maintain the status quo with respect to uneven distribution of federal grant dollars, was not unexpected. To understand this decision you only have to look at the Council roster and how many on that roster have multiple grants.

I agree with a previous comment pertaining to the definition of ESI. Faculty positions are becoming increasing difficult to obtain so we are seeing researchers in 5+ years of postdocs. Why doesn’t NIH consider increasing the number of K-awards and even extending the eligibility timeline? I know that the K99/R00 and K22 mechanisms are 4-5 years of postdoc experience. I think the number of postdoc years needs to reflect the reality that candidates may be in their 7th year of postdocing before securing a faculty position. Also, I think NIH needs to start thinking about how to increase the number of grants awarded to PIs from underrepresented backgrounds in science.

While it is laudable to help early and mid stage investigators, as pointed out this is a zero sum game. Why penalize more experienced investigators still doing outstanding work but who may have small labs that exist on 1 R01? As some of the original justification for the GSI pointed out there is a big difference between going from 1 to 0 grants, vs 3 to 2 or even 2 to 1, irrespective of seniority. I don’t think anyone believes that the grant that gets 15% is really that much worse than one that gets 10%, and that the PI of the latter is necessarily the better scientist that will make the next big breakthrough.

I was initially excited about this new policy as the NIH director’s statement, the Advisory Committee to the Director presentation, and this blog all mentioned that NIH will bolster the support for “early- and mid-career investigators”. As a person who is just recently removed from my ESI status, I figured that I must belong to the above-mentioned “early- and mid-career investigators”. However, after I went through the detailed description, I realized that I was wrong because I do not belong to any of the categories NIH is going to support, based on the definitions by NIH.

So now the question is: what category do I belong to? Do I belong to “senior-career investigator” if I am not an early- or mid-career investigator? Naturally, I would say no, I am not a senior-career investigator as I just started my independent position a few years ago.

As one would assume that you either belong early- career or mid-career, or you must belong to senior, based on a natural course of a career, how come this could occur?

Now the term “New Investigator” comes to play. New investigator, based on NIH definition, is an investigator who has not received his/her first NIH R01 award. I would guess that a New Investigator could be an early-career, mid-career, or senior-career, based on natural career stages. I also further guess that a significant portion (if not majority) of New investigators are still early-career or mid-career investigators. But the new NIH policy does not cover these investigators. I will argue that this is an oversight of NIH and that NIH should equally support these investigators.

First let’s look at how a new faculty works. After a lengthy postdoc training (3-7 years, or you name it), a new faculty starts his/her independent position with institutional support of 3-4 years. You will be eligible to be an ESI for the remaining years (10 years minus your postdoc years); some people might start their position approaching almost zero years as a ESI. Within these years (far less than 10 years for most ESIs), you have to secure your first R01; otherwise you will be left in cold.

Now let’s also look at how NIH defines “mid-career investigator”. Based on the NIH definition, a mid-career investigator is an investigator who receives his/her first NIH R01 award within 10 years). This means that from the day he/she is awarded the first R01, a mid-career investigator will have 4-5 years (mostly 5 years) of R01 support and have 10 years of time to get a second R01 grant if his new application receives a score in the top 25th percentile.

If you compare the situations between “mid-career investigator” and an ESI, it is obvious that it is much tougher for an ESI to secure his first R01 award (within only 1-5 years remaining as ESIs and 3-4 years of institutional support) than a mid-career investigator for a second R01 award (within 10 years and 4-5 years of R01 support). As a result, a significant portion (if not most) of ESIs will end up as New Investigators.

For fairness and parity, I urge NIH to include New investigators, or at least to include new investigators who are within 10 years since their first faculty position.

That is exactly what I want to say. Thanks WW.

From the point of view of a PI and mentor, NIH definitely needs a new mechanism to encourage young people to go into science and to keep good scientist in the game. The idea of limiting funding at the extremes was laudable and brave. Most importantly though, it was practical and all but the “richest” among us know it is based on sound logic. A shrinking field of “rich” scientist is a recipe for and failure, just as we are currently witnessing in society. As the field shrinks, so will those who are willing to get into it. I urge your to consider listening to the voices of the many in the field of science rather than the excessively loud voices of the few. To characterize the criticism of the NIH limited funding proposal as widespread and resounding is simply not correct from what I am hearing from colleagues. It is widespread among those who have benefitted greatly from the system. They are certainly good scientist, but for the good of science they should be willing to support their ideas and labs with reasonable funding rather than extreme and clearly unreasonable funding. I would argue that even if the 4 or 5th R01 in a lab produces at the same level as the single R01 that could go to another lab does it is still far better to keep that other lab going, keeping those ideas and the people they support in science. My advise to NIH is to do what most of us know is right. Our field is shrinking and it is becoming more difficult to get good students to go into science. We need a change and some type of reasonable funding limit was in my opinion a good start. It would be especially good as a mechanism of support for young and middle career scientist, and it would encourage young people driven away from science by fears of never getting funded. Doing nothing, or something that is incremental is akin to complacency.

I agree with WW that NIH should consider to include new investigators who have been a PI for less than 10 years in the initiative. Actually this is what’s being described by Dr. Larry Tabak at the Advisory Committee to the Director meeting.

What WW described are my sentiments exactly. This category of new investigators is the critical mass that should be focused on right now; ironically they are being left out by the NIH policies.

“We need a change and some type of reasonable funding limit was in my opinion a good start. It would be especially good as a mechanism of support for young and middle career scientist, and it would encourage young people driven away from science by fears of never getting funded. Doing nothing, or something that is incremental is akin to complacency.” “I don’t think anyone believes that the grant that gets 15% is really that much worse than one that gets 10%, and that the PI of the latter is necessarily the better scientist that will make the next big breakthrough.” I do agree with these statements. The “big guys” have louder voices and stronger social skills.

I agree that “new” investigators should be the primary focus. Age and years out of training have all of the aforementioned pitfalls. Intriguing thought to have a system that inversely weights the payline according to how many NIH grants or how much NIH funding you’ve received.

Couldn’t agree more that New Investigators should be included in this policy. I am a mid-career investigator who never received a R01: just two R21s, two larger (and very competitive) foundation grants, and a large industry grant, along with several sizable R01s as co-investigator have supported my lab OK so far. Because I am just beyond 10 years from my terminal degree, I would not fall into any of these categories. At the same time, my lab would be closed in ~2 years without any additional funding.

Please consider including New investigators. Since tenure-track position is hard to get these days, scientists interested in academia take multiple soft money positions before they could land on to a tenure-track position. Thus, they lose ESI category very quickly but still without a NIH research grant. Therefore, this initiative should support New investigators also. Moreover, it is highly likely that most of the New investigators are Assistant professors and due to the current high competition for NIH grants, they may be the ones who are affected the most thus leading to not getting tenured and forced to leave the academia after years of waiting to enter the academia.

I also agree that you must include “New Investigators (NI)” with Early Stage Investigators (ESI) OR just give a new definition that includes both NI and ESI (investigators never received an R01).

Mid-career is 10 years from first grant? Does that mean the average PI retires or dies by 20 years after her/his first grant?

I am not sure that penalizing ‘senior” investigators is going to increase the quality of NIH-funded research just as helping a mid-career investigator get over the funding hump for them to get stuck in the next cycle is of questionable value. In a blink of an eye we may end up with dozens of affirmative action categories each with its own priorities and champions.

Why not spend tax dollars on funding the best research possible instead of social engineering that shifts the funding bottleneck up the seniority scale? This includes caps on mega labs with productivity that does not correspond to their funding level.

Yes! Move the payline for us newbies, but as pointed out by many, it makes no sense to exclude ‘New Investigators’. Why would you do this? I would argue that we just merge ESI and ‘new’ into a single ‘early stage’, under which the only criteria is whether you have obtained independent R01 funding. Why focus on giving more dollars to those below an arbitrarily defined timepoint that varies markedly according to circumstance.

It’s great that NIH recognizes the importance of re-organizing the deck for those that that cards have been stacked against them. While this is lauadable, I have two major issues. First, the definition of early career, mid career, and new investigator should be redefined based on access to NIH funding and not years or periods since the last degree. The definition based on years primarily weeds out those scientist struggling in weak research environments. This leads to my second point. It’s interesting that the discussion here, even among colleagues assumes all potential scientists are in ‘big institutions’. No, what is NIH doing to nurture scientists in ‘smaller institutions’? It seems the Council’s decision is just like a Musical Dance, the same people changing chairs. Hopefully, NIH will develop a plan that will nurture scientists in ‘smaller institutions’ in the light of shrinking number of scientists in biomedical research.

It is very encouraging to hear the efforts from NIH. However, I do have some concerns: 1. It seems that new investigators are excluded. The people have more than 10 years working experience but just start PI should be considered since we are at the same position as early career for initiating a new lab or non-academic experience maybe excluded. 2. Apparently, NIH recognized that too much funds had been allocated to a few labs, which may not benefit creative and high risk research. However, the causes for this situation should be considered. For example, during grant reviewing, there is too much emphasis on school, PI’s background, but neglecting research itself. NIH may consider double blind review process for grants like R21. 3. Without whole budget increased, it is doubtful if this effort could be sustained especially there is not funding cap for each PI.

To be honest, Without increasing the overal funding, helping any one group means robbing the other one. Why does NIH want to lure young promising smart people into this low-pay and back-breaking career? To balance the system, NIH should set aside fund for researchers who want to find an alternative career. As many states did for tobacco workers in 70s and 80s, NIH should teach the young generation that science is not a viable career. This is perhaps the best use of training grant to teach the general public that the nation cannot afford so many scientists. Sorry to say this, but this message has long been floating in all medical schools that all researchers have to pay some or all of their salaries as the school cannot afford them. Wake up! Btw: I am young but will be considered as a senior researcher per NIH new policy.

Maybe true. The issue is there are no much needs in industry for pure bio research. NIH may should encourage PI to work on bench instead of writing proposals and limit the number of advance degree students and PostD in each lab but pay higher. Also including industrial partnership into the funding mechanism is another way to go.

The length of the post-doctoral training is unpredictable. Many find a faculty position with small career development grants from voluntary organizations. Besides, the ESI policy in many cases, in particular, women scientists, has not been very helpful. Therefore, New Investigators who are not ESIs and who have managed to run a research lab as a PI but not funded by NIH should be given the priority by the NIH.

I guess I would be considered a “senior” or “established” investigator having had a 25 year career supported by only 1 R01 at any time with some additional local funding. I have always felt on the brink of extinction but that is the life I chose and I am grateful and privileged to have had the opportunity to do what I love. I have also seen very talented colleagues lost to science because they fell to the vagaries of an imperfect peer review system. Without a cap or a sliding scale for multiple R01’s it seems inevitable that we will lose more “senior” scientists after long investment in their careers. That said I strongly support the idea of increased help to early and mid career individuals. I have personally witnessed their struggles, and it has been difficult in recent years to urge talented young people to enter the field due to the intense competition.

Same here, please include New Investigator in this Initiative. After a long period of post-doc training, many PIs like myself already start their first faculty job after, or very close to, 10 years they got the terminal doctoral degree.

We were left out for R35 ESI already, please don’t forget us again.

I will piggyback on some of the previous comments about how the ten year rule from earning the terminal degree is not a good measure. I did not start a tenure-track faculty position until 8 years after receiving my PhD, and it takes at least a year to truly get the lab up and running and collecting meaningful data, so this policy harms someone like me. I worked in industry before switching to academia, and that kind of experience is being penalized by this policy. Others have similar reasons for delay (long postdocs, taking time for family, etc.). This should be reconsidered.

I agree that New Investigators should be considered here. Many of us are past the 10 year mark due to having to take second postdocs or serve as research associate-level faculty, but still have not had an R01 funded. It’s especially frustrating to be just shy of the normal pay line and not able to get the early stage boost b/c of the 10 year limit.

The first step that needs to be taken is to restrict funding from the rich. “The Next Generation Researchers Initiative” simply ignores the hard data that productivity diminishes as funding exceeds certain level. Redistributing funds among the poor will create more problems than solving them.

What about mid-career investigators that have just failed to renew their first grant and have to submit a “new” grant. Will they be eligible for this program or fall through the cracks?

I have the same question. But people here are not quite interested in this question which is as important as the NI vs ESI.

Based on the police: “a mid-career investigator (within 10 years of receiving your first NIH R01 equivalent award) who scores in the 25th percentile, and either: or”.

I guess, as long as they received their 1st RO1 in 2007 or later, and that they have got any new RO1 yet so have the risk to lose their research support, they should be eligible for this program.

Any one has a different thought on this?

New investigators should definitely be included in the initiative. Excluding them is ageism.

What you are doing here is a crushing blow to the whole biomedical enterprise. You are luring young investigators into a blind alley where “a bunch of thugs” will club them to death. The idea that anyone who can get a 24-percentile score would also be competitive later after the system stop holding their hand (and they face single digit percentiles) – is patently absurd. What will happen to all these new investigators who are lured into the public biomedical enterprise is that they will just hit the brick wall later. Unfortunately, hitting that brick wall at age 45-50 is a lot worse than hitting it at age 35. None of the alternative employers are particularly interested in the hire of someone that old and set in their patterns. When (a decade from now) the young fools that got trapped and destroyed by this system start speaking out, it will forever be known that a public biomedical research career is the last thing anybody with a brain would want to do to themselves and their family.

I strongly agree with those comments to include new investigators (non-ESI) to this initiative. It is a valid concern that new investigators will suffer the most under this initiative since this is a zero-sum game.

Overall, my impression is that the productivity per grant dollar decreases when you have more grants.This may be a main reason when the NIH initially considered to cap the number of R01 grants. To help next generation researchers and also to improve the productivity, NIH can try something like a sliding-scale:

(this is adopted from a previous post) 1st R01 with 12% extra. 2nd R01 with 8% extra. 3rd R01 with 4% extra. Trying to get a 2nd RO1 while you already have one (more than 2 years remaining)? no benefit.

For scientists who already have multiple grants, it is unfair to set a three R01 cap if their work is excellent. Since big guys have louder voice, more resources and better connections (that’s why the 3-R01 cap cannot be implemented), they should be judged by stricter criteria, but can still get grants if their applications really stand out.

To get another R01 if you are holding 2 R01s? -2% 3 R01s? -4% 4 R01s? -6%

The % number above are rough and can be figured out later. Because the payline varied a lot across different NIH institutes, instead of same percentile numbers, the payline may also be extended or reduced by percentages.

This is a very good suggestion, with potential tweaks to the numbers. I would also support an overall “boost” to early and mid investigators, but the current consideration of funding (basically, you need to be without funding, on the verge of losing your only grant, or a star with only one grant (unicorn?)) seems to be at odds with the goal of bolstering a productive workforce.

Much better than the GSI plan, though. I also think the NIH deserves praise for looking at the issue and trying to make substantive changes to address it. No plan will be perfect…this is a good start.

The mission of the NIH is to fund the best research possible. It is not in the business of affirmative action.

Every now and then a Director comes with an attempt to improve on the system and ends up hurting it (e.g., Zerhouni and his translational priorities; the Brain Initiative which shuttled millions to already well-funded senior investigators). I am afraid this may be one of those initiatives hurting with almost surgical precision, the most productive investigators – all of whom paid the price to be where they are.

We need to define what the best research is before we could loud it. We never tried to give more opportunities to young or brave new researchers, but force them to work under low payment in a big group for surviving, since there is a little hope for them to find a decent job in industry like computer science. This is an ill state and should be corrected.

Hi Marcus; I am also curious about what constitutes the “best” science? Specifically, what metrics of “best” science are reliable for impactful discovery?

I sent an email regarding the antiquated distinction between New Investigators and ESI. Given the current realities of science, many of us had to do extended postdocs. My postdoc was 7 years because I chose to enter a field that I had no previous experience in. I thought that the NIH would like this because it was my goal to establish a truly interdisciplinary research program. It seems to be counterintuitive to leave those who chose this path in the cold.

I want to add my voice to those suggesting that this initiative apply either to all New Investigators or those recently emerging unfunded from ESI status. I’m 37, with no R01 (or any other NIH funding), and I’ll be losing ESI status soon. I had a baby and received a 6 month ESI extension, but let’s be honest – growing, birthing, and caring for a young baby did more than cause a 6 month hit on my productivity. The focus on ESI, as currently defined, is misplaced. I believe in myself and others in similar situations, and we are just as worthy of “help” as the new Asst Profs starting this year.

Currently, in our study sections, non-early stage scientists have to get a score under 2, or a percentile score of 9 or less to be funded. So lets pretend you are an MD/PhD who finishes post-doc and residency at age 40. You are now an “early stage” until you are 50, and voila, get your first RO1 at 45 with a score of 3.5, which is actually non-competetive. Now you are a mid-carreer until you are 55 when you get a grant with a score of 2.5, which would not be remotely near payline. Since money will be siphoned off to preferentially fund grants from the early and late stage investigators (who together, probably constitute a majority of applications), the payline for someone in the last decade of their career will be well below the current 9th percentile, which while not technically impossible, is so unpredictable as to not sustain a career. One simply cannot anticipate that an application will score below the best decile and one cannot plan a life this way.

You are making a bad situation worse by preferentially funding lower quality applications early on only to pull the rug out later. Or maybe, you are just trying to quickly kill of everyone currently over 50, who BTW are your most productive cohort and most experienced mentors.

Is this the alternative to capping the funding of the most insanely over-funded labs?

Cap over funded group is the way to go without under current situation, especially they hire too many postdocs

Strongly agree!!!

No one is suggesting that it is a good idea to fund low quality grants. What we are suggesting is that new investigators cannot compete with people with decades of work and influence under their belt.

Older guys/gals write a crappy grant but they get the benefit of the doubt. Younger faculty write a solid grant but get left out in the cold because they haven’t had the time to generate the same amount of data as the older faculty AND they get no benefit of the doubt, even for a solid grant.

And crappy productivity. I know a heavily funded PI who gets >1 million a year but only publishes a couple review articles, pretty bad!

Agreed, this is a stupid plan.

Although I favor the Grant Support Index proposal, I understand the motivation for the 21st Century Cures Act proposal. However, the two are not mutually exclusive. The 21st Century Cures Act does not attempt to address several issues that Dr. Collins raised in his first announcement of GSI on May 2. Specifically, he noted that the NIH should be “exercising optimum stewardship of the funds that we receive from taxpayers,” ”supporting more researchers working on a diversity of biomedical problems,” and freeing up “about 1,600 new awards.”

Some of these goals will be hard to monitor (are PI’s really stewarding a large number of grants responsibly?), but there are quick, easy ways for the NIH to evaluate whether some issues are mitigated by the current proposal. For example, does the percentage of money that goes to the top 10% of NIH-funded labs decrease, or continue to increase? Are there more NIH-funded labs in 2020 compared to 2016, or fewer?

I understand that there is support for no longer considering the GSI proposal, but I have heard a lot of voices from smaller universities strongly in support of it. I think the GSI proposal was not considered long enough for these softer voices to be heard.

I have been funded by NIH for >20 years, 100% on “soft money” for that length of time. I have to say that it has been a stressful ride. If I knew what I now know about soft-money careers, I would not have pursued a ph.d. It’s a hard gig and academe’s greater use of “contingent” positions (vs solid ones) is discouraging. There can be a slow, corrosive effect on the psyche. The very best, brightest, and most aggressive will likely continue to do fine, but most of the rest of us are not in that strata and have little influence. I hope there is a renaissance, but the NIH across-years funding trend is not encouraging.

Defining career and stages by years and age clearly doesn’t fit most people here on this blog. They should be defined by your funding history. Very early on I was fortunate (or not) to be allowed by my mentor to be a PI on a multi-PI RO1. Since then I have gotten at a couple of R21s. But I really haven’t gotten a full RO1 on my own for several reasons including parenthood. So what am I? Early, mid or late career by this criteria? By years and age, I would like be defined as mid- to late, but I am a woman who did take a different path because of motherhood etc yet am still producing and publishing. Most people here just want at minimum an RO1 worth of funding to run a lab- I am with them on that. Those with multiple grants should have some type of cap or reduction factor on subsequent funding levels.

For mid-career investigators, the condition of “at risk of losing all support” needs to be carefully defined. Does this refer to NIH support as a PI, or support from other sources such as teaching salary? A biostatistician may be helping on someone else’s R01 for 5 percent effort. Does this extra support mean they are penalized and cannot benefit from the more lenient 25th percentile for an R01 grant they are submitting as the PI? A better approach is to treat all mid-career investigators within 10 years equally and fairly, based upon the quality of their grant application rather than their current funding support (which can change at any time anyway), and simply raise the percentile to 20th percentile for all mid-career investigators.

I agree with your second point. Providing a blanket “bump” to midcareer investigators, regardless of their funding, would serve to support and bolster the ranks of productive scientists at this stage. The wording of the plan is vague for both those at risk and those “particularly promising” individuals.

I think the bottom line of this initiative is where does the money come from. $210 million supports about 100 R01s, and each IC probably can get a share of 5-10 more awards for ESI and mid-career PIs. There is no way these 5-10 more awards can reach every application that is better than the 25th percentile. If the money doesn’t come from the top 6%, then it comes from other established investigators who are struggling to have their ends meet with 1 or 2 R01s. This also does not address the productivity decline of senior established investigators when they receive too many grants. In addition, as many people have pointed out, the advisory group to NIH and council members are packed with the people within the top 6%, and only their voices can be heard. Without GSI or funding cap, the NIH simply does not have enough money to rescue the next generation biomedical researchers.

It strikes me that the plan would constitute a mid career rescue effort, rather than a boost for successful and productive mid career scientists. While the goal of bolstering the workforce is laudable, I’m not convinced increasing the number of marginally funded, independent investigators is the best solution. Has the NIH considered non-training funding mechanisms to support dependent scientists who function in team research environments led by senior investigators? Are we doing those “rescued” by this effort a disservice by stringing them along until the next grant cycle?

As others have suggested here, a sliding payline that requires those with multiple grants to achieve a better score to land subsequent grants makes a lot of sense.

The early-career benefit squarely focuses on R01 applications. However, after reading all related web-pages that I can find, the mid-career benefit does not appear to be limited to any specific funding mechanism(s). That suggests the mid-career benefit would apply regardless of the funding mechanism applied for, e.g., R21, R01, K24, P30, etc. Is that correct?

Starting new initiatives that require funding without an increase in overall funding for the NIH will hurt someone. Where is the money coming from? Who will be hurt with this decision? Has anyone at the NIH checked into this? Of course not. If others are given an advantage then that means someone else does not get funded. Let’s face it, the people who will be hurt are those in the middle who are not new or early stage and who are not in the top 5% of funded investigators. This group of scientists are the ones that have made it though the worst time in NIH funded science and now they are hit again. How is this fair? Why not increase funding for someone 45-55 years old so they can get a 2nd or 3rd R01? Why are they not considered? Again and again decisions are made that are thought to help, but again and again those making the decision forget the idea is to fund the best science. NIH did not think about this decision enough, so there will be 45-60 year old scientist losing their jobs due to this decision. More middle-aged people will be forced to do administrative jobs or retire early just to save a few people who are younger. This is not based on the best scientific ideas, but on age. This is an avoidable tragedy caused by poor decisions at NIH.

I do not think the initiative discriminates against age or middle-aged people. The PIs between 45-60 years old are in the prime time for research funding. This group of scientists are more resilient financially than ESIs to develop grant applications. This group of PIs are generally well established and should compete with the top 5% to pursue the best science. If you look at the numbers that the NIH has posted, the workforce cannot be stabilized without new blood into the system, and the current system discourages some of the best postdocs from entering into the stream.

I don’t consider mid career to be only 10 years after your first RO1. How are you going to pay for this? Are you going to lower the payline for everyone in their 50 and 60s? What are you going to do with a bunch of scientists that are in their mid 50s, have worked all their lives to develop model systems that are just now yielding translatable results that can’t be funded because the payline for them is now 2% because you are funding untested new investigators. Seems like a waste. You spend 15- 20 years funding someone and now you dump them just as you are starting to get a payoff from their work? Why don’t you just flush 5 million dollars X everyone who is outside of 10 years of funding down the toilet?

Is there a formal letter/petition regarding the ESI vs New Investigator issue?

If so, who can I contact to sign? If not, is there interest in writing one?

Most importantly, do not just post here, also submit your concerns to NIH via: [email protected]

when “big guys” spoke against GSI, they were heard. We need to be heard too.

Personally, I’m so glad for this new policy. I was awarded 1 R01 about 6 years ago, and I will lose my job in the next year if I don’t secure a new NIH grant. Am an Associate without tenure, and female.

One thing that the focus on early stage investigators misses is that we are also hurting late career investigators. Professors in their late 50s and early 60s who run single R01 labs are losing all funding and having to find a new job late in their career. One problem is that a single R01 investigator is competing with quadruple R01 investigators on a level playing field. The fix is to make the first R01 of each lab compete with each other, then seconds, third, and fourth R01.

Grants from study section should be binned based on investigator funding prior to being assigned a percentile. Thus, PIs with zero NIH dollars are put together in bin 1, and percentile ranked. PIs with $250k / y are in Bin 2. PIs with 251-500k are in Bin 3, 501-750k in Bin 4, and 750k and up in Bin 5. For grants that are applying for renewal, these are treated as if the PI was in the lower bin, so if it is your single R01 and you are renewing it, these renewals go into Bin 1 (because loss of that R01 makes the PI a $0 lab).

