discrimination based on gender essay

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What Is Discrimination?

Reporting discrimination.

Discrimination occurs when individuals or groups are treated unfairly based on a protected class, such as age, disability, marital status, national origin, race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or military status. Discrimination is harmful to our entire community and can lead to feelings of isolation, anxiety, and self-doubt impacting our goal to create a successful learning and working environment. At Ithaca College we are committed to preventing discrimination through education in and outside of the classroom, aligning our policies and procedures to comply with state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination, and having support in place for affected individuals.

Ithaca College has resources available for individuals’ experiencing discrimination. To learn about those resources, visit www.ithaca.edu/diversity .

As members of the Ithaca College community, we have the power to create positive change. Continue to help us build a culture that promotes equity, inclusion, and belonging.

• If you experience or witness discrimination based on gender or sex, make a report to the Title IX Office.
• If you experience or witness discrimination based on any other protected class, use this form to notify appropriate offices for their response.

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Essay on Gender Discrimination

• Updated on  
• Jul 14, 2022

One of the challenges present in today’s society is gender discrimination. Gender discrimination is when someone is treated unequally based on their gender. Gender discrimination is not just present in the workplace but in schools, colleges and communities as well. As per the Civil Rights Act of 1964,  gender discrimination is illegal in India. This is also an important and common essay topic in schools and competitive exams such as IELTS , TOEFL , SAT , UPSC , etc. Let’s explore some samples of essay on gender discrimination and tips for writing an impactful essay.

Tips for Writing an Impactful Essay

If you want to write a scoring and deep impact essay, here are some tips for writing a perfect informative essay:

• The most important and first step is to write an introduction and background information about and related to the topic
• Then you are also required to use the formal style of writing and avoid using slang language
• To make an essay more impactful, write dates, quotations, and names to provide a better understanding
• You can use jargon wherever it is necessary as it sometimes makes an essay complicated
• To make an essay more creative, you can also add information in bulleted points wherever possible
• Always remember to add a conclusion where you need to summarise crucial points
• Once you are done read through the lines and check spelling and grammar mistakes before submission

Essay on Gender Discrimination in 200 Words

One of the important aspects of a democratic society is the elimination of gender discrimination. The root cause of this vigorous disease is the stereotypical society itself. When a child is born, the discrimination begins; if the child is male, he is given a car, bat and ball with blue, and red colour clothes, whereas when a child is female, she is given barbie dolls with pink clothes. We all are raised with a mentality that boys are good at sports and messy, but girls are not good at sports and are well organised. This discriminatory mentality has a deeper impact when girls are told not to work while boys are allowed to do much work. This categorising males and females into different categories discriminating based on gender are known as gender discrimination. Further, this discriminatory behaviour in society leads to hatred, injustice and much more. This gender discrimination is evident in every woman’s life at the workplace, in educational institutions, in sports, etc., where young girls and women are deprived of their rights and undervalued. This major issue prevailing in society can be solved only by providing equality to women and giving them all rights as given to men.

Essay on Gender Discrimination in 300 Words 

Gender Discrimination, as the term signifies, is discrimination or discriminatory behaviour based on gender. The stereotypical mindset of people in the past has led to the discrimination that women face today. According to Kahle Wolfe, in 2015, women earned 83% of the income paid to men by working the same hours. Almost all women are not only discriminated against based on their salaries but also on their looks.

Further, most women are allowed to follow a certain dress code depending upon the work field and the dress women wear also decides their future career.

This dominant male society teaches males that women are weak and innocent. Thus women are mostly victims and are targeted in crimes. For example, In a large portion of the globe, women are blamed for rapes despite being victims because of their clothes. This society also portrays women as weaker and not eligible enough to take a stand for themselves, leading to the major destruction of women’s personalities as men are taught to let women down. This mindset of people nowadays is a major social justice issue leading to gender discrimination in society.

Further, gender-based discrimination is evident across the globe in a plethora of things, including sports, education, health and law. Every 1 out of 3 women in the world is abused in various forms at some point in their lives by men. This social evil is present in most parts of the world; in India, women are burnt to death if they are incapable of affording financial requirements; in Egypt, women are killed by society if they are sensed doing something unclean in or out of their families, whereas in South Africa baby girls are abandoned or killed as they are considered as burden for the family. Thus gender discrimination can be only eliminated from society by educating people about giving equal rights and respect to every gender.

Top Universities for Gender Studies Abroad

UK, Canada and USA are the top three countries to study gender studies abroad. Here’s the list of top universities you can consider to study abroad for Indian students if you planning to pursue gender studies course abroad:

We hope this blog has helped you in structuring a terrific essay on gender discrimination. Planning to ace your IELTS, get expert tips from coaches at Leverage Live by Leverage Edu .

Sonal is a creative, enthusiastic writer and editor who has worked extensively for the Study Abroad domain. She splits her time between shooting fun insta reels and learning new tools for content marketing. If she is missing from her desk, you can find her with a group of people cracking silly jokes or petting neighbourhood dogs.

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Essay on Gender Discrimination 1000+ Words

Gender discrimination is a deeply concerning issue that persists in our society. It refers to the unfair treatment or prejudice based on a person’s gender, whether they are male, female, or identify as another gender. In this essay, we will explore the concept of gender discrimination, its forms, consequences, and the ongoing fight for gender equality.

Understanding Gender Discrimination

Gender discrimination can take many forms, such as unequal pay for equal work, limited access to education or job opportunities, and stereotypes that restrict the roles and expectations of individuals based on their gender. It is important to recognize that discrimination affects both males and females, although women and transgender individuals often bear the brunt of it.

The Gender Pay Gap

One glaring example of gender discrimination is the gender pay gap. On average, women still earn less than men for doing the same job. In the United States, women earn approximately 82 cents for every dollar earned by men. This wage disparity limits women’s economic independence and hinders their financial well-being.

Unequal Access to Education

Gender discrimination also manifests in unequal access to education. In some parts of the world, girls face barriers that prevent them from attending school or receiving a quality education. This disparity not only limits their personal growth but also hampers the development of their communities and nations.

Stereotypes and Prejudice

Stereotypes and prejudiced beliefs about gender roles persist in many societies. These stereotypes dictate what is considered “appropriate” behavior, careers, or interests for males and females. For instance, the belief that only men can excel in leadership roles or that women are not suited for science and technology careers perpetuates gender discrimination.

The Consequences of Gender Discrimination

Gender discrimination has far-reaching consequences for individuals and society as a whole. It leads to lower self-esteem, diminished opportunities, and reduced overall well-being for those affected. Additionally, it perpetuates harmful gender norms and reinforces societal inequalities.

The Ongoing Fight for Gender Equality

Fortunately, there is a growing global movement to combat gender discrimination and promote gender equality. Women’s rights activists, organizations, and governments are working tirelessly to break down the barriers that perpetuate discrimination. International agreements like the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals include gender equality as a key objective.

Empowering Girls and Women

Empowering girls and women is at the heart of the fight against gender discrimination. Providing access to quality education, encouraging girls to pursue careers in all fields, and ensuring equal pay for equal work are essential steps toward gender equality. These actions not only benefit individuals but also contribute to stronger, more equitable societies.

Challenging Stereotypes

Challenging stereotypes and changing societal attitudes is another crucial aspect of the battle against gender discrimination. Promoting diverse and inclusive role models, both in real life and in media, helps break down traditional gender norms and promotes acceptance and equality for all genders.

Conclusion of Essay on Gender Discrimination

In conclusion, gender discrimination is a persistent issue that affects individuals and societies around the world. It manifests in various forms, from unequal pay to limited educational opportunities and harmful stereotypes. The consequences of gender discrimination are significant and far-reaching, impacting the lives and well-being of countless people.

However, there is hope. The fight for gender equality is gaining momentum, with individuals and organizations working tirelessly to challenge discrimination and promote equal rights. Empowering girls and women, ensuring equal pay, and challenging stereotypes are vital steps on the path to a more equitable world.

Gender discrimination is a problem that requires the collective effort of society to eradicate. By recognizing its existence, understanding its consequences, and actively working toward gender equality, we can break down the barriers of discrimination and build a future where all individuals, regardless of their gender, can thrive and fulfill their potential.

Also Check: The Essay on Essay: All you need to know

Essay on Gender Discrimination

Students are often asked to write an essay on Gender Discrimination in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Gender Discrimination

Understanding gender discrimination.

Gender discrimination refers to the unjust treatment of individuals based on their gender. It occurs when people are treated less favorably because they are male or female.

Forms of Gender Discrimination

This discrimination can take many forms. It can be seen in the workplace with unequal pay or opportunities. In schools, it may manifest as biased treatment or stereotyping.

Effects of Gender Discrimination

The effects of gender discrimination are harmful. It can lead to a lack of self-esteem, depression, and reduced opportunities for those affected.

Combating Gender Discrimination

To combat gender discrimination, we need to promote equality, challenge stereotypes, and encourage respect for all genders.

250 Words Essay on Gender Discrimination

Introduction.

Gender discrimination, also known as sex discrimination, involves treating an individual unfavorably due to their gender. It is a pervasive issue that transcends geographical boundaries and socio-economic contexts, affecting individuals and societies at large.

Manifestations of Gender Discrimination

Gender discrimination manifests in diverse ways, including disparities in education, employment, and healthcare. Women, for instance, often experience wage gaps, occupational segregation, and limited access to education. On the other hand, men may encounter bias in child custody cases or in sectors traditionally dominated by women.

The Impact of Gender Discrimination

The impact of gender discrimination is far-reaching. It stifles economic growth, hampers social progress, and undermines human rights. Gender discrimination can also perpetuate harmful stereotypes, leading to a cycle of inequality that can span generations.

Addressing Gender Discrimination

Addressing gender discrimination requires a multi-faceted approach. Legal frameworks should be implemented and enforced to protect individuals against discrimination. Additionally, educational campaigns can help challenge harmful stereotypes and promote gender equality.

In conclusion, gender discrimination is a pressing issue that demands our collective attention and action. By promoting gender equality, we can create more inclusive societies that value and respect the rights of all individuals, regardless of their gender.

500 Words Essay on Gender Discrimination

Introduction: understanding gender discrimination.

Gender discrimination, a pervasive societal issue, refers to unequal treatment or perceptions of individuals based on their gender. It manifests in various areas of life, from employment and education to health care and personal relationships. This essay delves into the roots of gender discrimination, its implications, and potential solutions.

The Roots of Gender Discrimination

Gender discrimination originates from deep-seated cultural norms and stereotypes. Societies often have preconceived notions about the roles and behaviors appropriate for different genders. These stereotypes, perpetuated through generations, contribute to the discrimination faced by those who do not conform.

For instance, women are often expected to be nurturing, emotional, and submissive, while men are perceived as strong, rational, and dominant. Such binary perceptions not only limit individual potential but also create an environment ripe for discrimination.

Implications of Gender Discrimination

The implications of gender discrimination are far-reaching and multifaceted. In the workplace, it often results in unequal pay and limited opportunities for advancement. According to the World Economic Forum, it could take another 257 years to close the economic gender gap at the current pace of change.

In healthcare, women often face discrimination, leading to inadequate healthcare services. For instance, women’s pain is often taken less seriously than men’s, leading to misdiagnosis or under-treatment.

Addressing gender discrimination requires a multi-pronged approach. Firstly, legal measures should be implemented to ensure equal rights and opportunities for all genders. This includes laws against gender-based violence, policies for equal pay, and regulations ensuring equal access to education and healthcare.

Finally, representation matters. Ensuring diverse representation in all areas of society, from politics to media, can challenge the status quo and promote a more balanced perception of gender roles.

Conclusion: Towards a Gender-Equal Society

Gender discrimination is a deeply ingrained societal issue with far-reaching implications. It is rooted in traditional gender roles and stereotypes, which limit individual potential and perpetuate inequality. Addressing this issue requires legal measures, societal change, and diverse representation. As we strive towards a more gender-equal society, it is crucial to challenge our perceptions and strive for equal rights and opportunities for all, regardless of gender.

Apart from these, you can look at all the essays by clicking here .

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What does gender equality look like today?

Date: Wednesday, 6 October 2021

Progress towards gender equality is looking bleak. But it doesn’t need to.

A new global analysis of progress on gender equality and women’s rights shows women and girls remain disproportionately affected by the socioeconomic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, struggling with disproportionately high job and livelihood losses, education disruptions and increased burdens of unpaid care work. Women’s health services, poorly funded even before the pandemic, faced major disruptions, undermining women’s sexual and reproductive health. And despite women’s central role in responding to COVID-19, including as front-line health workers, they are still largely bypassed for leadership positions they deserve.

UN Women’s latest report, together with UN DESA, Progress on the Sustainable Development Goals: The Gender Snapshot 2021 presents the latest data on gender equality across all 17 Sustainable Development Goals. The report highlights the progress made since 2015 but also the continued alarm over the COVID-19 pandemic, its immediate effect on women’s well-being and the threat it poses to future generations.

We’re breaking down some of the findings from the report, and calling for the action needed to accelerate progress.

The pandemic is making matters worse

One and a half years since the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic, the toll on the poorest and most vulnerable people remains devastating and disproportionate. The combined impact of conflict, extreme weather events and COVID-19 has deprived women and girls of even basic needs such as food security. Without urgent action to stem rising poverty, hunger and inequality, especially in countries affected by conflict and other acute forms of crisis, millions will continue to suffer.

A global goal by global goal reality check:

Goal 1. Poverty

In 2021, extreme poverty is on the rise and progress towards its elimination has reversed. An estimated 435 million women and girls globally are living in extreme poverty.

And yet we can change this .

Over 150 million women and girls could emerge from poverty by 2030 if governments implement a comprehensive strategy to improve access to education and family planning, achieve equal wages and extend social transfers.

Goal 2. Zero hunger

The global gender gap in food security has risen dramatically during the pandemic, with more women and girls going hungry. Women’s food insecurity levels were 10 per cent higher than men’s in 2020, compared with 6 per cent higher in 2019.

This trend can be reversed , including by supporting women small-scale producers, who typically earn far less than men, through increased funding, training and land rights reforms.

Goal 3. Good health and well-being

Disruptions in essential health services due to COVID-19 are taking a tragic toll on women and girls. In the first year of the pandemic, there were an estimated 1.4 million additional unintended pregnancies in lower and middle-income countries.

We need to do better .

Response to the pandemic must include prioritizing sexual and reproductive health services, ensuring they continue to operate safely now and after the pandemic is long over. In addition, more support is needed to ensure life-saving personal protection equipment, tests, oxygen and especially vaccines are available in rich and poor countries alike as well as to vulnerable population within countries.

Goal 4. Quality education

A year and a half into the pandemic, schools remain partially or fully closed in 42 per cent of the world’s countries and territories. School closures spell lost opportunities for girls and an increased risk of violence, exploitation and early marriage .

Governments can do more to protect girls education .

Measures focused specifically on supporting girls returning to school are urgently needed, including measures focused on girls from marginalized communities who are most at risk.

Goal 5. Gender equality

The pandemic has tested and even reversed progress in expanding women’s rights and opportunities. Reports of violence against women and girls, a “shadow” pandemic to COVID-19, are increasing in many parts of the world. COVID-19 is also intensifying women’s workload at home, forcing many to leave the labour force altogether.

Building forward differently and better will hinge on placing women and girls at the centre of all aspects of response and recovery, including through gender-responsive laws, policies and budgeting.

Goal 6. Clean water and sanitation

In 2018, nearly 2.3 billion people lived in water-stressed countries. Without safe drinking water, adequate sanitation and menstrual hygiene facilities, women and girls find it harder to lead safe, productive and healthy lives.

Change is possible .

Involve those most impacted in water management processes, including women. Women’s voices are often missing in water management processes. 

Goal 7. Affordable and clean energy

Increased demand for clean energy and low-carbon solutions is driving an unprecedented transformation of the energy sector. But women are being left out. Women hold only 32 per cent of renewable energy jobs.

We can do better .

Expose girls early on to STEM education, provide training and support to women entering the energy field, close the pay gap and increase women’s leadership in the energy sector.

Goal 8. Decent work and economic growth

The number of employed women declined by 54 million in 2020 and 45 million women left the labour market altogether. Women have suffered steeper job losses than men, along with increased unpaid care burdens at home.

We must do more to support women in the workforce .

Guarantee decent work for all, introduce labour laws/reforms, removing legal barriers for married women entering the workforce, support access to affordable/quality childcare.

Goal 9. Industry, innovation and infrastructure

The COVID-19 crisis has spurred striking achievements in medical research and innovation. Women’s contribution has been profound. But still only a little over a third of graduates in the science, technology, engineering and mathematics field are female.

We can take action today.

 Quotas mandating that a proportion of research grants are awarded to women-led teams or teams that include women is one concrete way to support women researchers. 

Goal 10. Reduced inequalities

Limited progress for women is being eroded by the pandemic. Women facing multiple forms of discrimination, including women and girls with disabilities, migrant women, women discriminated against because of their race/ethnicity are especially affected.

Commit to end racism and discrimination in all its forms, invest in inclusive, universal, gender responsive social protection systems that support all women. 

Goal 11. Sustainable cities and communities

Globally, more than 1 billion people live in informal settlements and slums. Women and girls, often overrepresented in these densely populated areas, suffer from lack of access to basic water and sanitation, health care and transportation.

The needs of urban poor women must be prioritized .

Increase the provision of durable and adequate housing and equitable access to land; included women in urban planning and development processes.

Goal 12. Sustainable consumption and production; Goal 13. Climate action; Goal 14. Life below water; and Goal 15. Life on land

Women activists, scientists and researchers are working hard to solve the climate crisis but often without the same platforms as men to share their knowledge and skills. Only 29 per cent of featured speakers at international ocean science conferences are women.