Then the NIH has to step up to the plate and make a rational decision about what size labs they want to see, which may be different between the various institutes. For example, NIH could set paylines for Bin 1 at 50%, Bin 2 at 30%, Bin 3 at 15%, and Bin 4 at 7%. This method also normalizes for those who use the RFA system for funding, as such would be impact their Bin. (T32s excluded from Bin, multi PI grants would choose how to allocate the total dollars between each PI).

This method also make renewing a grant a worth while endeavor, as currently it seems that renewals are judged even more harshly then new grants. Alternately, renewals should be based on progress report alone, if publication progress is sufficient we should trust the investigator to continue at that productivity and not make them write a new grant. New grants should only be for those who wish to expand their lab. Finally, each published paper should attribute a percentage of its work to each listed grant so that large labs do not have an unfair advantage on a grant per grant basis.

The real problem which is and has been ignored by NIH is that the career as a biomedical scientist is very unattractive because it is being pursued by way to many young people. In the old days it was one of the most satisfying and overall (not by $) rewarding jobs a young Ph.D. could pursue. Now many of the smartest young people don’t even look at it as a possibility. They simply don’t want to submit themselves and their families to that kind of abuse. The real solution for the lack of young people in science is not to expand the pool but to reduce entrance into the pool. Stop rewarding universities for overloading the system with such a huge number of young faculty that we end up with single digit percentiles. How about not paying for PI or co-investigator salaries – and cap overheads at 25%.

Check out the editorial by Mark Peifer in Science on this issue, he makes a lot of good points.

As a PI who made the decision to run a smaller lab, with a hands-on mentoring approach, from a single R01, the latest plan has me quite concerned. I am annoyed that the “heavily funded” PIs were so effective in their campaign to protect their funding options and that the latest plan will hit hardest PIs who don’t run big operations and are beyond this arbitrary “mid-career” definition. Scientific advances are made in and outstanding training is provided by labs that run off a single R01, but it is becoming harder and now even harder to succeed in science if you take that route.

On the money, pun intended. Those with the big bucks and influence strongly lobbied to protect their interests, at the expense of the majority of PIs who are suffering and whose voices were ignored. If this were a democracy, those who wield power would be voted out of office because the majority have lost faith in their leaders who are swimming in a swamp of special interests..

I asked the PO in the IC for my grant, they now have no plan to implement this policy, at least not this year. Sounds like this policy is just empty words.

Have anyone who falls in the two categories received funding already?

i am sure the answer is NO. in part because still on paper there is 20% cut NIH proposed (unlikely to happen though) threat and any IC/PO will be super conservative until fall/winter.. and in part because likely nobody really in a rush to implement that idea.

I have now heard of 2 R01s that were “on the bubble” and had been reviewed in the last round of council meetings (i.e. submitted in Oct/Nov 2016) that just received NOAs. They were both by ESIs. I don’t know if this is official movement related to the NGRI or institutes pushing out extra FY17 funding and it happened to go to ESIs.

Great initiatives! Hope they are implemented. Now NIH has to find a way to direct those who receive funding from NIH institutes that they have an obligation to support the development of promising and aspiring researchers. From my own experience, I wrote more than a dozen grant applications for my previous PI (from conception to obtaining letters of support). He received several grants for millions of dollars (U-19, R01, etc) and once it came time for him to keep his promise to promote me, he refused. To top it off, he threatened to cutoff funding for my studies and then threatened to fire my friend/colleague if I didn’t continue writing grants for him. The director of our division was completely indifferent; this is where the ethics training the NIH mandates appears to be an absolute waste of time. My point is that a culture change needs to happen as well or the NIH is going to have a lot of promising researchers slip through the cracks. I changed fields of research and am on 7th year as a post doc/Research Scientist, and approaching 20 publications; yet I can’t submit a K-award type grant (to many years experience) or an R-grant due to my title. I requested a promotion to a Research Assistant Professor within my current lab so I could submit R-grants, however, I was denied by my current mentor who decided his long time post doc should have the highest title in the lab (did I mention I will have 7 first author paper and at least 3 co-author papers within 3 1/2 years of joining his lab). Do you see the trend? The second I file a complaint, goodbye recommendation letter & goodbye any chance of becoming faculty. This needs to be fixed.

Great and promising program. The problem is in the small print…The funding mechanisms that will be used are likely to be mostly the R56. While this is a great grant to receive, it is short – only 1-2 years. The investigator must resubmit and obtain R01 funding to continue past this initial period. Don’t misunderstand me, 2 years is much better than NO FUNDING, but do they really think this will provide long-term stability for mid career investigators? In some cases it may. My opinion is not likely. As a mid-career investigator myself it would mean continuing the draining reapplication process concurrent with starting up a new R01 type project while having assured stability for only 1 or 2 years at most for that project. One will need to continue to submit other R01s and continue to resubmit those. All this time and effort will have to come at the expense of other more productive tasks (e.g., publishing, mentoring, etc.). Importantly, this may actually reduce long-term stability by dissuading investigators from just resubmitting the “almost funded” grant. Instead, one will take the R56 (bird in the hand and all that) with the potential to loose funding after just a year or 2 when the simple resubmission of the 5-yr R01 might have been successful anyway! Not sure this is a viable long-term solution…

It seems that NIH formally launch EEI and ESI. However, they seems intentionally avoid to address the issue we have mentioned here. If you have graduated for more than ten years but just start you career. YOU WILL BE TREATED AS AN ESTABLISHED PI. Are you kidding me?

Not to mention, it seems like you will be de-prioritized in favor of mid career w/ less than 1 R01– the EEI.

This is very disheartening. I am not sure what the length of postdoc has to do with preliminary data for an R01.

Why doesn’t ESI begin with independent position??? It would make sense– and it would be fair. My guess – because ESI conveniently leaves out many young faculty, allowing the NIH to address “young investigator” issues without busting the budget or reducing the 4+ R01 population.

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NIH Next Generation Researchers Initiative

Information on NIH Next Generation Researchers Initiative.

NIH has launched the Next Generation Researchers Initiative to address longstanding challenges faced by researchers trying to embark upon and sustain independent research careers, and to take steps to promote the growth, stability, and diversity of the biomedical research workforce.

An Early Stage Investigator (ESI) is a Program Director / Principal Investigator (PD/PI) who has completed their terminal research degree or end of post-graduate clinical training, whichever date is later, within the past 10 years and who has not previously competed successfully as PD/PI for a substantial NIH independent research award.  See the List of ESI NIH Grants that a PD/PI can hold and still be considered an ESI.   ESIs are encouraged to enter the date of their terminal research degree or the end date of their post-graduate clinical training in their eRA Commons profile to ensure their correct identification.   ESI applications with meritorious scores will be prioritized for fund ing.

​A  New Investigator  is a PD/PI who has not previously received substantial, independent funding from NIH.  NIH Institutes and Centers (ICs) fund New Investigators according to the ICs' programmatic and strategic interests. 

Please note, NIH anticipates that some PD/PIs may have experienced a lapse in their research or research training or have experienced periods of less than full-time effort during their ESI or EEI status.  In order to accommodate such lapses, the NIH will consider requests to extend ESI or EEI period for reasons that can include medical concerns, disability, family care responsibilities, extended periods of clinical training, natural disasters, and active duty military service, determined on a case by case basis at the sole discretion of NIH.  You may also make this request online at the Early Stage Investigator Extensions page .

• ESI Policy Updates
• New NIH Resubmission Dates
• Early Independence Awards (EIA)

For more information or questions email  [email protected] .

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New Labs Empower Next Generation of Researchers

April 29, 2024 By Katie Satterlee

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The Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Texas A&M University unveiled three renovated Intelligent Electromagnetic Sensor Laboratories (iEMSL) at a spring open house event. The renovations were led by electrical and computer engineering faculty members committed to bringing the almost 50-year-old facilities into the 21st century.  

“When Dr. Linda Katehi joined in 2019, she took it upon herself to rebuild the labs,” said Marco Iskander, an electrical and computer engineering instructional assistant professor and the managing director of the facilities.

The iEMSL labs specialize in high-frequency electronics, with a focus on integrating artificial intelligence (AI) into wireless circuits and radars.

“Wireless circuits are in your phones, Wi-Fi routers and Bluetooth systems and all require high-frequency systems,” said Dr. Arya Menon, an electrical and computer engineering assistant professor. 

The cross-disciplinary labs are shared spaces for faculty and students. Menon says they are introducing a new structure that improves collaborative research by sharing instruments and equipment rather than working in isolation.

“We hope that this structure, and the renovation itself, facilitates motivation among students in a nice bright lab space,” Menon said. “We want them to feel proud to work in these labs.”

Along with her research team, Katehi, a professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and the Department of Materials Science and Engineering, plans to use the labs to explore the integration of AI in high-frequency sensing and communication circuits. An example of Katehi’s work includes automotive radars, which are sensing systems used for driver assistance and safety that use radio waves to detect objects. 

Integrating AI can reduce the number of vehicle radars and allow the remaining few to make decisions on their own, potentially saving power. Currently, cars can have up to 12 radars or sensors designed to perform certain functions such as detecting specific directions or objects. Each one utilizes part of the car's power to operate, some just for one purpose.

“We want the sensors to fulfill many functions and instantaneous decisions to be made by the radar itself, which is what we call intelligence,” Katehi said. “By giving circuits intelligence, the power usage, weight and volume can be reduced.” 

Equipped with state-of-the-art instrumentation, each newly renovated lab provides researchers opportunities to push the boundaries of science.

“If you want to do cutting-edge research, you need a cutting-edge lab,” said Menon. “And you need the lab to be a space students feel inspired to work in.”

Rapid Prototyping and Machining Lab  

Located in room 160, this lab features multiple 3D printers and etchers for rapid antenna prototyping and support structures required for in-lab validation. It also houses an anechoic chamber designed to absorb electromagnetic and sound waves.

Microwave and Millimeter Wave Metrology Lab 

Located in rooms 160 and 164, the metrology lab offers personnel probing stations, spectrum and vector network analyzers and signal generators. The lab also provides full communication systems, a digital signal processing test bench and an optical communication test bench.

Instructional Lab

Located in room 167, the teaching lab provides hands-on training in radio frequency measurements. The lab will also be used to train and educate undergraduate students in ECEN 453 Microwave Solid-State Circuits and Systems.

The teaching lab allows students to measure the technology they study. High-end benches, reaching up to four gigahertz in measurements, will be available to use for coursework. Capstone courses ECEN 403 Electrical Design Laboratory I and ECEN 404 Electrical Design Laboratory II will also run through the lab. 

Visualization Studio 

Located in 167, the visualization lab enables visualization of electromagnetic concepts through high-quality 3D renders. The lab will also be used to educate students, provide workforce training in these emerging technologies and provide exposure to current trends in microelectronics.

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Center for Innovation in Teaching & Learning

I-STEM Education Initiative

Search this site:, inspiring the next generation: tour of the illinois’ materials research laboratory.

By Bruce Adams, Contributing Writer

May 1, 2024

"I love doing outreach and showing students cool things about the world. The reason why I got into science was because I wanted to understand why cool things happened, and now here I am, getting a PhD."

These words from Autumn Cook, a third-year Ph.D. student in chemistry, encapsulate the essence of an excursion by middle school students from Franklin STEAM Academy in Champaign to the Materials Research Lab (MRL) at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign on Friday, February 9.

The tour builds upon a collaboration between I-MRSEC, funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF), aimed at fostering middle school students' interest in science, engineering, and mathematics through direct engagement with Illinois faculty, graduate, and post-doctoral students. The initiative particularly targets students from marginalized and previously excluded populations who often lose interest in STEM fields after middle school.

For Cook, the decision to participate in this outreach initiative was driven by a personal mission to serve as a role model for queer and trans individuals in science—a representation they wished they had during their own academic journey.

"I was approached by Pamela A Pena Martin because my PI, Alexa Kuenstler , is part of the I-MRSEC grant. I love doing this type of work because when I was in graduate school and, to a certain extent, college, I didn't have any queer and trans role models in science during my graduate school and college years. I want to be that role model for the next generation of scientists or at least show them that queer adults exist and are thriving," Cook expressed. Hence, volunteering as a tour guide and group leader for middle schoolers was an instinctive choice for them.

During the tour, alongside other student guides and MRL research scientists, I-MRSEC staff presented a myriad of fascinating demonstrations to the Franklin students. Kathy Walsh showcased the capabilities of a 3D Optical Profiler by examining the surfaces of candies like Skittles, Sweethearts, and Nerds up close—a visual feast for curious minds.

Xiaoli Wang led a Cleanroom tour, providing insights into research conducted on ultra-sensitive materials, where even a speck of dust could disrupt an experiment.

Roddel Remy engaged the students with a demonstration on testing the crunchiness of snack foods, using pretzels and potato straws as examples.

Michael Smith , from the Illinois Quantum Information Science and Technology Center (IQUIST), delved into the realm of quantum science, demonstrating how manipulating frequencies can affect wire circles and metal strips—a captivating glimpse into the future of technology.

Julio Soares illuminated the Fluorescence Room, unraveling the mysteries of light waves and colors with a homemade spectrometer, allowing Franklin students to explore the fluorescent properties of their drawings with magic markers and a blacklight.

Beyond the excitement of witnessing these awe-inspiring demonstrations and enjoying pizza for lunch, the field trip provided Franklin students with a energetic opportunity to witness a diverse group of researchers in action.

Their dedication to outreach exemplifies the transformative power of mentorship and representation in STEM. As they continue to inspire and empower the next generation of scientists, let us remember the importance of inclusivity and diversity in shaping the future of scientific innovation. Through such experiences, the students can envision themselves as future contributors to the world of science.

Our vision for Illinois as a land-grant institution is to foster accessible, effective STEM teaching and learning—from preschool through graduate education—at local, state, and national levels, thereby preparing a highly able citizenry and diverse STEM workforce to tackle pressing global challenges. View I-STEM News

I-stem internship opportunity.

I-STEM is recruiting! We need enthusiastic undergrad and/or grad students for two roles, depending upon student strengths/interests.

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January 26, 2022 In Franklin STEAM Academy, Musical Magnetism program makes STEM fun, approachable. Full Story

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Undergrads Experience Materials Science Research Courtesy of the I-MRSEC REU

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Inspiring the next generation

WASHINGTON, D.C.- The U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) recently participated in Bring a Child to Work Day at the Pentagon. With thousands in attendance, diverse families from all walks of life were introduced to the exciting and innovative research and development projects and programs conducted at ERDC.

“Any time we can tell the ERDC story, especially somewhere like the Pentagon, it’s a win for our organization,” said Speler Montgomery, mathematician and talent acquisition program manager for the ERDC’s Directorate of Human Capital. “I had some parents ask if we were hiring. It’s not only a time to tell children who we are, but it’s also a time to tell their parents.”

The theme for this year’s event, “Inspire 2 Aspire,” encourages the mindset that children can choose their own future. The hope is that the children who participate in the day’s activities will be able to see the potential for their future.

“I think that ERDC’s presence at this event allowed us to tell the ERDC story to the next generation of scientist and engineers,” said Montgomery.

Throughout the day, participants were given a glimpse into what a career with ERDC might look like, sparking imagination for their future and introducing a younger generation to jobs in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM). Multiple children of all ages expressed interest in one day becoming an engineer, mathematician or scientist and were excited to learn how ERDC could be a possible choice for fulfilling their dream in STEM. They were also able to learn about potential internships, camps and educational programs that ERDC offers.

“Kids were excited to know that they can turn their love for math and science into a career at a place like ERDC,” said Montgomery. “It was great to see their faces light up when we told them all the cool things we do here. Many older students were interested in our student internships.”

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How Pew Research Center will report on generations moving forward

Journalists, researchers and the public often look at society through the lens of generation, using terms like Millennial or Gen Z to describe groups of similarly aged people. This approach can help readers see themselves in the data and assess where we are and where we’re headed as a country.

Pew Research Center has been at the forefront of generational research over the years, telling the story of Millennials as they came of age politically and as they moved more firmly into adult life . In recent years, we’ve also been eager to learn about Gen Z as the leading edge of this generation moves into adulthood.

But generational research has become a crowded arena. The field has been flooded with content that’s often sold as research but is more like clickbait or marketing mythology. There’s also been a growing chorus of criticism about generational research and generational labels in particular.

Recently, as we were preparing to embark on a major research project related to Gen Z, we decided to take a step back and consider how we can study generations in a way that aligns with our values of accuracy, rigor and providing a foundation of facts that enriches the public dialogue.

A typical generation spans 15 to 18 years. As many critics of generational research point out, there is great diversity of thought, experience and behavior within generations.

We set out on a yearlong process of assessing the landscape of generational research. We spoke with experts from outside Pew Research Center, including those who have been publicly critical of our generational analysis, to get their take on the pros and cons of this type of work. We invested in methodological testing to determine whether we could compare findings from our earlier telephone surveys to the online ones we’re conducting now. And we experimented with higher-level statistical analyses that would allow us to isolate the effect of generation.

What emerged from this process was a set of clear guidelines that will help frame our approach going forward. Many of these are principles we’ve always adhered to , but others will require us to change the way we’ve been doing things in recent years.

Here’s a short overview of how we’ll approach generational research in the future:

We’ll only do generational analysis when we have historical data that allows us to compare generations at similar stages of life. When comparing generations, it’s crucial to control for age. In other words, researchers need to look at each generation or age cohort at a similar point in the life cycle. (“Age cohort” is a fancy way of referring to a group of people who were born around the same time.)

When doing this kind of research, the question isn’t whether young adults today are different from middle-aged or older adults today. The question is whether young adults today are different from young adults at some specific point in the past.

To answer this question, it’s necessary to have data that’s been collected over a considerable amount of time – think decades. Standard surveys don’t allow for this type of analysis. We can look at differences across age groups, but we can’t compare age groups over time.

Another complication is that the surveys we conducted 20 or 30 years ago aren’t usually comparable enough to the surveys we’re doing today. Our earlier surveys were done over the phone, and we’ve since transitioned to our nationally representative online survey panel , the American Trends Panel . Our internal testing showed that on many topics, respondents answer questions differently depending on the way they’re being interviewed. So we can’t use most of our surveys from the late 1980s and early 2000s to compare Gen Z with Millennials and Gen Xers at a similar stage of life.

This means that most generational analysis we do will use datasets that have employed similar methodologies over a long period of time, such as surveys from the U.S. Census Bureau. A good example is our 2020 report on Millennial families , which used census data going back to the late 1960s. The report showed that Millennials are marrying and forming families at a much different pace than the generations that came before them.

Even when we have historical data, we will attempt to control for other factors beyond age in making generational comparisons. If we accept that there are real differences across generations, we’re basically saying that people who were born around the same time share certain attitudes or beliefs – and that their views have been influenced by external forces that uniquely shaped them during their formative years. Those forces may have been social changes, economic circumstances, technological advances or political movements.

When we see that younger adults have different views than their older counterparts, it may be driven by their demographic traits rather than the fact that they belong to a particular generation.

The tricky part is isolating those forces from events or circumstances that have affected all age groups, not just one generation. These are often called “period effects.” An example of a period effect is the Watergate scandal, which drove down trust in government among all age groups. Differences in trust across age groups in the wake of Watergate shouldn’t be attributed to the outsize impact that event had on one age group or another, because the change occurred across the board.

Changing demographics also may play a role in patterns that might at first seem like generational differences. We know that the United States has become more racially and ethnically diverse in recent decades, and that race and ethnicity are linked with certain key social and political views. When we see that younger adults have different views than their older counterparts, it may be driven by their demographic traits rather than the fact that they belong to a particular generation.

Controlling for these factors can involve complicated statistical analysis that helps determine whether the differences we see across age groups are indeed due to generation or not. This additional step adds rigor to the process. Unfortunately, it’s often absent from current discussions about Gen Z, Millennials and other generations.

When we can’t do generational analysis, we still see value in looking at differences by age and will do so where it makes sense. Age is one of the most common predictors of differences in attitudes and behaviors. And even if age gaps aren’t rooted in generational differences, they can still be illuminating. They help us understand how people across the age spectrum are responding to key trends, technological breakthroughs and historical events.

Each stage of life comes with a unique set of experiences. Young adults are often at the leading edge of changing attitudes on emerging social trends. Take views on same-sex marriage , for example, or attitudes about gender identity .

Many middle-aged adults, in turn, face the challenge of raising children while also providing care and support to their aging parents. And older adults have their own obstacles and opportunities. All of these stories – rooted in the life cycle, not in generations – are important and compelling, and we can tell them by analyzing our surveys at any given point in time.

When we do have the data to study groups of similarly aged people over time, we won’t always default to using the standard generational definitions and labels. While generational labels are simple and catchy, there are other ways to analyze age cohorts. For example, some observers have suggested grouping people by the decade in which they were born. This would create narrower cohorts in which the members may share more in common. People could also be grouped relative to their age during key historical events (such as the Great Recession or the COVID-19 pandemic) or technological innovations (like the invention of the iPhone).

By choosing not to use the standard generational labels when they’re not appropriate, we can avoid reinforcing harmful stereotypes or oversimplifying people’s complex lived experiences.

Existing generational definitions also may be too broad and arbitrary to capture differences that exist among narrower cohorts. A typical generation spans 15 to 18 years. As many critics of generational research point out, there is great diversity of thought, experience and behavior within generations. The key is to pick a lens that’s most appropriate for the research question that’s being studied. If we’re looking at political views and how they’ve shifted over time, for example, we might group people together according to the first presidential election in which they were eligible to vote.

With these considerations in mind, our audiences should not expect to see a lot of new research coming out of Pew Research Center that uses the generational lens. We’ll only talk about generations when it adds value, advances important national debates and highlights meaningful societal trends.

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Kim Parker is director of social trends research at Pew Research Center .

As Biden and Trump seek reelection, who are the oldest – and youngest – current world leaders?

How teens and parents approach screen time, who are you the art and science of measuring identity, u.s. centenarian population is projected to quadruple over the next 30 years, older workers are growing in number and earning higher wages, most popular.

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Notice Number: NOT-OD-18-214

Key Dates Release Date: July 26, 2018

Issued by National Institutes of Health ( NIH )

The purpose of this notice is to update NIH’s Next Generation Researchers Initiative (NGRI) policy ( NOT-OD-17-101 ) as it relates to Early Established Investigators (EEIs).

Since announcing the NGRI policy in August 2017, NIH’s strategy for achieving these goals has evolved based on on-going work by an Advisory Committee to the Director (ACD) Next Generation Researchers Initiative Working Group and other stakeholder feedback. As a result, NIH will not use an EEI flag in application and review systems as described in NOT-OD-17-101 .

NIH will continue to prioritize funding for Early Stage Investigators (ESIs), and pending the deliberations of the ACD Next Generation Working Group, will use an interim strategy to consider at risk investigators (investigators with meritoriously-scored applications who would not have major NIH research funding if the application under consideration is not awarded and who do not have significant research support from other sources) in its funding strategies.

NIH will continue to update the community as additional information becomes available.

Please direct all inquiries to:

Division of Biomedical Research Workforce Office of Extramural Research Website: https://researchtraining.nih.gov Email: [email protected]

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Russia's Nuclear Fuel Cycle

• A significant increase in uranium mine production is planned.
• There is increasing international involvement in parts of Russia's fuel cycle.
• A major Russian political and economic objective is to increase exports, particularly for front-end fuel cycle services through Tenex, as well as nuclear power plants.

Russia uses about 5500 tonnes of natural uranium per year.

There is high-level concern about the development of new uranium deposits, and a Federal Council meeting in April 2015 agreed to continue the federal financing of exploration and estimation works in Vitimsky Uranium Region in Buryatia. It also agreed to financing construction of the engineering infrastructure of Mine No. 6 of Priargunsky Industrial Mining and Chemical Union (PIMCU). The following month the Council approved key support measures including the introduction of a zero rate for mining tax and property tax; simplification of the system of granting subsoil use rights; inclusion of the Economic Development of the Far East and Trans-Baikal up to 2018 policy in the Federal Target Program; and the development of infrastructure in Krasnokamensk.

In June 2015 Rosgeologia signed a number of agreements to expedite mineral exploration in Russia, including one with Rosatom. It was established in July 2011 by presidential decree and consists of 38 enterprises located in 30 regions across Russia, but uranium is a minor part of its interests.

Uranium resources and mining

Russia has substantial economic resources of uranium, with about 9% of world reasonably assured resources plus inferred resources up to $130/kg – 505,900 tonnes U (2014 Red Book ). Rosatom reported ARMZ resources as 517,000 tU in September 2015, mostly requiring underground mining. Historic uranium exploration expenditure is reported to have been about $4 billion. The Federal Natural Resources Management Agency (Rosnedra) reported that Russian uranium reserves grew by 15% in 2009, particularly through exploration in the Urals and Kalmykia Republic, north of the Caspian Sea.

Uranium production has varied from 2870 to 3560 tU/yr since 2004, and in recent years has been supplemented by that from Uranium One Kazakh operations, giving 7629 tU in 2012. In 2006 there were three mining projects in Russia, since then others have been under construction and more projected, as described below. Cost of production in remote areas such as Elkon is said to be US$ 60-90/kg. Spending on new ARMZ domestic projects in 2013 was RUR 253.5 million, though in November 2013 all Rosatom investment in mining expansion was put on hold due to low uranium prices.

Plans announced in 2006 for 28,600 t/yr U 3 O 8 output by 2020, 18,000t of this from Russia* and the balance from Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Mongolia have since taken shape, though difficulties in starting new Siberian mines makes the 18,000 t target unlikely. Three uranium mining joint ventures were established in Kazakhstan with the intention of providing 6000 tU/yr for Russia from 2007: JV Karatau, JV Zarechnoye and JV Akbastau (see below and Kazakhstan paper).

* See details for April 2008 ARMZ plans. In 2007 TVEL applied for the Istochnoye, Kolichkanskoye, Dybrynskoye, Namarusskoye and Koretkondinskoye deposits with 30,000 tU in proved and probable reserves close to the Khiagda mine in Buryatia. From foreign projects: Zarechnoye 1000 t, Southern Zarechnoye 1000 t, Akbastau 3000 t (all in Kazakhstan); Aktau (Uzbekistan) 500 t, Novo-Konstantinovskoye (Ukraine) 2500 t. In addition Russia would like to participate in development of Erdes deposit in Mongolia (500t) as well as in Northern Kazakhstan deposits Semizbai (Akmolonsk Region) and Kosachinoye.

*(this chart is now slightly out of date but still gives a general picture)

AtomRedMetZoloto (ARMZ) is the state-owned company which took over Tenex and TVEL uranium exploration and mining assets in 2007-08, as a subsidiary of Atomenergoprom (79.5% owned). It inherited 19 projects with a total uranium resource of about 400,000 tonnes, of which 340,000 tonnes are in Elkonskiy uranium region and 60,000 tonnes in Streltsovskiy and Vitimskiy regions. The rights to all these resources had been transferred from Rosnedra , the Federal Agency for Subsoil Use under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment .

JSC ARMZ Uranium Holding Company (as it is now known) became the mining division of Rosatom in 2008, responsible for all Russian uranium mine assets and also Russian shares in foreign joint ventures. In 2008, 78.6% of JSC Priargunsky, all of JSC Khiagda and 97.85% of JSC Dalur was transferred to ARMZ. In March 2009 the Federal Financial Markets Service of Russia registered RUR 16.4 billion of additional shares in ARMZ placed through a closed subscription to pay for uranium mining assets, on top of a RUR 4 billion issued in mid 2008 to pay for the acquisition of Priargunsky, Khiagda and Dalur. In November 2009 SC Rosatom paid a further RUR 33 billion for ARMZ shares, increasing its equity to 76.1%.

In 2009 and 2010 ARMZ took a 51% share in Canadian-based Uranium One Inc, paying for this with $610 million in cash and by exchange of assets in Kazakhstan: 50% of JVs Akbastau, Karatau and Zarechnoye, mining the Budenovskoye and Zarechnoye deposits. (An independent financial advisor put the value of ARMZ's stakes in the Akbastau and Zarechnoye JVs at $907.5 million.) Uranium One has substantial production capacity in Kazakhstan, including now those two mines with Karatau, Akdala, South Inkai and Kharasan, as well as small prospects in USA and Australia (sold in 2015). In 2013 ARMZ completed the purchase of outstanding shares in Uranium One Inc, and it became a full subsidiary of ARMZ. JSC Uranium One Group (U1 Group) is from December 2016 a 78.4% owned subsidiary of Atomenergoprom and apparently separate from ARMZ.

Following this, late in 2013 Rosatom established Uranium One Holding NV  (U1H) as its global growth platform for all international uranium mining assets belonging to Russia, with headquarters in Amsterdam. It lists assets in Kazakhstan, USA and Tanzania, as well as owning and managing Rosatom’s stake in Uranium One Inc. In 2013 it accounted for 5086 tU production at average cash cost of $16/lb U 3 O 8 , and reported 229,453 tU measured, indicated and inferred resources (attributable share). In 2014 it produced 4857 tU and listed resources of 177,000 tU. The company plans to extend its interests into rare earths. Its ‘strategic partner’ is JSC NAC Kazatomprom.

ARMZ remains responsible for uranium mining in Russia. At the end of 2013 it was 82.75% owned by Rosatom and 17.25% TVEL. Exploration expenditure has nearly doubled in two years to about US$ 52 million in 2008. In 2013 the government approved an exploration budget of RUR 14 billion ($450 million) through to 2020, principally in the Far East and Northern Siberia. Deposits suitable for ISL mining will be sought in the Transurals, Transbaikal and Kalmykyia. Other work will be in the Urals, Siberian, Far East Federal Districts (Zauralsky, Streltsovsky, Vitimsky and Vostochno-Zabaikalsky, and Elkonsky ore regions).

Rosgeologia, the Russian state-run geological exploration services company set up in 2011, has identified "promising" uranium deposits in the North-West Federal District of Russia following completion of a survey of the Kuol-Panayarvinskaya area on the border of the Murmansk region and the Republic of Karelia. It signed an agreement with Rosatom in 2015 to focus on uranium.

CJSC Rusburmash (RBM) is the exploration subsidiary of ARMZ. VNIPIPT is the subsidiary responsible for R&D and engineering of mining and processing plants.

In December 2010 ARMZ made a $1.16 billion takeover bid for Australia's Mantra Resources Ltd with a prospective Mkuju River project in southern Tanzania, which was expected in production about 2013 at 1400 tU/yr, but is now deferred. This is now under U1H.

Domestic mining

In 2009 the government accepted Rosatom’s proposal for ARMZ and Elkonsky Mining and Metallurgical Combine to set up the “open-type joint stock company” EGMK-Project. The state’s contribution through Rosatom to the EGMK-Project authorized capital will be RUR 2.657 billion, including RUR 2.391 billion in 2009 and RUR 0.266 billion in 2010. EGMK-Project is being set up to draw up the project and design documentation for Elkonsky Mining and Metallurgical Combine (see below).

The Russian Federation’s main uranium deposits are in four districts:

• The Trans-Ural district in the Kurgan region between Chelyabinsk and Omsk, with the Dalur ISL mine.
• Streltsovskiy district in the Transbaikal or Chita region of SE Siberia near the Chinese and Mongolian borders, served by Krasnokamensk and with major underground mines.
• The Vitimsky district in Buryatia about 570 km northwest of Krasnokamensk, with the Khiagda ISL mine.
• The more recently discovered remote Elkon district in the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) some 1200 km north-northeast of the Chita region.

Present production by ARMZ is principally from the Streltsovskiy district, where major uranium deposits were discovered in 1967, leading to large-scale mining, originally with few environmental controls. These are volcanogenic caldera-related deposits. Krasnokamensk is the main town serving the mines.

In 2008 ARMZ said that it intended to triple production to 10,300 tU per year by 2015, with some help from Cameco, Mitsui and local investors. ARMZ planned to invest RUR 203 billion (US$ 6.1billion) in the development of uranium mining in Russia in 2008-2015. It aimed for 20,000 tU per year by 2024. Total cost was projected at RUR 67 billion ($2 billion), mostly at Priargunsky, with RUR 4.8 billion ($144 million) there by end of 2009 including a new $30 million, 500 tonne per day sulfuric acid plant commissioned in 2009, replacing a 1976 acid plant.

Russian uranium mining

Source: 2016 ‘Red Book’ except Olovskaya and Lunnoye.

Russian uranium production, tonnes U

Trans-Ural, Kurgan region

A modest level of production is from Dalur in the Trans-Ural Kurgan region. This is a low-cost ($40/kg) acid in situ leach (ISL) operation in sandstones. About 1350 km east of Moscow, Uksyanskoye is the town supporting the Dalur mine. ARMZ’s 2008 plan had production at Dalur by acid ISL increasing from 350 to 800 tU/yr by 2019 (expanding from the Dalmatovskoye field in the Zauralsk uranium district to Khokhlovskoye in the Shumikhinsky district, then Dobrovolnoye in the Zverinogolovsky district). In 2014 JSC Dalur completed further exploration of the Khokhlovskoye deposit and increased its resources from 4700 to 5500 tonnes. A mill upgrade was started in 2016. More than half of 2016 production was from the Ust-Uksyansky part of Dalmatovskoye field.

In 2016 geological exploration at the Dobrovolnoye deposit was advanced, and a permit for development was received in June 2017, allowing construction of the pilot plant, which commenced in 2020. Its reserves are quoted as 7067 tU. After pilot operation to 2021, commercial operation is expected to maintain Dalur production at 700 tU per year to about 2025 after Dalmatovskoye and Khokhlovskoye are exhausted, reaching full capacity in 2031.

Transbaikal Chita region, Streltsovskiy district

Here, several underground mines operated by JSC Priargunsky Industrial Mining and Chemical Union ( PIMCU  – 85% ARMZ) supply low-grade ore to a central mill near Krasnokamensk. PIMCU was established in 1968, and produces some other metals than uranium. Since 2008 it has been an ARMZ subsidiary. Historical production from Priargunsky is reported to be 140,000 tU (some from open cut mines) and 2011 known resources (RAR + IR) are quoted as 115,000 tU at 0.159%U. In 2013 ‘reserves’ were quoted by ARMZ at 108,700 tonnes. Production is up to about 3000 tU/yr, about one-tenth of it from heap leaching. In 2015 production was 1977 tU and costs were reduced by 11%, so that it hoped to break even in mid-2016.

The company has six underground mines, most of them operating: Mine #1, Mine #2, Glubokiy Mine, Shakhta 6R, Mine #8 with extraction from Maly Tulukui deposit, and Mine #6 (see below). ARMZ’s 2008 plan called for Priargunsky's production to be expanded from 3000 to 5000 tU/yr by 2020.

Mine #1 production rate was increased in 2016. It is on the opposite side of the Oktyabriski settlement from mine #2 and about 2 km from it.

Mine #2 was making a loss in 2013 due to market conditions, so it was closed in order to concentrate on bringing mine #8 to full production. Stoping operations resumed in February 2015, with production target 130 tU for the year, from average grade 0.15%. It is now known as section 2 of mine #8. Some production has been exported to France, Sweden and Spain.

Mine #8 began producing in 2011, towards phase 1 target capacity of 400 t/yr by the end of 2014. The total cost of development is expected to be RUR 4.8 billion (RUR 3.5 billion for phase 1). Production was increased 22% in 2016.

Mine #6  will access the Argunskoye and Zherlovoye deposits which comprise 35% of the Streltsovskoye reserves of 40,900 tU, with much higher grade (0.3%U) than the rest. Production cost from mine #6 is projected at $90/kgU. Future plans for Priargunsky are focused on development of mine #6, official construction of which commenced in 2018.

Development began in 2009 for stage 1 production from 2015 to reach full capacity in 2019, but this was put on hold in 2013. In March 2015 ARMZ said it hoped to find co-investors in the project, and federal funds might be forthcoming. Then in June 2015 Rosatom’s Investment Committee decided to finance the development. In August 2016 ARMZ said that RUR 27 billion was required to enable 2022 commissioning. In March 2018 a new financing arrangement was announced to the extent of RUR 18.5 billion, with Priargunsky to own 51% of the project and ARMZ 49% directly. Most of the project financing – RUR 16.1 billion – would be from China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), with the balance of RUR 2.5 billion from a new Russia-China Investment Fund for Regional Development (RCIF) “as a first step in widening cooperation” with China. According to the Russian Gazette (quoted by Platts Nuclear Fuel ), CNNC’s investment would give it a 49% stake in the joint venture, entitling it to that proportion of annual production. Construction recommenced in March 2018, aiming for first production in 2023, ramping up to full capacity of 1800 tU/yr by 2026. Rosatom reported that the Mine #6 development project is supervised by the government of Zabaikalsky Krai.

Mine #4. Mining the Tulukuy pit of Mine #4 ceased in 1991 due to low grades, but now low-cost block-type underground leaching is ready to be employed in the pit bottom to recover the remaining 6000 tU. Following this the pit will be filled with low-grade ore for heap leaching.

A re-evaluation of reserves in 2012 suggested that mineable resources apart from Mine #6 amounted to only 32,000 tU. Mine #8 resources were quoted at 12,800 tU in December 2012. In 2014 PIMCU, as part of the Kaldera project, identified four promising areas over 100 sq km in the Streltsovskoye ore field, with resources estimated at 80,000 tU, and they will be explored over 2015-17.

In 2014 PIMCU completed an upgrade of its sulfuric acid plant to take daily production from 400 to 500 tonnes, for use in both the conventional mill and in underground and heap leaching. Also the mill (hydrometallurgical plant) process was improved.

There is a legacy environmental problem at Priargunsky arising from 30 waste rock and low-grade ore dumps as well as tailings. Rehabilitation of waste rock dumps and open pits is proceeding and low-grade ores are being heap leached. Dams and intercepting wells below the tailings dams with hydrogeological monitoring and wastewater treatment is addressing water pollution. Final rehabilitation of the impacted areas will occur after final closure takes place. In 2016 ARMZ announced a new heap leaching initiative for very low-grade ores stockpiled on the surface, to produce 50 to 63 tU/yr.

In 2006 Priargunsky won a tender to develop Argunskoye and Zherlovoye deposits in the Chita region with about 40,000 tU reserves. Dolmatovsk and Khokhlovsk have also been identified as new mines to be developed (location uncertain).

Development of Olovskoye and Gornoye deposits* in the Transbaikal region near Priargunsky towards Khiagda would add 900 tU/yr production for RUR 135 billion ($5.7 billion). Measured resources together are 12,200 tU and inferred resources 1600 tU, all at 0.072% average (JORC-compliant). In 2007 newly-formed ARMZ set up two companies to undertake this, and possibly attract some foreign investment:

• Gornoye Uranium Mining Company (UDK Gornoye) to develop the Gornoye and Berezovoye mines in the Krasnochikoysky and Uletovsky districts in Chita, with underground mining and some heap leach (ore grade 0.226%U) originally to produce 300 tU/yr from 2014, but now anticipating up to 1000 tU/yr from 2025.
• Olovskaya Mining & Chemical Company to develop the Olovskoye deposits in the Chernyshevsk district of Chita region with underground, open cut and heap leach to produce 600 tU/yr from 2016.

The 2016 Red Book noted that UDK Gornoye was undertaking pilot mining project design for the Berezovoye deposit.

* 2006 plans were for 2000t/yr at new prospects in Chita Region and Buryatia (Gornoye, Berezovoye, Olovskoye, Talakanskoye properties etc.), plus some 3000t at new deposits.

Buryatia, Vitimsky district

JSC  Khiagda 's operations are at Vitimsky in Buryatia about 570 km northwest of Krasnokamensk, serving Priargunsky's operations in Chita region, and 140 km north of Chita city. They are starting from a low base – in 2010 production from the Khiagdinskoye ore field was 135 tU, rising to 440 tU in 2013 (fully utilising the pilot plant) and targeting 1000 tU/yr from 2018 with a new plant. These are a low-cost (US$ 70/kgU) acid in situ leach (ISL) operations in sandstones, and comprise the only ISL mine in the world in permafrost. Groundwater temperature is 1-4°C, giving viscosity problems, especially when winter air temperature is -40°C. The main uranium mineralisation is a phosphate, requiring oxidant addition to the acid solution. In the Khiagdinskoye field itself there are eight palaeochannel deposits over 15 x 8 km, at depths of 90 to 280 metres (average 170 m). Single orebodies are up to 4 km long and 15 to 400 m wide, 1 to 20 m thick.

JSC Khiagda has resources of 55,000 tU amenable to ISL mining, with resource potential estimated by Rosatom of 350,000 tU, giving a mine life of over 50 years. In 2015 ‘reserves’ were quoted by ARMZ at 39,300 tonnes U. The 2008 ARMZ plan envisaged production from JSC Khiagda's project increasing to 1800 tU/yr by 2019, but in 2013 the higher target was postponed. The 2018 plan is now 1000 tonnes. In 2014 JSC Khiagda continued construction of the main production facility and on the sulfuric acid plant, the first stage of which was commissioned in September 2015. Its final design capacity is 110,000 t/yr.

JSC Khiagda is currently mining uranium from the Khiagdin and Istochnoy deposits of the Khiagda ore field. Preparatory work for mining operations at the Vershinny deposit is under way. In May 2018, JSC Khiagda announced that engineering and geological surveys ahead of the construction of mining facilities was under way at Kolichikan and Dybryn deposits. The other two fields in the immediate vicinity are Namaru and Tetrakhskoye. All these deposits occur over an area about 50 x 20 km. There are also plans to install plant for extracting rare earth oxides (REO) as by-product. The nearest towns are Romanovka, 133 km north of Chita, and Bagdarin.

Sakha/Yakutia, Elkon district

ARMZ’s long-term hope is development of the massive Elkon project with several mines in the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) some 1200 km north-northeast of the Chita region. The Elkon project is in a mountainous region with difficult climate conditions and little infrastructure, making it a challenging undertaking. Production from metasomatite deposits is planned to ramp up to 5000 tU/yr over ten years, for RUR 90.5 billion ($3 billion), and 2020 start up was envisaged, but this is now "after 2030". Elkon is set to become Russia's largest uranium mining complex, based on resources of over 270,000 tU (or 357,000 tU quoted by Rosatom in 2015). It will involve underground mining, radiometric sorting, milling, processing and uranium concentrate production of up to 5000 tU/yr.

Elkon Mining and Metallurgical Combine (EMMC) was set up by ARMZ to develop the substantial Elkonsky deposits. The Elkon MMC project involves the JSC Development Corporation of South Yakutia and aims to attract outside funding to develop infrastructure and mining in a public-private partnership, with ARMZ holding 51%. Foreign equity including from Japan, South Korea and India is envisaged, and in March a joint venture arrangement with India was announced. The Elkon MMC developments are to become “the locomotive of the economic development of the entire region”, building the infrastructure, electricity transmission lines, roads and railways, as well as industrial facilities, from 2010. Of 15 proposed construction sites, three have been tentatively selected: at the mouth of Anbar River, Diksi Village and Ust-Uga Village. The building of four small floating co-generation plants to supply heat and electricity to northern regions of Yakutia is linked with the Elkon project in southern Yakutia.

There are eight deposits in the Elkon project with resources of 320,000 tU* (RAR + IR) at average 0.146%U, with gold by-product: Elkon, Elkon Plateau, Kurung, Neprokhodimoye, Druzhnoye (southern deposits), as well as Yuzhnaya, Severnaya, Zona Interesnaya and Lunnoye (see below). In mid-2010 ARMZ released JORC-compliant resource figures for the five southern deposits: 71,300 tU as measured and indicated resources, and 158,500 tU as inferred resources, averaging 0.143%U. ARMZ pointed out that the resource assessment against international standards will increase the investment attractiveness of EMMC. However, in September 2011 ARMZ said that production costs would be US$ 120-130/kgU, which would be insufficient in the current market, and costs would need to be cut by 15-20%.

* 257,800 tU of this was in the five southern deposits. The 2011 Red Book gives 271,000 tU resources for Elkon, or 319,000 tU in situ.

First production from EMMC was expected in 2015 ramping up to 1000 tU/yr in 2018, 2000 tU/yr in 2020 and 5000 tU/yr by 2024 based on the southern deposits as well as Severnoye and Zona Interesnoye. This schedule has slipped by at least ten years. Also, it is remote, and mining will be underground, incurring significant development costs. ARMZ and EMMC are seeking local government (Sakha) support for construction of main roads and railways to access the Elkon area, and make investment there more attractive.

JSC Lunnoye was set up by ARMZ at the same time as EMMC to develop a small deposit jointly by ARMZ (50.1%) and a gold mining company Zoloto Seligdara as a pilot project to gain practical experience in the region in a polymetallic orebody. Lunnoye is expected in full production in 2016, reaching 100 tU/yr. It has reserves of 800 tU and 13 t gold, and is managed by Zoloto Seligdara. ARMZ in mid 2011 expressed impatience with the rate of development.

Further mine prospects

The Federal Subsoil Resources Management Agency (Rosnedra) was transferring about 100,000 tonnes of uranium resources to miners, notably ARMZ, in 2009-10, and 14 projects, mainly small to medium deposits, were prepared for licensing then. They are located mainly in the Chita (Streltsovskiy district), Trans-Ural (Zauralskiy district) and Buryatia (Vitimskiy district) uranium regions.

The projects prepared for licensing include:

• Chita Oblast – Zherlovskoye, Pyatiletnee, Dalnee and Durulguevskoye.
• Republic of Buratiya – Talakanskoye, Vitlausskoye, Imskoye, Tetrakhskoye, and Dzhilindinskoye.
• Kurgan Oblast – Dobrovolnoye (now licensed).
• Khabarovsk Krai – Lastochka.
• Republic of Tyva – Ust-Uyuk and Onkazhinskoye.
• Republic of Khakassia – Primorskoye.

All together these projects have 76,600 tonnes of reasonably assured and inferred resources, plus 106,000 tonnes of less-certain 'undiscovered' resources.

Rosnedra published a list of deposits in the Republic of Karelia, Irkutsk Region and the Leningrad Region to be offered for tender in 2009. In particular, Tyumenskiy in Mamsko-Chuiskiy District of Irkutsk Region was to be offered for development, followed by Shotkusskaya ploshchad in Lodeinopolsky District of Leningrad Region. In Karelia Salminskaya ploshchad in Pitkyaranskiy District and the Karku deposit were offered. None of these 2009 offerings had reasonably assured or inferred resources quoted, only 'undiscovered' resources in Russia's P1 to P3 categories and it appears that none were taken up. In 2016 the Karelia Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology acknowledged only one uranium deposit “of no commercial interest” at Srednyaya Padma (Medvezhegorsk District) and announced that no mining was planned.

Foreign and private equity in uranium mining

In October 2006 Japan's Mitsui & Co with Tenex agreed to undertake a feasibility study for a uranium mine in eastern Russia to supply Japan. First production from the Yuzhnaya mine in Sakha Republic (Yakutia) is envisaged for 2009. Mitsui had an option to take 25% of the project, and was funding $6 million of the feasibility study. Construction of the Yuzhnaya mine was estimated to cost US$ 245 million, with production reaching 1000 tU/yr by 2015. This would represent the first foreign ownership of a Russian uranium mine. However, according to the 2016 Red Book , Yuzhnaya now appears to be part of the Elkon project (see above).

Following from previous deals with Tenex, in November 2007 Cameco signed an agreement with ARMZ. The two companies are to create joint ventures to explore for and mine uranium in both Russia and Canada, starting with identified deposits in northwestern Russia and the Canadian provinces of Saskatchewan and Nunavut.

In addition to ARMZ, private companies may also participate in tenders for mining the smaller and remote uranium deposits being prepared for licensing in Russia. ARMZ is open to relevant investment projects with strategic partners, and Lunnoye deposit is an example where a private company Zoloto Seligdara is partnering with ARMZ.

Mine rehabilitation

Some RUR 340 million (US$10m) is being allocated in the federal budget to rehabilitate the former Almaz mine in Lermontov, Stavropol Territory, in particular Mine 1 on Beshtau Mountain and Mine 2 on Byk Mountain, as well as reclamation of the tailings dump and industrial site of the hydrometallurgical plant. The work will be undertaken by Rosatom organizations under Rostechnadzor. In 2008, rehabilitation of Lermontovsky tailings was included in a federal target program, and over RUR 360 million was allocated for the purpose.

Secondary supplies

Some uranium also comes from reprocessing used fuel from VVER-440, fast neutron and submarine reactors - some 2500 tonnes of uranium has so far been recycled into RBMK reactors.

Also arising from reprocessing used fuels, some 32 tonnes of reactor-grade plutonium has been accumulated for use in MOX. Added to this there is now 34 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium from military stockpiles to be used in MOX fuel for BN-600 and BN-800 fast neutron reactors at Beloyarsk, supported by a $400 million payment from the USA. Some of this weapons plutonium may also be used in the MHR high-temperature gas-cooled reactor under development at Seversk, if this proceeds.

About 28% of the natural uranium feed sent to USEC in USA for enrichment, and contra to the LEU supplied from blended-down Russian military uranium, is being sent to Russia for domestic use. The value of this to mid 2009 was US$ 2.7 billion, according to Rosatom. See also Military Warheads as Source of Fuel paper.

Russia's uranium supply is expected to suffice for at least 80 years, or more if recycling is increased. However, from 2020 it is intended to make more use of fast neutron reactors.

Fuel Cycle Facilities: conversion & enrichment

Many of Russia's fuel cycle facilities were originally developed for military use and hence are located in former closed cities (names bracketed) in the country. In October 2015 the ministry of economic development moved to open four of these which host facilities managed by Rosatom: Novouralsk, Zelenogorsk, Seversk and Zarechny.

In 2009 the conversion and enrichment plants were taken over by the newly-established JSC Enrichment & Conversion Complex, and in 2010 this became part of TVEL , a subsidiary of Atomenergoprom.

Seversk in Western Siberia is a particular focus of new investment, with Rosatom planning to spend a total of RUR100 billion on JSC Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC, SGChE) over 2012-20 to develop its “scientific, technical and production potential in terms of nuclear technology.” SCC comprises several nuclear reactors and plants for conversion, enrichment, separation and reprocessing of uranium and separation of plutonium. In 2012 Rosatom announced that it was investing RUR 45.5 billion ($1.6 billion) in SCC at Seversk to 2017 for modernising the enrichment capacity and setting up a new conversion plant.

TVEL has decided to rationalize some of its activities at Novouralsk, setting up a scientific and production association (SPA) in 2016 to incorporate Urals Gas Centrifuges Plant (UZGT or UGCP), Novouralsk Scientific and Design Center (NSDC), Uralpribor, and Electrochemical Converters Plant (ECCP).

Russia’s total uranium conversion capacity is about 25,000 tU/yr, but only about half of this is used as of 2013.

TVEL plans to consolidate its conversion capacity at JSC Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC) at Seversk near Tomsk, where some capacity already operates. In 2012 Rosatom said it would spend RUR 7.5 billion to set up a new conversion plant at SCC Seversk, to commence operation in 2016. The new plant is designed to have a capacity of 20,000 tU per year from 2020, including 2000 t of recycled uranium. Public hearings on the project were under way in 2014. The 2015 edition of the World Nuclear Association Nuclear Fuel Report gives capacity then as 12,500 tU.