 And yet we can change this .

Ensure women activists, scientists and researchers have equal voice, representation and access to forums where these issues are being discussed and debated. 

Goal 16. Peace, justice and strong institutions

The lack of women in decision-making limits the reach and impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and other emergency recovery efforts. In conflict-affected countries, 18.9 per cent of parliamentary seats are held by women, much lower than the global average of 25.6 per cent.

This is unacceptable .

It's time for women to have an equal share of power and decision-making at all levels.

Goal 17. Global partnerships for the goals

There are just 9 years left to achieve the Global Goals by 2030, and gender equality cuts across all 17 of them. With COVID-19 slowing progress on women's rights, the time to act is now.

Looking ahead

As it stands today, only one indicator under the global goal for gender equality (SDG5) is ‘close to target’: proportion of seats held by women in local government. In other areas critical to women’s empowerment, equality in time spent on unpaid care and domestic work and decision making regarding sexual and reproductive health the world is far from target. Without a bold commitment to accelerate progress, the global community will fail to achieve gender equality. Building forward differently and better will require placing women and girls at the centre of all aspects of response and recovery, including through gender-responsive laws, policies and budgeting.

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What is Gender Discrimination?

Around the world, individuals, businesses, governments, and other systems discriminate against people based on gender. Cis women and girls are the most recognized target, but trans people face significant gender discrimination, as well. Discrimination harms these groups and society as a whole. In this article, we’ll define gender and gender discrimination, provide three examples of gender discrimination in action, and explain its negative effects.

Gender discrimination occurs when a person is treated negatively or unequally based on their gender. It includes restricted access to education, jobs, and healthcare; unequal pay; sexual harassment; and much more.

What is gender?

Before we talk about gender discrimination, we need to know what “gender” is. The World Health Organization has a decent definition: “Gender refers to the characteristics of women, men, girls and boys that are socially constructed.” When society talks about “gender norms,” it’s referring to behaviors and roles associated with men, women, girls, and boys. While not inaccurate, the WHO’s definition is incomplete because it implies a kind of binary. There are more genders beyond men, women, girls, and boys. The Canadian Institutes of Health Research provides a fuller definition: “Gender refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviors, expressions and identities of girls, women, boys, men, and gender diverse people.” In short, gender is a social construct that varies over time and across societies.

How is gender different from sex? The CIHR defines sex as “a set of biological attributes in humans and animals.” These attributes include chromosomes, gene expression, hormone levels and function, and reproductive/sexual anatomy. Sex is typically categorized as “male” or “female,” but even within sex, categories are more complex than a binary. People can identify with the gender typically associated with their sex (cisgender) or identify with a different gender (transgender). If someone doesn’t identify with an exclusively male or female gender, they may call themselves “non-binary.” If someone is flexible about the gender they identify as they may call themselves “gender fluid.” These identities are considered part of the trans community, but because gender is tied to personal identity and self-representation, there are no fixed rules or definitions. Courses like the ones on this list provide further education on topics like sex and gender.

What is gender discrimination and is it a violation of someone’s rights?

Gender discrimination is when someone is treated unequally and unfairly based on their gender identity. Like all discrimination, gender discrimination is a human rights violation, though the distinction between “gender” and “sex” is a more recent development. Take the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as an example. Article 2 reads: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex [emphasis added], language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status (emphasis added).” Article 2 covers sex discrimination, but it doesn’t mention gender. This is most likely because when the UDHR was written, gender and sex were considered the same. Times have changed. The phrase “other status” has been used to expand the rights given in Article 2. A press release from the UN describes how the organization and regional instruments have based changes on this phrase.

What does gender discrimination look like?

There are countless instances of gender discrimination fueling gender inequality and gender-based violence. Let’s take a closer look at three examples to see how gender discrimination touches every part of societies around the world:

Paying women less for the same work

The gender pay gap is a global issue. According to the International Labor Organization, women make about 20 cents less than men. There are factors like differences in jobs, education, skills, and experience, but gender discrimination is a significant factor, as well. In the United States, Lilly Ledbetter experienced this firsthand. For almost 20 years, Ledbetter worked in managerial positions at a Goodyear tire manufacturing plant. According to a write-up from the National Women’s Law Center, she faced sexual harassment and discrimination from her boss, who believed women shouldn’t work at the plant. Ledbetter also wasn’t allowed to talk about her salary, so it wasn’t until she got an anonymous note that she learned she was paid less than men in the same position. Ledbetter filed a lawsuit.

The court process was a rollercoaster. First, a jury decided in her favor, awarding her back pay and damages. Then, Goodyear tried to vacate the judgment. It eventually went to the Supreme Court where Goodyear prevailed. The majority reasoned that Ledbetter lost her right to sue for pay discrimination because she hadn’t brought her claim within 180 days of getting the first discriminatory check. This ruling ignored the fact that the discrimination was ongoing and, because of the secrecy around salaries, there was no way Ledbetter could have known she was being paid less. While she may have lost the court case, Ledbetter’s lawsuit led to the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in 2009. It resets the 180-day filing period each time discrimination happens. When people work to establish laws like this, they help close the gender gap in Economic Participation and Opportunity.

Restricting education access for girls

Gender discrimination in education is one of the root causes of gender inequality worldwide. Without a good education, individuals are severely limited when it comes to job opportunities. The consequences fan out from there, making a person more vulnerable to poverty, violence, human trafficking, poor health, and more. Globally, girls tend to be targets of discrimination. What’s happened recently in Afghanistan is a prime example.

From 1996-2001, the Taliban did not let girls study. In August 2021, the Taliban regained control in the region and began restricting girls from school once again. At first, the militant fundamentalist group said it would let girls attend secondary school, but in 2022 , they broke their promise. Girls had already shown up to their classrooms only to be turned away. The Taliban’s excuse? They were trying to decide on a school uniform. This is significant because back in 1996-2001, the Taliban didn’t technically outlaw education for girls. They kept saying school closures were temporary and that as soon as things were sorted out, girls could come back. That never happened. Now, people fear the same situation is unfolding today. There have also been restrictions at the university level . At Nangarhar University, girls are only allowed to choose from seven of the 13 faculties. They are not allowed to take subjects like engineering, economics, agriculture, veterinary medicine, and journalism. This is blatant gender discrimination.

Discriminating against trans people in healthcare settings

Trans people face significant gender discrimination. Some of the most consequential discrimination occurs in healthcare settings, which is a big reason why trans people are more vulnerable to health problems. In the largest study of transgender and gender non-conforming people in the US, 19% of participants said they were denied care because of their gender identity. 28% reported harassment in medical settings and high levels of delaying care when hurt or sick because of the discrimination. Half of the participants also said they needed to educate their medical providers on transgender care.

Delaying care because of discrimination and trauma – as well as receiving poor medical treatment – worsen health outcomes for transgender people. A 2019 study from the CDC found that trans people were twice as likely as cisgender adults to receive depression diagnoses. They’re also at a higher risk for asthma and heart disease. This shows a clear link between discrimination and poor health. The medical field needs to address transphobia and ignorance if it wants to stop discriminating based on gender. Some of the courses on this list provide further information on gender and health.

How does gender discrimination hurt everyone?

Gender discrimination impacts a person’s health. According to research compiled in a Medical News Today article , women who reported gender discrimination within the year got higher scores on a depression screening tool. Women also experience higher risks for anxiety, PTSD, and eating disorders. While men are more likely to die by suicide, women are 1.5 times more likely to attempt suicide. The exact reason isn’t clear, but experts believe discrimination plays a role. Gender discrimination also intersects with issues involving race, class, religion, and more, which complicates and compounds the discrimination.

Gender inequality negatively affects everyone, not just its targets. In a study from the Global Early Adolescent Study, gender stereotypes hurt both boys and girls. Boys are often taught to deal with their issues using violence. They’re also less equipped to handle difficult emotions, which could explain why men are more likely to die by suicide. When gender stereotypes exist, anyone who doesn’t fit the stereotypes – whether they’re women, men, or non-binary – faces discrimination. Still not sure of how significant gender discrimination is? It leads to gender inequality, which hurts a nation’s economy. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, gender discrimination in social institutions leads to a $6 trillion loss for the global economy. When everyone is allowed full economic freedom and opportunities, it makes sense that the whole economy – and not just individuals and families – benefits. For the sake of everyone in society, ending gender discrimination is essential.

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About the author, emmaline soken-huberty.

Emmaline Soken-Huberty is a freelance writer based in Portland, Oregon. She started to become interested in human rights while attending college, eventually getting a concentration in human rights and humanitarianism. LGBTQ+ rights, women’s rights, and climate change are of special concern to her. In her spare time, she can be found reading or enjoying Oregon’s natural beauty with her husband and dog.

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Research: How Bias Against Women Persists in Female-Dominated Workplaces

• Amber L. Stephenson,
• Leanne M. Dzubinski

A look inside the ongoing barriers women face in law, health care, faith-based nonprofits, and higher education.

New research examines gender bias within four industries with more female than male workers — law, higher education, faith-based nonprofits, and health care. Having balanced or even greater numbers of women in an organization is not, by itself, changing women’s experiences of bias. Bias is built into the system and continues to operate even when more women than men are present. Leaders can use these findings to create gender-equitable practices and environments which reduce bias. First, replace competition with cooperation. Second, measure success by goals, not by time spent in the office or online. Third, implement equitable reward structures, and provide remote and flexible work with autonomy. Finally, increase transparency in decision making.

It’s been thought that once industries achieve gender balance, bias will decrease and gender gaps will close. Sometimes called the “ add women and stir ” approach, people tend to think that having more women present is all that’s needed to promote change. But simply adding women into a workplace does not change the organizational structures and systems that benefit men more than women . Our new research (to be published in a forthcoming issue of Personnel Review ) shows gender bias is still prevalent in gender-balanced and female-dominated industries.

• Amy Diehl , PhD is chief information officer at Wilson College and a gender equity researcher and speaker. She is coauthor of Glass Walls: Shattering the Six Gender Bias Barriers Still Holding Women Back at Work (Rowman & Littlefield). Find her on LinkedIn at Amy-Diehl , X/Twitter @amydiehl , and visit her website at amy-diehl.com .
• AS Amber L. Stephenson , PhD is an associate professor of management and director of healthcare management programs in the David D. Reh School of Business at Clarkson University. Her research focuses on the healthcare workforce, how professional identity influences attitudes and behaviors, and how women leaders experience gender bias.
• LD Leanne M. Dzubinski , PhD is professor of leadership and director of the Beeson International Center at Asbury Seminary, and a prominent researcher on women in leadership. She is coauthor of Glass Walls: Shattering the Six Gender Bias Barriers Still Holding Women Back at Work (Rowman & Littlefield).

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Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender

Feminism is said to be the movement to end women’s oppression (hooks 2000, 26). One possible way to understand ‘woman’ in this claim is to take it as a sex term: ‘woman’ picks out human females and being a human female depends on various biological and anatomical features (like genitalia). Historically many feminists have understood ‘woman’ differently: not as a sex term, but as a gender term that depends on social and cultural factors (like social position). In so doing, they distinguished sex (being female or male) from gender (being a woman or a man), although most ordinary language users appear to treat the two interchangeably. In feminist philosophy, this distinction has generated a lively debate. Central questions include: What does it mean for gender to be distinct from sex, if anything at all? How should we understand the claim that gender depends on social and/or cultural factors? What does it mean to be gendered woman, man, or genderqueer? This entry outlines and discusses distinctly feminist debates on sex and gender considering both historical and more contemporary positions.

1.1 Biological determinism

1.2 gender terminology, 2.1 gender socialisation, 2.2 gender as feminine and masculine personality, 2.3 gender as feminine and masculine sexuality, 3.1.1 particularity argument, 3.1.2 normativity argument, 3.2 is sex classification solely a matter of biology, 3.3 are sex and gender distinct, 3.4 is the sex/gender distinction useful, 4.1.1 gendered social series, 4.1.2 resemblance nominalism, 4.2.1 social subordination and gender, 4.2.2 gender uniessentialism, 4.2.3 gender as positionality, 5. beyond the binary, 6. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the sex/gender distinction..

The terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ mean different things to different feminist theorists and neither are easy or straightforward to characterise. Sketching out some feminist history of the terms provides a helpful starting point.

Most people ordinarily seem to think that sex and gender are coextensive: women are human females, men are human males. Many feminists have historically disagreed and have endorsed the sex/ gender distinction. Provisionally: ‘sex’ denotes human females and males depending on biological features (chromosomes, sex organs, hormones and other physical features); ‘gender’ denotes women and men depending on social factors (social role, position, behaviour or identity). The main feminist motivation for making this distinction was to counter biological determinism or the view that biology is destiny.

A typical example of a biological determinist view is that of Geddes and Thompson who, in 1889, argued that social, psychological and behavioural traits were caused by metabolic state. Women supposedly conserve energy (being ‘anabolic’) and this makes them passive, conservative, sluggish, stable and uninterested in politics. Men expend their surplus energy (being ‘katabolic’) and this makes them eager, energetic, passionate, variable and, thereby, interested in political and social matters. These biological ‘facts’ about metabolic states were used not only to explain behavioural differences between women and men but also to justify what our social and political arrangements ought to be. More specifically, they were used to argue for withholding from women political rights accorded to men because (according to Geddes and Thompson) “what was decided among the prehistoric Protozoa cannot be annulled by Act of Parliament” (quoted from Moi 1999, 18). It would be inappropriate to grant women political rights, as they are simply not suited to have those rights; it would also be futile since women (due to their biology) would simply not be interested in exercising their political rights. To counter this kind of biological determinism, feminists have argued that behavioural and psychological differences have social, rather than biological, causes. For instance, Simone de Beauvoir famously claimed that one is not born, but rather becomes a woman, and that “social discrimination produces in women moral and intellectual effects so profound that they appear to be caused by nature” (Beauvoir 1972 [original 1949], 18; for more, see the entry on Simone de Beauvoir ). Commonly observed behavioural traits associated with women and men, then, are not caused by anatomy or chromosomes. Rather, they are culturally learned or acquired.

Although biological determinism of the kind endorsed by Geddes and Thompson is nowadays uncommon, the idea that behavioural and psychological differences between women and men have biological causes has not disappeared. In the 1970s, sex differences were used to argue that women should not become airline pilots since they will be hormonally unstable once a month and, therefore, unable to perform their duties as well as men (Rogers 1999, 11). More recently, differences in male and female brains have been said to explain behavioural differences; in particular, the anatomy of corpus callosum, a bundle of nerves that connects the right and left cerebral hemispheres, is thought to be responsible for various psychological and behavioural differences. For instance, in 1992, a Time magazine article surveyed then prominent biological explanations of differences between women and men claiming that women’s thicker corpus callosums could explain what ‘women’s intuition’ is based on and impair women’s ability to perform some specialised visual-spatial skills, like reading maps (Gorman 1992). Anne Fausto-Sterling has questioned the idea that differences in corpus callosums cause behavioural and psychological differences. First, the corpus callosum is a highly variable piece of anatomy; as a result, generalisations about its size, shape and thickness that hold for women and men in general should be viewed with caution. Second, differences in adult human corpus callosums are not found in infants; this may suggest that physical brain differences actually develop as responses to differential treatment. Third, given that visual-spatial skills (like map reading) can be improved by practice, even if women and men’s corpus callosums differ, this does not make the resulting behavioural differences immutable. (Fausto-Sterling 2000b, chapter 5).

In order to distinguish biological differences from social/psychological ones and to talk about the latter, feminists appropriated the term ‘gender’. Psychologists writing on transsexuality were the first to employ gender terminology in this sense. Until the 1960s, ‘gender’ was often used to refer to masculine and feminine words, like le and la in French. However, in order to explain why some people felt that they were ‘trapped in the wrong bodies’, the psychologist Robert Stoller (1968) began using the terms ‘sex’ to pick out biological traits and ‘gender’ to pick out the amount of femininity and masculinity a person exhibited. Although (by and large) a person’s sex and gender complemented each other, separating out these terms seemed to make theoretical sense allowing Stoller to explain the phenomenon of transsexuality: transsexuals’ sex and gender simply don’t match.

Along with psychologists like Stoller, feminists found it useful to distinguish sex and gender. This enabled them to argue that many differences between women and men were socially produced and, therefore, changeable. Gayle Rubin (for instance) uses the phrase ‘sex/gender system’ in order to describe “a set of arrangements by which the biological raw material of human sex and procreation is shaped by human, social intervention” (1975, 165). Rubin employed this system to articulate that “part of social life which is the locus of the oppression of women” (1975, 159) describing gender as the “socially imposed division of the sexes” (1975, 179). Rubin’s thought was that although biological differences are fixed, gender differences are the oppressive results of social interventions that dictate how women and men should behave. Women are oppressed as women and “by having to be women” (Rubin 1975, 204). However, since gender is social, it is thought to be mutable and alterable by political and social reform that would ultimately bring an end to women’s subordination. Feminism should aim to create a “genderless (though not sexless) society, in which one’s sexual anatomy is irrelevant to who one is, what one does, and with whom one makes love” (Rubin 1975, 204).

In some earlier interpretations, like Rubin’s, sex and gender were thought to complement one another. The slogan ‘Gender is the social interpretation of sex’ captures this view. Nicholson calls this ‘the coat-rack view’ of gender: our sexed bodies are like coat racks and “provide the site upon which gender [is] constructed” (1994, 81). Gender conceived of as masculinity and femininity is superimposed upon the ‘coat-rack’ of sex as each society imposes on sexed bodies their cultural conceptions of how males and females should behave. This socially constructs gender differences – or the amount of femininity/masculinity of a person – upon our sexed bodies. That is, according to this interpretation, all humans are either male or female; their sex is fixed. But cultures interpret sexed bodies differently and project different norms on those bodies thereby creating feminine and masculine persons. Distinguishing sex and gender, however, also enables the two to come apart: they are separable in that one can be sexed male and yet be gendered a woman, or vice versa (Haslanger 2000b; Stoljar 1995).