The main operating conversion plant has been at Angarsk near Irkutsk in Siberia, with 18,700 tonnes U/yr capacity – part of TVEL's JSC Angarsk Electrolysis & Chemical Combine (AECC). In anticipation of the planned new plant at SCC Seversk however, the Angarsk conversion plant was shut down in April 2014.

TVEL also had conversion capacity at Kirovo-Chepetsky Chemical Combine (KCCC) in Glazoy, which was shut down in the 1990s. Since 2009 this has been a RosRAO site, for clean-up

The Elektrostal conversion plant, 50 km east of Moscow, has 700 tU/yr capacity for reprocessed uranium, initially that from VVER-440 fuel. It is owned by Maschinostroitelny Zavod (MSZ) whose Elemash fuel fabrication plant is there. Some conversion of Kazakh uranium has been undertaken for west European company Nukem, and all 960 tonnes of recycled uranium from Sellafield in UK, owned by German and Netherlands utilities, has been converted here. UK-owned recycled uranium has also been sent there.

Uranium enrichment

Four enrichment plants totalling 24 million kg SWU/yr of centrifuge capacity operate at Novo-Uralsk (formerly Sverdlovsk-44) near Yekaterinburg in the Urals, Zelenogorsk (formerly Krasnoyarsk-45), Seversk (formerly Tomsk-7) near Tomsk, and Angarsk near Irkutsk – the last three all in Siberia. The first two service foreign primary demand and Seversk specialises in enriching reprocessed uranium, including that from western Europe. As of early 2011, all are managed by TVEL, rather than Tenex (Techsnabexport).

The Novouralsk (Novo-Uralsk) plant is part of the JSC Urals Electrochemical Combine (UECC) in the Sverdlovsk region. It has operated 8th generation centrifuges since 2003, and 9 th generation units from 2013. The fourth cascade of 9 th generation centrifuges was commissioned in August 2016. TVEL is spending RUR 42 billion on re-equipping the plant with 9 th generation units by 2019. In 2016 it was operating 6 th to 9 th generation centrifuges. The plant can enrich to 30% U-235  (for research and BN fast reactors), the others only to 5% U-235.

The TVEL-Kazakh JV Uranium Enrichment Centre (UEC) bought a 25% share of UECC and became entitled to half its output – up to 5 million SWU/yr (see below). In April 2013 the government commission for control over foreign investments approved this sale.

UECC once claimed 48% of Russian enrichment capacity and 20% of the world’s. Rosatom in 2015 applied to the government to create a territory of priority development (TPD) in Novouralsk, a special economic zone enjoying low taxes, simplified administrative procedures and other benefits.

The Zelenogorsk plant is known as the PA Electrochemical Plant (ECP) in the Krasnoyarsk region (120 km east of that city), and has ISO 14001 environmental accreditation and ISO 9001 quality assurance system. It is starting to run 9 th generation centrifuges and in 2021 commissioned its third cascade of these. In 2011 Rosatom said the plant's capacity was 8.7 million SWU/yr and it planned to increase that to 12 million SWU/yr by 2020, with a view to exporting its services. Rosatom was investing RUR 70 billion ($2.3 billion) by 2020 in developing the plant, with up to 90% of the new centrifuges installed there to make it the main enrichment plant. It is the site of a new deconversion plant (see below).

The Seversk plant is part of the JSC Siberian Chemical Combine (Sibirsky Khimichesky Kombinat – SKhK or SCC), Tomsk region, which opened in 1953. It is about 15 km from Tomsk. As well as the enrichment plant with substantial capacity for recycled uranium the site has other facilities, and several plutonium production reactors (now closed). It is starting to run 9th generations centrifuges.

Angarsk , near Irkutsk in Siberia, is part of the JSC Angarsk Electrolysis & Chemical Combine (AECC). It is the only enrichment plant located outside a 'closed' city, nor has it had any defence role, and hence it became the site of the new International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) and fuel bank. In 2014 AECC said it would retain its present capacity. In December 2014 it started to undertake enrichment of tails (depleted UF 6 ) stored onsite up to natural UF 6 levels, and expects this to continue to 2030 as a major activity.

Technology: Diffusion technology was phased out by 1992 and all plants now operate modern gas centrifuges, with fitting of 8th generation equipment now complete. New units have a service life of up to 30 years, compared with half that previously. The last 6th & 7th generation centrifuges were set up in 2005, 8th generation equipment was supplied over 2004 to 2012, and about 240,000 units per year replaced 5th generation models. (6th generation units are still produced for export to China.) Two new 9 th generation cascades were commissioned in 2015 and 10 th generation units were being tested in 2016.

While TVEL had taken over responsibility for manufacture, in 2016 Rosatom decided to combine the design and production of centrifuges at the Urals Gas Centrifuge Plant (UZGT or UGCP) in Novouralsk, as part of the scientific and production association (SPA) set up by TVEL. OKB-Nizhniy Novgorod and Cetrotech-SPb had been involved in design and manufacture. The first 9 th generation centrifuges were supplied to UECC early in 2013 from UZGT.

Tails re-enrichment: A significant proportion of the capacity of Novouralsk and Zelenogorsk plants – some 7 M SWU/yr – was earlier taken up by enrichment of tails (depleted uranium), including for west European companies Areva and Urenco. According to WNA sources, about 10,000 to 15,000 tonnes of tails per year, with U-235 assays between 0.25% and 0.40%, has been shipped to Russia for re-enrichment to about 0.7% U-235 since 1997. The tails were stripped down to about 0.10% U-235, and remain in Russia, being considered a resource for future fast reactors. The contracts for this work for Urenco and Areva ended in 2010.

A portion of the Zelenogorsk capacity, about 4.75 M SWU/yr, was taken up with re-enrichment of tails to provide 1.5% enriched material for downblending much of the Russian HEU destined for USA. It was also the site for downblending much of the of ex-weapons uranium for sale to the USA (though all the other three plants may have contributed over the 20 years).

Seversk capacity is about 3 M SWU/yr, and some recycled uranium (from reprocessing) has been enriched here for Areva, under a 1991 ten-year contract covering about 500 tonnes UF 6 . (French media reports in 2009 alleging that waste from French nuclear power plants was stored at Seversk probably refer to tails from enrichment of the recycled uranium.) It is understood to be enriching the 960 tU of reprocessed uranium from Sellafield in UK, belonging to its customers in Germany and Netherlands, sent to Elektrostal in eight shipments over 2001-09.

In 2012 Rosatom announced that it was investing RUR 45.5 billion ($1.6 billion) in SCC at Seversk to 2017 for modernising the enrichment capacity and setting up a new conversion plant.

Angarsk (AECC) is the smallest of three Siberian plants, with capacity of about 2.6 million SWU/yr. In July 2011 TVEL confirmed that there were no plans to expand it. A significant focus is tails enrichment. The International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) has been set up at Angarsk (see following IUEC section).

TVEL-Kazakh JV Uranium Enrichment Centre (UEC)

In the context of a December 2006 agreement with Kazakhstan, in 2008 Kazatomprom set up a 50-50 joint venture with Techsnabexport (Tenex) for financing a 5 million SWU/yr increment to the Angarsk plant, with each party to contribute about US$ 1.6 billion and hold 50% equity. It then appeared that initial JV capacity would be about 3 million SWU/yr, with first production in 2011. However, in 2010 Rosatom announced that this would not proceed, due to surplus world capacity, but other joint venture enrichment arrangements with Kazatomprom were offered, notably up to a 49% share in Novouralsk or Zelenogorsk.

After deciding that it would be uneconomic to expand capacity at Angarsk, in March 2011 it was announced that Kazatomprom would buy a share in Urals Electrochemical Combine (UECC) which owns the Novouralsk plant through its 50% equity in the TVEL-Kazakh JV Uranium Enrichment Centre (UEC), "instead of building new capacity at AECC" at Angarsk where UEC was originally established. In mid-2011 it was reported that Kazatomprom would acquire shares in UECC either directly (30%) or in the event as a 50% shareholder in UEC with TVEL, related to the need to enrich 6000 tU/yr. Over 2012-13 UEC acquired 25% of UECC, and UEC became operational in the second half of 2013, with access to 5 million SWU/yr – about half of UECC production. The cost of the Kazatomprom share, earlier estimated by it at $500 million, was not disclosed. The first batch of enriched uranium was shipped in November 2013. UEC share of production in 2014 was 4.99 million SWU.

Deconversion

Russia's W-ECP or W-EKhZ deconversion plant is at Zelenogorsk Electrochemical Plant (ECP). The 10,000 t/yr deconversion (defluorination) plant was built by Tenex under a technology transfer agreement with Areva NC (now Orano), so that depleted uranium can be stored long-term as uranium oxide, and hydrogen fluoride is produced as a by-product. The W1-ECP plant is similar to Areva's W2 plant at Pierrelatte in France and has mainly west European equipment. It was commissioned in December 2009 and to January 2021 had processed 100,000 t depleted uranium hexafluoride. The Russian-designed phase 2 for production of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride was commissioned in December 2010. During the ten years to end of 2020, some 11,000 t of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride as well as much more hydrofluoric acid were shipped to customers. TVEL is building a second unit, W2-ECP, with equipment from Orano Projects in France. This will expand ECP’s capacity to 20,000 t/yr depleted uranium hexafluoride from 2023 and producing up to 2400 t/yr of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride. 

Fuel fabrication

Fuel fabrication is undertaken by JSC TVEL, which supplies 76 nuclear reactors in Russia and 13 in other countries as well as 30 research reactors and fuel for naval and icebreaker reactors. Its operations are certified against ISO 9001 and it has about 17% of the world market for fabricated fuel. Russian fuel technology is supported by TVEL’s A.A. Bochvar High Technology Research Institute of Inorganic Materials ( VNIINM ).

Fuel cycles

Russia aims to maximise recycling of fissile materials from used fuel. Hence reprocessing used fuel is a basic practice, with reprocessed uranium being recycled and plutonium used in MOX, at present only for fast reactors. However, innovative developments of MOX use open up wider possibilities, and both the REMIX cycle and the Dual Component Power System are described below.

Uranium fuel fabrication

TVEL has two fuel fabrication plants with combined capacity of 2800 t/yr finished fuel:

• The huge Maschinostroitelny Zavod (MSZ) at Elektrostal 50 km east of Moscow – known as Elemash.
• Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant (NCCP) in Siberia.

TVEL's Chepetsk Mechanical Plant (CMP or ChMZ) near Glazov in Udmurtiya makes zirconium cladding and also some uranium products.

Most fuel pellets for RBMK and VVER-1000 reactors were being made at the Ulba plant at Ust Kamenogorsk in Kazakhstan, but Elemash and Novosibirsk have increased production. MSZ/Elemash produces fuel assemblies for both Russian and west European reactors using fresh and recycled uranium. It also fabricates research reactor and icebreaker fuel and in 2016 is producing the first fuel for the RITM-200 reactors in new icebreakers. VNIINM claims the fuel has greater energy density than previous icebreaker fuel.

Novosibirsk produces mainly VVER-440 & 1000 fuel, including that for initial use in China.

MSZ/Elemash is the principal exporter of fuel assemblies. Total production is about 1400 t/yr, including fuel assemblies for VVER-440, VVER-1000, RBMK-1000, BN-600 reactors, powders and fuel pellets for delivery to foreign clients. It has a contract to supply high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel over seven years for China's first CFR600 fast reactor. The plant also produces nuclear fuel for research reactors.

TVEL is developing a uranium-erbium fuel for VVERs enriched to 5-7% for load-following and longer fuel cycles. Some RBMK fuel is already enriched over 5%.

Early in 2021 MSZ set up a new production line for fast reactor fuel, including HEU. Russia’s BN-600 reactor uses uranium fuel with three levels of enrichment: 17%, 21% and 26%. Fuel for China’s CFR600 is likely to be similar. On another production line MSZ has already provided fuel for China’s CEFR, including a 2020 reload, reported to be 64% enriched.

TVEL’s NCCP also produces pure lithium-7, and accounts for over 70% of the world supply of Li-7, both 99.95% for use in PWR cooling systems, and also now 99.99% pure. A plant upgrade in 2013 makes it possible to double the volume of Li-7 output there.

TVEL has done extensive work done on utilization of reprocessed uranium (RepU) in VVER-type reactors, and there are plans for all units of the Kola nuclear station to shift to RepU fuel. Some PWR reactors, e.g. Kalinin 2 and Balakovo 3, are using recycled uranium in TVSA fuel assemblies already.

There is no plan or provision to use MOX in light-water reactors.

TVEL owns 35% equity in the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Kazakhstan. This has major new investment under way. It has secured both ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 accreditation. Since 1973 Ulba has produced nuclear fuel pellets from Russian-enriched uranium which are used in Russian and Ukrainian VVER and RBMK reactors. Some of this product incorporates gadolinium and erbium burnable poisons. Ulba briefly produced fuel for submarines (from 1968) and satellite reactors. Since 1985 it has been able to handle reprocessed uranium, and it has been making fuel pellets incorporating this for western reactors, supplied through TVEL.

TVEL's Moscow Composite Metal Plant designs and makes control and protection systems for nuclear power reactors.

REMIX fuel cycle

REMIX (Regenerated Mixture) fuel has been developed by the  V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute  for Tenex as a development of MOX to supply light water reactors. Remix fuel is produced directly from a non-separated mix of recycled uranium and plutonium from reprocessing used fuel, with a low-enriched uraniium (up to 17% U-235) make-up comprising about 20% of the mix. This gives fuel with about 1% Pu-239 and 4% U-235 which can sustain burn-up of 50 GWd/t over four years and has similar characteristics to normal LWR fuel. It is distinct from MOX in having low and incidental levels of plutonium – none is added. The spent Remix fuel after four years is about 2% Pu-239* and 1% U-235, and following about five years of cooling and then reprocessing the non-separated uranium and plutonium is recycled again after LEU addition. The waste (fission products and minor actinides) is vitrified, as today from reprocessing, and stored for geological disposal. Before vitrification it may be processed to recover valuable fission products such as isotopes Cs, Sr and Tc.

* a 68% increase, compared with 104% in MOX fuel cycle, according to Tenex.

Remix fuel can be repeatedly recycled with 100% core load in current VVER-1000 reactors and correspondingly reprocessed many times – up to five times, so that with fewer than three fuel loads in circulation a reactor could run for 60 years using the same fuel, with LEU recharge. As with normal MOX, the use of Remix fuel reduces consumption of natural uranium in VVERs by about 20% at each recycle as compared with open fuel cycle. Remix can serve as a replacement for existing reactor fuel, but in contrast to MOX there is a higher cost for fuel fabrication due to the high activity levels from U-232. Compared with UO 2  fuel, the cost increment is 25-30%. The Remix cycle can be modified from the above figures according to need. The increasing concentrations of even isotopes of both elements is compensated by the fresh uranium top-up, possibly at increasing enrichment levels.

A 2019 study showed that the use of regenerated uranium in Remix fuel for VVER reactors, and therefore the U-236 isotope, also significantly increases the proportion of Pu-238 in the fuel, which prevents its diversion for non-peaceful purposes.

Remix allows all the recovered uranium and plutonium to be recycled and will give a saving in used fuel storage and disposal costs compared with the once-through fuel cycle, matched by the reprocessing cost, though this is expected to reduce. Compared with the MOX cycle, it has the virtue of not giving rise to any accumulation of reprocessed uranium (RepU) or allow any separated plutonium.

Rosatom loaded three TVS-2M fuel assemblies each with six REMIX fuel rods into Balakovo 3 in June 2016. They remained for two fuel cycles, and a third 18-month cycle began in early 2020. These all showed good results, and Rosatom is now proceeding to pilot operation of several full-REMIX fuel assemblies. No changes in reactor design or safety measures are required. Remix fuel is also being tested in the MIR research reactor at RIAR in Dimitrovgrad.

Tenex suggests Remix being used with a form of fuel leasing from a supplier to a utility, with repeated recycle between them. Commercial application is planned for the mid-2020s. 

In August 2020 Rosatom announced that Remix fuel for VVER-1000 reactors would be produced on a new production line at the Siberian Chemical Plant (SCC) at Seversk from 2023. In June 2021 TVEL commissioned equipment for the pilot fuel production line, enabling initial production of fuel assemblies by year end, using fuel pellets made at the MCC Zheleznogorsk plant. Eventually a commercial-scale Remix fuel fabrication plant is envisaged.

MOX fuel fabrication (only for fast reactors)

In late 2007 it was decided that MOX fuel production using recycled materials should be based on electrometallurgical (pyrochemical) reprocessing and vibropack dry processes for fuel fabrication, as developed at RIAR. The goals for closing the fuel cycle included minimising cost, recycle of minor actinides (for burning), excluding separated plutonium, and arrangement of all procedures in remote systems to allow for 'hot' materials. However, plans for vibropack fuels are not being pursued with any vigour.

MCC Zheleznogorsk MOX plant: A 60 t/yr commercial mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility (MFFF) commenced operation at Zheleznogorsk (formerly Krasnoyarsk-26, 70 km northeast of Krasnoyarsk) in 2015, operated by the Mining & Chemical Combine (MCC or GKhK). This was built at a cost of some RUR 9.6 billion as part of Rosatom’s Proryv, or 'Breakthrough', project, to develop fast reactors with a closed fuel cycle whose MOX fuel will be reprocessed and recycled. It represents the first industrial-scale use of plutonium in the Russian civil fuel cycle, and is also the Russian counterpart to the US MFFF for disposition of 34 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium.* About half the plant’s equipment was imported.

* The head of Rosatom reported to the president in September 2015: “Industrial operation has begun at a new MOX fuel (uranium-plutonium fuel) production plant, the first such plant in history. Our American partners have still not managed to finish the plant they were building. They have already spent $7.7 billion on it and, as Congress informs, they are now going to suspend the project because no one knows how much more money it will cost. We built our plant in 2.5 years at a cost of a little over $200 million, or 9.6 billion rubles. The plant is working and is now reaching industrial capacity.”

MCC’s MFFF will make 400 pelletised MOX fuel assemblies per year for the BN-800 and future BN-1200 fast reactors. The MOX can have up to 30% plutonium. The capacity is designed to be able to supply five BN-800 units or equivalent BN-1200 capacity. First production of 20 fuel assemblies for Beloyarsk 4 was in 2015, working up to full capacity in 2017. The BN-800 each year requires 1.84 tonnes of reactor-grade plutonium recovered from 190 tonnes of used VVER fuel. The first serial batch of MOX for BN-800 passed acceptance tests in December 2018. (Plutonium from used BN fuel will be used in VVER-1000 reactors.) The MFFF is built in rock tunnels at a depth of about 200 metres.

Longer-term MCC Zheleznogorsk was intending to produce MOX granules for vibropacked fuel using civil plutonium oxide, ex-weapons plutonium metal and depleted uranium. Initial capacity of 14 t/yr of granules was funded to RUR 5.1 billion (US$ 169 million then) over 2010-12. The granulated MOX is sent to RIAR Dimitrovgrad for vibropacking into FNR fuel assemblies.

In June 2011 Rosatom announced that it was investing RUR 35 billion in MCC to 2030, including particularly MOX fuel fabrication. In February 2012 the figure was put at RUR 80 billion minimum.

Mayak MOX plant: A small pelletised MOX fuel fabrication plant has operated at the Mayak plant at Ozersk since 1993, for BN-350 and BN-600 fuel (40 fuel assemblies per year), and it supplied some initial pelletised MOX fuel for BN-800 start-up, the assemblies being made by RIAR Dimitrovgrad.

Seversk MOX plant: Another MOX plant for disposing of military plutonium is planned at Seversk (Tomsk-7) in Siberia, to the same design as its US equivalent. This is for dense MOX fuel for fast reactors, and was planned for completion by the end of 2017, with RUR 5.8 billion allocated by TVEL for the equipment. (Seversk had the other two dual-purpose but basically military plutonium production reactors, totalling 2500 MWt. One of these – ADE4 – was shut down in April 2008, the other – ADE5 – in June 2008.)

RIAR Dimitrovgrad MOX plant: The Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (RIAR or NIIAR) at Dimitrovgrad, Ulyanovsk, has a small MOX fuel fabrication plant. This produces vibropacked fuel which was said to be more readily recycled. Under the federal target programme this was allocated RUR 2.95 billion (US$ 83 million) for expansion from 2012. Its main research has been on the use of military plutonium in MOX, in collaboration with France, USA and Japan. From 2014 the plant produced 106 fuel assemblies for Beloyarsk 4 BN-800, before MCC's MFFF took over this role.

Vibropacked MOX fuel (VMOX) was earlier seen as the way forward. This is made by agitating a mechanical mixture of (U,Pu)O 2 granulate and uranium powder, which binds up excess oxygen and some other gases (that is, operates as a getter) and is added to the fuel mixture in proportion during agitation. The getter resolves problems arising from fuel-cladding chemical interactions. The granules are crushed (U,Pu)O 2 cathode deposits from pyroprocessing. VMOX needs to be made in hot cells. It has been used in BOR-60 since 1981 (with 20-28% Pu), and tested in BN-350 and BN-600 as part of a hybrid core (with some military plutonium). This was evaluated by OKBM and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute. However, its future is uncertain, and MOX fuel may revert to being conventional sintered pellets.

Dual-component power system MOX

Rosatom has proposed a fuel cycle involving both thermal and fast reactors, using two kinds of MOX fuel, and envisages implementing this system when the first BN-1200 reactors are online about 2027. In 2020 the first MOX using plutonium from conventional power reactors was loaded into Beloyarsk's BN-800 reactor and later in the year another 180 such fuel assemblies will be added. By the end of 2021, the reactor will fully switch to MOX fuel.

In this fuel cycle, normal thermal reactors are the primary plutonium source, but this plutonium is reactor-grade, with about one-third even-mass number non-fissile isotopes. The plutonium is mixed with deflourinated tails from uranium enrichment ( i.e. depleted uranium). Whether derived from used uranium fuel or MOX fuel, it is separated and made into MOX fuel for fast breeder reactors with not less than 1.2 breeding ratio, and the used fuel from these has a much lower proportion of even-number non-fissile plutonium isotopes.

In future this ‘clean’ or high-fissile plutonium recovered from fast reactor fuel can then made into MOX fuel for the original thermal reactors, and comprise about 30% of their fuel. The other 70% could be enriched reprocessed uranium (RepU), the depleted tails of which are also used for MOX, instead of using normal depleted uranium. Their used fuel is reprocessed to continue the dual cycle. Minor actinides are burned in the fast reactors.

One fast reactor running on 'dirty' MOX would therefore be in balance with two VVER reactors fuelled with 'clean' MOX (30% of load) and RepU oxide enriched to about 17% U-235 (70% of load) via segregated reprocessing facilities and segregated fuel fabrication.

Further details are in the information paper on Mixed Oxide Fuel .

Nitride fuel fabrication for fast reactors

Overall, RUR 17 billion is budgeted for nitride fuel development, which is mainly for the BREST-300 reactor, part of Rosatom’s Proryv or 'Breakthrough' project . Both SCC plants will be part of the Pilot Demonstration Power/Energy Complex (PDPC or PDEC) with the BREST reactor, integral to the Proryv project and approved by government decree in August 2016. The Proryv project at SCC is expected to be fully operational from 2023.

To avoid problems in reactor operation and spent fuel, nitrogen-15 is the preferred isotope. VNIINM has patented a technique for enrichment in N-15, annual demand for which is expected to be several tonnes.

SCC nitride fuel plant KEU-1: In collaboration with TVEL, the Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC) at Seversk is making test batches of dense mixed nitride uranium-plutonium (MNUP) fuel for fast reactors, essentially prototype fuel for BREST. Construction of SCC’s pilot nitride fuel plant started in March 2014 with a view to commissioning in 2017-18, in time to produce fuel for the first BREST-300 reactor, which is now expected in operation about 2024. In April 2016 Atomenergomash supplied to SCC a plant for preparation of input materials for automated fabrication of MNUP fuel for fast neutron reactors. 

SCC completed acceptance tests on the first ETVS nitride fuel assembly in September 2014, and it had further ones (ETVS-10 & 11) ready a year later, using parts supplied by VNIINM. In April 2015 the first ETVS nitride fuel assemblies were put into the BN-600 reactor at Beloyarsk for testing over three years, and by August 2015 there were nine ETVS there. In November 2015 the post-irradiation inspection of ETVS-1 after six-month storage to cool showed it to be in good shape. In April 2016 two more dense nitride fuel assemblies (ETVS-12 & 13) were delivered to Beloyarsk for irradiation in the BN-600 reactor. They were designed by VNIINM and made by SCC as prototypes for BREST-300 and BN-1200 reactors. In mid-2016 VNIINM produced two more pilot fuel assemblies, ETVS-14 & 15, with mixed nitride fuel for testing in the BN-600 reactor at Beloyarsk.  MSZ completed acceptance tests on these in August. In December 2016 SCC announced successful post-irradiation tests on ETVS fuel assemblies, confirming their suitability for BREST. ETVS-16 to 21 were scheduled for 2017. The next series of ETVS will be of a different design. By November 2020, more than 1000 MNUP fuel rods had been produced and more than 21 fuel assemblies had been irradiated in BN-600, the latest ones each with 61 fuel rods.

SCC nitride fuel plant KEU-2: SCC started construction of a second integrated experimental facility (KEU-2) in 2016, to fabricate fuel for testing in the BN-800 reactor at Beloyarsk. A U-Pu-Np nitride fuel fabrication and recycling facility is part of the Pilot Demonstration Power Complex (PDPC; Russian acronym: ODEK) at SCC. Rosatom began installing equipment here for MNUP fuel fabrication and refabrication for the BREST-300 in 2017. The main fabrication line was expected in operation in 2020, with daily production capacity of up to 60 kg of fuel, or 120 nuclear fuel assemblies, and a total of 14.7 tonnes of fuel per year.