So, this group of feminist arguments against biological determinism suggested that gender differences result from cultural practices and social expectations. Nowadays it is more common to denote this by saying that gender is socially constructed. This means that genders (women and men) and gendered traits (like being nurturing or ambitious) are the “intended or unintended product[s] of a social practice” (Haslanger 1995, 97). But which social practices construct gender, what social construction is and what being of a certain gender amounts to are major feminist controversies. There is no consensus on these issues. (See the entry on intersections between analytic and continental feminism for more on different ways to understand gender.)

2. Gender as socially constructed

One way to interpret Beauvoir’s claim that one is not born but rather becomes a woman is to take it as a claim about gender socialisation: females become women through a process whereby they acquire feminine traits and learn feminine behaviour. Masculinity and femininity are thought to be products of nurture or how individuals are brought up. They are causally constructed (Haslanger 1995, 98): social forces either have a causal role in bringing gendered individuals into existence or (to some substantial sense) shape the way we are qua women and men. And the mechanism of construction is social learning. For instance, Kate Millett takes gender differences to have “essentially cultural, rather than biological bases” that result from differential treatment (1971, 28–9). For her, gender is “the sum total of the parents’, the peers’, and the culture’s notions of what is appropriate to each gender by way of temperament, character, interests, status, worth, gesture, and expression” (Millett 1971, 31). Feminine and masculine gender-norms, however, are problematic in that gendered behaviour conveniently fits with and reinforces women’s subordination so that women are socialised into subordinate social roles: they learn to be passive, ignorant, docile, emotional helpmeets for men (Millett 1971, 26). However, since these roles are simply learned, we can create more equal societies by ‘unlearning’ social roles. That is, feminists should aim to diminish the influence of socialisation.

Social learning theorists hold that a huge array of different influences socialise us as women and men. This being the case, it is extremely difficult to counter gender socialisation. For instance, parents often unconsciously treat their female and male children differently. When parents have been asked to describe their 24- hour old infants, they have done so using gender-stereotypic language: boys are describes as strong, alert and coordinated and girls as tiny, soft and delicate. Parents’ treatment of their infants further reflects these descriptions whether they are aware of this or not (Renzetti & Curran 1992, 32). Some socialisation is more overt: children are often dressed in gender stereotypical clothes and colours (boys are dressed in blue, girls in pink) and parents tend to buy their children gender stereotypical toys. They also (intentionally or not) tend to reinforce certain ‘appropriate’ behaviours. While the precise form of gender socialization has changed since the onset of second-wave feminism, even today girls are discouraged from playing sports like football or from playing ‘rough and tumble’ games and are more likely than boys to be given dolls or cooking toys to play with; boys are told not to ‘cry like a baby’ and are more likely to be given masculine toys like trucks and guns (for more, see Kimmel 2000, 122–126). [ 1 ]

According to social learning theorists, children are also influenced by what they observe in the world around them. This, again, makes countering gender socialisation difficult. For one, children’s books have portrayed males and females in blatantly stereotypical ways: for instance, males as adventurers and leaders, and females as helpers and followers. One way to address gender stereotyping in children’s books has been to portray females in independent roles and males as non-aggressive and nurturing (Renzetti & Curran 1992, 35). Some publishers have attempted an alternative approach by making their characters, for instance, gender-neutral animals or genderless imaginary creatures (like TV’s Teletubbies). However, parents reading books with gender-neutral or genderless characters often undermine the publishers’ efforts by reading them to their children in ways that depict the characters as either feminine or masculine. According to Renzetti and Curran, parents labelled the overwhelming majority of gender-neutral characters masculine whereas those characters that fit feminine gender stereotypes (for instance, by being helpful and caring) were labelled feminine (1992, 35). Socialising influences like these are still thought to send implicit messages regarding how females and males should act and are expected to act shaping us into feminine and masculine persons.

Nancy Chodorow (1978; 1995) has criticised social learning theory as too simplistic to explain gender differences (see also Deaux & Major 1990; Gatens 1996). Instead, she holds that gender is a matter of having feminine and masculine personalities that develop in early infancy as responses to prevalent parenting practices. In particular, gendered personalities develop because women tend to be the primary caretakers of small children. Chodorow holds that because mothers (or other prominent females) tend to care for infants, infant male and female psychic development differs. Crudely put: the mother-daughter relationship differs from the mother-son relationship because mothers are more likely to identify with their daughters than their sons. This unconsciously prompts the mother to encourage her son to psychologically individuate himself from her thereby prompting him to develop well defined and rigid ego boundaries. However, the mother unconsciously discourages the daughter from individuating herself thereby prompting the daughter to develop flexible and blurry ego boundaries. Childhood gender socialisation further builds on and reinforces these unconsciously developed ego boundaries finally producing feminine and masculine persons (1995, 202–206). This perspective has its roots in Freudian psychoanalytic theory, although Chodorow’s approach differs in many ways from Freud’s.

Gendered personalities are supposedly manifested in common gender stereotypical behaviour. Take emotional dependency. Women are stereotypically more emotional and emotionally dependent upon others around them, supposedly finding it difficult to distinguish their own interests and wellbeing from the interests and wellbeing of their children and partners. This is said to be because of their blurry and (somewhat) confused ego boundaries: women find it hard to distinguish their own needs from the needs of those around them because they cannot sufficiently individuate themselves from those close to them. By contrast, men are stereotypically emotionally detached, preferring a career where dispassionate and distanced thinking are virtues. These traits are said to result from men’s well-defined ego boundaries that enable them to prioritise their own needs and interests sometimes at the expense of others’ needs and interests.

Chodorow thinks that these gender differences should and can be changed. Feminine and masculine personalities play a crucial role in women’s oppression since they make females overly attentive to the needs of others and males emotionally deficient. In order to correct the situation, both male and female parents should be equally involved in parenting (Chodorow 1995, 214). This would help in ensuring that children develop sufficiently individuated senses of selves without becoming overly detached, which in turn helps to eradicate common gender stereotypical behaviours.

Catharine MacKinnon develops her theory of gender as a theory of sexuality. Very roughly: the social meaning of sex (gender) is created by sexual objectification of women whereby women are viewed and treated as objects for satisfying men’s desires (MacKinnon 1989). Masculinity is defined as sexual dominance, femininity as sexual submissiveness: genders are “created through the eroticization of dominance and submission. The man/woman difference and the dominance/submission dynamic define each other. This is the social meaning of sex” (MacKinnon 1989, 113). For MacKinnon, gender is constitutively constructed : in defining genders (or masculinity and femininity) we must make reference to social factors (see Haslanger 1995, 98). In particular, we must make reference to the position one occupies in the sexualised dominance/submission dynamic: men occupy the sexually dominant position, women the sexually submissive one. As a result, genders are by definition hierarchical and this hierarchy is fundamentally tied to sexualised power relations. The notion of ‘gender equality’, then, does not make sense to MacKinnon. If sexuality ceased to be a manifestation of dominance, hierarchical genders (that are defined in terms of sexuality) would cease to exist.

So, gender difference for MacKinnon is not a matter of having a particular psychological orientation or behavioural pattern; rather, it is a function of sexuality that is hierarchal in patriarchal societies. This is not to say that men are naturally disposed to sexually objectify women or that women are naturally submissive. Instead, male and female sexualities are socially conditioned: men have been conditioned to find women’s subordination sexy and women have been conditioned to find a particular male version of female sexuality as erotic – one in which it is erotic to be sexually submissive. For MacKinnon, both female and male sexual desires are defined from a male point of view that is conditioned by pornography (MacKinnon 1989, chapter 7). Bluntly put: pornography portrays a false picture of ‘what women want’ suggesting that women in actual fact are and want to be submissive. This conditions men’s sexuality so that they view women’s submission as sexy. And male dominance enforces this male version of sexuality onto women, sometimes by force. MacKinnon’s thought is not that male dominance is a result of social learning (see 2.1.); rather, socialization is an expression of power. That is, socialized differences in masculine and feminine traits, behaviour, and roles are not responsible for power inequalities. Females and males (roughly put) are socialised differently because there are underlying power inequalities. As MacKinnon puts it, ‘dominance’ (power relations) is prior to ‘difference’ (traits, behaviour and roles) (see, MacKinnon 1989, chapter 12). MacKinnon, then, sees legal restrictions on pornography as paramount to ending women’s subordinate status that stems from their gender.

3. Problems with the sex/gender distinction

3.1 is gender uniform.

The positions outlined above share an underlying metaphysical perspective on gender: gender realism . [ 2 ] That is, women as a group are assumed to share some characteristic feature, experience, common condition or criterion that defines their gender and the possession of which makes some individuals women (as opposed to, say, men). All women are thought to differ from all men in this respect (or respects). For example, MacKinnon thought that being treated in sexually objectifying ways is the common condition that defines women’s gender and what women as women share. All women differ from all men in this respect. Further, pointing out females who are not sexually objectified does not provide a counterexample to MacKinnon’s view. Being sexually objectified is constitutive of being a woman; a female who escapes sexual objectification, then, would not count as a woman.

One may want to critique the three accounts outlined by rejecting the particular details of each account. (For instance, see Spelman [1988, chapter 4] for a critique of the details of Chodorow’s view.) A more thoroughgoing critique has been levelled at the general metaphysical perspective of gender realism that underlies these positions. It has come under sustained attack on two grounds: first, that it fails to take into account racial, cultural and class differences between women (particularity argument); second, that it posits a normative ideal of womanhood (normativity argument).

Elizabeth Spelman (1988) has influentially argued against gender realism with her particularity argument. Roughly: gender realists mistakenly assume that gender is constructed independently of race, class, ethnicity and nationality. If gender were separable from, for example, race and class in this manner, all women would experience womanhood in the same way. And this is clearly false. For instance, Harris (1993) and Stone (2007) criticise MacKinnon’s view, that sexual objectification is the common condition that defines women’s gender, for failing to take into account differences in women’s backgrounds that shape their sexuality. The history of racist oppression illustrates that during slavery black women were ‘hypersexualised’ and thought to be always sexually available whereas white women were thought to be pure and sexually virtuous. In fact, the rape of a black woman was thought to be impossible (Harris 1993). So, (the argument goes) sexual objectification cannot serve as the common condition for womanhood since it varies considerably depending on one’s race and class. [ 3 ]

For Spelman, the perspective of ‘white solipsism’ underlies gender realists’ mistake. They assumed that all women share some “golden nugget of womanness” (Spelman 1988, 159) and that the features constitutive of such a nugget are the same for all women regardless of their particular cultural backgrounds. Next, white Western middle-class feminists accounted for the shared features simply by reflecting on the cultural features that condition their gender as women thus supposing that “the womanness underneath the Black woman’s skin is a white woman’s, and deep down inside the Latina woman is an Anglo woman waiting to burst through an obscuring cultural shroud” (Spelman 1988, 13). In so doing, Spelman claims, white middle-class Western feminists passed off their particular view of gender as “a metaphysical truth” (1988, 180) thereby privileging some women while marginalising others. In failing to see the importance of race and class in gender construction, white middle-class Western feminists conflated “the condition of one group of women with the condition of all” (Spelman 1988, 3).

Betty Friedan’s (1963) well-known work is a case in point of white solipsism. [ 4 ] Friedan saw domesticity as the main vehicle of gender oppression and called upon women in general to find jobs outside the home. But she failed to realize that women from less privileged backgrounds, often poor and non-white, already worked outside the home to support their families. Friedan’s suggestion, then, was applicable only to a particular sub-group of women (white middle-class Western housewives). But it was mistakenly taken to apply to all women’s lives — a mistake that was generated by Friedan’s failure to take women’s racial and class differences into account (hooks 2000, 1–3).

Spelman further holds that since social conditioning creates femininity and societies (and sub-groups) that condition it differ from one another, femininity must be differently conditioned in different societies. For her, “females become not simply women but particular kinds of women” (Spelman 1988, 113): white working-class women, black middle-class women, poor Jewish women, wealthy aristocratic European women, and so on.

This line of thought has been extremely influential in feminist philosophy. For instance, Young holds that Spelman has definitively shown that gender realism is untenable (1997, 13). Mikkola (2006) argues that this isn’t so. The arguments Spelman makes do not undermine the idea that there is some characteristic feature, experience, common condition or criterion that defines women’s gender; they simply point out that some particular ways of cashing out what defines womanhood are misguided. So, although Spelman is right to reject those accounts that falsely take the feature that conditions white middle-class Western feminists’ gender to condition women’s gender in general, this leaves open the possibility that women qua women do share something that defines their gender. (See also Haslanger [2000a] for a discussion of why gender realism is not necessarily untenable, and Stoljar [2011] for a discussion of Mikkola’s critique of Spelman.)

Judith Butler critiques the sex/gender distinction on two grounds. They critique gender realism with their normativity argument (1999 [original 1990], chapter 1); they also hold that the sex/gender distinction is unintelligible (this will be discussed in section 3.3.). Butler’s normativity argument is not straightforwardly directed at the metaphysical perspective of gender realism, but rather at its political counterpart: identity politics. This is a form of political mobilization based on membership in some group (e.g. racial, ethnic, cultural, gender) and group membership is thought to be delimited by some common experiences, conditions or features that define the group (Heyes 2000, 58; see also the entry on Identity Politics ). Feminist identity politics, then, presupposes gender realism in that feminist politics is said to be mobilized around women as a group (or category) where membership in this group is fixed by some condition, experience or feature that women supposedly share and that defines their gender.

Butler’s normativity argument makes two claims. The first is akin to Spelman’s particularity argument: unitary gender notions fail to take differences amongst women into account thus failing to recognise “the multiplicity of cultural, social, and political intersections in which the concrete array of ‘women’ are constructed” (Butler 1999, 19–20). In their attempt to undercut biologically deterministic ways of defining what it means to be a woman, feminists inadvertently created new socially constructed accounts of supposedly shared femininity. Butler’s second claim is that such false gender realist accounts are normative. That is, in their attempt to fix feminism’s subject matter, feminists unwittingly defined the term ‘woman’ in a way that implies there is some correct way to be gendered a woman (Butler 1999, 5). That the definition of the term ‘woman’ is fixed supposedly “operates as a policing force which generates and legitimizes certain practices, experiences, etc., and curtails and delegitimizes others” (Nicholson 1998, 293). Following this line of thought, one could say that, for instance, Chodorow’s view of gender suggests that ‘real’ women have feminine personalities and that these are the women feminism should be concerned about. If one does not exhibit a distinctly feminine personality, the implication is that one is not ‘really’ a member of women’s category nor does one properly qualify for feminist political representation.

Butler’s second claim is based on their view that“[i]dentity categories [like that of women] are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary” (Butler 1991, 160). That is, the mistake of those feminists Butler critiques was not that they provided the incorrect definition of ‘woman’. Rather, (the argument goes) their mistake was to attempt to define the term ‘woman’ at all. Butler’s view is that ‘woman’ can never be defined in a way that does not prescribe some “unspoken normative requirements” (like having a feminine personality) that women should conform to (Butler 1999, 9). Butler takes this to be a feature of terms like ‘woman’ that purport to pick out (what they call) ‘identity categories’. They seem to assume that ‘woman’ can never be used in a non-ideological way (Moi 1999, 43) and that it will always encode conditions that are not satisfied by everyone we think of as women. Some explanation for this comes from Butler’s view that all processes of drawing categorical distinctions involve evaluative and normative commitments; these in turn involve the exercise of power and reflect the conditions of those who are socially powerful (Witt 1995).

In order to better understand Butler’s critique, consider their account of gender performativity. For them, standard feminist accounts take gendered individuals to have some essential properties qua gendered individuals or a gender core by virtue of which one is either a man or a woman. This view assumes that women and men, qua women and men, are bearers of various essential and accidental attributes where the former secure gendered persons’ persistence through time as so gendered. But according to Butler this view is false: (i) there are no such essential properties, and (ii) gender is an illusion maintained by prevalent power structures. First, feminists are said to think that genders are socially constructed in that they have the following essential attributes (Butler 1999, 24): women are females with feminine behavioural traits, being heterosexuals whose desire is directed at men; men are males with masculine behavioural traits, being heterosexuals whose desire is directed at women. These are the attributes necessary for gendered individuals and those that enable women and men to persist through time as women and men. Individuals have “intelligible genders” (Butler 1999, 23) if they exhibit this sequence of traits in a coherent manner (where sexual desire follows from sexual orientation that in turn follows from feminine/ masculine behaviours thought to follow from biological sex). Social forces in general deem individuals who exhibit in coherent gender sequences (like lesbians) to be doing their gender ‘wrong’ and they actively discourage such sequencing of traits, for instance, via name-calling and overt homophobic discrimination. Think back to what was said above: having a certain conception of what women are like that mirrors the conditions of socially powerful (white, middle-class, heterosexual, Western) women functions to marginalize and police those who do not fit this conception.

These gender cores, supposedly encoding the above traits, however, are nothing more than illusions created by ideals and practices that seek to render gender uniform through heterosexism, the view that heterosexuality is natural and homosexuality is deviant (Butler 1999, 42). Gender cores are constructed as if they somehow naturally belong to women and men thereby creating gender dimorphism or the belief that one must be either a masculine male or a feminine female. But gender dimorphism only serves a heterosexist social order by implying that since women and men are sharply opposed, it is natural to sexually desire the opposite sex or gender.

Further, being feminine and desiring men (for instance) are standardly assumed to be expressions of one’s gender as a woman. Butler denies this and holds that gender is really performative. It is not “a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is … instituted … through a stylized repetition of [habitual] acts ” (Butler 1999, 179): through wearing certain gender-coded clothing, walking and sitting in certain gender-coded ways, styling one’s hair in gender-coded manner and so on. Gender is not something one is, it is something one does; it is a sequence of acts, a doing rather than a being. And repeatedly engaging in ‘feminising’ and ‘masculinising’ acts congeals gender thereby making people falsely think of gender as something they naturally are . Gender only comes into being through these gendering acts: a female who has sex with men does not express her gender as a woman. This activity (amongst others) makes her gendered a woman.

The constitutive acts that gender individuals create genders as “compelling illusion[s]” (Butler 1990, 271). Our gendered classification scheme is a strong pragmatic construction : social factors wholly determine our use of the scheme and the scheme fails to represent accurately any ‘facts of the matter’ (Haslanger 1995, 100). People think that there are true and real genders, and those deemed to be doing their gender ‘wrong’ are not socially sanctioned. But, genders are true and real only to the extent that they are performed (Butler 1990, 278–9). It does not make sense, then, to say of a male-to-female trans person that s/he is really a man who only appears to be a woman. Instead, males dressing up and acting in ways that are associated with femininity “show that [as Butler suggests] ‘being’ feminine is just a matter of doing certain activities” (Stone 2007, 64). As a result, the trans person’s gender is just as real or true as anyone else’s who is a ‘traditionally’ feminine female or masculine male (Butler 1990, 278). [ 5 ] Without heterosexism that compels people to engage in certain gendering acts, there would not be any genders at all. And ultimately the aim should be to abolish norms that compel people to act in these gendering ways.

For Butler, given that gender is performative, the appropriate response to feminist identity politics involves two things. First, feminists should understand ‘woman’ as open-ended and “a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end … it is open to intervention and resignification” (Butler 1999, 43). That is, feminists should not try to define ‘woman’ at all. Second, the category of women “ought not to be the foundation of feminist politics” (Butler 1999, 9). Rather, feminists should focus on providing an account of how power functions and shapes our understandings of womanhood not only in the society at large but also within the feminist movement.

Many people, including many feminists, have ordinarily taken sex ascriptions to be solely a matter of biology with no social or cultural dimension. It is commonplace to think that there are only two sexes and that biological sex classifications are utterly unproblematic. By contrast, some feminists have argued that sex classifications are not unproblematic and that they are not solely a matter of biology. In order to make sense of this, it is helpful to distinguish object- and idea-construction (see Haslanger 2003b for more): social forces can be said to construct certain kinds of objects (e.g. sexed bodies or gendered individuals) and certain kinds of ideas (e.g. sex or gender concepts). First, take the object-construction of sexed bodies. Secondary sex characteristics, or the physiological and biological features commonly associated with males and females, are affected by social practices. In some societies, females’ lower social status has meant that they have been fed less and so, the lack of nutrition has had the effect of making them smaller in size (Jaggar 1983, 37). Uniformity in muscular shape, size and strength within sex categories is not caused entirely by biological factors, but depends heavily on exercise opportunities: if males and females were allowed the same exercise opportunities and equal encouragement to exercise, it is thought that bodily dimorphism would diminish (Fausto-Sterling 1993a, 218). A number of medical phenomena involving bones (like osteoporosis) have social causes directly related to expectations about gender, women’s diet and their exercise opportunities (Fausto-Sterling 2005). These examples suggest that physiological features thought to be sex-specific traits not affected by social and cultural factors are, after all, to some extent products of social conditioning. Social conditioning, then, shapes our biology.

Second, take the idea-construction of sex concepts. Our concept of sex is said to be a product of social forces in the sense that what counts as sex is shaped by social meanings. Standardly, those with XX-chromosomes, ovaries that produce large egg cells, female genitalia, a relatively high proportion of ‘female’ hormones, and other secondary sex characteristics (relatively small body size, less body hair) count as biologically female. Those with XY-chromosomes, testes that produce small sperm cells, male genitalia, a relatively high proportion of ‘male’ hormones and other secondary sex traits (relatively large body size, significant amounts of body hair) count as male. This understanding is fairly recent. The prevalent scientific view from Ancient Greeks until the late 18 th century, did not consider female and male sexes to be distinct categories with specific traits; instead, a ‘one-sex model’ held that males and females were members of the same sex category. Females’ genitals were thought to be the same as males’ but simply directed inside the body; ovaries and testes (for instance) were referred to by the same term and whether the term referred to the former or the latter was made clear by the context (Laqueur 1990, 4). It was not until the late 1700s that scientists began to think of female and male anatomies as radically different moving away from the ‘one-sex model’ of a single sex spectrum to the (nowadays prevalent) ‘two-sex model’ of sexual dimorphism. (For an alternative view, see King 2013.)

Fausto-Sterling has argued that this ‘two-sex model’ isn’t straightforward either (1993b; 2000a; 2000b). Based on a meta-study of empirical medical research, she estimates that 1.7% of population fail to neatly fall within the usual sex classifications possessing various combinations of different sex characteristics (Fausto-Sterling 2000a, 20). In her earlier work, she claimed that intersex individuals make up (at least) three further sex classes: ‘herms’ who possess one testis and one ovary; ‘merms’ who possess testes, some aspects of female genitalia but no ovaries; and ‘ferms’ who have ovaries, some aspects of male genitalia but no testes (Fausto-Sterling 1993b, 21). (In her [2000a], Fausto-Sterling notes that these labels were put forward tongue–in–cheek.) Recognition of intersex people suggests that feminists (and society at large) are wrong to think that humans are either female or male.

To illustrate further the idea-construction of sex, consider the case of the athlete Maria Patiño. Patiño has female genitalia, has always considered herself to be female and was considered so by others. However, she was discovered to have XY chromosomes and was barred from competing in women’s sports (Fausto-Sterling 2000b, 1–3). Patiño’s genitalia were at odds with her chromosomes and the latter were taken to determine her sex. Patiño successfully fought to be recognised as a female athlete arguing that her chromosomes alone were not sufficient to not make her female. Intersex people, like Patiño, illustrate that our understandings of sex differ and suggest that there is no immediately obvious way to settle what sex amounts to purely biologically or scientifically. Deciding what sex is involves evaluative judgements that are influenced by social factors.

Insofar as our cultural conceptions affect our understandings of sex, feminists must be much more careful about sex classifications and rethink what sex amounts to (Stone 2007, chapter 1). More specifically, intersex people illustrate that sex traits associated with females and males need not always go together and that individuals can have some mixture of these traits. This suggests to Stone that sex is a cluster concept: it is sufficient to satisfy enough of the sex features that tend to cluster together in order to count as being of a particular sex. But, one need not satisfy all of those features or some arbitrarily chosen supposedly necessary sex feature, like chromosomes (Stone 2007, 44). This makes sex a matter of degree and sex classifications should take place on a spectrum: one can be more or less female/male but there is no sharp distinction between the two. Further, intersex people (along with trans people) are located at the centre of the sex spectrum and in many cases their sex will be indeterminate (Stone 2007).

More recently, Ayala and Vasilyeva (2015) have argued for an inclusive and extended conception of sex: just as certain tools can be seen to extend our minds beyond the limits of our brains (e.g. white canes), other tools (like dildos) can extend our sex beyond our bodily boundaries. This view aims to motivate the idea that what counts as sex should not be determined by looking inwards at genitalia or other anatomical features. In a different vein, Ásta (2018) argues that sex is a conferred social property. This follows her more general conferralist framework to analyse all social properties: properties that are conferred by others thereby generating a social status that consists in contextually specific constraints and enablements on individual behaviour. The general schema for conferred properties is as follows (Ásta 2018, 8):

Conferred property: what property is conferred. Who: who the subjects are. What: what attitude, state, or action of the subjects matter. When: under what conditions the conferral takes place. Base property: what the subjects are attempting to track (consciously or not), if anything.

With being of a certain sex (e.g. male, female) in mind, Ásta holds that it is a conferred property that merely aims to track physical features. Hence sex is a social – or in fact, an institutional – property rather than a natural one. The schema for sex goes as follows (72):

Conferred property: being female, male. Who: legal authorities, drawing on the expert opinion of doctors, other medical personnel. What: “the recording of a sex in official documents ... The judgment of the doctors (and others) as to what sex role might be the most fitting, given the biological characteristics present.” When: at birth or after surgery/ hormonal treatment. Base property: “the aim is to track as many sex-stereotypical characteristics as possible, and doctors perform surgery in cases where that might help bring the physical characteristics more in line with the stereotype of male and female.”

This (among other things) offers a debunking analysis of sex: it may appear to be a natural property, but on the conferralist analysis is better understood as a conferred legal status. Ásta holds that gender too is a conferred property, but contra the discussion in the following section, she does not think that this collapses the distinction between sex and gender: sex and gender are differently conferred albeit both satisfying the general schema noted above. Nonetheless, on the conferralist framework what underlies both sex and gender is the idea of social construction as social significance: sex-stereotypical characteristics are taken to be socially significant context specifically, whereby they become the basis for conferring sex onto individuals and this brings with it various constraints and enablements on individuals and their behaviour. This fits object- and idea-constructions introduced above, although offers a different general framework to analyse the matter at hand.

In addition to arguing against identity politics and for gender performativity, Butler holds that distinguishing biological sex from social gender is unintelligible. For them, both are socially constructed:

If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all. (Butler 1999, 10–11)

(Butler is not alone in claiming that there are no tenable distinctions between nature/culture, biology/construction and sex/gender. See also: Antony 1998; Gatens 1996; Grosz 1994; Prokhovnik 1999.) Butler makes two different claims in the passage cited: that sex is a social construction, and that sex is gender. To unpack their view, consider the two claims in turn. First, the idea that sex is a social construct, for Butler, boils down to the view that our sexed bodies are also performative and, so, they have “no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute [their] reality” (1999, 173). Prima facie , this implausibly implies that female and male bodies do not have independent existence and that if gendering activities ceased, so would physical bodies. This is not Butler’s claim; rather, their position is that bodies viewed as the material foundations on which gender is constructed, are themselves constructed as if they provide such material foundations (Butler 1993). Cultural conceptions about gender figure in “the very apparatus of production whereby sexes themselves are established” (Butler 1999, 11).

For Butler, sexed bodies never exist outside social meanings and how we understand gender shapes how we understand sex (1999, 139). Sexed bodies are not empty matter on which gender is constructed and sex categories are not picked out on the basis of objective features of the world. Instead, our sexed bodies are themselves discursively constructed : they are the way they are, at least to a substantial extent, because of what is attributed to sexed bodies and how they are classified (for discursive construction, see Haslanger 1995, 99). Sex assignment (calling someone female or male) is normative (Butler 1993, 1). [ 6 ] When the doctor calls a newly born infant a girl or a boy, s/he is not making a descriptive claim, but a normative one. In fact, the doctor is performing an illocutionary speech act (see the entry on Speech Acts ). In effect, the doctor’s utterance makes infants into girls or boys. We, then, engage in activities that make it seem as if sexes naturally come in two and that being female or male is an objective feature of the world, rather than being a consequence of certain constitutive acts (that is, rather than being performative). And this is what Butler means in saying that physical bodies never exist outside cultural and social meanings, and that sex is as socially constructed as gender. They do not deny that physical bodies exist. But, they take our understanding of this existence to be a product of social conditioning: social conditioning makes the existence of physical bodies intelligible to us by discursively constructing sexed bodies through certain constitutive acts. (For a helpful introduction to Butler’s views, see Salih 2002.)

For Butler, sex assignment is always in some sense oppressive. Again, this appears to be because of Butler’s general suspicion of classification: sex classification can never be merely descriptive but always has a normative element reflecting evaluative claims of those who are powerful. Conducting a feminist genealogy of the body (or examining why sexed bodies are thought to come naturally as female and male), then, should ground feminist practice (Butler 1993, 28–9). Feminists should examine and uncover ways in which social construction and certain acts that constitute sex shape our understandings of sexed bodies, what kinds of meanings bodies acquire and which practices and illocutionary speech acts ‘make’ our bodies into sexes. Doing so enables feminists to identity how sexed bodies are socially constructed in order to resist such construction.

However, given what was said above, it is far from obvious what we should make of Butler’s claim that sex “was always already gender” (1999, 11). Stone (2007) takes this to mean that sex is gender but goes on to question it arguing that the social construction of both sex and gender does not make sex identical to gender. According to Stone, it would be more accurate for Butler to say that claims about sex imply gender norms. That is, many claims about sex traits (like ‘females are physically weaker than males’) actually carry implications about how women and men are expected to behave. To some extent the claim describes certain facts. But, it also implies that females are not expected to do much heavy lifting and that they would probably not be good at it. So, claims about sex are not identical to claims about gender; rather, they imply claims about gender norms (Stone 2007, 70).

Some feminists hold that the sex/gender distinction is not useful. For a start, it is thought to reflect politically problematic dualistic thinking that undercuts feminist aims: the distinction is taken to reflect and replicate androcentric oppositions between (for instance) mind/body, culture/nature and reason/emotion that have been used to justify women’s oppression (e.g. Grosz 1994; Prokhovnik 1999). The thought is that in oppositions like these, one term is always superior to the other and that the devalued term is usually associated with women (Lloyd 1993). For instance, human subjectivity and agency are identified with the mind but since women are usually identified with their bodies, they are devalued as human subjects and agents. The opposition between mind and body is said to further map on to other distinctions, like reason/emotion, culture/nature, rational/irrational, where one side of each distinction is devalued (one’s bodily features are usually valued less that one’s mind, rationality is usually valued more than irrationality) and women are associated with the devalued terms: they are thought to be closer to bodily features and nature than men, to be irrational, emotional and so on. This is said to be evident (for instance) in job interviews. Men are treated as gender-neutral persons and not asked whether they are planning to take time off to have a family. By contrast, that women face such queries illustrates that they are associated more closely than men with bodily features to do with procreation (Prokhovnik 1999, 126). The opposition between mind and body, then, is thought to map onto the opposition between men and women.

Now, the mind/body dualism is also said to map onto the sex/gender distinction (Grosz 1994; Prokhovnik 1999). The idea is that gender maps onto mind, sex onto body. Although not used by those endorsing this view, the basic idea can be summed by the slogan ‘Gender is between the ears, sex is between the legs’: the implication is that, while sex is immutable, gender is something individuals have control over – it is something we can alter and change through individual choices. However, since women are said to be more closely associated with biological features (and so, to map onto the body side of the mind/body distinction) and men are treated as gender-neutral persons (mapping onto the mind side), the implication is that “man equals gender, which is associated with mind and choice, freedom from body, autonomy, and with the public real; while woman equals sex, associated with the body, reproduction, ‘natural’ rhythms and the private realm” (Prokhovnik 1999, 103). This is said to render the sex/gender distinction inherently repressive and to drain it of any potential for emancipation: rather than facilitating gender role choice for women, it “actually functions to reinforce their association with body, sex, and involuntary ‘natural’ rhythms” (Prokhovnik 1999, 103). Contrary to what feminists like Rubin argued, the sex/gender distinction cannot be used as a theoretical tool that dissociates conceptions of womanhood from biological and reproductive features.

Moi has further argued that the sex/gender distinction is useless given certain theoretical goals (1999, chapter 1). This is not to say that it is utterly worthless; according to Moi, the sex/gender distinction worked well to show that the historically prevalent biological determinism was false. However, for her, the distinction does no useful work “when it comes to producing a good theory of subjectivity” (1999, 6) and “a concrete, historical understanding of what it means to be a woman (or a man) in a given society” (1999, 4–5). That is, the 1960s distinction understood sex as fixed by biology without any cultural or historical dimensions. This understanding, however, ignores lived experiences and embodiment as aspects of womanhood (and manhood) by separating sex from gender and insisting that womanhood is to do with the latter. Rather, embodiment must be included in one’s theory that tries to figure out what it is to be a woman (or a man).

Mikkola (2011) argues that the sex/gender distinction, which underlies views like Rubin’s and MacKinnon’s, has certain unintuitive and undesirable ontological commitments that render the distinction politically unhelpful. First, claiming that gender is socially constructed implies that the existence of women and men is a mind-dependent matter. This suggests that we can do away with women and men simply by altering some social practices, conventions or conditions on which gender depends (whatever those are). However, ordinary social agents find this unintuitive given that (ordinarily) sex and gender are not distinguished. Second, claiming that gender is a product of oppressive social forces suggests that doing away with women and men should be feminism’s political goal. But this harbours ontologically undesirable commitments since many ordinary social agents view their gender to be a source of positive value. So, feminism seems to want to do away with something that should not be done away with, which is unlikely to motivate social agents to act in ways that aim at gender justice. Given these problems, Mikkola argues that feminists should give up the distinction on practical political grounds.

Tomas Bogardus (2020) has argued in an even more radical sense against the sex/gender distinction: as things stand, he holds, feminist philosophers have merely assumed and asserted that the distinction exists, instead of having offered good arguments for the distinction. In other words, feminist philosophers allegedly have yet to offer good reasons to think that ‘woman’ does not simply pick out adult human females. Alex Byrne (2020) argues in a similar vein: the term ‘woman’ does not pick out a social kind as feminist philosophers have “assumed”. Instead, “women are adult human females–nothing more, and nothing less” (2020, 3801). Byrne offers six considerations to ground this AHF (adult, human, female) conception.