In October 2014 SCC announced a tender for a reprocessing plant to be completed by 2018, with VNIPIET as SCC’s preferred bidder. It included a module for processing used nuclear fuel, to examine technologies VNIINM and the VG Khlopin Radium Institute have developed. VNIINM said its experiments in 2016 had confirmed for the first time that the technology used for the reprocessing of used mixed nitride fuel enables the re-use of more than 99.9% of the actinides. The actual RUR 20 billion plant is to have a capacity of 5 t/yr used fuel from the BREST-300 and 0.5 t/yr of “rejects from electrolysis process and americium-containing burning elements.” It will  commence operation about 2024, after the BREST-300 is in service. This will be part of the Pilot Demonstration Power/Energy Complex (PDPC or PDEC) with the BREST reactor.

SCC started testing three different refining technologies for the plant in 2016. The best option will be selected and used in the used fuel recycling module within PDPC. The project manager said that the refining installation “can be used as a sector-wide test-bench to deal with uranium, plutonium, and neptunium.”

Mayak nitride fuel plant: A new 14 tonne per year plant to fabricate dense mixed nitride fuel for fast neutron reactors is planned at PA Mayak, to operate from 2018. In the federal target programme to 2020, RUR 9.35 billion ($310 million) was budgeted for it. Later it may be expanded to 40 tonnes per year.

International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC)

The IUEC concept was inaugurated at the end of 2006 in collaboration with Kazakhstan, and in March 2007 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed to set up a working group and continue developing the proposal. In September 2007 the joint stock company Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Centre (JSC Angarsk IUEC) was registered and a year later Rostechnadzor licensed the centre.

Late in 2008 Ukraine's Nuclear Fuel Holding Company, SC Nuclear Fuel, decided to take a 10% stake in it, matching Kazatomprom's 10%, and this was effected in October 2010. Armenia finalised its 10% share in IUEC in May 2012 (2600 shares for RUR 2.6 million). Negotiations since then have proceeded with South Africa, Vietnam, Bulgaria, UAE, Jordan, South Korea and Mongolia (in connection with Russian uranium interests there). Russia also invited India to participate in order to secure fuel for its Kudankulam plant. The aim is for Techsnabexport/TVEL eventually to hold only 51%. Each of the 26,000 IUEC shares is priced at RUR 1000.

Present equity in JSC Angarsk IUEC: TVEL 70%, Kazatomprom 10%, Ukraine State Concern Nuclear Fuel 10%, Armenia NPP 10%.

The centre is to provide assured supplies of low-enriched uranium for power reactors to new nuclear power states and those with small nuclear programmes, giving them equity in the project, but without allowing them access to the enrichment technology. Russia will maintain majority ownership. IUEC will sell both enrichment services (SWU) and enriched uranium product. Arrangements for IAEA involvement were being sorted out in 2009, and in 2010 a feasibility study commenced on IUEC investment, initially for equity in JSC Angarsk Electrolysis & Chemical Combine (AECC) so that part of its capacity supplies product to IUEC shareholders.

The existing enrichment plant at Angarsk was to feed the IUEC and accordingly was removed from the category of "national strategic installations", though it had never been part of the military programme. In February 2007 the IUEC was entered into the list of Russian nuclear facilities eligible for implementation of IAEA safeguards. The USA has expressed support for the IUEC at Angarsk. Since 2010 the facility has been under IAEA safeguards.

Development of the IUEC was envisaged in three phases:

• Use part of the existing capacity at Angarsk in cooperation with Kazatomprom and under IAEA supervision.
• Expand Angarsk capacity (perhaps double) with funding from new partners by 2017.
• Full internationalisation with involvement of many customer nations under IAEA auspices.

In 2012-13 the IUEC website said: “The JSC IUEC has been established within the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex , but it can use capacities of other three Russian combines to diversify production and optimize logistics.”

In 2016 a major customer was Ukraine’s State Concern Nuclear Fuel, which since 2012 has bought 60,000 SWU per year, proportional to its shareholding.

IUEC guaranteed LEU reserve ('fuel bank')

In November 2009 the IAEA board approved a Russian proposal to create an international guaranteed LEU reserve or 'fuel bank' of low-enriched uranium under IAEA control at the IUEC at Angarsk. This was established a year later and comprises 123 tonnes of low-enriched uranium as UF 6 , enriched 2.0-4.95% U-235 (with 40t of latter), available to any IAEA member state in good standing which is unable to procure fuel for political reasons. It is fully funded by Russia, held under safeguards, and the fuel will be made available to the IAEA at market rates, using a formula based on spot prices. Following an IAEA decision to allocate some of it, Rosatom will transport material to St Petersburg and transfer title to the IAEA, which will then transfer ownership to the recipient. The 120 tonnes of low-enriched uranium as UF 6 is equivalent to two full fuel loads for a typical 1000 MWe reactor, and in 2010 was worth some $250 million.

This initiative complements the   IAEA LEU Bank set up in Kazakhstan by making more material available to the IAEA for assurance of fuel supply to countries without their own fuel cycle facilities. The IAEA LEU Bank is located at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant (UMP) in Kazakhstan, which has 50 years of experience in handling UF 6 . A formal agreement with Kazakhstan to establish the legal framework was signed in August 2015, and the partnership agreement between the IAEA and UMP was signed in May 2016. Construction of the building with 600 m 2 storage area started in September 2016, and the facility was formally opened at the end of August 2017. It became operational in 2019, and it awarded contracts to Orano and Kazatomprom to supply it.

Used fuel and reprocessing

Russian policy is to close the fuel cycle as far as possible and utilise recycled uranium, and also to use plutonium in MOX fuel. However, its achievements in doing this have been limited – in 2011 only about 16% of used fuel was reprocessed, this being from VVER–440s, BN-600, research reactors and naval reactors. The reprocessed uranium (RepU) is mainly used for RBMK fuel. By 2030 Rosatom hopes to fully close the fuel cycle. Commercial reprocessing started in 1977, and several projects at two sites have been under way to progress this intention:

• At Mayak Production Association in Ozersk, the RT-1 spent fuel reprocessing facility was first updated and returned to service in 2016, and will then be shut down in about 2030.
• At Mining and Chemical Combine (MCC) in Zheleznogorsk, the MOX fuel fabrication plant for fast reactors was commissioned in 2015 (see above).
• At MCC the Pilot Demonstration Centre (PDC) for used nuclear fuel reprocessing was commissioned in 2015.
• At MCC the full-scale RT-2 facility would be completed by 2025 to reprocess VVER, RBMK and BN used fuel into mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel or into REMIX – the regenerated mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides.
• At MCC Zheleznogorsk the spent fuel pool storage would be supplemented by dry storage, commissioned in 2012, and MCC will become the destination for all of Russia’s used fuel.

In 2013 used fuel arisings in Russia were:

All used fuel is stored at reactor sites for at least three years to allow decay of heat and radioactivity. High burn-up fuel requires longer before it is ready to transport. At present the used fuel from RBMK reactors and from VVER-1000 reactors is stored (mostly at reactor sites) and not reprocessed. It is expected that used fuel in storage will build up to about 40,000 tonnes by the time substantial reprocessing at MCC Zheleznogorsk gets under way about 2022. The materials from this will be burned largely in fast reactors by 2050, when none should remain.

In late 2007 it was decided that MOX fuel production using recycled materials from both light water and fast reactors should be based on electrometallurgical (pyrochemical) reprocessing. The goals for closing the fuel cycle are minimising cost, minimising waste volume, recycle of minor actinides (for burning), excluding separated plutonium, and arrangement of all procedures in remote-handled systems. This reprocessing route remains to be developed.

In August 2016 a new program for management of used fuel to 2020 was announced. It provides for transport of used fuel to Mayak at Ozersk for reprocessing, or to a central storage facility at MCC Zheleznogorsk where the reprocessing plant is due to be commissioned.

RT-1 reprocessing plant, Mayak

Used fuel from VVER-440 reactors Kola 1-4 and Rovno 1-2 in Ukraine), the BN-600 (Beloyarsk) and from naval reactors is sent to the Mayak Chemical Combine's 400 t/yr RT-1 plant (Chelyabinsk-65) at Ozersk, near Kyshtym 70 km northwest of Chelyabinsk in the Urals for reprocessing.* An upgrade of the RT-1 plant to enable it to take VVER-1000 fuel was completed in 2016, and reprocessing of fuel from Rostov began late in the year. In 2017, 20 tonnes of used VVER-1000 fuel from Balakovo is to be reprocessed.

* The original reprocessing plant at the site was hastily built in the mid-1940s, for military plutonium production in association with five producer reactors (the last shut down in 1990).

The RT-1 plant started up in 1971 and employs the Purex process. Since about 2000 the plant has been extended and modified so that it can accept a wide variety of inputs, including U-Be research reactor fuel.  It had reprocessed about 5000 tonnes of used fuel to 2012 and was reported to be running at about 100 t/yr capacity, following the loss of foreign contracts. In 2015 RT-1 processed 230 tonnes of fuel, 35% more than in 2014, and its capacity is expected to reach 400 t/yr “within several years”, comprising all types from Russian designed reactors, notably VVER-1000 and RBMK. From 2017 it will also be able to reprocess uranium nitride fuel. However, after the commissioning of the RT-2 plant at MCC, it is due to be decommissioned about 2030.

About 93% of its feed to 2015 has been from Russian and Ukrainian VVER-440 reactors, about 3% from naval sources or icebreakers and 3% from the BN-600 reactor. It earlier reprocessed BN-350 used fuel. Damaged used fuel is to be reprocessed there to avoid the need for prolonged storage. In September 2015 Rosatom said that reprocessing the fuel from 201 decommissioned vessels transferred to it from the Ministry of Defence was 97% complete, and that no naval fuel remained in the Far East. Regular shipments of used submarine fuel from Andreeva Bay storage to Mayak for reprocessing commenced in mid-2017, and 22,000 naval fuel assemblies are expected to be shipped by 2024, via Murmansk.

In 2015 Mayak started reprocessing the uranium-beryllium fuel from dismantled Alfa -class submarines, as a ‘nuclear legacy project’. These unsuccessful vessels had a single reactor of 155 MWt cooled by lead-bismuth and using very highly enriched uranium – 90% enriched U-Be fuel. The experience gained with lead-bismuth eutectic is being applied in Russia’s fast reactor programme – notably BREST (since SVBR was dropped).

Recycled uranium is enriched to 2.6% U-235 by mixing RepU product from different sources and is used in all fresh RBMK fuel, while separated plutonium oxide is stored. High-level waste is vitrified and stored. There are plans to use RepU for all the Kola VVER reactors. Vitrified HLW from Ukraine’s VVER-440 used fuel is to be returned to Ukraine from 2018.

Used fuel storage capacity there is being increased from 6000 to 9000 tonnes, but will remain limited compared with Zheleznogorsk. Hence the used fuel received is usually treated fairly promptly. In 2015, 5184 RBMK used fuel assemblies were sent there from the Leningrad and Kursk plants, for storage initially.

Zheleznogorsk MCC: Pilot Demonstration Centre and RT-2 reprocessing plant

A Pilot Demonstration Centre (PDC) for several reprocessing technologies is operated by MCC at Zheleznogorsk, built at a cost of RUR 8.4 billion and completed in 2015 as a "strategic investment project". Its initial capacity with research hot cells is 10 t/yr, increasing to 100 t/yr, with later increase to 250 t/yr from 2018 as phase 2. PDC phase 2 was expected to be in full operation in 2019. It will have innovative technology including embrittlement by crystallization, and simultaneous gas, thermo and mechanical spent fuel assembly shredding. Initially it will deal with VVER-1000 fuel, later with fuel from fast reactors. It will effectively be the first stage of the large redesigned RT-2 plant at the MCC/GHK site to be operational about 2024. The cost of RepU product is expected to be some €500/kg. The PDC “can be used for demonstration of the closed nuclear fuel cycle of thermal neutron reactors running on REMIX-fuel” as well as producing MOX fuel.

The RT-2 reprocessing plant at Zheleznogorsk is now on track for completion with 700 t/yr capacity by 2025 (in addition to the 250 t/yr at PDC). Another 800 t/yr is planned by 2028. Originally it was planned to have two 1500 t/yr lines, but for some time the project was under review. Construction started in 1984 but halted in 1989 when 30-40% complete due to public opposition and lack of funds (though in 1993 it was officially reported as "under construction"). It has now been redesigned and is expected to operate from around 2025 with advanced Purex process, for both VVER-1000 and RBMK fuel, and also BN fuel. Its cost is about $2 billion, with no federal funds. The facility could form part of the new Global Nuclear Infrastructure Initiative and foreign equity in a joint stock company is being considered. (See also International Collaboration section below.)

Zheleznogorsk MCC: RBMK and VVER used fuel storage

VVER-1000 used fuel is sent to the Mining & Chemical Combine (MCC) (Gorno-Khimichesky Kombinat – GHK) at Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26) in Siberia for pool storage. The site is about 60 km north of Krasnoyarsk. This fuel comes from three Russian, three Ukrainian and one Bulgarian plants. A large pool storage facility was built by MCC at Zheleznogorsk in 1985 for VVER-1000 used fuel, though its 6000 tonne capacity would have been filled in 2010. The facility was fully refurbished over 2009-10, and some dry storage capacity was commissioned in 2011. In December 2009 Rostechnadzor approved pool storage expansion to 7200 tonnes and MCC sought approval to expand it to 8400 tonnes capacity to allow another 6 years input. It is now planned to expand wet storage for VVER-1000 fuel to 11,000 tonnes.

In 2012 the first stage of an 8600 tonne dry storage facility for used fuel (INF DSF-2) was commissioned at Zheleznogorsk. It was built by the E4 Group at a cost of about $500 million for the MCC/GHK. It is the largest dry storage facility in the world, holding 8129 tonnes of RBMK fuel, initially from Leningrad and Kursk power plants, followed by Smolensk. At Leningrad the fuel is cut up and put into the large containers before being shipped to MCC. RBMK fuel is not presently economic to reprocess so has been stored at reactor sites, and when transferred to MCC it is stored in hermetically sealed capsules filled with nitrogen and helium, inside a building but air-cooled.

The second stage of MCC dry storage will take VVER-1000 fuel currently in wet storage there and increase capacity to over 37,000 tonnes (26,510 t RBMK, 11,275 t VVER). MCC expects to commission it about the end of 2016. It is expected to be commissioned about the end of 2015. The original wet storage facility is to be decommissioned in 2026. Used fuel will be stored for up to 50 years, pending reprocessing. MCC has flagged the possibility of storing foreign VVER-1000 used fuel, such as that from fuel take-back arrangements linked to foreign reactor sales (initially Iran). This can be reprocessed in Russia, but the waste must be repatriated.

Bilibino's LWGR used fuel is stored at Bilibino site.

(Three decommissioned graphite-moderated reactors which principally produced military plutonium, with associated underground reprocessing plant, are also at MCC Zheleznogorsk. The huge underground complex, 200-250 m deep, was originally established in 1950 for plutonium and weapons production.)

Other reprocessing plants

At SCC Seversk a reprocessing plant for nitride fuel from BREST fast reactors is envisaged to operate from 2024, closing that fuel cycle. See above under SCC nitride fuel plant KEU-2 .

In  2016 it was announced that decommissioning of the HEU downblending and mixing plant at SCC would be completed by 2022. The plant was built in 1996 at the conversion plant in order to implement the Russia-US program for blending down high-enriched uranium from Russian nuclear weapons into low-enriched uranium for export and use in US nuclear power plants. This program concluded in 2013.

Some kind of radioactive waste processing plant is under construction at the Kursk nuclear power station, according to Nikimt-Atomstroy. A completed section, fully operational by the end of 2014, would process liquid radioactive waste. The two remaining sections of the project include a processing facility for solid radioactive waste and a storage facility.

Legacy materials

Russia has a significant amount of legacy materials, some as a result of military materials production ( e.g. slightly irradiated uranium), others from the civil fuel cycle ( e.g. reprocessed uranium), and as a result of reviews over 2006-08 these are now recognised as potentially having significant value. The total quantity is not such as to impact the civil market; there are some technical challenges ( e.g. limiting U-232 to 5 ppb in enriched RepU), and in any case Russia’s preference is to use the material domestically while making resultant expertise available internationally.

The main material not found in the civil nuclear fuel cycle is slightly irradiated uranium (SIU, 0.65% U-235) from military plutonium production with low burn-up of natural uranium, after reprocessing to separate that plutonium. If SIU is enriched, the product can readily be used in nuclear plants and the tails become DSIU, with lower content of even uranium isotopes (232, 234, 236) than normal RepU, hence more valuable.

Historically, Russian used fuel from all but VVER-1000 civil reactors has been reprocessed at Mayak to yield RepU with about 0.9% U-235. This has mostly been enriched to provide fuel for RBMK reactors, with the tails as DRepU.

Also historically, to 2000, foreign used fuel was reprocessed and the RepU blended with LEU to yield reactor fuel which was returned as if the RepU had been enriched.

In the centrifuge enrichment process, different ways of feeding cascades with both U nat and RepU and blending the product can control U-232 levels and also U-236 levels (which if over 0.1% can be compensated by higher enrichment levels). Russian enrichment plants have provision for this flexible cascading. Then blending the enriched uranium product (from SIU, DSIU or RepU) with U nat or SIU can further reduce both of these even isotopes according to customer requirements, and below the pending Russian limit of 5 ppb U-232 (now 2 ppb).

This will enable use of RepU in VVER-1000 reactors from 2021 and increase the value of Russian RepU for domestic needs. It will also mean that production and use of RepU are balanced, especially as RBMK units are decommissioned and the Mayak RT-1 plant capacity is increased to 250 t/yr and the PDC at MCC Zheleznogorsk reaches 250 t/yr.

Russia expects to have spare capacity to process foreign RepU from about 2020.

Radioactive waste

Russia's Duma passed a new Federal Law on Radioactive Waste Management in June 2011, after 19 months consideration and many amendments. It was passed by the state Council in July and then signed into law. It establishes a legal framework for radioactive waste management, provides for a national radwaste management system meeting the requirements of the Joint Convention on the Safe Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and on the Safe Management of Radioactive Waste ratified by Russia in 2006.

In November 2015 the government approved Rosatom’s second federal target programme (FTP NRS-2) for nuclear and radiation safety for 2016 to 2030. "The key issue is the deferred liabilities accumulated during the 70 years of the nuclear industry, particularly during the time of the Soviet Union.” In the first FTP since 2008 Rosatom has completed more than was set out then, against a budget of RUR 123 billion. About 73% of the new FTP budget of RUR 562 billion will be for decommissioning commercial reactors, and the withdrawal of buildings and facilities at Mayak Production Association, Siberian Chemical Combine, Angarsk Electrolysis and Chemical Complex and Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant – facilities once involved in state defence programmes. Nearly 20% of the funding will go on creating the infrastructure required for the processing and final disposal of used nuclear fuel and radioactive waste; 5% on monitoring and ensuring nuclear and radiation safety; and 2% on scientific and technological support. About 70% of the budget is from federal funds, much of the rest from Rosatom. It will be implemented in three 5-year stages, and involves the transition to new used fuel recycling technologies to close the fuel cycle, establishing a final HLW repository, decommissioning of 82 nuclear & radiation hazardous facilities, two nuclear icebreakers and other tasks.

Rosatom and the National Operator for Radioactive Waste Management – FSUE NO RAO – is responsible for coordination and execution of works associated with radwaste management, notably its disposal. This includes military waste. The law establishes time limits for interim radwaste storage and volume limits for waste generators, and defines how they should bring waste in condition suitable for disposal and transfer it to the national operator along with payment of disposal charges. Import and export of radwaste is banned. All newly-generated waste is the responsibility of its generators who will pay for its disposal and storage, with funds accumulated in the SC Rosatom’s bank account as a special fund. However, the 2011 law did not address how to resolve property disputes in siting, nor local authority responsibilities, nor financing mechanisms for affected municipalities. In October 2014 NO RAO submitted to Rosatom proposals for changes in legislation on these matters so that it could proceed with its mandate. In 2015 RUR 6.5 billion will be paid over by various enterprises to Rosatom’s reserved fund for radioactive waste disposal, at rates set in 2013 for the period to 2017.

Rosatom plans to draft two more laws: on decommissioning and used fuel management.

FSUE RosRAO is a Moscow-based Rosatom company providing commercial back-end radwaste and decommissioning services for intermediate- and low-level waste as well as handling non-nuclear radwaste and nuclear decommissioning. It commenced operation in 2009 under a temporary arrangement pending finalisation of regulations under the new legislation, and became part of Rosatom’s Life Cycle Back-End Division (LC BED) in 2013. It incorporates Radon, and now has branches in each of seven federal districts. The Kirovo-Chepetsk branch is responsible for decommissioning that conversion plant with 440,000 tonnes of waste by 2025 at a cost of RUR 2.1 billion.

Naval waste

RosRAO’s Far East Centre for Radioactive Waste Management is DalRAO , near Vladivostok in the Maritime Territory. It has Fokino and Viluchinsk divisions or regions, and operates a long-term open-air storage facility in Razboinik Bay for reactor compartments* from dismantled submarines. The long-term storage facility was under construction from 2006 with Japanese assistance and was commissioned in 2012. It has three nuclear service ships, and the Japanese government donated a floating dock and other equipment to move the reactor compartments. RosRAO plans to have the Regional Center for Conditioning and Long-term Storage of Radioactive Waste (RAW Regional Center) here, mainly for naval waste pending handover to NO RAO. In October 2014 the last spent fuel from dismantled nuclear submarines in the Maritime Territory was dispatched to the Mayak reprocessing plant.

* In 2014 the first three were brought ashore, in 2015 RosRAO planned to move five and then raise the number to ten per year, with a total of 54 three-compartment units to be placed. 

RosRAO's Northwest Centre for Radioactive Waste Management is SevRAO , in the Murmansk region, which is engaged in remediation of the sites which were Navy Northern Fleet bases, and dismantling of retired nuclear-powered naval ships and submarines as well as nuclear service ships at several sites. Andreeva Bay is the main centre of attention today, and international funding is applied to removing its stock of used naval fuel under the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership ( NDEP ), which was established in 2002 and is supported by many countries and the EU through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Its Nuclear Window funds work at Andreeva Bay, dismantling Lepse and the Papa -class submarine at Severodvinsk, with €165 million pledged to mid-2017.

Sayda Bay west of Murmansk was a low-level waste storage site for the navy and has become a regional radioactive waste storage centre as well as a major ship and submarine dismantling centre. After being docked for 24 years at Atomflot’s base near Murmansk, the nuclear service ship Lepse was towed to the Nerpa shipyard in Sayda Bay in 2012 and cut up on a slipway over 2013-16, leaving two problematical sections of the hull. It had served as a floating receptacle for used fuel from Russian icebreakers from 1961 to 1988, and stored damaged fuel from the Lenin . An aft section contained radioactive waste that was sent to the nearby Sayda Bay facility, and a fore section contained 639 used fuel assemblies from icebreakers, many of them badly damaged, were removed over 2019-21 inside a special structure and sent to Mayak. All this is funded internationally under the NDEP.

The old Volodarsky, used as a nuclear service ship from 1966 to 1991 and laden with a lot of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste, anchored near Murmansk until 2013, was also towed to Sayda Bay, unloaded and then dismantled by the end of 2014. This was funded by the Russian government. Other solid radioactive waste was collected at Andreeva Bay for transport to Sayda Bay for long-term storage. A lot of submarine dismantling was undertaken at Sayda Bay, with many three-compartment reactor units now stored there on land. In August 2021 Rosatom reported that 120 out of 123 decommissioned submarines in the Arctic region had been dismantled.

Gremikha is a current naval base between Murmansk and Archangel where SevRAO is undertaking the defuelling and dismantling of 11 highly-radioactive liquid metal-cooled naval reactors from Alfa -class submarines from 2014 to 2023. After the 50-tonne reactors are removed from the hull segments shipped apparently from Sayda Bay, they are put into a hot cell and then defuelled, with the fuel loaded into containers for transport to Mayak for reprocessing. This work takes about a year for each core. Raising the scuttled K-27 submarine with similar reactors and dismantling it is pending there (see below). 

Andreeva Bay, in Litsa Fjord 55 km from the Norway border, was set up in the 1960s as a naval base for nuclear submarine refuelling. In 1982 a major leak from a used fuel pool caused the contents to be transferred to temporary and poorly engineered dry storage. Most of the used fuel from dismantled Northern Fleet submarines was stored at Andreeva Bay – some 22,000 fuel assemblies from 100 naval reactors. In 1992 Norway signed an agreement to address the nuclear legacy issues of the former Northern Fleet and the decommissioning of the nuclear submarines. Andreeva Bay was transferred to civil management in 1993 as Branch #1 of SevRAO. The strategy for removing used fuel from the original dry storage units was developed from 2002, with funding from the UK. The removal procedure included building an enclosure of the dry storage units, some of which are damaged and leaking, then transferring the fuel to new canisters, which are then put into 40-tonne casks for storage or transport. In May 2014 SevRAO signed a RUR100 million contract with Norway’s Finnmark to upgrade the Andreeva Bay dry storage facility, and this was commissioned in 2017. From 2017 to 2020 about 10,000 fuel assemblies were removed from Andreeva Bay to a storage site outside the Murmansk region for disposal.

Submarine fuel is shipped to Andreeva Bay in the 1620 dwt Rossita . This is a dedicated ship to transport up to 720 tonnes of used nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, and was built for Atomflot in Italy in 2011. The Rossita is primarily for naval waste and fuel from decommissioned submarines, and is used on the Northern Sea Route cruising between Gremikha, Andreeva Bay, Sayda Bay, Severodvinsk and other Russian facilities which dismantle nuclear submarines.  Rossita also moves casks of used submarine fuel from Andreeva Bay to the railhead at the Atomflot base at Murmansk, for transport to Mayak.

A new vessel built in Italy under a 2013 contract, the semi-submersible pontoon dock Itarus , designed to transport three-compartment units of dismantled Russian nuclear submarines for SevRAO in Sayda Bay, was delivered in 2016.

As SevRAO has made good progress, there are plans costed at €123 million to recover seven items of radioactive debris from Arctic waters, where most were dumped in Soviet times, by 2032. This includes submarine reactor compartments and two entire submarines with fuel still in their reactors – K-27 which was scuttled in 1982 in shallow water after major failure in one of its lead-bismuth cooled reactors, and K-159 which sank while under tow to decommissioning in 2003. The majority of the debris is in the eastern bays of the Novaya Zemlya, in the Kara Sea. Some is in the Barents Sea. The total radioactivity of nuclear submarines in both seas is estimated at 37 PBq.

Civil waste

RosRAO is envisaged as an international operator, providing back-end fuel cycle services globally.

The National Operator for Radioactive Waste Management ( NO RAO ) is a federal-state unitary enterprise set up in March 2012 as the national manager of Russia's used nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, including its disposal. It is the national operator for handling all nuclear waste materials and the single organisation authorised to carry out final disposal of radioactive waste, and also other related functions. Its functions and tariffs are set by government, notably the Ministry of Natural Resources. Its branches are at Zheleznogorsk in Krasnoyarsk, Seversk in Tomsk, Dimitrovgrad in Ulyanovsk and (from late 2013) Novouralsk in Sverdlovsk.

NO RAO is planning an underground research laboratory in Nizhnekansky granitoid massif near Krasnoyarsk for study into the feasibility of disposal of solid HLW and solid medium-level long-lived waste. It has called for tenders, with stage 1 to be completed by the end of 2019, and the whole project completed in 2024. See section below on High-level waste disposal, geological repositories .

The System of State Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste (SSAC RM&RAW) is intended to perform physical inventory testing of nuclear materials and radioactive waste at their locations, and carry out accounting and control of them at the federal, regional and departmental levels. In February 2015 Rosatom introduced an automated system for accounting and control of radwaste from more than 2000 organisations, which is to be fully implemented by the end of the year.

About 32 million cubic metres of radioactive waste is to be disposed of within the framework of NO RAO’s program at a cost of about RUR 307 billion, according to Rosatom. NO RAO’s investment program runs to 2035 and includes capital investment in infrastructure of RUR 158 billion ($4.77 billion). Owners of the radioactive waste needing disposal are to provide 80% of that money, while the remaining 20% is to come from the federal budget. In 2013, 24,000 tonnes of used fuel was reported to be awaiting reprocessing or disposal. Rosatom’s Social Council plays a major role in achieving public acceptance.

Plant 20 at PA Mayak, Ozersk, is understood to be a military plutonium processing facility employing 1900 people. There was a plan to close it down and transfer operations to the Siberian Chemical Combine at Seversk as part of restructuring the nuclear weapons complex, but this was cancelled in March 2010. In 2011 Rostechnadzor said that urgent attention was needed “to the 20 open liquid radioactive waste pools, including decommissioning those at FGUP PA Mayak as containing the highest concentration and amount of liquid radioactive waste.”

Used fuel from Russian-built foreign power and research reactors is repatriated, much of it through the port of Murmansk. Some 70 containers were unloaded and moved south by rail over 2008-2014.

High-level waste disposal, geological repositories

No repository is yet available for high-level waste. Earlier, site selection was proceeding in granite on the Kola Peninsula, and 30 potential disposal sites have been identified in 18 regions, including Siberia, the Urals, the Volga region and the Northwest federal district in order of priority. In 2003 Krasnokamensk in the Chita region 7000 km east of Moscow was suggested as the site for a major spent fuel repository.

Then in 2008 the Nizhnekansky Rock Massif at Zheleznogorsk in Krasnoyarsk Territory was put forward as a site for a national deep geological repository. Rosatom said the terms of reference for the facility construction would be tabled by 2015 to start design activities and set up an underground rock laboratory. Public hearings on the Nizhnekansky Granite Massif were held in July 2012 and in November 2013 it was identified in the Regional Energy Planning Scheme as the planned repository site. In August 2016 the Territorial Planning Scheme to 2030 confirmed the site and approved construction of repository facilities here for 4500 m 3 net of class 1 waste and 155,000 m 3 net of class 2 waste.

The National Operator for Radioactive Waste Management (NO RAO) envisages the establishment of an underground laboratory in the Yeniseysky area near Krasnoyarsk for this waste and then no less than nine years' research. It completed the design documentation for the underground laboratory in March 2015 and expects to begin construction in 2017. A decision on repository construction is due by 2025, and the facility itself is to be completed by 2035. Phase 1 of the facility is to be designed to hold 20,000 tonnes of intermediate- and high-level waste, which will be retrievable.

Low- and intermediate-level waste

These are mostly handled similarly to those in other countries. Radon has been the organisation responsible for medical and industrial radioactive waste. It has had 16 storage sites for waste up to intermediate level. Not far outside Moscow, the major Radon facility has both laboratories and disposal sites. Other near-surface storage facilities were in 2008 planned for Sosnovy Bor, Glazov, Gatchina, Novovoronezh, Kirovo-chepetsky, Murmansk, Sarov, Saratov, Bilibino, Kransokamensk, Zelenogorsk, Seversk, Dimitrovgrad, Angarsk, and Udomlya.

NO RAO is planning to establish repositories for at least 300,000 m 3 of low- and intermediate-level waste (LILW, class 3&4 radioactive waste), and these plans are to be in place by 2018. One facility would be built in each of Russia’s seven federal districts to dispose of these three waste streams. In August 2016 the Territorial Planning Scheme to 2030 approved construction of the following near-surface repository facilities:

• 100,000 m 3 LILW at Ozersk in Chelyabinsk region for Mayak.
• 200,000 m 3 LILW at Tomsk/ Seversk for SCC.
• 48,000 m 3 LILW from Urals Electrochemical Combine at Novouralsk.
• 50,000 m 3 LILW at Sosnovy Bor in the Leningrad oblast.

In December 2015 NO RAO received a licence to operate the first stage of a repository at Novouralsk. The licence permits the near-surface disposal of solid radioactive waste by its Seversk branch on behalf of the Urals Electrochemical Combine, and the first stage of 15,000 m 3 was opened in December 2016. Construction of the second stage is to start in 2017, taking capacity to 54,000 m 3 . The facility with a total final capacity of 150,000 m 3 is planned to operate until 2035. “The investments in design, operation and care & maintenance of the facility, as well as subsequent monitoring of the environment will be RUR 6 billion (US$820 million), as per preliminary estimates,” according to NO RAO.

NO RAO has received local government approval in the Chelyabinsk and Tomsk regions respectively for the final disposal of low- and intermediate-level waste (LILW) at the sites of Mayak Production Association in Ozersk, and Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC), based in Tomsk. In 2017 NO RAO said it planned a 214,000 m 3 repository near Ozersk, and 150,000 m 3 at Seversk near Tomsk, both to be built by 2021.

However, Russia has also for many years used deep-well injection for low- and intermediate-level waste from some facilities, notably Seversk, Zheleznogorsk and Dimitrovgrad. This is mainly waste from reprocessing. A Central Europe review report in 1999 said that the wells ranged from 300 up to 1500 metres deep, and that Seversk was the main site utilising the method, with 30 million cubic metres injected. This practice has delayed Russian acceptance of an IAEA standard for radioactive waste disposal, since it has no packaging or engineered barriers and relies on the geology alone for safe isolation. The new 2011 Radioactive Waste Management law said: “Underground disposal of liquid radioactive waste may be executed, in accordance with the requirements of federal regulations and rules, inside geological formations (‘collector horizons’) as limited by the bounds of the area allotted, within which liquid radioactive waste must remain localised.”

In July 2013 Rostechnadzor issued five-year licences to the three regional branches of NO RAO, for “activities associated with final disposal of liquid radioactive waste.” In the November 2013 Regional Energy Planning Scheme two active sites for deep geological disposal of liquid radioactive waste (LRW) are identified: Dimitrovgrad, Ulyanovsk oblast, on the NIIAR site 1300 km SE of Moscow, and a northern one: Zheleznogorsk, Krasnoyarsk territory in Siberia, on the MCC site. A preliminary finding of the 2013 IRRS mission from IAEA was that “License conditions related to the safety assessment and safety case of liquid radioactive waste disposal facilities should be revised.” In August 2016 the Territorial Planning Scheme to 2030 approved deep well repository for 50 million m 3 of liquid radioactive waste.

Energospetsmontazh announced in March 2015 that the trial operation of plasma-based processing of radioactive waste had started at Novovoronezh. The system is designed for plasma pyrolysis processing of solid radioactive waste of medium and low activity containing both combustible and non-combustible components.

Kyshtym accident and related pollution

There was a major chemical accident at Mayak Chemical Combine (then known as Chelyabinsk-40) near Kyshtym in Russia in 1957. This plant had been built in haste in the late 1940s for military purposes. The failure of the cooling system for a tank storing many tonnes of dissolved nuclear waste resulted in an explosion due to ammonium nitrate having a force estimated at about 75 tonnes of TNT (310 GJ). Most of the 740-800 PBq of radioactive contamination settled out nearby and contributed to the pollution of the Techa River, but a plume containing 80 PBq of radionuclides spread hundreds of kilometres northeast. The affected area was already very polluted – the Techa River had previously received about 100 PBq of deliberately dumped waste, and Lake Karachay had received some 4000 PBq. This ‘Kyshtym accident’ killed perhaps 200 people and the radioactive plume affected thousands more as it deposited particularly Cs-127 and Sr-90. It is rated as a level 6 ‘serious accident’ on the International Nuclear Event Scale, only surpassed by Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents.

Up to 1951 the Mayak plant had dumped its waste into the Techa River, whose waters ultimately flow into the Ob River and Arctic Ocean. Then they were disposed of into Lake Karachay until at least 1953, when a storage facility for high-level waste was built – the source of the 1957 accident. Finally, a 1967 duststorm picked up a lot of radioactive material from the dry bed of Lake Karachay and deposited it on to the surrounding province. It appears that some radioactive discharges into the Techa River continued, and that in particular between 2001 and 2004, some 30-40 million cubic metres of radioactive effluent was discharged near the reprocessing facility, which “caused radioactive contamination of the environment with the isotope strontium-90.” There is no radiological quantification.

The outcome of these three events made some 26,000 square kilometres the most radioactively-polluted area on Earth by some estimates, comparable with Chernobyl.

Decommissioning

Rostechnadzor oversees a major programme of decommissioning old fuel cycle facilities, financed under the Federal target program on Nuclear and Radiation Safety. The government said it planned to spend some $5 billion to 2015 on decommissioning and waste management. Since 1995 nuclear power plants have contributed to a decommissioning fund.

Several civil reactors are being decommissioned: an experimental 50 MWt LWGR type at Obninsk which started up in 1954 (5 MWe) and was the forerunner of RBMKs, two early and small prototype LWGR (AMB-100 & 200) units – Beloyarsk 1&2 – the Melekess VK-50 prototype BWR, and three larger prototype VVER-440 units at Novovoronezh, a V-210 and V-365 and a V-179. Five were shut down 1981-90 and await dismantling. The fuel has been removed from these and that from Novovoronezh has been shipped to centralised storage in Zheleznogorsk and will be stored there for about ten years before reprocessing. The Beloyarsk fuel is still onsite since reprocessing technology for it is not yet available. The plant is being dismantled, and the site is due to be clear by 2032.

Shutdown Civil Power Reactors

At Novovoronezh 1&2 a decommissioning project with partial dismantling of equipment was largely completed in 2020. The work will take several years, and buildings are likely to be re-used. In particular that portion of the site houses the district heating pumps and equipment, which provides 75% of the heat for the city, and a spare parts store for Rosenergoatom. Novovoronezh 3 was shut down in December 2016 and it will be cannibalised to keep unit 4 (also V-179) operating for up to 60 years.

In 2010 Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC) in collaboration with Rosatom set up the JSC Pilot Demonstration Center for Decommissioning of Uranium-Graphite Reactors (PDC UGR) at SCC site to implement a decommissioning concept for 13 shut-down uranium-graphite production reactors (PUGR) for military plutonium. These are at Mayak Chemical Combine at Ozersk (5), near Kyshtym, at Siberian Chemical Combine, Seversk (5), and at Mining & Chemical Combine, Zheleznogorsk (3). The last plutonium production reactor, ADE-2 at Zheleznogorsk, finally closed for decommissioning in April 2010.* The fuel has been removed from the shut-down reactors and nearly all of it has been reprocessed at Mayak and Seversk. The concept provides for building multiple safety barriers and sealing of shut-down reactors rather than their dismantling, at a cost estimated to be RUR 2 billion (US$ 67 million) each. Entombment is the option selected for EI-2, ADE-4 and ADE-5 reactors. All 13 are expected o be decommissioned by 2030. EI-2, also described as Russia’s first industrial nuclear power station since it produced power as well as military plutonium, operated to the end of 1990 and was decommissioned in 2015. In 2009 SCC won a tender to prepare for decommissioning of the four Bilibino reactors (due to close 2019-21) and two closed ones at Beloyarsk (all LWGRs).

*Russia's plutonium was produced by 13 reactors at three sites: PO Mayak in Ozersk, also known as Chelyabinsk-65 (A, AV-1-3, AI-IR); SKhK – the Siberian Chemical Combine in Seversk, also known as Tomsk-7 (ADE-3,4&5, EI-1, EI-2); and GKhK – the Mining and Chemical Combine in Zheleznogorsk, also known as Krasnoyarsk-26 (AD, ADE-1&2). The five Mayak reactors produced an estimated 31t of weapons-grade plutonium between 1948 and 1990, the five SKhK reactors produced 68t between 1955 and 2008, and the three GKhK reactors produced 46t between 1958 and 2010. Ten of these reactors were shut down between 1987 and 1992, leaving only ADE-2, 4 and 5 until 2008 & 2010. Of four heavy water reactors at Mayak (OK-180, OK-190, OK-190M and LF-2) the first was intended for plutonium production but in fact all were used for producing isotopes and tritium. LF-2 remains in operation.

In January 2014 Rosatom announced that the PDC UGR, having established its credibility and expertise, would cease to be part of SCC and become part of its new End-of-Life (EOL) Management Division, under the Federal Centre for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (FC NRS).

Three nuclear-powered icebreakers have been decommissioned: Lenin , Sibir and Arktika, also the support vessel: Lepse which held some used nuclear fuel from the Arctic fleet. Lepse was taken out of the water in October 2014 for further dismantling at the Nerpa Shipyard in Murmansk. Lenin is being turned into a museum. SevRAO, the northern branch of RosRAO, dismantles nuclear-powered naval vessels at its Sayda Bay site in Murmansk, and Atomflot is considering using it for retired icebreakers.

In 2014 the Angarsk Electrolysis & Chemical Complex (AECC) said that decommissioning of its conversion plant and diffusion enrichment plants would require RUR 20 billion ($500 million). Decommissioning the conversion capacity at Kirovo-Chepetsky Chemical Combine which was shut down in the 1990s is expected to cost RUR 2.1 billion.

Organisation

The State Corporation (SC) Rosatom is a vertically-integrated holding company which took over Russia's nuclear industry in 2007, from the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (FAEA, also known as Rosatom). This had been formed from the Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom) in 2004, which had succeeded a Soviet ministry in 1992. The civil parts of the industry, with a history of over 60 years, are consolidated under JSC AtomEnergoProm (AEP).

During 2008 there was a major reorganisation or "privatisation" of nuclear industry entities involving change from Federal State Unitary Enterprises (FSUE) to Joint Stock Companies (JSC), with most or all of the shares held by AtomEnergoProm. By mid August 2008, 38 of 55 civil nuclear FSUEs had been reformed. Some renaming occurred due to new restrictions on the use of "Russia" or derivatives (eg "Ros") in JSC names. In mid 2014 eight of the remaining FSUEs were designated ‘federal nuclear organisation’, including Mayak PA and MCC.

The State Nuclear Energy Corporation Rosatom (as distinct from the earlier Rosatom agency) is a non-profit company set up in 2007 to hold all nuclear assets, including more than 350 companies and organisations, on behalf of the state. In particular, it holds all the shares in the civil holding company AtomEnergoProm (AEP). It took over the functions of the Rosatom agency and works with the Ministries of Industry and Energy (MIE) and of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT) but does not report to any particular ministry. Early in 2012 the government announced that its civil divisions might be privatized, at least to a 49% share in individual entities. The total workforce is over 250,000.

SC Rosatom divisions are:

• Nuclear weapons complex.
• Nuclear & radiation safety and waste.
• Nuclear power – Atomenergoprom, Rosenergoatom.
• Applied and fundamental science, composite materials.
• Atomflot – Arctic fleet of seven nuclear icebreakers and one nuclear merchant ship.

AtomEnergoProm (Atomic Energy Power Corporation, AEP) is the single vertically-integrated state holding company for Russia's nuclear power sector, separate from the military complex. It was set up at the end of 2007 to consolidate the civil activities of Rosatom including uranium production, engineering, design, reactor construction, power generation, isotope production and research institutes in its several branches, but not used fuel reprocessing or disposal facilities. It incorporates more than 80 enterprises operating in all areas of the nuclear fuel cycle. The April 2007 Presidential decree establishing it specifies nuclear materials, which may be owned exclusively by the state, lists Russian legal entities allowed to possess nuclear materials and facilities, existing joint stock companies to be incorporated into Atomenergoprom, and lists federal state unitary enterprises to be corporatized first and incorporated into Atomenergoprom at a later stage. Exclusive state ownership of nuclear materials had been seen as a barrier to competitiveness and other Russian corporate entities will now be allowed to hold civil-grade nuclear materials, under state control.

Entities from Atomenergoprom itself down to various third-level subsidiaries will be joint stock companies eventually. Public investment in the bottom level operations is envisaged – the joint venture between Alstom and Atomenergomash to provide large turbines and generators is cited as an example.

JSC AtomEnergoProm's many entities include the following (most are JSCs):

- ARMZ Uranium Holding Co (JSC AtomRedMetZoloto) – uranium production – owns Russian mine assets. - Uranium One Group (U1 Group) – responsible for all foreign uranium mining, 78.4% owned. - Techsnabexport (TENEX) – foreign trade in uranium products and services, with North American subsidiary TENAM. - JSC Enrichment & Conversion Complex. - TVEL – conversion, enrichment and nuclear fuel fabrication. The BREST-300 reactor is being built by TVEL at SCC Seversk, apparently due to the integration of fuel cycle facilities in the project. - ASE Group is Rosatom’s engineering division, accounting for 30% of the global nuclear power plant construction market according to Rosatom. Most foreign projects are ASE's reponsibility. It now incorporates the following entities: - Atomproekt, the new name for VNIPIET (All-Russia Science Research and Design Institute of Power Engineering Technology) which since 2013 incorporates St Petersburg Atomenergoproekt (SPbAEP) – design of nuclear power projects, radiochemical plants and waste facilities. From 2015 this is part of the ASE Group. - Nizhny-Novgorod Atomenergoproekt (NN AEP or NIAEP) – power plant design, from 2012: holding company for ASE. Sometimes then known as NIAEP-ASE, but re-named Atomstroyexport in December 2016. From October 2014 this is the parent company of Moscow JSC Atomenergoproekt (AEP), so the whole entity became the ASE Group (united company NIAEP-ASE-AEP). Then in 2015 Atomproekt was added to it. - Atomstroyexport (ASE) – construction of nuclear plants abroad, merged with NIAEP in 2012. Sometimes known as NIAEP-ASE until re-named Atomstroyexport in December 2016. From the end of 2014, ASE owns all the shares in JSC Atomenergoproekt and 49% of those in NIAEP, taking them over from Atomenergoprom. - Moscow Atomenergoproekt (AEP) – power plant design, became part of NIAEP-ASE. - Energospetsmontazh – construction and assembly, also repair of nuclear plants. - Atomenergomash (AEM) – a group of companies building reactors. - OKBM Afrikantov (formerly just OKBM – Experimental Design Bureau of Machine-building – Mashinostroyeniya) at Nizhny Novgorod- reactor design and construction. - OKB Gidropress (Experimental Design Bureau pressurised water – Hydropress) at Podolsk near Moscow – PWR reactor design. - JSC Rosenergoatom (briefly Energoatom) – responsible for construction and operation of nuclear power generation. - Rusatom Overseas was established in 2011 to promote Russian nuclear technologies in world markets. After restructuring in May 2015, it is divided into two companies served by Rusatom International Network which runs Rosatom's regional offices around the world, supporting the activities of Rosatom's divisions in foreign markets, seeking new business opportunities and promoting Rosatom's products and services abroad. The two companies are:  • JSC Rusatom Energy International , 44% owned by Rosatom and 56% by Atomenergoprom. It manages foreign construction projects and operation of those nuclear power plants as a shareholder in project companies. It is a major shareholder in JSC Akkuyu Nuclear in Turkey and a 34% shareholder in Fennovoima Oy in Finland. The functions of the company include financing, construction on budget and on time, safe and efficient operation of nuclear power plants, and sale of electricity on foreign markets. • JSC Rusatom Overseas Inc , based in Moscow and responsible for promotion of the integrated offer of nuclear power plant construction projects in international markets. Its key tasks are growth of the overseas orders portfolio of Rosatom companies and retaining the leading positions of Russia in global nuclear market. It is to ensure full back-up of the customer nuclear power programmes at all stages of implementation, including financing, training, localisation of supply chain, fuel supply with take-back of used fuel for reprocessing, and decommissioning. - Rusatom Overseas Germany (RAOS Germany) in 2016 will take over the international sales and marketing activities of NUKEM Technologies GmbH in the regions outside of the Western European markets, hence bundling all international marketing activities in the nuclear back-end area and high-temperature reactor fuel with Rusatom Overseas. - Rusatom Service – coordination of servicing nuclear plants abroad, providing “customised solutions for the modernization and operating period extension of VVER-based nuclear power plants”. - Atomenergoremont – maintenance and upgrading of nuclear power plants, - NUKEM Technologies GmbH is active worldwide in management of radioactive waste and spent fuel, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. NUKEM Technologies Engineering Services GmbH focuses on engineering. Both are wholly-owned subsidiaries of JSC Atomstroyexport, and from 2016 are apparently part of Rusatom Overseas. - Research & Development Institute for Power Engineering (NIKIET) at Moscow – power plant design (originally: submarine power plants) - Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering (CDBME) of the Russian Shipbuilding Agency – involved in some reactor design. - JSC State Specialised Design Institute (SSDI or GSPI) was a direct subsidiary of Atomenergoprom set up in 1948 for producing plutonium but now designing SMRs.

Electricity:

JSC Rosenergoatom is the only Russian organization primarily acting as a utility operating nuclear power plants. It was established in 1992 and reorganized in 2001 and then in 2008 as an open JSC. From December 2011 JSC Atomenergoprom holds 96% of the shares, and SC Rosatom (which owns Atomenergoprom) holds 4%. Rosenergoatom owns all nuclear power plants, both operating and under construction.

InterRAO UES was formerly a joint venture of Rosenergoatom and RAO UES, the utility which was broken up in mid 2008. It is now 57.3% owned by Rosatom and focused on electricity generation in areas such as Armenia and the Kaliningrad part of Russia, as the country's exporter and importer of electricity. It has 8 GWe of generating plant of its own and plans to increase this to 30 GWe by 2015, with the Baltic nuclear plant at Kaliningrad as an early priority. It heads a group of over 20 companies located in 14 countries, involving 18 GWe of capacity. Inter RAO-WorleyParsons (IRWP, with Inter RAO 51%) was set up in mid 2010 to work on the transfer of power engineering technology into Inter RAO's market and to promote Inter RAO's projects oversees.

Engineering and general designers:

In July 2008 the St Petersburg, Moscow and Nizhny-Novgorod divisions of Atomernergoproekt were converted to joint stock companies, with all shares held by Atomenergoprom. The first two are engineering companies and general designers of nuclear power plants mainly using VVER reactors developed by Gidropress. By the end of 2015 all the following engineering companies had been consolidated into the ASE Group as Rosatom's engineering division.

Atomproekt at St Petersburg was formed from the 2013 merger of St Petersburg Atomenergoproekt (SPbAEP) with the All-Russia Science Research and Design Institute of Integrated Power Engineering Technology – VNIPIET (established in 1933) to create the country’s largest nuclear power plant design and development company. It has a particular focus on fast reactors as well as VVER. The company supports all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, from a decision to start a nuclear power plant construction project to decommissioning. On completion of the merger in mid-2014 it became Atomproekt. Earlier, SPbAEP worked closely with Atomstroyexport (ASE) on exported plants. Atomproekt is responsible for Leningrad II plant, Beloyarsk, Baltic, and also the Belarus, Tianwan, Hanhikivi and Paks II plants as export projects.

Atomproekt is also much involved in fuel fabrication and radioactive waste management. It is Russia's sole design company for used nuclear fuel storage facilities. It is closely involved with the Proryv project for closed fuel cycle with fast reactors.