• It reproduces the dictionary definition of ‘woman’.
• One would expect English to have a word that picks out the category adult human female, and ‘woman’ is the only candidate.
• AHF explains how we sometimes know that an individual is a woman, despite knowing nothing else relevant about her other than the fact that she is an adult human female.
• AHF stands or falls with the analogous thesis for girls, which can be supported independently.
• AHF predicts the correct verdict in cases of gender role reversal.
• AHF is supported by the fact that ‘woman’ and ‘female’ are often appropriately used as stylistic variants of each other, even in hyperintensional contexts.

Robin Dembroff (2021) responds to Byrne and highlights various problems with Byrne’s argument. First, framing: Byrne assumes from the start that gender terms like ‘woman’ have a single invariant meaning thereby failing to discuss the possibility of terms like ‘woman’ having multiple meanings – something that is a familiar claim made by feminist theorists from various disciplines. Moreover, Byrne (according to Dembroff) assumes without argument that there is a single, universal category of woman – again, something that has been extensively discussed and critiqued by feminist philosophers and theorists. Second, Byrne’s conception of the ‘dominant’ meaning of woman is said to be cherry-picked and it ignores a wealth of contexts outside of philosophy (like the media and the law) where ‘woman’ has a meaning other than AHF . Third, Byrne’s own distinction between biological and social categories fails to establish what he intended to establish: namely, that ‘woman’ picks out a biological rather than a social kind. Hence, Dembroff holds, Byrne’s case fails by its own lights. Byrne (2021) responds to Dembroff’s critique.

Others such as ‘gender critical feminists’ also hold views about the sex/gender distinction in a spirit similar to Bogardus and Byrne. For example, Holly Lawford-Smith (2021) takes the prevalent sex/gender distinction, where ‘female’/‘male’ are used as sex terms and ‘woman’/’man’ as gender terms, not to be helpful. Instead, she takes all of these to be sex terms and holds that (the norms of) femininity/masculinity refer to gender normativity. Because much of the gender critical feminists’ discussion that philosophers have engaged in has taken place in social media, public fora, and other sources outside academic philosophy, this entry will not focus on these discussions.

4. Women as a group

The various critiques of the sex/gender distinction have called into question the viability of the category women . Feminism is the movement to end the oppression women as a group face. But, how should the category of women be understood if feminists accept the above arguments that gender construction is not uniform, that a sharp distinction between biological sex and social gender is false or (at least) not useful, and that various features associated with women play a role in what it is to be a woman, none of which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient (like a variety of social roles, positions, behaviours, traits, bodily features and experiences)? Feminists must be able to address cultural and social differences in gender construction if feminism is to be a genuinely inclusive movement and be careful not to posit commonalities that mask important ways in which women qua women differ. These concerns (among others) have generated a situation where (as Linda Alcoff puts it) feminists aim to speak and make political demands in the name of women, at the same time rejecting the idea that there is a unified category of women (2006, 152). If feminist critiques of the category women are successful, then what (if anything) binds women together, what is it to be a woman, and what kinds of demands can feminists make on behalf of women?

Many have found the fragmentation of the category of women problematic for political reasons (e.g. Alcoff 2006; Bach 2012; Benhabib 1992; Frye 1996; Haslanger 2000b; Heyes 2000; Martin 1994; Mikkola 2007; Stoljar 1995; Stone 2004; Tanesini 1996; Young 1997; Zack 2005). For instance, Young holds that accounts like Spelman’s reduce the category of women to a gerrymandered collection of individuals with nothing to bind them together (1997, 20). Black women differ from white women but members of both groups also differ from one another with respect to nationality, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation and economic position; that is, wealthy white women differ from working-class white women due to their economic and class positions. These sub-groups are themselves diverse: for instance, some working-class white women in Northern Ireland are starkly divided along religious lines. So if we accept Spelman’s position, we risk ending up with individual women and nothing to bind them together. And this is problematic: in order to respond to oppression of women in general, feminists must understand them as a category in some sense. Young writes that without doing so “it is not possible to conceptualize oppression as a systematic, structured, institutional process” (1997, 17). Some, then, take the articulation of an inclusive category of women to be the prerequisite for effective feminist politics and a rich literature has emerged that aims to conceptualise women as a group or a collective (e.g. Alcoff 2006; Ásta 2011; Frye 1996; 2011; Haslanger 2000b; Heyes 2000; Stoljar 1995, 2011; Young 1997; Zack 2005). Articulations of this category can be divided into those that are: (a) gender nominalist — positions that deny there is something women qua women share and that seek to unify women’s social kind by appealing to something external to women; and (b) gender realist — positions that take there to be something women qua women share (although these realist positions differ significantly from those outlined in Section 2). Below we will review some influential gender nominalist and gender realist positions. Before doing so, it is worth noting that not everyone is convinced that attempts to articulate an inclusive category of women can succeed or that worries about what it is to be a woman are in need of being resolved. Mikkola (2016) argues that feminist politics need not rely on overcoming (what she calls) the ‘gender controversy’: that feminists must settle the meaning of gender concepts and articulate a way to ground women’s social kind membership. As she sees it, disputes about ‘what it is to be a woman’ have become theoretically bankrupt and intractable, which has generated an analytical impasse that looks unsurpassable. Instead, Mikkola argues for giving up the quest, which in any case in her view poses no serious political obstacles.

Elizabeth Barnes (2020) responds to the need to offer an inclusive conception of gender somewhat differently, although she endorses the need for feminism to be inclusive particularly of trans people. Barnes holds that typically philosophical theories of gender aim to offer an account of what it is to be a woman (or man, genderqueer, etc.), where such an account is presumed to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for being a woman or an account of our gender terms’ extensions. But, she holds, it is a mistake to expect our theories of gender to do so. For Barnes, a project that offers a metaphysics of gender “should be understood as the project of theorizing what it is —if anything— about the social world that ultimately explains gender” (2020, 706). This project is not equivalent to one that aims to define gender terms or elucidate the application conditions for natural language gender terms though.

4.1 Gender nominalism

Iris Young argues that unless there is “some sense in which ‘woman’ is the name of a social collective [that feminism represents], there is nothing specific to feminist politics” (1997, 13). In order to make the category women intelligible, she argues that women make up a series: a particular kind of social collective “whose members are unified passively by the objects their actions are oriented around and/or by the objectified results of the material effects of the actions of the other” (Young 1997, 23). A series is distinct from a group in that, whereas members of groups are thought to self-consciously share certain goals, projects, traits and/ or self-conceptions, members of series pursue their own individual ends without necessarily having anything at all in common. Young holds that women are not bound together by a shared feature or experience (or set of features and experiences) since she takes Spelman’s particularity argument to have established definitely that no such feature exists (1997, 13; see also: Frye 1996; Heyes 2000). Instead, women’s category is unified by certain practico-inert realities or the ways in which women’s lives and their actions are oriented around certain objects and everyday realities (Young 1997, 23–4). For example, bus commuters make up a series unified through their individual actions being organised around the same practico-inert objects of the bus and the practice of public transport. Women make up a series unified through women’s lives and actions being organised around certain practico-inert objects and realities that position them as women .

Young identifies two broad groups of such practico-inert objects and realities. First, phenomena associated with female bodies (physical facts), biological processes that take place in female bodies (menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth) and social rules associated with these biological processes (social rules of menstruation, for instance). Second, gender-coded objects and practices: pronouns, verbal and visual representations of gender, gender-coded artefacts and social spaces, clothes, cosmetics, tools and furniture. So, women make up a series since their lives and actions are organised around female bodies and certain gender-coded objects. Their series is bound together passively and the unity is “not one that arises from the individuals called women” (Young 1997, 32).

Although Young’s proposal purports to be a response to Spelman’s worries, Stone has questioned whether it is, after all, susceptible to the particularity argument: ultimately, on Young’s view, something women as women share (their practico-inert realities) binds them together (Stone 2004).

Natalie Stoljar holds that unless the category of women is unified, feminist action on behalf of women cannot be justified (1995, 282). Stoljar too is persuaded by the thought that women qua women do not share anything unitary. This prompts her to argue for resemblance nominalism. This is the view that a certain kind of resemblance relation holds between entities of a particular type (for more on resemblance nominalism, see Armstrong 1989, 39–58). Stoljar is not alone in arguing for resemblance relations to make sense of women as a category; others have also done so, usually appealing to Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’ relations (Alcoff 1988; Green & Radford Curry 1991; Heyes 2000; Munro 2006). Stoljar relies more on Price’s resemblance nominalism whereby x is a member of some type F only if x resembles some paradigm or exemplar of F sufficiently closely (Price 1953, 20). For instance, the type of red entities is unified by some chosen red paradigms so that only those entities that sufficiently resemble the paradigms count as red. The type (or category) of women, then, is unified by some chosen woman paradigms so that those who sufficiently resemble the woman paradigms count as women (Stoljar 1995, 284).

Semantic considerations about the concept woman suggest to Stoljar that resemblance nominalism should be endorsed (Stoljar 2000, 28). It seems unlikely that the concept is applied on the basis of some single social feature all and only women possess. By contrast, woman is a cluster concept and our attributions of womanhood pick out “different arrangements of features in different individuals” (Stoljar 2000, 27). More specifically, they pick out the following clusters of features: (a) Female sex; (b) Phenomenological features: menstruation, female sexual experience, child-birth, breast-feeding, fear of walking on the streets at night or fear of rape; (c) Certain roles: wearing typically female clothing, being oppressed on the basis of one’s sex or undertaking care-work; (d) Gender attribution: “calling oneself a woman, being called a woman” (Stoljar 1995, 283–4). For Stoljar, attributions of womanhood are to do with a variety of traits and experiences: those that feminists have historically termed ‘gender traits’ (like social, behavioural, psychological traits) and those termed ‘sex traits’. Nonetheless, she holds that since the concept woman applies to (at least some) trans persons, one can be a woman without being female (Stoljar 1995, 282).

The cluster concept woman does not, however, straightforwardly provide the criterion for picking out the category of women. Rather, the four clusters of features that the concept picks out help single out woman paradigms that in turn help single out the category of women. First, any individual who possesses a feature from at least three of the four clusters mentioned will count as an exemplar of the category. For instance, an African-American with primary and secondary female sex characteristics, who describes herself as a woman and is oppressed on the basis of her sex, along with a white European hermaphrodite brought up ‘as a girl’, who engages in female roles and has female phenomenological features despite lacking female sex characteristics, will count as woman paradigms (Stoljar 1995, 284). [ 7 ] Second, any individual who resembles “any of the paradigms sufficiently closely (on Price’s account, as closely as [the paradigms] resemble each other) will be a member of the resemblance class ‘woman’” (Stoljar 1995, 284). That is, what delimits membership in the category of women is that one resembles sufficiently a woman paradigm.

4.2 Neo-gender realism

In a series of articles collected in her 2012 book, Sally Haslanger argues for a way to define the concept woman that is politically useful, serving as a tool in feminist fights against sexism, and that shows woman to be a social (not a biological) notion. More specifically, Haslanger argues that gender is a matter of occupying either a subordinate or a privileged social position. In some articles, Haslanger is arguing for a revisionary analysis of the concept woman (2000b; 2003a; 2003b). Elsewhere she suggests that her analysis may not be that revisionary after all (2005; 2006). Consider the former argument first. Haslanger’s analysis is, in her terms, ameliorative: it aims to elucidate which gender concepts best help feminists achieve their legitimate purposes thereby elucidating those concepts feminists should be using (Haslanger 2000b, 33). [ 8 ] Now, feminists need gender terminology in order to fight sexist injustices (Haslanger 2000b, 36). In particular, they need gender terms to identify, explain and talk about persistent social inequalities between males and females. Haslanger’s analysis of gender begins with the recognition that females and males differ in two respects: physically and in their social positions. Societies in general tend to “privilege individuals with male bodies” (Haslanger 2000b, 38) so that the social positions they subsequently occupy are better than the social positions of those with female bodies. And this generates persistent sexist injustices. With this in mind, Haslanger specifies how she understands genders:

S is a woman iff [by definition] S is systematically subordinated along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is ‘marked’ as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction.

S is a man iff [by definition] S is systematically privileged along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is ‘marked’ as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a male’s biological role in reproduction. (2003a, 6–7)

These are constitutive of being a woman and a man: what makes calling S a woman apt, is that S is oppressed on sex-marked grounds; what makes calling S a man apt, is that S is privileged on sex-marked grounds.

Haslanger’s ameliorative analysis is counterintuitive in that females who are not sex-marked for oppression, do not count as women. At least arguably, the Queen of England is not oppressed on sex-marked grounds and so, would not count as a woman on Haslanger’s definition. And, similarly, all males who are not privileged would not count as men. This might suggest that Haslanger’s analysis should be rejected in that it does not capture what language users have in mind when applying gender terms. However, Haslanger argues that this is not a reason to reject the definitions, which she takes to be revisionary: they are not meant to capture our intuitive gender terms. In response, Mikkola (2009) has argued that revisionary analyses of gender concepts, like Haslanger’s, are both politically unhelpful and philosophically unnecessary.

Note also that Haslanger’s proposal is eliminativist: gender justice would eradicate gender, since it would abolish those sexist social structures responsible for sex-marked oppression and privilege. If sexist oppression were to cease, women and men would no longer exist (although there would still be males and females). Not all feminists endorse such an eliminativist view though. Stone holds that Haslanger does not leave any room for positively revaluing what it is to be a woman: since Haslanger defines woman in terms of subordination,

any woman who challenges her subordinate status must by definition be challenging her status as a woman, even if she does not intend to … positive change to our gender norms would involve getting rid of the (necessarily subordinate) feminine gender. (Stone 2007, 160)

But according to Stone this is not only undesirable – one should be able to challenge subordination without having to challenge one’s status as a woman. It is also false: “because norms of femininity can be and constantly are being revised, women can be women without thereby being subordinate” (Stone 2007, 162; Mikkola [2016] too argues that Haslanger’s eliminativism is troublesome).

Theodore Bach holds that Haslanger’s eliminativism is undesirable on other grounds, and that Haslanger’s position faces another more serious problem. Feminism faces the following worries (among others):

Representation problem : “if there is no real group of ‘women’, then it is incoherent to make moral claims and advance political policies on behalf of women” (Bach 2012, 234). Commonality problems : (1) There is no feature that all women cross-culturally and transhistorically share. (2) Delimiting women’s social kind with the help of some essential property privileges those who possess it, and marginalizes those who do not (Bach 2012, 235).

According to Bach, Haslanger’s strategy to resolve these problems appeals to ‘social objectivism’. First, we define women “according to a suitably abstract relational property” (Bach 2012, 236), which avoids the commonality problems. Second, Haslanger employs “an ontologically thin notion of ‘objectivity’” (Bach 2012, 236) that answers the representation problem. Haslanger’s solution (Bach holds) is specifically to argue that women make up an objective type because women are objectively similar to one another, and not simply classified together given our background conceptual schemes. Bach claims though that Haslanger’s account is not objective enough, and we should on political grounds “provide a stronger ontological characterization of the genders men and women according to which they are natural kinds with explanatory essences” (Bach 2012, 238). He thus proposes that women make up a natural kind with a historical essence:

The essential property of women, in virtue of which an individual is a member of the kind ‘women,’ is participation in a lineage of women. In order to exemplify this relational property, an individual must be a reproduction of ancestral women, in which case she must have undergone the ontogenetic processes through which a historical gender system replicates women. (Bach 2012, 271)

In short, one is not a woman due to shared surface properties with other women (like occupying a subordinate social position). Rather, one is a woman because one has the right history: one has undergone the ubiquitous ontogenetic process of gender socialization. Thinking about gender in this way supposedly provides a stronger kind unity than Haslanger’s that simply appeals to shared surface properties.

Not everyone agrees; Mikkola (2020) argues that Bach’s metaphysical picture has internal tensions that render it puzzling and that Bach’s metaphysics does not provide good responses to the commonality and presentation problems. The historically essentialist view also has anti-trans implications. After all, trans women who have not undergone female gender socialization won’t count as women on his view (Mikkola [2016, 2020] develops this line of critique in more detail). More worryingly, trans women will count as men contrary to their self-identification. Both Bettcher (2013) and Jenkins (2016) consider the importance of gender self-identification. Bettcher argues that there is more than one ‘correct’ way to understand womanhood: at the very least, the dominant (mainstream), and the resistant (trans) conceptions. Dominant views like that of Bach’s tend to erase trans people’s experiences and to marginalize trans women within feminist movements. Rather than trans women having to defend their self-identifying claims, these claims should be taken at face value right from the start. And so, Bettcher holds, “in analyzing the meaning of terms such as ‘woman,’ it is inappropriate to dismiss alternative ways in which those terms are actually used in trans subcultures; such usage needs to be taken into consideration as part of the analysis” (2013, 235).

Specifically with Haslanger in mind and in a similar vein, Jenkins (2016) discusses how Haslanger’s revisionary approach unduly excludes some trans women from women’s social kind. On Jenkins’s view, Haslanger’s ameliorative methodology in fact yields more than one satisfying target concept: one that “corresponds to Haslanger’s proposed concept and captures the sense of gender as an imposed social class”; another that “captures the sense of gender as a lived identity” (Jenkins 2016, 397). The latter of these allows us to include trans women into women’s social kind, who on Haslanger’s social class approach to gender would inappropriately have been excluded. (See Andler 2017 for the view that Jenkins’s purportedly inclusive conception of gender is still not fully inclusive. Jenkins 2018 responds to this charge and develops the notion of gender identity still further.)