Atomenergoproekt (formerly Moscow AEP) established in 1986 is a major general design and engineering company for nuclear power plants. It may also function as general contractor. In October 2014 it became a subsidiary of NIAEP-ASE.

Its version of the AES-2006 evolved to the VVER-TOI, which Rosatom says is planned to be standard for new projects in Russia and worldwide. It is general designer of Novovoronezh II, being built by NIAEP-ASE, Kursk II, Smolensk II as well as Kudankulam in India and Akkuyu in Turkey. It has been responsible for Kursk and Smolensk RBMK plants, Novovoronezh I, Balakovo, and the Zaporozhe, Temelin and Bushehr plants.

NIAEP-ASE:  Nizhny-Novgorod Engineering Company Atomenergoproekt (NIAEP) set up in 1951 is building plants at Rostov (Volgodonsk) and Kalinin. NIAEP in March 2012 was merged with Atomstroyexport (ASE) to bolster the latter's engineering capability. (Earlier it had linked with ASE to utilize some 1980s VVER equipment not required for Bulgaria's proposed Belene plant, and built it at Kalinin.)  NIAEP  became a holding company for JSC ASE, but NIAEP-ASE was being used as acronym to late 2014.

Atomstroyexport  (ASE), established by merger in 1998, emerged from the reorganisation as a closed joint stock company owned by Atomenergoprom (50.2%) and Gazprombank (49.8%, it is 69% owned by Gazprom). Early in 2009 the Atomenergoprom and related equity was increased to 89.3% by additional share issue, leaving Gazprombank with 10.7%. It was responsible for export of nuclear plants to China, Iran, India and Bulgaria. In 2009 German-based Nukem Technologies GmbH, which specialises in decommissioning, waste management and engineering services, became a 100% subsidiary of Atomstroyexport. In 2012 ASE merged with Nizhny-Novgorod Atomenergoproekt (NN AEP or NIAEP) to form NIAEP-ASE.

Rosatom, through NIAEP-ASE, offers both EPC (engineering, procurement, construction) and BOO (build, own, operate) contracts for overseas nuclear power plant projects, the latter involving at least 25% Rosatom equity. Rosatom offers various kinds of project financing, including attraction of strategic and institutional investors and debt financing. Some project finance is covered by international agreements involving either export credits, Russian government credit or the participation of Russian state banks. It says that lending rates can be optimized for nuclear power plant projects, and up to 85% of the finance may be provided by government credit from Russia.

In November 2014 the projects in hand on the company website were: Rostov 3&4, Baltic 1&2, Nizhny Novgorod 1&2, Kursk II, all in Russia, and Kudankulam 1&2, Tianwan 3&4, Akkuyu 1-4, Ostrovets 1&2, Bushehr 1, Ninh Thuan 1&2. In mid-2013 Rooppur in Bangladesh was added (but then removed). It is also building a large (3x400 MWe) gas combined-cycle plant: South Ural/Yuzhnouralskaya GRES-2 units 1&2.

NIAEP (post 2012 merger) has a design institute in Nizhny-Novgorod, project management offices in Nizhny-Novgorod, Moscow and St Petersburg, and 11 representative offices in Europe and Asia to oversee projects.

Titan-2 was a major subcontractor for the Leningrad II construction, and in 2015 it took over as general contractor for units 1&2. It will also be general contractor for Hanhikivi in Finland.

Rusatom Service was set up in October 2011 by Rosenergoatom (51%), Atomenergomash (16%), Gidropress (16%) and Atomtekhenergo (16%). It will undertake maintenance and repair as well as modernization of Russian-design nuclear power plants abroad, applying Russian domestic experience. The company is also to work in the area of technical consultancy, training and retraining of plant personnel. The market is estimated at €1.5 billion per year, rising to €2.5 billion by 2020, including western-design reactors by then.

OTsKS – Rosatom Branch Centre for Capital Construction – was set up in August 2012 to manage its capital investment program in Russia and internationally. It oversees regulatory, technical and legal aspects of capital construction projects, as well as estimating costs and developing schedules. It also provides training for customer-contractors and general contractors such as NIAEP-ASE as well as the personnel of construction companies. Rosatom subsidiary companies had to complete their transition to new rules on planning capital construction projects developed by OTsKS, by the end of 2013. Its main customer is Rosenergoatom which is building about ten units in Russia, with 12 more planned by 2025.

AKME-engineering was established in 2009 to implement the SVBR-100 project at Dimitrovgrad, including design, construction and commercial operation. It is a JV of Rosatom and JSC Irkutskenergo, and is licensed for construction and operation of nuclear plants by Rostechnadzor.

Uralenergostroy in Yekaterinburg is a civil works general contractor responsible for BN-800, BN-1200 and MBIR plants.

The Federal Centre of Nuclear and Radiation Safety ( FC NRS ) is a federal-state unitary enterprise set up in 2007 by Rosatom as part of its End-of-Life (EOL) Management Division. The Pilot Demonstration Center for Decommissioning of Uranium-Graphite Reactors (PDC UGR) is to become part of it, rather than staying with SCC.

The National Operator for Radioactive Waste Management ( NO RAO ) is a federal-state unitary enterprise set up in 2012 responsible for waste management and disposal. It is the National Operator for handling all nuclear waste materials, with functions and tariffs set by government.

FSUE RosRAO provides commercial back-end radwaste and decommissioning services for intermediate- and low-level waste as well as handling non-nuclear radwaste. It commenced operation in 2009 under a temporary arrangement pending finalisation of regulations under the new legislation. It incorporates Radon, which was the organisation responsible for medical and industrial radioactive waste, and now has branches in each of seven federal districts. RosRAO’s Far East Centre (DalRAO) operates long-term storage for over 70 submarine reactor compartments, pending their recycling. Its northern centre is SevRAO, in the Murmansk region, is engaged in remediation of the sites of Navy Northern Fleet bases, and dismantling of retired nuclear-powered naval ships and submarines. RosRAO is envisaged as an international operator. RosRAO became part of Rosatom’s Life Cycle Back-End Division (LC BED) in 2013.

In 2013 Rosatom’s Life Cycle Back-End Division (LC BED) was set up to incorporate entities hitherto the responsibility of FC NRS: the Mining and Chemical Combine (MCC), RosRAO, SPA V.G.Khlopin Radium Institute and Radon. FC NRS will continue involvement with the new division.

FSUE Atomflot is a Rosatom division operating the nuclear powered icebreakers and merchant ship in Arctic waters.

Situation and Crisis Centre of Rosatom was established in 1998 acts as the Operator of the Nuclear Industry System for Prevention and Management of Emergencies. It keeps track of nuclear enterprises and transport of nuclear materials.

SNIIP Systematom is an engineering company for nuclear and radiation safety systems. It will supply the equipment for automated radiation monitoring systems (ARMS) at the Kalinin 1 nuclear unit in Russia and Tianwan 4 in China.

The VI Lenin All-Russian Electrotechnical Institute and its affiliated Experimental Plant were made FSUEs by presidential decree in March 2015, and removed from the Ministry of Education & Science.

Supply chain entities

Atomenergomash (AEM) was set up in 2006 to control the supply chain for major reactor components. After an equity issue in 2009 it was 63.6% owned by AEP, 14.7% by TVEL and 7.6% by Tenex, and 7% by AEM-finance. In 2009 AEM had sales of RUR 16 billion. AEM companies claim to have provided equipment in 13% of nuclear plants worldwide. Rosatom has one of the largest procurement budgets in the Russian economy, with the annual value of its orders totaling more than RUR 1000 billion ($17.8 billion) in recent years. Almost 85,000 companies are registered as suppliers to Rosatom and 70,000 contracts are signed each year by the group.

Supply chain reliability for nuclear procurement is a significant concern for Rosatom, and it is seeking reform from the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS), in particular to ensure a credible ability to deliver high quality goods and services on time rather than just accepting the lowest price. Rosatom wants to conduct audit checks of suppliers prior to their participation in competitive bidding procedures, in order to verify that they would actually be able to fulfil the orders on which they bid. Rosatom cited as an example of the need for procurement reform the purchase of circulation pumps and combined valves for the Novovoronezh power plant. The supplier agreed to a schedule, but this stretched to 80 months and the equipment eventually delivered failed safety tests at the plant. A similar situation occurred at the Beloyarsk plant. The costs of such delays to Rosatom far exceed any compensation it can claim from delinquent suppliers.

The former main nuclear fabrication company, Atommash, was established in 1973 at Volgodonsk and went bankrupt in 1995. It was then profoundly restructured and resurrected as EMK-Atommash before becoming part of JSC Energomash, a major diversified engineering company apparently independent of Rosatom/AEP. Atommash largely moved away from nuclear equipment, though Atomenergomash (subsidiary of AEP) was keen to resuscitate it as an alternative heavy equipment supplier to OMZ. In 2009 Atomenergomash was doing due diligence on the Energomash group, with a view to taking a half share in it, "to create competition in the segment of monopoly suppliers of long-lead nuclear equipment.” In October 2014 AEM-Assets, a subsidiary of Rosatom, acquired the production assets and a 100% interest in Energomash LLC (Volgodonsk)-Atommash, the forging company, and Energomash JSC (Volgodonsk)-Atommash, which provides services related to the lease of equipment and immovable property. Atommash was integrated into Rosatom as part of AEM-Technology, and can now produce four complete sets of nuclear island equipment per year. The reactor pressure vessel supplied to Belarus in 2015 was the first it had produced in 30 years. Two reactor pressure vessels for the RITM-200 reactors for Russia’s new icebreaker were also produced in 2015. In 2017 it was building the reactor pressure vessel for the MBIR fast research reactor.

Objedinennye Mashinostroitelnye Zavody (OMZ – Uralmash-Izhora Group) itself is the largest heavy industry company in Russia, and has a wide shareholding. Izhorskiye Zavody, the country's main reactor component supplier, became part of the company in 1999, and Skoda Steel and Skoda JS in Czech Republic joined in 2003. OMZ is expected to produce the forgings for all new domestic AES-2006 model VVER-1200 nuclear reactors (four per year from 2016), plus exports. At present Izhora can produce the heavy forgings required for Russia's VVER-1000 reactors at the rate of two per year, and it is manufacturing components for the first two Leningrad II VVER-1200 units.

The Power Machines Company (JSC Silovye Mashiny Concern, or Silmash) was established in 2000 and brought together a number of older enterprises including Leningradsky Metallichesky Zavod (LMZ), Elektrosila, Turbine Blades Factory, etc. Siemens holds 26% of the stock. Silmash makes steam turbines up to 1200 MWe, including the 1000 MWe turbines for Atomstroyexport projects in China, India and Iran, and has supplied equipment to 57 countries worldwide. It is making 1200 MWe turbine generators for the Leningrad and Novovoronezh II nuclear plants. A significant amount of Power Machines' business is in Asia.

The Russian EnergyMachineBuilding Company (REMCO) was established as a closed joint stock company in Russia in 2008, amalgamating some smaller firms, with half the shares owned by Atomenergomash. It is one of the largest manufacturers of complex heat-exchange equipment for nuclear and thermal power plants, oil and gas industry. Its subsidiaries include JSC Machine-Building Plant ZiO-Podolsk and JSC Engineering Company ZIOMAR.

JSC Machine Building Plant ZiO-Podolsk is one of the largest manufacturers designing and producing equipment for nuclear power and other plants. It has made equipment, including steam generators and heat exchangers, for all nuclear plants in the former USSR. It is increasing capacity to four nuclear equipment sets per year. It appears to be 51% owned by REMCO. It is making the reactor pressure vessel and other main equipment for the BN-800 fast reactor at Beloyarsk as well as steam generators for Novovoronezh, Kalinin 4, Leningrad and Belene.

In April 2007 a joint venture company to manufacture the turbine and generator portions of new nuclear power plants was announced by French engineering group Alstom and JSC Atomenergomash. The 49:51 Alstom-Atomenergomash LLC (AAEM) joint venture, in which both parties would invest EUR 200 million, was established at Podolsk, near Moscow. It includes the technology transfer of Alstom's state of the art Arabelle steam turbine and generator (available up to 1800 MWe) tailored to Russian VVER technology. In 2010 AAEM signed an agreement with Inter RAO-Worley Parsons (IRWP) to establish an engineering consortium to design turbine islands for Russia's VVER reactor-based nuclear power plants. At the same time Alstom signed strategic agreements with major Russian energy companies to jointly provide power generation products and services for Russia's power industry in hydro, nuclear and thermal power generation and electricity transmission. Another agreement, between Alstom Power and Rosatom, details plans to set up a local facility to manufacture Alstom's Arabelle steam turbines for nuclear plants. In 2011 Petrozavodskmash joined the group, and its site is more suitable for shipping large components, so in 2011 the company decided to build its factory for Arabelle manufacture at Petrozavodsk, in Karelia, by 2015 instead of continuing with ZiO-Podolsk near Moscow. First production was expected in 2013 with output reaching three 1200 MWe turbine and generator sets per year in 2016. The Baltic plant will be the first customer, in a RUB 35 billion order, with Russian content about 50%. This will increase to over 70% for subsequent projects.

In September 2007 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) signed an agreement with Russia's Ural Turbine Works (UTZ) to manufacture, supply and service gas and steam turbines in the Russian market. Under the agreement, MHI, Japan's biggest machinery maker, will license its manufacturing technologies for large gas turbines and steam turbines to UTZ – part of the Renova Group. The agreement also calls for a joint venture to be established in Russia to provide after-sales service.

Russia has developed several generations of centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Ninth-generation machines are now being deployed, 10th generation ones re being developed, and 11th generation are being designed. The 9th generation units are said to be 1.5 times as efficient as 8th. Overall since 1960, the machine weight, size and power characteristics have remained practically unchanged, but their efficiency was raised more than six-fold, design service life was increased from 3 to 30 years, and the SWU cost was reduced “several times”. Centrifuges for China under a US$ 1 billion contract are manufactured at both Tocmash and Kovrov Mechanical plant, both of which will become part of the Fuel Company being established by TVEL. Russia intends to export its centrifuges to the USA and SE Asia.

For more up to date information on heavy engineering, see paper on Heavy Manufacturing of Power Plants .

Early in 2006 Rosenergoatom set up a subsidiary to supply floating nuclear power plants (BNPPs) ranging in size from 70 to 600 MWe. The plants are designed by OKBM in collaboration with others. The pilot plant, now under construction, is 70 MWe plus heat output and incorporates two KLT-40S reactors based on those in icebreakers.

Regulation and safety

Two main laws govern the use of nuclear power: the Federal Law on the Use of Atomic Energy (November 1995 and Federal Law on Radiation Safety of Populations (January 1996). These are supported by federal laws including those on environmental protection (2002) and the Federal Law on Radioactive Waste Management (2011). The 1996 Federal Law on Radiation Safety of Populations is administered by the Federal Ministry of Health.

Rostekhnadzor   is the regulator, set up (as GAN) in 1992, reporting direct to the President. Because of the links with military programs, a culture of secrecy pervaded the old Soviet nuclear power industry. After the 1986 Chernobyl accident, changes were made and a nuclear safety committee established. The State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety – Gosatomnadzor (GAN) succeeded this in 1992, being responsible for licensing, regulation and operational safety of all facilities, for safety in transport of nuclear materials, and for nuclear materials accounting. Its inspections can result in legal charges against operators. However, on some occasions when it suspended operating licences in the 1990s, Minatom successfully overrode this. In 2004 GAN was incorporated into the Federal Ecological, Technological & Atomic Supervisory Service, Rostechnadzor, which has a very wide environmental and safety mandate. It has executive authority for development and implementation of public policy and legal regulation in the environmental field, as well as in the field of technological and nuclear supervision. It controls and supervises natural resources development, industrial safety, nuclear safety (except for weapons), safety of electrical networks, hydraulic structures and industrial explosives. It licences nuclear energy facilities, and supervises nuclear and radiation safety of nuclear and radiologically hazardous installations, including supervision of nuclear materials accounting, control and physical protection.  A 2011 overview is on IAEA website.

Safety has evidently been improving at Russian nuclear power plants. In 1993 there were 29 incidents rating level 1 and higher on the INES scale, in 1994 there were nine, and since then to 2003, no more than four. Also, up until 2001 many employees received annual radiation doses of over 20 mSv, but since 2002 very few have done so.

In 2008 Rostechnadzor was transferred to the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment, but this was reversed in mid 2010 and it was brought back under direct control of the government and focused on civil nuclear energy. Following other changes in federal legislation, an IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission in 2013 said that Rostechnadzor had made "significant progress" in its development since 2009 and had “become an effective independent regulator with a professional staff”. Rostechnadzor undertook to make the final IRRS report early in 2014 public.

Glavgosexpertiza , the Russian State Expert Examination Board, is the authority responsible for appraising design documentation and engineering services on behalf of the Ministry of Construction of Russia. Glavgosexpertiza ensures compliance of all major infrastructure construction projects with national technical regulations and statutory requirements. 

Rosprirodnadzor , the Federal Service for Supervision of Natural Resources needs to give environmental approval to new projects, through its State Environmental Commission.

Exports: fuel cycle

Soviet exports of enrichment services began in 1973, and Russia has strongly continued this, along with exports of radioisotopes. After 1990, uranium exports began, through Techsnabexport (Tenex). At 2015 Atomexpo it was announced that at the start of the year Rosatom’s foreign portfolio totaled US$ 101.4 billion, of which $66 billion was reactors, $21.8 billion was the contracted sales of EUP and SWU, and the remaining $13.6 billion was attributable to the sales of fabricated fuel assemblies and uranium. Rosatom’s goal is to gain half its revenue from exported goods and services.

Tenex expects to increase its share in the global market for front-end fuel cycle services to 40% by 2030, assisted by offering an ‘integrated product’ covering the entire nuclear fuel cycle, and to contribute up to half of Rosatom’s foreign currency revenue. Tenex revenue in 2014 was over $2.2 billion, and forward orders totalled almost $23 billion, including almost $6 billion in over 20 contracts with US utilities for enriched uranium product. Tenex sees the Asia-Pacific market as a growth area, using a new transport route through Vostochny Seaport, Primorye Territory.

In 2009 Tenex signed long-term enrichment services contacts with three US utilities – AmerenUE, Luminant and Pacific Gas & Electric – and one in Japan – Chubu. The contracts cover supply from 2014 to 2020. Then it contracted to supply enriched uranium product over the same period with Exelon, the largest US nuclear utility. By the end of 2010, the value of contracts with US companies rose to about $4 billion, beyond the diluted ex-military uranium already being supplied to 2013 from Russian weapons stockpiles. In 2012, Tenex supplied about 45% of world demand for enrichment services and 17% of that for fabricated fuel. It exported fuel for 34 reactors as well as supplying 33 Russian ones.

This US-Russian "Megatonnes to Megawatts" program supplies about 15% of world reactor requirements for enriched uranum and is part of a US$ 12 billion deal in 1994 between US and Russian governments, with a non-proliferation as well as commercial rationale. USEC and Tenex are the executive agents for the program. However, Rosatom confirmed in mid 2006 that no follow-on program of selling Russian high-enriched uranium from military stockpiles was anticipated once this program concludes in 2013. The 20-year program is equivalent to about 140,000 to 150,000 tonnes of natural uranium, and has supplied about half of US needs. By September 2010 it was 80% complete.

TVEL in 2010 won a tender to construct a fuel manufacturing plant in Ukraine, against competition from US company Westinghouse. Russia's long-term contract to supply fuel to the Ukrainian market is set to run until the end of the useful life of existing Ukrainian reactors, perhaps up to 35 years.

TVEL in 2014 secured contracts with foreign partners that exceeded $3 billion, keeping its ten-year order book at more than $10 billion. Contracts were signed with Finland, Hungary and Slovakia, as well as for research reactors in the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Uzbekistan. TVEL said it has 17% of the global nuclear fuel supply market.

Rosatom has claimed to be able to undercut world prices for nuclear fuel and services by some 30%.

It was also pushing ahead with plans to store and probably reprocess foreign spent fuel, and earlier the Russian parliament overwhelmingly supported a change in legislation to allow this. The proposal involved some 10% of the world's spent fuel over ten years, or perhaps up to 20,000 tonnes of spent fuel, to raise US$ 20 billion, two thirds of which would be invested in expanding civil nuclear power. In July 2001 President Putin signed into effect three laws including one to allow this import of spent nuclear fuel (essentially an export of services, since Russia would be paid for it).

The President also set up a special commission to approve and oversee any spent fuel accepted, with five members each from the Duma, the Council, the government and presidential nominees, chaired by Dr Zhores Alferov, a parliamentarian, Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Nobel Prize physicist. This scheme was progressed in 2005 when the Duma ratified the Vienna Convention on civil liability for nuclear damage. However in July 2006 Rosatom announced it would not proceed with taking any foreign-origin used fuel, and the whole scheme lapsed.

Exports: general, plants and projects

Russia is engaged with international markets in nuclear technology, well beyond its traditional eastern European client states. An important step up in this activity was in August 2011 when Rosatom established Rusatom Overseas company, with authorized capital of RUR 1 billion. In mid-2015 it was split into JSC Rusatom Overseas Inc. and JSC Rusatom Energy International .

Rusatom Overseas Inc  is responsible for implementing non fuel-cycle projects in foreign markets, though apparently it also promotes products, services and technologies of the Russian nuclear industry generally to the world markets. According to Rosatom, "Rusatom Overseas acts as an integrator of Rosatom's complex solutions in nuclear energy, manages the promotion of the integrated offer and the development of Russian nuclear business abroad, as well as working to create a worldwide network of Rosatom marketing offices." Rusatom Overseas planned to open some 20 offices around the world by 2015, as a market research front and shop window for all Rosatom products and services.

Rusatom Energy International acts "as a developer of Rosatom's foreign projects, which are implemented with the build-own-operate (BOO) structure" and is a shareholder in those project companies. One of the first projects that Rosatom is implementing using the BOO structure is the Akkuyu plant in Turkey. A second project is Hanhikivi in Finland.

At 2015 Atomexpo it was announced that at the start of the year Rosatom’s foreign portfolio totaled US$ 101.4 billion, of which $66 billion was reactors, $21.8 billion was the contracted sales of EUP and SWU, and the remaining $13.6 billion was attributable to the sales of fabricated fuel assemblies and uranium. The total at the end of 2015 was over $110 billion, and export revenues in 2015 were $6.4 billion, up 20% from 2014. Rosatom’s goal is to gain half its revenue from exported goods and services. Its long-term strategy, approved by its board in late 2011, calls for foreign operations to account for half of its business by 2030. It aims to hold at least one-third of the global enrichment services market by then, as well as 5% of the market for pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel. The corporation said that it is "actively strengthening its position abroad for the construction of nuclear power plants." In April 2015 Rosatom said that it had contracts for 19 nuclear plants in nine countries, including those under construction (5). In September 2015 it said it had orders for 30 nuclear power reactors in 12 countries, at about $5 billion each to construct, and it was negotiating for 10 more. It said that the total value of all export orders was $300 billion. It aims to have orders for the construction of some 30 power reactors outside of Russia by 2030.

Atomstroyexport (ASE, now NIAEP-ASE) has had three reactor construction projects abroad, all involving VVER-1000 units. It is embarking upon and seeking more, as detailed in Nuclear Power in Russia companion paper, final section on Exports of Nuclear Reactors.

Since 2006 Rosatom has actively pursued nuclear cooperation deals in South Africa, Namibia, Chile and Morocco as well as with Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Vietnam, Bangladesh and Kuwait. In 2012 an agreement with Japan was concluded.

Tenex has also entered agreements (now taken over by ARMZ) to mine and explore for uranium in South Africa (with local companies) and Canada (with Cameco).

In September 2008 ARMZ signed a MOU with a South Korean consortium headed by Kepco on strategic cooperation in developing uranium projects. This included joint exploration, mining and sales of natural uranium in the Russian Federation and possibly beyond, but no more has been heard of it.

International collaboration

Russia is engaged with international markets in nuclear energy, well beyond its traditional eastern European client states. In June 2011 Rosatom announced that it was establishing Rusatom Overseas company, a new structure to be responsible for implementing non fuel-cycle projects in foreign markets. It could act as principal contractor and also owner of foreign nuclear capacity under build-own-operate (BOO) arrangements. It is vigorously pursing markets in developing countries and is establishing eight offices abroad.

President Putin's Global Nuclear Infrastructure Initiative was announced early in 2006. This is in line with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 2005 proposal for Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (MNA) and with the US Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). The head of Rosatom said that he envisages Russia hosting four types of international nuclear fuel cycle service centres (INFCCs) as joint ventures financed by other countries. These would be secure and maybe under IAEA control. The first is an International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) – one of four or five proposed worldwide (see separate section). The second would be for reprocessing and storage of used nuclear fuel. The third would deal with training and certification of personnel, especially for emerging nuclear states. In this context there is a need for harmonized international standards, uniform safeguards and joint international centers. The fourth would be for R&D and to integrate new scientific achievements.

In March 2008 AtomEnergoProm signed a general framework agreement with Japan's Toshiba Corporation to explore collaboration in the civil nuclear power business. The Toshiba partnership is expected to include cooperation in areas including design and engineering for new nuclear power plants, manufacturing and maintenance of large equipment, and "front-end civilian nuclear fuel cycle business". In particular the construction of an advanced Russian centrifuge enrichment plant in Japan is envisaged, also possibly one in the USA. The companies say that the "complementary relations" could lead to the establishment of a strategic partnership. Toshiba owns 77% of US reactor builder Westinghouse and is also involved with other reactor technology.