In addition to her revisionary argument, Haslanger has suggested that her ameliorative analysis of woman may not be as revisionary as it first seems (2005, 2006). Although successful in their reference fixing, ordinary language users do not always know precisely what they are talking about. Our language use may be skewed by oppressive ideologies that can “mislead us about the content of our own thoughts” (Haslanger 2005, 12). Although her gender terminology is not intuitive, this could simply be because oppressive ideologies mislead us about the meanings of our gender terms. Our everyday gender terminology might mean something utterly different from what we think it means; and we could be entirely ignorant of this. Perhaps Haslanger’s analysis, then, has captured our everyday gender vocabulary revealing to us the terms that we actually employ: we may be applying ‘woman’ in our everyday language on the basis of sex-marked subordination whether we take ourselves to be doing so or not. If this is so, Haslanger’s gender terminology is not radically revisionist.

Saul (2006) argues that, despite it being possible that we unknowingly apply ‘woman’ on the basis of social subordination, it is extremely difficult to show that this is the case. This would require showing that the gender terminology we in fact employ is Haslanger’s proposed gender terminology. But discovering the grounds on which we apply everyday gender terms is extremely difficult precisely because they are applied in various and idiosyncratic ways (Saul 2006, 129). Haslanger, then, needs to do more in order to show that her analysis is non-revisionary.

Charlotte Witt (2011a; 2011b) argues for a particular sort of gender essentialism, which Witt terms ‘uniessentialism’. Her motivation and starting point is the following: many ordinary social agents report gender being essential to them and claim that they would be a different person were they of a different sex/gender. Uniessentialism attempts to understand and articulate this. However, Witt’s work departs in important respects from the earlier (so-called) essentialist or gender realist positions discussed in Section 2: Witt does not posit some essential property of womanhood of the kind discussed above, which failed to take women’s differences into account. Further, uniessentialism differs significantly from those position developed in response to the problem of how we should conceive of women’s social kind. It is not about solving the standard dispute between gender nominalists and gender realists, or about articulating some supposedly shared property that binds women together and provides a theoretical ground for feminist political solidarity. Rather, uniessentialism aims to make good the widely held belief that gender is constitutive of who we are. [ 9 ]

Uniessentialism is a sort of individual essentialism. Traditionally philosophers distinguish between kind and individual essentialisms: the former examines what binds members of a kind together and what do all members of some kind have in common qua members of that kind. The latter asks: what makes an individual the individual it is. We can further distinguish two sorts of individual essentialisms: Kripkean identity essentialism and Aristotelian uniessentialism. The former asks: what makes an individual that individual? The latter, however, asks a slightly different question: what explains the unity of individuals? What explains that an individual entity exists over and above the sum total of its constituent parts? (The standard feminist debate over gender nominalism and gender realism has largely been about kind essentialism. Being about individual essentialism, Witt’s uniessentialism departs in an important way from the standard debate.) From the two individual essentialisms, Witt endorses the Aristotelian one. On this view, certain functional essences have a unifying role: these essences are responsible for the fact that material parts constitute a new individual, rather than just a lump of stuff or a collection of particles. Witt’s example is of a house: the essential house-functional property (what the entity is for, what its purpose is) unifies the different material parts of a house so that there is a house, and not just a collection of house-constituting particles (2011a, 6). Gender (being a woman/a man) functions in a similar fashion and provides “the principle of normative unity” that organizes, unifies and determines the roles of social individuals (Witt 2011a, 73). Due to this, gender is a uniessential property of social individuals.

It is important to clarify the notions of gender and social individuality that Witt employs. First, gender is a social position that “cluster[s] around the engendering function … women conceive and bear … men beget” (Witt 2011a, 40). These are women and men’s socially mediated reproductive functions (Witt 2011a, 29) and they differ from the biological function of reproduction, which roughly corresponds to sex on the standard sex/gender distinction. Witt writes: “to be a woman is to be recognized to have a particular function in engendering, to be a man is to be recognized to have a different function in engendering” (2011a, 39). Second, Witt distinguishes persons (those who possess self-consciousness), human beings (those who are biologically human) and social individuals (those who occupy social positions synchronically and diachronically). These ontological categories are not equivalent in that they possess different persistence and identity conditions. Social individuals are bound by social normativity, human beings by biological normativity. These normativities differ in two respects: first, social norms differ from one culture to the next whereas biological norms do not; second, unlike biological normativity, social normativity requires “the recognition by others that an agent is both responsive to and evaluable under a social norm” (Witt 2011a, 19). Thus, being a social individual is not equivalent to being a human being. Further, Witt takes personhood to be defined in terms of intrinsic psychological states of self-awareness and self-consciousness. However, social individuality is defined in terms of the extrinsic feature of occupying a social position, which depends for its existence on a social world. So, the two are not equivalent: personhood is essentially about intrinsic features and could exist without a social world, whereas social individuality is essentially about extrinsic features that could not exist without a social world.

Witt’s gender essentialist argument crucially pertains to social individuals , not to persons or human beings: saying that persons or human beings are gendered would be a category mistake. But why is gender essential to social individuals? For Witt, social individuals are those who occupy positions in social reality. Further, “social positions have norms or social roles associated with them; a social role is what an individual who occupies a given social position is responsive to and evaluable under” (Witt 2011a, 59). However, qua social individuals, we occupy multiple social positions at once and over time: we can be women, mothers, immigrants, sisters, academics, wives, community organisers and team-sport coaches synchronically and diachronically. Now, the issue for Witt is what unifies these positions so that a social individual is constituted. After all, a bundle of social position occupancies does not make for an individual (just as a bundle of properties like being white , cube-shaped and sweet do not make for a sugar cube). For Witt, this unifying role is undertaken by gender (being a woman or a man): it is

a pervasive and fundamental social position that unifies and determines all other social positions both synchronically and diachronically. It unifies them not physically, but by providing a principle of normative unity. (2011a, 19–20)

By ‘normative unity’, Witt means the following: given our social roles and social position occupancies, we are responsive to various sets of social norms. These norms are “complex patterns of behaviour and practices that constitute what one ought to do in a situation given one’s social position(s) and one’s social context” (Witt 2011a, 82). The sets of norms can conflict: the norms of motherhood can (and do) conflict with the norms of being an academic philosopher. However, in order for this conflict to exist, the norms must be binding on a single social individual. Witt, then, asks: what explains the existence and unity of the social individual who is subject to conflicting social norms? The answer is gender.

Gender is not just a social role that unifies social individuals. Witt takes it to be the social role — as she puts it, it is the mega social role that unifies social agents. First, gender is a mega social role if it satisfies two conditions (and Witt claims that it does): (1) if it provides the principle of synchronic and diachronic unity of social individuals, and (2) if it inflects and defines a broad range of other social roles. Gender satisfies the first in usually being a life-long social position: a social individual persists just as long as their gendered social position persists. Further, Witt maintains, trans people are not counterexamples to this claim: transitioning entails that the old social individual has ceased to exist and a new one has come into being. And this is consistent with the same person persisting and undergoing social individual change via transitioning. Gender satisfies the second condition too. It inflects other social roles, like being a parent or a professional. The expectations attached to these social roles differ depending on the agent’s gender, since gender imposes different social norms to govern the execution of the further social roles. Now, gender — as opposed to some other social category, like race — is not just a mega social role; it is the unifying mega social role. Cross-cultural and trans-historical considerations support this view. Witt claims that patriarchy is a social universal (2011a, 98). By contrast, racial categorisation varies historically and cross-culturally, and racial oppression is not a universal feature of human cultures. Thus, gender has a better claim to being the social role that is uniessential to social individuals. This account of gender essentialism not only explains social agents’ connectedness to their gender, but it also provides a helpful way to conceive of women’s agency — something that is central to feminist politics.

Linda Alcoff holds that feminism faces an identity crisis: the category of women is feminism’s starting point, but various critiques about gender have fragmented the category and it is not clear how feminists should understand what it is to be a woman (2006, chapter 5). In response, Alcoff develops an account of gender as positionality whereby “gender is, among other things, a position one occupies and from which one can act politically” (2006, 148). In particular, she takes one’s social position to foster the development of specifically gendered identities (or self-conceptions): “The very subjectivity (or subjective experience of being a woman) and the very identity of women are constituted by women’s position” (Alcoff 2006, 148). Alcoff holds that there is an objective basis for distinguishing individuals on the grounds of (actual or expected) reproductive roles:

Women and men are differentiated by virtue of their different relationship of possibility to biological reproduction, with biological reproduction referring to conceiving, giving birth, and breast-feeding, involving one’s body . (Alcoff 2006, 172, italics in original)

The thought is that those standardly classified as biologically female, although they may not actually be able to reproduce, will encounter “a different set of practices, expectations, and feelings in regard to reproduction” than those standardly classified as male (Alcoff 2006, 172). Further, this differential relation to the possibility of reproduction is used as the basis for many cultural and social phenomena that position women and men: it can be

the basis of a variety of social segregations, it can engender the development of differential forms of embodiment experienced throughout life, and it can generate a wide variety of affective responses, from pride, delight, shame, guilt, regret, or great relief from having successfully avoided reproduction. (Alcoff 2006, 172)

Reproduction, then, is an objective basis for distinguishing individuals that takes on a cultural dimension in that it positions women and men differently: depending on the kind of body one has, one’s lived experience will differ. And this fosters the construction of gendered social identities: one’s role in reproduction helps configure how one is socially positioned and this conditions the development of specifically gendered social identities.

Since women are socially positioned in various different contexts, “there is no gender essence all women share” (Alcoff 2006, 147–8). Nonetheless, Alcoff acknowledges that her account is akin to the original 1960s sex/gender distinction insofar as sex difference (understood in terms of the objective division of reproductive labour) provides the foundation for certain cultural arrangements (the development of a gendered social identity). But, with the benefit of hindsight

we can see that maintaining a distinction between the objective category of sexed identity and the varied and culturally contingent practices of gender does not presume an absolute distinction of the old-fashioned sort between culture and a reified nature. (Alcoff 2006, 175)

That is, her view avoids the implausible claim that sex is exclusively to do with nature and gender with culture. Rather, the distinction on the basis of reproductive possibilities shapes and is shaped by the sorts of cultural and social phenomena (like varieties of social segregation) these possibilities gives rise to. For instance, technological interventions can alter sex differences illustrating that this is the case (Alcoff 2006, 175). Women’s specifically gendered social identities that are constituted by their context dependent positions, then, provide the starting point for feminist politics.

Recently Robin Dembroff (2020) has argued that existing metaphysical accounts of gender fail to address non-binary gender identities. This generates two concerns. First, metaphysical accounts of gender (like the ones outlined in previous sections) are insufficient for capturing those who reject binary gender categorisation where people are either men or women. In so doing, these accounts are not satisfying as explanations of gender understood in a more expansive sense that goes beyond the binary. Second, the failure to understand non-binary gender identities contributes to a form of epistemic injustice called ‘hermeneutical injustice’: it feeds into a collective failure to comprehend and analyse concepts and practices that undergird non-binary classification schemes, thereby impeding on one’s ability to fully understand themselves. To overcome these problems, Dembroff suggests an account of genderqueer that they call ‘critical gender kind’:

a kind whose members collectively destabilize one or more elements of dominant gender ideology. Genderqueer, on my proposed model, is a category whose members collectively destabilize the binary axis, or the idea that the only possible genders are the exclusive and exhaustive kinds men and women. (2020, 2)

Note that Dembroff’s position is not to be confused with ‘gender critical feminist’ positions like those noted above, which are critical of the prevalent feminist focus on gender, as opposed to sex, kinds. Dembroff understands genderqueer as a gender kind, but one that is critical of dominant binary understandings of gender.

Dembroff identifies two modes of destabilising the gender binary: principled and existential. Principled destabilising “stems from or otherwise expresses individuals’ social or political commitments regarding gender norms, practices, and structures”, while existential destabilising “stems from or otherwise expresses individuals’ felt or desired gender roles, embodiment, and/or categorization” (2020, 13). These modes are not mutually exclusive, and they can help us understand the difference between allies and members of genderqueer kinds: “While both resist dominant gender ideology, members of [genderqueer] kinds resist (at least in part) due to felt or desired gender categorization that deviates from dominant expectations, norms, and assumptions” (2020, 14). These modes of destabilisation also enable us to formulate an understanding of non-critical gender kinds that binary understandings of women and men’s kinds exemplify. Dembroff defines these kinds as follows:

For a given kind X , X is a non-critical gender kind relative to a given society iff X ’s members collectively restabilize one or more elements of the dominant gender ideology in that society. (2020, 14)

Dembroff’s understanding of critical and non-critical gender kinds importantly makes gender kind membership something more and other than a mere psychological phenomenon. To engage in collectively destabilising or restabilising dominant gender normativity and ideology, we need more than mere attitudes or mental states – resisting or maintaining such normativity requires action as well. In so doing, Dembroff puts their position forward as an alternative to two existing internalist positions about gender. First, to Jennifer McKitrick’s (2015) view whereby gender is dispositional: in a context where someone is disposed to behave in ways that would be taken by others to be indicative of (e.g.) womanhood, the person has a woman’s gender identity. Second, to Jenkin’s (2016, 2018) position that takes an individual’s gender identity to be dependent on which gender-specific norms the person experiences as being relevant to them. On this view, someone is a woman if the person experiences norms associated with women to be relevant to the person in the particular social context that they are in. Neither of these positions well-captures non-binary identities, Dembroff argues, which motivates the account of genderqueer identities as critical gender kinds.

As Dembroff acknowledges, substantive philosophical work on non-binary gender identities is still developing. However, it is important to note that analytic philosophers are beginning to engage in gender metaphysics that goes beyond the binary.

This entry first looked at feminist objections to biological determinism and the claim that gender is socially constructed. Next, it examined feminist critiques of prevalent understandings of gender and sex, and the distinction itself. In response to these concerns, the entry looked at how a unified women’s category could be articulated for feminist political purposes. This illustrated that gender metaphysics — or what it is to be a woman or a man or a genderqueer person — is still very much a live issue. And although contemporary feminist philosophical debates have questioned some of the tenets and details of the original 1960s sex/gender distinction, most still hold onto the view that gender is about social factors and that it is (in some sense) distinct from biological sex. The jury is still out on what the best, the most useful, or (even) the correct definition of gender is.

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I am very grateful to Tuukka Asplund, Jenny Saul, Alison Stone and Nancy Tuana for their extremely helpful and detailed comments when writing this entry.

Copyright © 2022 by Mari Mikkola < m . mikkola @ uva . nl >

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Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Journal of the International Academy for Case Studies (Print ISSN: 1078-4950; Online ISSN: 1532-5822)

Review Article: 2023 Vol: 29 Issue: 1

Gender Discrimination: An Overview of Historical and Contemporary Issues

Kendall Oswald, University of Warwick

Citation Information : Oswald, K. (2023). Gender discrimination: an overview of historical and contemporary issues. Journal of the International Academy for Case Studies, 29 (1), 1-2.

This research article provides an overview of gender discrimination, including its historical roots and contemporary manifestations. Discrimination based on gender has been a pervasive issue throughout history, with women facing barriers to education, employment, and political participation. Although progress has been made towards gender equality, gender discrimination still persists in many forms today. Gender-based violence, workplace inequality, legal barriers, and poverty are among the contemporary issues that disproportionately affect women. This article highlights the importance of addressing the root causes of gender discrimination and working towards the creation of a society that values and respects individuals regardless of their gender identity or expression. Education, policy reform, and advocacy efforts aimed at promoting gender equality can help create a more just and equitable world for all.

Gender Discrimination, Contemporary Issues, Gender-Based Violence, Workplace Inequality, Legal Barriers, Human Rights, Gender Equality, Policy Reform, Advocacy Efforts.

Introduction

Gender discrimination has been a prevalent issue throughout history, and despite progress towards gender equality, it still persists in many forms today. Discrimination based on gender refers to the unequal treatment of individuals on the basis of their gender identity or expression. This research article examines the history of gender discrimination and how it manifests in contemporary society.

Historical Overview of Gender Discrimination

Gender discrimination has been a significant issue throughout history. Women have been denied the right to education, employment, and political participation based solely on their gender. For example, in the United States, women were not allowed to vote until 1920, and it was not until the 1960s and 1970s that women began to achieve greater social and economic equality. In many parts of the world, gender discrimination is still prevalent. Women continue to face barriers to education and employment, and they are often paid less than men for performing the same job. In some countries, women are not allowed to drive, own property, or even leave their homes without male supervision ( Dilli et al., 2019; Kirton & Greene, 2005 ).

Contemporary Forms of Gender Discrimination

Despite progress towards gender equality, gender discrimination still manifests in many forms in contemporary society. One of the most significant forms of gender discrimination is gender-based violence, including sexual assault and domestic violence. Women are disproportionately affected by gender-based violence, with an estimated one in three women experiencing some form of violence in their lifetime ( Risman, 2018; Robeyns, 2003 ).

Gender discrimination also manifests in the workplace, where women often face barriers to career advancement and are paid less than men for performing the same job. Women are also underrepresented in leadership positions, with only a small percentage of CEOs and board members being female.

In many countries, women still face legal barriers to equality, such as laws that prevent them from inheriting property or require them to have a male guardian. Women are also disproportionately affected by poverty, with many working in low-wage jobs without access to basic benefits such as healthcare and paid leave ( Zhu & Chang, 2019 ).

Gender discrimination has been a pervasive issue throughout history, and while progress towards gender equality has been made, it still persists in many forms today. Discrimination based on gender is a violation of human rights and has significant social and economic consequences. To achieve gender equality, it is crucial to address the root causes of gender discrimination and to work towards the creation of a society that values and respects individuals regardless of their gender identity or expression. This can be achieved through education, policy reform, and advocacy efforts aimed at eliminating gender-based violence, promoting workplace equality, and ensuring legal protections for all individuals. By working towards gender equality, we can create a more just and equitable world for all.

Dilli, S., Carmichael, S. G., & Rijpma, A. (2019). Introducing the historical gender equality index . Feminist Economics , 25 (1), 31-57.

Indexed at , Google Scholar , Cross Ref

Kirton, G., & Greene, A. M. (2005). Gender, equality and industrial relations in the ‘New Europe’: An introduction . European Journal of Industrial Relations , 11 (2), 141-149.

Risman, B. J. (2018). Gender as a social structure (pp. 19-43) . Springer International Publishing.

Google Scholar , Cross Ref

Robeyns, I. (2003). Sen's capability approach and gender inequality: Selecting relevant capabilities . Feminist Economics , 9 (2-3), 61-92.

Zhu, N., & Chang, L. (2019). Evolved but not fixed: A life history account of gender roles and gender inequality . Frontiers in Psychology , 10 , 1709.

Received : 20-Dec-2022, Manuscript No. JIACS-23-13433; Editor assigned : 23-Dec-2022, PreQC No. JIACS-23-13433(PQ); Reviewed : 06-Jan-2023, QC No. JIACS-23-13433; Revised : 13-Jan-2023, Manuscript No. JIACS-23-13433(R); Published : 20-Jan-2023

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Gender discrimination in the United States: Experiences of women

Gillian k. steelfisher.

1 Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston Massachusetts

Mary G. Findling

Sara n. bleich, logan s. casey, robert j. blendon, john m. benson, justin m. sayde, carolyn miller.

2 Research, Evaluation, and Learning Unit, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Princeton New Jersey

Associated Data

To examine reported experiences of gender discrimination and harassment among US women.

Data Source and Study Design

Data come from a nationally representative, probability‐based telephone survey of 1596 women, conducted January‐April 2017.

We calculated the percentages of women reporting gender discrimination and harassment in several domains, including health care. We used logistic regression to examine variation in experiences among women by race/ethnicity and sexual orientation/gender identity.

Principal Findings

Sizable fractions of women experience discrimination and harassment, including discrimination in health care (18 percent), equal pay/promotions (41 percent), and higher education (20 percent). In adjusted models, Native American, black, and Latina women had higher odds than white women of reporting gender discrimination in several domains, including health care. Latinas’ odds of health care avoidance versus whites was (OR [95% CI]) 3.69 (1.59, 8.58), while blacks’ odds of discrimination in health care visits versus whites was 2.00 [1.06, 3.74]. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) women had higher odds of reporting sexual harassment (2.16 [1.06, 4.40]) and violence (2.71 [1.43, 5.16]) against themselves or female family members than non‐LGBTQ women.

Conclusions

Results suggest that discrimination and harassment are widely experienced by women across multiple domains of their lives, particularly those who are a racial/ethnic minority or LGBTQ. Further policy and programmatic efforts beyond current legal protections for women are needed to meaningfully reduce these negative experiences, as they impact women's health care and their lives overall.

1. INTRODUCTION

The prominence of the #MeToo and #TimesUp movements have heightened public awareness of discrimination, sexual assault, and harassment against women in the United States. 1 While this is an important step in bringing visibility to these issues, these movements were popularized largely by anecdotal experiences of celebrities, with an emphasis on the impact for their careers. In order to identify appropriate policies that address discrimination for the larger public and to support related health outcomes, it is critical to examine and document experiences of discrimination among a broader swath of women and across a broader spectrum of life domains, including health. It is particularly important to examine the experience of women at risk for multiple types of discrimination, including racial/ethnic minority women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) women.

Evidence about the negative health effects of gender discrimination is grounded in a strong body of literature, showing that the gender‐based discrimination and harassment that women experience in the workplace affect their physical and mental health, as well as their economic opportunities. 2 , 3 , 4 Such discrimination and harassment further contribute to gender inequalities in health. 5 , 6 Research has also shown there is gender‐based discrimination against women in health care interactions and gender bias in medicine, which can have negative health impacts. 7 , 8 , 9

Evidence about the health impact of gender discrimination is supported indirectly by literature documenting the relationship between racial/ethnic discrimination and negative health outcomes. 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 These studies suggest that the experience of discrimination—be it institutional (eg, health care) or interpersonal (eg, microaggressions)—increases the body's stress response over time, and that discrimination is linked to a range of poor health‐related behaviors, mental health outcomes, and physical health problems, including high blood pressure, heart disease, and mortality. 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 Experiencing gender discrimination may negatively impact women's health through parallel mechanisms, that is, through both psychological and physiological stress responses and health behaviors that lead to worse health outcomes. 15 , 16 Research in the field also suggests that women who are racial/ethnic minorities are disproportionately exposed to discrimination and are also more likely to experience health effects of discrimination. 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 Similarly, women who identify as LGBTQ are at higher risk for experiencing discrimination than their non‐LGBTQ counterparts. 20 , 21

While older studies document gender discrimination in discrete areas of women's lives (eg, the workplace), increasing evidence about the health risks of discrimination suggests an updated examination across a broader range of areas is warranted. 2 , 6 , 14 , 22 The purpose of this specific study is twofold: (a) to document the prevalence of gender discrimination against women across multiple institutional and interpersonal domains, including health care, education, employment, housing, political participation, police and the criminal justice system, slurs, microaggressions, harassment, and violence; and (b) to examine the variation in discrimination experiences of racial/ethnic minority women and LGBTQ women. This study brings a public health perspective to the complexity and pervasiveness of discrimination in the United States today alongside complementary articles in this issue of Health Services Research . It was conducted as part of a larger survey fielded in 2017 to understand nationally representative experiences of discrimination against several different groups in America today, including blacks, Latinos, Asians, Native Americans, women, and LGBTQ people.

2.1. Study design and sample

Data were obtained from a nationally representative, probability‐based telephone (cell and landline) survey of US adults, conducted from January 26 to April 9, 2017. The survey was jointly designed by Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and National Public Radio. SSRS administered the survey. Because Harvard researchers were not directly involved in data collection and de‐identified datasets were used for analysis, the study was determined to be “not human subjects research” by the Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health Office of Human Research Administration.

The full survey sample included 3453 US adults aged 18 years and older, and this paper examines the subsample of 1596 US women. The completion rate for this survey was 74 percent among respondents who answered initial demographic screening questions, with a 10 percent overall response rate, calculated based on the American Association for Public Opinion Research's (AAPOR) RR3 formula. 23 Because data from this study were drawn from a probability sample and used the best available sampling and weighting practices in polling methods (eg, 68 percent of interviews were conducted by cell phone, and 32 percent were conducted via landline), they are expected to provide accurate results consistent with surveys with higher response rates 24 , 25 and are therefore reliably generalizable to the broader population of US women, within a margin of error of ± 4.6 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence interval. See Benson, Ben‐Porath, and Casey (2019) for a further description of the survey methodology. 26

2.2. Survey instrument

Polling questions were developed using AAPOR best practices for survey research, after conducting a review of available survey questions on discrimination. 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 10 , 11 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 27 The questionnaire was reviewed by external experts for bias, balance, and comprehension, and it was pretested in the field before it was conducted among the full sample. 26 The poll asked about women's experiences of discrimination, including harassment. We conceptualized gender discrimination as differential or unfair treatment of individuals based on their self‐identification as a woman/female. We include discrimination that is “institutional,” meaning propagated by social institutions (based on laws, policies, institutions, and related behavior of individuals who work in or control these laws, policies, or institution) or “interpersonal,” meaning propagated by individuals (based on beliefs, words, and behavior). 11 , 27 , 28 We analyzed 17 questions from the survey, covering six interpersonal and six institutional areas of discrimination that women may face (question wording in Appendix S1 ). Institutional areas included employment, education, health care, housing, political participation, and police and courts. Interpersonal areas included gender‐based slurs, microaggressions, sexual harassment, being threatened or nonsexually harassed, and violence. We also examined two areas in which concerns about discrimination might prevent women from taking potentially needed action: seeking health or police services. We examined discrimination in domains previously demonstrated to be associated with health (eg, health care interactions), 8 , 9 as well as domains outside health services research (eg, police interactions), to capture a wide range of possible discriminatory experiences across women's lives. Questions were only asked among a random half sample of respondents in order to maximize the number of questions (and thus dimensions of discrimination considered) while limiting the survey length and time burden for any individual respondent. Questions were only asked of relevant subgroups (eg, questions about college only asked among women who had ever applied to or attended college). Questions about harassment, violence, and avoiding institutions for fear of discrimination were asked about yourself or family members because of the sensitive nature of the topic and prior literature demonstrating that vicariously experiencing stress (eg, through discrimination experienced by family members) can directly and adversely affect individuals. 29

2.3. Statistical analyses

We first calculated the prevalence of all women who reported that they had ever experienced gender discrimination in each of the domains. Second, we generated bivariate statistics to assess whether women in racial/ethnic minority groups or women in a sexual and/or gender minority (LGBTQ) were more likely to experience gender discrimination. For race/ethnicity, women self‐identified with one of the following mutually exclusive groups: white (reference group); Hispanic or Latina; black; Asian; American Indian, Alaska Native, or Native American; or Other. If respondents identified as Latina and another race, interviewers asked if they identified more with being Hispanic/Latina (coded as Latina) or more with the other race (coded as the other race). For sexual orientation and/or gender identity, women were classified as LGBTQ if they identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or queer, or if they identified as transgender or genderqueer/gender nonconforming. Women were classified as non‐LGBTQ if they self‐identified as heterosexual/straight and female gender, and did not identify as transgender or genderqueer/gender nonconforming. Using pairwise t tests of differences in proportions, we made uncontrolled comparisons of the percentage of women reporting discrimination between racial/ethnic minority and white women, as well as between LGBTQ and non‐LGBTQ women. Differences achieving statistical significance at P  < .05 are discussed in the results.

To give further consideration as to whether race/ethnicity or LGBTQ status is a driver of these associations, we then conducted logistic regression models to assess whether reporting discrimination remained significantly associated with race/ethnicity or sexual orientation/gender identity after controlling for the following possible confounders: age (18‐29, 30‐49, 50‐64, 65+); self‐reported household income (<$25 000, $25 000‐<$50 000, $50 000‐<$75 000, $75 000+), education (less than college degree or college graduate), and, for health care questions only, current health insurance status (uninsured, Medicaid insured, non‐Medicaid insured). Finally, we examined whether each sociodemographic variable was significantly associated with experiencing discrimination across domains in order to consider other possible drivers of gender discrimination.

To compensate for known biases in telephone surveys (eg, nonresponse bias) and variations in probability of selection within and across households, sample data were weighted by household size and composition, cell phone/landline use, and demographics (age, education, race/ethnicity, and Census region) to reflect the true population distribution of women in the country. Other techniques, including random‐digit dialing, replicate subsamples, and random selection of a respondent within a household, were used to ensure that the sample is representative. All analyses were conducted using STATA version 15.0 (StataCorp), and all tests accounted for the variance introduced by weighted data.

Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of this nationally representative sample of women are displayed in Table ​ Table1. 1 . A majority were white (65 percent), 15 percent were Hispanic/Latina, 13 percent were black, 6 percent were Asian, and 1 percent were Native American. About nine in ten women (89 percent) identified as non‐LGBTQ, 7 percent identified as LGBTQ, and 4 percent refused to answer sexual orientation/gender identity questions.

Weighted characteristics of a nationally representative sample of women in the United States, overall and by race/ethnicity and sexual orientation/gender identity a

Sizeable fractions reported personally experiencing institutional discrimination across all domains of life examined. For example, about one in five women (18 percent) reported gender‐based discrimination when going to a doctor or health clinic, while more than four in 10 (41 percent) reported such discrimination in obtaining equal pay or being considered for promotions, and 31 percent reported discrimination in applying for jobs. Approximately one‐fifth experienced discrimination in applying to or while attending college (20 percent), and a similar fraction experienced discrimination trying to rent a room/apartment or buy a house (16 percent) or in interacting with the police (15 percent).

Sizable fractions of women reported experiencing interpersonal discrimination personally or within their family: 37 percent reported that they or female family members have experienced sexual harassment, and 29 percent said they or female family members have been threatened or nonsexually harassed. More than a fifth (21 percent) said they or family members experienced violence because they are women.

Concerns that they would experience discrimination also prevented some women from taking action to protect themselves: 9 percent reported that they have avoided the doctor or seeking health care for themselves or their family, and the same percentage (9 percent) reported that they have avoided calling the police or other authority figures, even when in need.

Looking at uncontrolled comparisons across racial/ethnic groups, black, Native American, and Hispanic/Latina women were more likely to report discrimination than white women in several domains (Table ​ (Table2). 2 ). In particular, Native American women were dramatically more likely to than white women to report sexual harassment (62 vs 42 percent, P  < .03), threats or nonsexual harassment (58 vs 31 percent, P  < .01), and gender‐based violence (58 vs 21 percent, P  < .01) against themselves or a female family member. They were also more likely to avoid health care because of concerns about gender‐based discrimination or poor treatment (27 vs 7 percent, P  < .02). Asian women, and in a few cases Hispanic/Latina women, were less likely to report discrimination than white women in some domains.

Differences in percent of women reporting gender discrimination, by race/ethnicity and sexual orientation/gender identity a

There were also differences between LGBTQ and non‐LGBTQ women's experiences of discrimination and harassment. LGBTQ women were more likely than non‐LGBTQ women to report gender discrimination when it comes to being paid equally or considered for promotions (61 vs 40 percent, P  < .01). When it comes to interpersonal discrimination against themselves or female family members, they were more likely to report sexual harassment (65 vs 36 percent, P  < .01), being threatened or nonsexually harassed (48 vs. 28 percent, P  < .01), and experiencing violence (42 vs 20 percent, P  < .01).

After we controlled for potential sociodemographic confounders in logistic regression models, many of the racial/ethnic and sexual orientation/gender identity differences persisted, and six emerged (see Tables ​ Tables3 3 and ​ and4 4 for detailed results). Notably, the odds of Native American women reporting discrimination were significantly higher than white women across nine domains, while the odds of Latina and black women were higher than whites in two and three domains, respectively. Notably, Asian women had lower odds than whites for reporting discrimination in seven domains, and all racial/ethnic minority women had lower odds of reporting sexual harassment compared to white women (Table ​ (Table4 4 ).

Odds of reporting personal experiences of gender discrimination across institutional domains among a nationally representative sample of US women

Abbreviations: CI, Confidence Interval; OR, Odds Ratio.

Odds of reporting interpersonal experiences of gender discrimination across domains among a nationally representative sample of US women

As in uncontrolled comparisons, adjusted models showed that LGBTQ women had higher odds of reporting gender discrimination in obtaining equal pay and promotions, sexual harassment, and violence compared to their non‐LGBTQ counterparts.

Several additional sociodemographic characteristics in the models were associated with discrimination. In both health care domains, uninsured women also had significantly higher odds of reporting gender discrimination than women with non‐Medicaid insurance. College‐educated women had significantly higher odds of reporting discrimination across both health care domains and all interpersonal domains compared to women without a college education. Women ages 18‐29 had significantly higher odds of reporting discrimination in most interpersonal domains compared to women 30 and over.

4. DISCUSSION

This study presents strong evidence that US women report widespread discrimination and harassment. This continuing evidence of reported systemic institutional and interpersonal discrimination against women suggests that additional policies and programs are needed to eliminate discrimination at the population level beyond legal protections already in place (eg, through the 19th amendment and Title IX ) and, subsequently, address negative health consequences associated with these experiences. Several findings are particularly relevant to consideration for those working to develop, implement, and evaluate policies addressing gender discrimination in the United States.

First, results confirm that many women experience interpersonal and institutional gender discrimination not only within the workplace, but also across a wide spectrum of other domains, including health care, higher education, housing, and the legal system. Our findings raise a host of concerns not only about gender discrimination within these individual domains, but also across them. While it is beyond the scope of our results to promote specific policies or practices to end gender discrimination in the United States, these results make clear that future work needs to consider the interrelated experiences of discrimination across multiple facets of women's lives.

Second, findings related to the experiences of gender discrimination within the health care arena suggest focused attention is needed here. It is alarming that one in five women report discrimination in their clinical experience and one in ten report avoiding care. It may be important to develop policies specific to the complexities of medical decision making, with recognition that gender inequalities in the underlying clinical evidence base may play a role in how decision making occurs in the clinical setting. 30 Further, given that both Latina and black women report higher odds of gender discrimination in health care, policies may need to account for the needs of these groups of women particularly. 9

Third, the evidence points to persistent experiences of gender discrimination and harassment against women in racial/ethnic minorities even outside health care. Our findings of discrimination and harassment among Native American women in particular were striking, as a majority reported personally experiencing gender discrimination in obtaining equal pay or promotions and that they or female family members had experienced both sexual and nonsexual harassment, as well as violence. These results are consistent with other findings of high incidence of violence, sexual violence, abuse, and assault against Native American women. They are especially troubling given further evidence that the high prevalence of historical and current trauma that Native American women experience has resulted in substantially worse health outcomes. 31 , 32 Findings are also consistent with prior evidence that Native American women avoid health care systems they do not perceive as culturally safe. 32 These findings raise important concerns about relevant gender discrimination policy for Native American women specifically, as well as broader considerations of policy support for women who are at risk of multiple and compounded types of discrimination based on their race/ethnicity and gender.

Fourth, we note that women who identified as LGBTQ were more likely to experience gender discrimination in work and more likely to experience (directly or through family) interpersonal discrimination including sexual harassment and violence. This adds to existing evidence that LGBTQ women experience high rates of sexual violence 33 and provides additional evidence about the experience of discrimination across multiple dimensions of their lives. Policies to guard against anti‐LGBTQ discrimination may need to consider the multiple and potentially compounded types of discrimination that LGBTQ women specifically face in these arenas.