Regarding reactor design, Rosatom has said it is keen to be involved in international projects for Generation IV reactor development and is keen to have international participation in fast neutron reactor development, as well as joint proposals for MOX fuel fabrication.

In April 2007 Red Star, a government-owned design bureau, and US company Thorium Power (now Lightbridge Corporation) agreed to collaborate on testing Lightbridge's seed and blanket fuel assemblies at the Kurchatov Institute with a view to using thorium-plutonium fuel in VVER-1000 reactors, partly in order to dispose of surplus military plutonium (see information papers on Fuel Fabrication and Military Warheads as a Source of Nuclear Fuel for details).

In 2006 the former working relationship with Kazakhstan in nuclear fuel supplies was rebuilt. Kazatomprom has agreed to a major long-term program of strategic cooperation with Russia in uranium and nuclear fuel supply, as well as development of small reactors, effectively reuniting the two countries' interests in future exports of nuclear fuel to China, Japan, Korea, the USA and Western Europe.

In June 2010 Rosatom signed a major framework agreement with the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) covering "nuclear energy development strategy, nuclear fuel cycle, development of next-generation reactors, future gas coolant reactor systems, radiation safety and nuclear material safety, prevention and emergency measures." Much of the collaboration will be focused on reprocessing and waste, also sodium-cooled fast reactors. Subsequently EdF and Rosatom signed a further cooperation agreement covering R&D, nuclear fuel, and nuclear power plants - both existing and under construction.

In March 2007 Russia signed a cooperation declaration with the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), so that Russia became a regular observer in all NEA standing technical committees, bringing it much more into the mainstream of world nuclear industry development. Russia had been participating for some years in the NEA's work on reactor safety and nuclear regulation and is hosting an NEA project on reactor vessel melt-through. This agreement was expected to assist Russia's integration into the OECD, and in October 2011 Russia made an official request to join the NEA. It was accepted as the 31st member of the OECD NEA in May 2012, effective from January 2013. Russia will be represented by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rosatom, and nuclear regulator Rostechnadzor.

Over two decades to about 2010 a Russian-US coordinating committee* was discussing building a GT-MHR prototype at Seversk, primarily for weapons plutonium disposition. Today OKBM is responsible to collaboration with China on HTR development, though NIIAR and Kurchatov Institute are also involved.

* involving SC Rosatom, NIIAR, OKBM, RRC Kurchatov Institute and VNIINM on the Russian side and NNSA, General Atomics, Oak Ridge National Laboratory on the US side.

Research & development

In mid-2009 the Russian government said that it would provide more than RUR 120 billion (about US$3.89 billion) over 2010 to 2012 for a new program devoted to R&D on the next generation of nuclear power plants. It identified three priorities for the nuclear industry: improving the performance of light water reactors over the next two or three years, developing a closed fuel cycle based on deployment of fast reactors in the medium term, and developing nuclear fusion over the long term. Rosatom said that its 2014 spending on R&D would amount to RUR 27-28 billion (US$ 528 million), about 4.5% of its revenue. In 2013 it spent RUR 24 billion, and in 2012 RUR 22.7 billion on R&D. In 2015 Rosatom said that it invested 5% of its revenues in R&D “to reinforce our technological leadership.”

Many research reactors were constructed in the 1950s and 60s. In 2015, 52 non-military research and test reactors were operational in Russia, plus about three in former Soviet republics and eight Russian ones elsewhere. Most of these use ceramic fuel enriched to 36% or 90% U-235. Overall over 130 research reactors have been built based on Russian technology. MBIR is now under construction at Dimitrovgrad.

Kurchatov Institute

Russia has had substantial R&D on nuclear power for seven decades. The premier establishment for this is the Russian Research Centre Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, set up 1943 as the Laboratory No. 2 of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In 2010 it joined the Skolkovo project, an R&D centre set up to rival Silicon Valley in the USA, and became a Federal State Unitary Enterprise. It has run twelve research reactors there, six of which are now shut down. The 24 kW F-1 research reactor was started up in December 1946 and has passed its 70th anniversary in operation. The largest reactor is IR-8, of 8 MWt, a high-flux unit used for isotope production.

The Kurchatov Institute has designed nuclear reactors for marine and space applications, and continues research on HTRs. Since 1995 it has been involved internationally with accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials. US Lightbridge Corporation's seed and blanket fuel assemblies are being tested there with a view to using thorium-based fuel in VVER-1000 reactors.

Kurchatov’s Molten Salt Actinide Recycler and Transmuter (MOSART) is fuelled only by transuranic fluorides from uranium and MOX LWR used fuel, without U or Th support. The 2400 MWt reactor has a homogeneous core of Li-Na-Be or Li-Be fluorides without graphite moderator and has reduced reprocessing compared with the original US design. Thorium may also be used, though MOSART is described as a burner-converter rather than a breeder.

Since 1955 the Institute has hosted the main experimental work on plasma physics and nuclear fusion, and the first tokamak systems were developed there. Since 1990, much of its funding comes from international cooperation and commercial projects.

Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute (PNPI)

The Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute ( PNPI ) is near St Petersburg but part of the Kurchatov Institute. It was formerly the B.P. Konstantinov Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute (PIYaF). In 1959 the 18 MWt WWR-M high-flux research reactor was put into operation, and in 1970 the 1 GeV proton synchrocyclotron SC-1000 started up, these continue in operation.

A 100 MWt high-flux reactor with 25 associated research facilities, PIK , achieved criticality in 2011 at Gatchina but further major work led to its launch at 100 kW in 2019. It uses 27 kg of 90% enriched uranium fuel, tenders for which were called in 2020. PIK is the most powerful high-flux research beam reactor in Russia and is planned to be the basis for the International Centre for Neutron Research. In October 2020 Glavgosexpertiza approved a project for the modernisation of the PIK reactor, and a further launch was announced in February 2021.

The Institute for High Energy Physics and the Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics are also part of the Kurchatov Institute, as are the 'Prometheus' Central Research Institute of Structural Materials and the Research Institute of Chemical Reagents and High Purity Chemicals, which were previously part of the Ministry of Education and Science.

Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (RIAR/NIIAR)

Russia's State Scientific Centre – Research Institute of Atomic Reactors ( RIAR , or NIIAR) – said to be the biggest nuclear research centre in Russia, is in Dimitrovgrad (Melekess), in Ulyanovsk county 1300 km SE of Moscow. It was founded in 1956 to host both research and experimental reactors, and it researches fuel cycle, radiochemicals and radioactive waste management, as well as producing radionuclides for medicine and industry. It hosts the main R&D on electrometallurgical pyroprocessing, especially for fast reactors, and associated vibropacked fuel technology for these.

RIAR/NIIAR has the largest materials study laboratory in Eurasia, used particularly for irradiated fuel.* The complex's major future role will be in fuel reprocessing. The initial fuel for MBIR is likely to be from reprocessed BOR-60 fuel, as also intended for SVBR-100. In 2014 construction of a new multifunctional radiochemical research centre for closed fuel cycles for fast reactors commenced as part of the revised federal target programme for 2010-2015 and until 2020. Fuel research at RIAR already includes integration of minor actinides into FNR closed fuel cycle, nitride fuel (both mononitride and U-Pu nitride), metallic fuel (U-Pu-Zr, U-Al, U-Be) and RBMK spent fuel conditioning. It also is working on molten salt fuel – reprocessing and minor actinide behaviour, though Kurchatov Institute seems to be the main locus of MSR research.

* In 2010 TerraPower from the USA proposed that RIAR should carry out in-pile tests and post-irradiation examinations of structural materials and fuel specimens planned for its travelling-wave reactor. A final agreement was expected in November, but apparently did not eventuate.

RIAR's first research reactor – SM – has been running since 1961 and now produces radioisotopes and does materials testing. It is a 100 MWt very high-flux water-cooled pressure vessel-type reactor originally using 90% enriched fuel with a neutron trap that operates in the intermediate neutron spectrum. It has been modernised several times and as SM-3 it was recommissioned in 1993. In 2020 it again had a new core. It is expected to operate until 2040. 

The MIR-MR  loop-type reactor commissioned in 1967 is used for testing fuels in runs up to 40 days at up to 100 MWt. It has been important in developing fuel rod designs for power and naval reactors. It is testing the first batch of REMIX fuel and also accident-tolerant fuel (ATF). It has a beryllium moderator and uses 90% enriched fuel. It was due to be retired in 2020.

The small pool-type reactors RBT-6 & RBT-10/2 commissioned in 1975 and 1984 are used for long-term experiments and use the spent fuel assemblies from SM. They are 6 & 7 MWt respectively. 

As well as three other research reactors, the BOR-60 * experimental fast reactor is operated here by RIAR – the world’s only operating fast research reactor. It started up in 1969 and is to be replaced with the  MBIR , with four times the irradiation capacity.

* BOR = bystry opytniy reaktor. BOR-60 was licensed to 2015 but was extended to December 2020.

The multi-purpose fast neutron research reactor – MBIR* – will be a 150 MWt multi-loop reactor capable of testing lead or lead-bismuth and gas coolants as well as sodium, simultaneously in three parallel outside loops. Initially it will have sodium coolant. It will run on vibropacked MOX fuel with plutonium content of 38%, produced at RIAR in existing facilities. A 24% Pu fuel may also be used. RIAR intends to set up an on-site closed fuel cycle for it, using pyrochemical reprocessing it has developed at pilot scale. MBIR’s cost was estimated at RUR 40 billion in 2015. Rostechnadzor granted a site licence to RIAR in August 2014, and a construction licence in May 2015. Construction started in September 2015. Completion was expected in 2020, but the project was paused after starting construction. In November 2020 Rosatom appointed a new contractor, AO Institut Orgenergostroy, and construction resumed, with commissioning expected in 2028. The reactor pressure vessel is being made by Atommash at Volgodonsk.

* MBIR = mnogotselevoy issledovatilskiy reaktor na bystrych neytronach.

Russia's only boiling water reactor, the prototype VK-50 of 200 MWt was commissioned in 1964 and was due to be retired in 2020.

Rosatom is setting up an International Research Centre (IRC) based on MBIR and is inviting international participation in connection with the IAEA INPRO programme. In June 2013 an agreement with France and the USA was signed to this end. In April 2017 Rosatom was soliciting Japanese involvement. The full MBIR research complex is now budgeted at $1 billion, with the Russian budget already having provided $300 million from the federal target programme. Pre-construction shares of 1% were being offered for $10 million, allowing involvement in detailed design of irradiation facilities. From 2020 the fee would rise to $36 million per 1% share. RIAR will be the legal owner of MBIR, performing operational and administrative functions, while the International Research Centre will be the legal entity responsible for marketing and research management. In May 2017 Rosatom announced that the multifunctional radiochemical research facility under construction at RIAR would be included in the IRC, to be used for testing technologies to close the fast reactor fuel cycle.

The first 100 MWe Lead-Bismuth Fast Reactor (SVBR) from Gidropress was to be built at RIAR, but the project was dropped in 2018. It was designed to use a wide variety of fuels, though the demonstration unit would initially have used uranium enriched to 16.3%. With U-Pu MOX fuel it would operate in closed cycle. It was described by Gidropress as a multi-function reactor, for power, heat or desalination.

RIAR has established a joint venture with JSC Izotop – Izotop-NIIAR – to produce Mo-99 at Dimitrovgrad from 2010, using newly-installed German equipment. This aimed to capture 20% of the world market for Mo-99 by 2012, and 40% subsequently. In September 2010 JSC Isotop signed a framework agreement with Canada-based MDS Nordion to explore commercial opportunities outside Russia on the basis of this JV, initially over ten years.

Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (FEI/IPPE)

In 1954 the world's first nuclear powered electricity generator began operation in the then closed city of Obninsk at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (FEI or IPPE). The AM-1* reactor is water-cooled and graphite-moderated, with a design capacity of 30 MWt or 5 MWe. It was similar in principle to the plutonium production reactors in the closed military cities and served as a prototype for other graphite channel reactor designs including the Chernobyl-type RBMK** reactors. AM-1 produced electricity until 1959 and was used until 2000 as a research facility and for the production of isotopes. FEI also bid to host the MBIR project.

* AM = atom mirny – peaceful atom

** RBMK = reaktor bolshoi moshchnosty kanalny – high power channel reactor

In the 1950s the FEI at Obninsk was also developing fast breeder reactors (FBRs), and in 1955 the BR-1* fast neutron reactor began operating. It produced no power but led directly to the BR-5 which started up in 1959 with a capacity of 5 MWt which was used to do the basic research necessary for designing sodium-cooled FBRs. It was upgraded and modernised in 1973 and then underwent major reconstruction in 1983 to become the BR-10 with a capacity of 8 MWt which is now used to investigate fuel endurance, to study materials and to produce radioisotopes.

* BN = bystry reaktor – fast reactor

Research & Development Institute for Power Engineering (NIKIET)

NIKIET in Moscow is one of Russia’s major nuclear design and research centres with a primary focus on advanced reactor technologies including those for regional power supplies, research and isotope production reactors, and neutronic systems for the international fusion reactor (ITER). 

NIKIET is at concept development stage with a seabed reactor module – SHELF – a 6 MWe, 28 MWt remotely-operated PWR with low-enriched fuel of UO 2 in aluminium alloy matrix. Fuel cycle is 56 months. The SHELF module uses an integral reactor with forced and natural circulation in the primary circuit, in which the core, steam generator, motor-driven circulation pump and control and protection system drive are housed in a cylindrical pressure vessel. The reactor and turbogenerator are in a cylindrical pod about 15 m long and 8 m diameter, sitting on the sea bed. It is intended as electricity supply for oil and gas developments in Arctic seas. In 2018 NIKIET also proposed its use for the RUR 100 billion Pavlovsky lead-zinc mine project in northern Novaya Zemlya.

In 2010 the government was to allocate RUR 500 million (about US$ 170 million) of federal funds to design a space nuclear propulsion and generation installation in the megawatt power range. In particular, SC Rosatom was to get RUR 430 million and Roskosmos (Russian Federal Space Agency) RUR 70 million to develop it. The work would be undertaken by (NIKIET) in Moscow, based on previous developments including those of nuclear rocket engines. A conceptual design was expected in 2011, with the basic design documentation and engineering design to follow in 2012. Tests were planned for 2018.

Since 2010 NIKIET is also involved with Luch Scientific Production Association (SPA Luch) and a Belarus organization, the Joint Institute for Power Engineering and Nuclear Research (Sosny), to design a small transportable nuclear reactor. The project draws on Sosny’s experience in designing the Pamir-630D truck-mounted small nuclear reactor, two of which were built in Belarus from 1976 during the Soviet era. This was a 5000 kWt/630 kWe HTR reactor using 45% enriched fuel in rods with zirconium hydride moderator and driving a gas turbine with dinitrogen tetroxide (N 2 O 4 ) through the Brayton cycle. After some operational experience in 1985-86 the Pamir project was scrapped. The new design will be a similar HTR concept but about 2 MWe.

Joint Institute for Nuclear Research

The Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, at Dubna near Moscow, is an international physics research centre with 18 member states and six associate members. It has the IBR-2M fast periodic pulsed reactor of 2 MWt, commissioned in 1984 and modernised in 2010 with higher neutron flux. It uses plutonium oxide fuel. 

Mining & Chemical Combine (MCC)

At the Mining & Chemical Combine (MCC), Zheleznogorsk the ADE2 reactor was the third nuclear reactor of its kind built in Russia and came on line in 1964, primarily as a plutonium production unit. However, from 1995 heat and electricity production became its main purposes. The ADE-2 operating experience contributed to technological measures to justify and extend service lives of RBMK reactors at nuclear power plants, with considerable economic benefit and safety improvement. This work was given a governmental science and technology award in 2009. ADE2 was closed for final decommissioning in April 2010 after "46 years of nearly faultless operation".

MCC Zheleznogorsk also produces granulated MOX for vibropacked FNR fuel, using both military and civil plutonium.

Other R&D establishments

PA Mayak  at Ozersk is the main production centre for radioisotopes.

The Institute for Reactor Materials  (IRM) is at Zarechny, near Beloyarsk, Penza oblast.

TVEL's A.A. Bochvar High Technology Research Institute of Inorganic Materials ( VNIINM ) at Mayak supplies components for fast reactor fuel assemblies. It earlier developed the technology for reprocessing spent uranium-beryllium fuel from liquid metal-cooled fast reactors in dismantled Alpha-class nuclear submarines.

The All-Russian Scientific and Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operation ( VNIIAES ) in Moscow was founded in 1979 to provide scientific and technical support for operation of nuclear power plants aimed at improving their safety, reliability and efficiency as well as scientific coordination of the setup of mass-constructed nuclear power facilities.

In 2009 the Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute (MEPhI) was renamed the National Research Nuclear University and reformed to incorporate a number of other educational establishments. While partly funded by Rosatom, it is the responsibility of the Federal Education Agency (Rosobrazovaniye).

Public opinion

An April 2008 survey carried out by the Levada Centre found that 72% of Russians were in favour of at least preserving the country's nuclear power capacity and 41% thought that nuclear was the only alternative to oil and gas as they deplete. Over half said that they were indignant about Soviet attempts to cover up news of the Chernobyl accident in 1986.

In April 2010 the Levada Centre polled 1600 adults and found that 37% supported current levels of nuclear power, 37% favoured its active development (making 74% positive), while 10% would like a phase-out and 4.3% would prefer to abandon it completely. 42.6% saw no alternative to nuclear power for replacing depleting oil and gas.

Immediately after the Fukushima accident in 2011 Levada had only 22% for active development, 30% maintaining current level (ie 52% positive), 27% wanting a phase-out and 12% wanting to abandon it.

In February 2012 a Levada Centre poll showed that 29% of respondents favoured active development of nuclear power, while 37% support retaining it at the current level, so 66% positive. Only 15% of suggested phasing it out, and 7% preferred abandoning nuclear.

The Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) took a poll in April 2012 on the anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. It found that 27% of Russians support nuclear power development – up from 16% in 2011, 38 % agree with the present level, and 26% want to reduce it. Nuclear development is supported by young (32%), highly-educated Russians (31%), residents of cities with a population of one million and more, large cities and towns (30-33%). Regarding safety, 35% consider plants of be sufficiently safe, and 57% don’t.

In 2015 a poll commissioned by Rosenergoatom found that a clear majority of citizens living near nuclear power plants were in favour of them, and that support had grown since 2013. Most figures for the local plants were more than 70% favourable, and for nuclear power development they were above 80%.

Non-proliferation

Russia is a nuclear weapons state, and a depository state of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) under which a safeguards agreement has been in force since 1985. The Additional Protocol was ratified in 2007. However, Russia takes the view that voluntary application of IAEA safeguards are not meaningful for a nuclear weapons state and so they are not generally applied. One exception is the BN-600 Beloyarsk-3 reactor which is safeguarded so as to give experience of such units to IAEA inspectors.

However, this policy is modified in respect to some uranium imports. All facilities where imported uranium under certain bilateral treaties goes must be on the list of those eligible and open to international inspection, and this overrides the voluntary aspect of voluntary offer agreements. It includes conversion plants, enrichment, fuel fabrication and nuclear power plants. Also the IUEC at Angarsk will be open to inspection.

Russia undertook nuclear weapons tests from 1949 to 1990.

Russia's last plutonium production reactor which started up in 1964 was finally closed down in April 2010 - delayed because it also provided district heating, and replacement plant for this was ready until then. The reactor may be held in reserve for heating, not dismantled. The other two such production reactors were closed in 2008. All three closures are in accordance with a 2003 US-Russia agreement.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

The Soviet Union also used 116 nuclear explosions (81 in Russia) for geological research, creating underground gas storage, boosting oil and gas production and excavating reservoirs and canals. Most were in the 3-10 kiloton range and all occurred 1965-88.

Background: Soviet nuclear culture

In the 1950s and 1960s Russia seemed to be taking impressive steps to contest world leadership in civil development of nuclear energy. It had developed two major reactor designs, one from military plutonium production technology (the light water cooled graphite moderated reactor – RBMK), and one from naval propulsion units, very much as in USA (the VVER series - pressurised, water cooled and moderated). An ambitious plant, Atommash, to mass produce the latter design was taking shape near Volgodonsk, construction of numerous nuclear plants was in hand and the country had many skilled nuclear engineers.

But a technological arrogance developed, in the context of an impatient Soviet establishment. Then Atommash sunk into the Volga sediments, Chernobyl tragically vindicated western reactor design criteria, and the political structure which was not up to the task of safely utilising such technology fell apart. Atommash had been set up to produce eight sets of nuclear plant equipment each year (reactor pressure vessels, steam generators, refueling machines, pressurizers, service machinery – a total of 250 items). In 1981 it manufactured the first VVER-1000 pressure vessel, which was shipped to South Ukraine NPP. Later, its products were supplied to Balakovo, Smolensk (RBMK), and Kalinin in Russia, and Zaporozhe, Rovno and Khmelnitsky plants in Ukraine. By 1986 Atommash had produced 14 pressure vessels (of which five have remained at the factory), instead of the eight per year intended. Then Chernobyl put the whole nuclear industry into a long standby. Russia was disgraced technologically, and this was exacerbated by a series of incidents in its nuclear-propelled navy contrasting with a near-impeccable safety record in the US Navy.

An early indication of the technological carelessness was substantial pollution followed by a major accident at Mayak Chemical Combine (then known as Chelyabinsk-40) near Kyshtym in 1957. The failure of the cooling system for a tank storing many tonnes of dissolved nuclear waste resulted in a non-nuclear explosion having a force estimated at about 75 tonnes of TNT (310 GJ). This killed 200 people and released some 740 PBq of radioactivity, affecting thousands more. Up to 1951 the Mayak plant had dumped its waste into the Techa River, whose waters ultimately flow into the Ob River and Arctic Ocean. Then they were disposed of into Lake Karachay until at least 1953, when a storage facility for high-level waste was built – the source of the 1957 accident. Finally, a 1967 duststorm picked up a lot of radioactive material from the dry bed of Lake Karachay and deposited it on to the surrounding province. The outcome of these three events made some 26,000 square kilometres the most radioactively-polluted area on Earth by some estimates, comparable with Chernobyl.

After Chernobyl there was a significant change of culture in the Russian civil nuclear establishment, at least at the plant level, and this change was even more evident in the countries of eastern Europe who saw the opportunity for technological emancipation from Russia. By the early 1990s a number of western assistance programs were in place which addressed safety issues and helped to alter fundamentally the way things were done in the eastern bloc, including Russia itself. Design and operating deficiencies were tackled, and a safety culture started to emerge. At the same time some R&D programs were suspended.

Both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Association of Nuclear Operators contributed strongly to huge gains in safety and reliability of Soviet-era nuclear plants – WANO having come into existence as a result of Chernobyl. In the first two years of WANO's existence, 1989-91, operating staff from every nuclear plant in the former Soviet Union visited plants in the west on technical exchange, and western personnel visited every FSU plant. A great deal of ongoing plant-to-plant cooperation, and subsequently a voluntary peer review program, grew out of these exchanges.

Notes & references

General references.

Prof V.Ivanov, WNA Symposium 2001, Prof A.Gagarinski and Mr A.Malyshev, WNA Symposium 2002 Josephson, Paul R, 1999, Red Atom - Russia's nuclear power program from Stalin to today Minatom 2000, Strategy of Nuclear Power Development in Russia O. Saraev, paper at WNA mid-term meeting in Moscow, May 2003 Rosenergoatom Bulletin 2002, esp. M.Rogov paper Perera, Judith 2003, Nuclear Power in the Former USSR , McCloskey, UK Kamenskikh, I, 2005, paper at WNA Symposium Kirienko, S. 2006, paper at World Nuclear Fuel Cycle conference, April and WNA Symposium, Sept Shchedrovitsky, P. 2007, paper at WNA Symposium, Sept Panov et al 2006, Floating Power Sources Based on Nuclear reactor Plants Rosenergoatom website Rosatom website nuclear.ru OECD NEA & IAEA, 2012, Uranium 2011: Resources, Production and Demand – 'Red Book' Rybachenov, V. 2012, Disposition of Excess Weapons-grade Plutonium – problems and prospects, Centre for Arms Control, Energy & Environmental Studies Status of Small and Medium Sized Reactor Designs – A Supplement to the IAEA Advanced Reactors Information System (ARIS) , International Atomic Energy Agency, September 2012 Diakov, A. & Podvig, P, March 2013, Spent nuclear fuel management in the Russian Federation Gavrilov, P.M. Sept 2015, Establishing the centralised ‘dry’ SNF storage and the MOX-fuel production for fast neutron reactors at MCC site, World Nuclear Association 2015 Symposium presentation. M. Baryshnikov, REMIX Nuclear Fuel Cycle, World Nuclear Fuel Cycle conference, Abu Dhabi, April 2016 M. Aboimov, Enriching the Past (legacy nuclear materials), World Nuclear Fuel Cycle conference, Abu Dhabi, April 2016 A.V. Boitsov et al , Uranium production and environmental restoration at the Priargunsky Centre, Russian Federation , International Atomic Energy Agency (2002) European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) & Northern Development Environmental Partnership, Overcoming the Legacy of the Soviet Nuclear Fleet , Andreeva Bay 27 June 2017 Anatoli Diakov. The History of Plutonium Production in Russia , Science & Global Security, 19, pp. 28-45 (2011)

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The Independent Nuclear News Agency

Fast reactors / russia’s tvel delivers first batch of fuel for china’s cfr-600 demonstrator.

By Kamen Kraev 7 October 2022

The fuel assemblies were manufactured at the Elemash Machine-Building Plant in Elektrostal, near Moscow.

In January 2019, Tvel signed a contract to supply nuclear fuel for the CFR-600 demonstration project.

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