Notably, our findings of greater reported interpersonal discrimination among college‐educated women are consistent with other literature showing positive associations between socioeconomic status and reported discrimination among racial/ethnic minorities. 27 , 34 However, it is unclear whether this relationship is driven by unequal exposures (eg, greater contact with institutions where women may experience discrimination/harassment) or differential reporting (eg, higher likelihood of recognizing and/or self‐reporting discrimination/harassment).

4.1. Limitations

Our results should be interpreted considering several limitations. First, although we assessed perspectives across a broad range of settings, we only examined a subset of types of discrimination and harassment that women may experience, and thus, we cannot speak to the full scope of discrimination. Second, we assessed whether women have or have not experienced any types of discrimination, without regard to timing or severity. This limits the ability to detect current levels experienced and instead focuses on lifetime experiences. However, lifetime experiences remain valid measures of discrimination, as discriminatory experiences may have long‐term effects on behavior or health. 3 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 Third, we note that many forms of discrimination, including sexual harassment and violence, are often under‐reported—particularly on surveys administered by an interviewer, such as in this study. 35 Prior research has also found that women are often reluctant to label offensive experiences as “harassment.” 22 To overcome the challenge of sensitive topic areas, we asked whether “you or someone in your family who is also female” had experienced gendered harassment or violence. Nonetheless, respondents may have not been comfortable answering these questions over the phone and also may have interpreted questions differently based on varying backgrounds and expectations. Women may also face multiple types of discrimination simultaneously based on intersecting parts of their social identities (eg, based on both gender and race). 17 It is not always possible for women to disentangle the reasons they face discrimination, so restricting analyses to only gender‐based discrimination may result in underreporting of discrimination by some respondents, and this may be different across women of different racial/ethnic or LGBTQ identities. Questions about discrimination based on race/ethnicity and LGBTQ identity are examined separately in other articles in this issue. Fourth, nonresponse bias is a concern in public opinion surveys, though evidence suggests that low response rates do not bias results if the survey sample is representative of the study population. 24 , 25 Recent research has shown that such surveys, when based on probability samples and weighted using US Census parameters, yield accurate estimates in most cases when compared with both objective measures and higher response surveys. 24 , 25 , 36 , 37 For instance, a recent study showed that across fourteen different demographic and personal characteristics, the average difference between government estimates from high‐response rate surveys and a Pew Research Center poll with a response rate similar to this poll was 3 percentage points. 24 However, it is still possible that some selection bias may remain that is related to the experiences being measured. Finally, we note that this survey was conducted before the viral October 2017 #MeToo movement, catalyzed by 80 women accusing film producer Harvey Weinstein of sexual harassment and abuse. 38 This movement may have increased the salience of issues and increased subsequent self‐reported sexual harassment, so results from this study may be considered lower bound estimates of self‐reported gender‐based sexual harassment. 1 , 39

Despite these limitations, this study design was strengthened by its probability sampling design and by the breadth of questions asked on gender discrimination across institutions and interpersonally. It allowed us to examine reported experiences of gender discrimination and harassment among women. Most of the limitations suggest that our findings may underreport the experiences of discrimination and harassment, and thus, our results can be considered a lower bound estimate of gender discrimination and harassment in the United States today. We may also underreport the added burden of discrimination against women who are racial/ethnic minorities or LGBTQ. In the end, our findings further support the need for policy and programmatic efforts beyond current legal protections for women to reduce gender discrimination and harassment in order to improve women's health and well‐being.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Far beyond isolated cases, women report experiencing widespread discrimination across many areas of their lives with public, private, or governmental institutions—including in health care, the workplace, and higher education, as well as in personal interactions through gender slurs, microaggressions, and harassment. Women's experiences of discrimination vary widely by racial/ethnic background, LGBTQ identity, and other sociodemographic factors, with Native American women experiencing particularly high rates of gender discrimination and harassment across multiple areas of their lives. Evidence here amplifies findings from other papers in this journal issue on the multidimensional nature of gender discrimination in the United States, which impact women's health care and their lives overall. Major institutional changes in policy and programs should address these issues on a larger scale to combat systematic gender discrimination in the United States in all its facets.

Supporting information

Acknowledgments.

Joint Acknowledgment/Disclosure Statement : This work was supported by Grant #73713 from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.

Dr. SteelFisher's husband has done work for Eli Lilly in the past five years and has minority ownership in a company that does work for Eli Lilly. Some readers may wish to know all healthcare‐related financial relationships of the authors.

SteelFisher GK, Findling MG, Bleich SN, et al. Gender discrimination in the United States: Experiences of women . Health Serv Res . 2019; 54 :1442–1453. 10.1111/1475-6773.13217 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]

69 Gender Discrimination Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

🏆 best gender discrimination topic ideas & essay examples, 🔎 interesting topics to write about gender discrimination, 🎓 good essay topics on gender discrimination.

• Gender Discrimination in the Workplace Essay This essay will document gender bias and gender discrimination in the context of social and physical and the social confines of the work place that is experienced at work in the context of United States […]
• Gender Discrimination and Shared Responsibility Therefore, it is of great importance to address the mentioned challenge, and one of the solutions lays in the education of women.
• Gender Discrimination in History and Nowadays In literature, especially in the works of Greek philosophers, there is a striking discrepancy in the perceptions of women’s place and homosexuality. Women were regarded as the devil’s seed, and the criteria to classify a […]
• Gender Discrimination in Public Administration The subject of the dispute and the statement of claim was the vacancy of a traffic controller, which was initially offered to Johnson, but then, as part of the program, the place was given to […]
• Discussion of Gender Discrimination in Modern Society In the professional field, women are constantly in discriminatory positions of jeopardy due to their gender. However, women still need to compete in the work environment.
• Gender Roles, Expectations, and Discrimination Despite Isaac being the calmest boy in the school, he had a crush on Grace, a beautiful girl in the school who was from a wealthy family.
• Gender Stereotypes and Sexual Discrimination In this Ted Talk, Sandberg also raises a question regarding the changes that are needed to alter the current disbalance in the number of men and women that achieve professional excellence.
• Discrimination and Politics of Gender and Sexuality Furthermore, the heterosexual had equal rights in terms of marriage as it was legalized in 50 states and there was no longer hiding one’s identity.
• Gender and the Problem of Discrimination Generally, after the evaluation of the facts, it appears that the consumption of media forms socializes us to hold particular conceptions of gender and the other related concepts and issues, and can even confront gender […]
• Gender Discrimination in the Workplace and Better Management Skills All complexities and worries including gender discrimination and violence at the workplace are the domain of management for which skilled management is an asset par excellent.
• Racial and Gender Discrimination in the Workplace and Housing Job discrimination is that discrimination which arises at the places of work Factors that include the presence of a high population of the unemployed create room for the vice.
• Ethics of Gender Identity Discrimination at Work Besides, ethical theories such as virtue ethics facilitate an understanding of the ethical impasse of whether to terminate the contract of transgender employees or embrace their sexual identity in the workplace environment.
• The Problem of Gender Discrimination In so doing, it has determined that the number of women in the workforce has systematically and continually risen over the course of the past two decades while the number of men in the workforce […]
• Institutions and Gender Discrimination Issues In addition, parents buy clothes and toys that reflect gender issues in society and this contributes to the development of gendered stereotypes.
• Gender Discrimination on Birth Stage There has been a controversial debate over the years on the decline of men due to the emphasis on women’s empowerment.
• Gender Discrimination in Russian Workplaces In the Soviet era, women were seen as an important factor in the industrialization of the country and they were allocated education and work opportunity by Russia’s socialist government.
• Gender-Based Discrimination in the Workplace In order to give a good account of the effects of gender-based discrimination against women, this paper examines the space of women in the automotive engineering industry.
• Problem of the Gender Discrimination in the Workplace This requires the employer to consider some of the things such as the number of women and men that applied for the available positions.
• Age and Gender: Discrimination During the Hiring Process When an employer sets forth to hire employees, there are a number of factors that have to be put into consideration by the concerned employer in order to ensure that those that are recruited have […]
• Gender Discrimination at the Workplace: A Case of Sexual Harassment In the current case and issues surrounding Herman Cain the Republican presidential candidate, it is apparent that cases of sexual harassment have taken place based on the above definition.
• Controversy of Gender and Race Discrimination Gender and race issues should be well tackled, for instance, in some of the societies men are believed to be superior to women and hold all the important positions in the society.
• Gender Discrimination and Intergenerational Transmission of Preferences
• Age and Gender Discrimination in the News Industry
• Analysis of the Phenomenon of Racial and Gender Discrimination
• Avoiding Sexual Orientation and Gender Discrimination in the Workplace
• Overview of Business Ethics and Gender Discrimination
• The Problem of Career and Gender Discrimination in Bahrain
• Caregivers, Firm Policies, and Gender Discrimination Claims
• Collaboration, Alphabetical Order, and Gender Discrimination: Evidence From the Lab
• Cultural Defense for Ethnic Accommodation or Cultural Excuse for Gender Discrimination
• Effective Public Policy Which Reduces Gender Discrimination in the Agricultural Labour Market
• The Link Between Equal Opportunity and Gender Discrimination
• Equal Protection and Gender Discrimination in Military Training
• Ethnic and Gender Discrimination in the Rental Housing Market
• Exploring Gender Discrimination Across Countries and Cultures
• Family Labor Market Decisions and Statistical Gender Discrimination
• Family Matters: Endogenous Gender Discrimination in Economic Development
• The Question of Gender Discrimination Against Asian Americans
• Gender Discrimination and Efficiency in Marriage: The Bargaining Family Under Scrutiny
• Measuring and Testing for Gender Discrimination in Physician Pay: English Family Doctors
• Gender Discrimination and Emigration: Push Factor Versus Screening Process Hypothesis
• Output and Gender Discrimination in Pay: Evidence From Manufacturing Industry
• Gender Discrimination and Evaluators’ Gender: Evidence From the Italian Academy
• Political Instability, Gender Discrimination, and Population Growth in Developing Countries
• Gender Discrimination and Firm Profit Efficiency: Evidence From Brazil
• Prejudice and Gender Discrimination Against Women and Minorities
• Gender Discrimination and Gender Bias in the Modern Society
• Gender Discrimination and Growth: Theory and Evidence From India
• Rent Sharing and Gender Discrimination in Collegiate Athletics
• Social Norms and Gender Discrimination in the Labor Market: An Agent-Based Exercise
• Gender Discrimination and Prejudice Evident in Promotional Content
• Subjective Performance Evaluation and Gender Discrimination
• Gender Discrimination and Self-Employment Dynamics in Europe
• The Analogies Between Racial and Gender Discrimination
• Gender Discrimination and Social Identity: Evidence From Urban Pakistan
• The Glass Ceiling and How Gender Discrimination Affects Women
• Gender Discrimination During the Early Nineteenth Century
• Life and Contributions of Nafis Sadik to the Fight Against Gender Discrimination
• Gender Discrimination Set Straight: Women’s Right to Express the Option of Voting
• The Women During the Persian Rule and the Gender Discrimination
• Gender Discrimination Still Exists in Today’s Era
• Stereotype Topics
• Gender Stereotypes Essay Titles
• Sexism Essay Ideas
• Women’s Role Essay Topics
• Transgender Paper Topics
• Bullying Research Topics
• Gender Issues Questions
• Family Relationships Research Ideas
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• 06 September 2023

Gender equality: the route to a better world

You have full access to this article via your institution.

The Mosuo people of China include sub-communities in which inheritance passes down either the male or the female line. Credit: TPG/Getty

The fight for global gender equality is nowhere close to being won. Take education: in 87 countries, less than half of women and girls complete secondary schooling, according to 2023 data. Afghanistan’s Taliban continues to ban women and girls from secondary schools and universities . Or take reproductive health: abortion rights have been curtailed in 22 US states since the Supreme Court struck down federal protections, depriving women and girls of autonomy and restricting access to sexual and reproductive health care .

SDG 5, whose stated aim is to “achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls”, is the fifth of the 17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, all of which Nature is examining in a series of editorials. SDG 5 includes targets for ending discrimination and violence against women and girls in both public and private spheres, eradicating child marriage and female genital mutilation, ensuring sexual and reproductive rights, achieving equal representation of women in leadership positions and granting equal rights to economic resources. Globally, the goal is not on track to being achieved, and just a handful of countries have hit all the targets.

How the world should oppose the Taliban’s war on women and girls

In July, the UN introduced two new indices (see go.nature.com/3eus9ue ), the Women’s Empowerment Index (WEI) and the Global Gender Parity Index (GGPI). The WEI measures women’s ability and freedoms to make their own choices; the GGPI describes the gap between women and men in areas such as health, education, inclusion and decision making. The indices reveal, depressingly, that even achieving a small gender gap does not automatically translate to high levels of women’s empowerment: 114 countries feature in both indices, but countries that do well on both scores cover fewer than 1% of all girls and women.

The COVID-19 pandemic has made things worse, with women bearing the highest burden of extra unpaid childcare when schools needed to close, and subjected to intensified domestic violence. Although child marriages declined from 21% of all marriages in 2016 to 19% in 2022, the pandemic threatened even this incremental progress, pushing up to 10 million more girls into risk of child marriage over the next decade, in addition to the 100 million girls who were at risk before the pandemic.

Of the 14 indicators for SDG 5, only one or two are close to being met by the 2030 deadline. As of 1 January 2023, women occupied 35.4% of seats in local-government assemblies, an increase from 33.9% in 2020 (the target is gender parity by 2030). In 115 countries for which data were available, around three-quarters, on average, of the necessary laws guaranteeing full and equal access to sexual and reproductive health and rights had been enacted. But the UN estimates that worldwide, only 57% of women who are married or in a union make their own decisions regarding sexual and reproductive health and rights.

Systemic discrimination against girls and women by men, in many contexts, remains a colossal barrier to achieving gender equality. But patriarchy is not some “natural order of things” , argues Ruth Mace, an anthropologist at University College London. Hundreds of women-centred societies exist around the world. As the science writer Angela Saini describes in her latest book, The Patriarchs , these are often not the polar opposite of male-dominated systems, but societies in which men and women share decision making .

After Roe v. Wade: dwindling US abortion access is harming health a year later

One example comes from the Mosuo people in China, who have both ‘matrilineal’ and ‘patrilineal’ communities, with rights such as inheritance passing down either the male or female line. Researchers compared outcomes for inflammation and hypertension in men and women in these communities, and found that women in matrilineal societies, in which they have greater autonomy and control over resources, experienced better health outcomes. The researchers found no significant negative effect of matriliny on health outcomes for men ( A.  Z. Reynolds et al. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 117 , 30324–30327; 2020 ).

When it comes to the SDGs, evidence is emerging that a more gender-equal approach to politics and power benefits many goals. In a study published in May, Nobue Amanuma, deputy director of the Integrated Sustainability Centre at the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies in Hayama, Japan, and two of her colleagues tested whether countries with more women legislators, and more younger legislators, are performing better in the SDGs ( N. Amanuma et al. Environ. Res. Lett. 18 , 054018; 2023 ). They found it was so, with the effect more marked for socio-economic goals such as ending poverty and hunger, than for environmental ones such as climate action or preserving life on land. The researchers recommend further qualitative and quantitative studies to better understand the reasons.

The reality that gender equality leads to better outcomes across other SDGs is not factored, however, into most of the goals themselves. Of the 230 unique indicators of the SDGs, 51 explicitly reference women, girls, gender or sex, including the 14 indicators in SDG 5. But there is not enough collaboration between organizations responsible for the different SDGs to ensure that sex and gender are taken into account. The indicator for the sanitation target (SDG 6) does not include data disaggregated by sex or gender ( Nature 620 , 7; 2023 ). Unless we have this knowledge, it will be hard to track improvements in this and other SDGs.

The road to a gender-equal world is long, and women’s power and freedom to make choices is still very constrained. But the evidence from science is getting stronger: distributing power between genders creates the kind of world we all need and want to be living in.

Nature 621 , 8 (2023)

doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-023-02745-9

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This Is How Everyday Sexism Could Stop You From Getting That Promotion

By Jessica Nordell and Yaryna Serkez Oct. 14, 2021

By Jessica Nordell Graphics by Yaryna Serkez

Jessica Nordell is a science and culture journalist. Yaryna Serkez is a writer and a graphics editor for Opinion.

When the computer scientist and mathematician Lenore Blum announced her resignation from Carnegie Mellon University in 2018, the community was jolted. A distinguished professor, she’d helped found the Association for Women in Mathematics, and made seminal contributions to the field. But she said she found herself steadily marginalized from a center she’d help create — blocked from important decisions, dismissed and ignored. She explained at the time : “Subtle biases and microaggressions pile up, few of which on their own rise to the level of ‘let’s take action,’ but are insidious nonetheless.”

It’s an experience many women can relate to. But how much does everyday sexism at work matter? Most would agree that outright discrimination when it comes to hiring and advancement is a bad thing, but what about the small indignities that women experience day after day? The expectation that they be unfailingly helpful ; the golf rounds and networking opportunities they’re not invited to ; the siphoning off of credit for their work by others; unfair performance reviews that penalize them for the same behavior that’s applauded in men; the “ manterrupting ”?

When I was researching my book “The End of Bias: A Beginning” I wanted to understand the collective impact of these less visible forms of bias, but data were hard to come by. Bias doesn’t happen once or twice; it happens day after day, week after week. To explore the aggregate impact of routine gender bias over time, I teamed up with Kenny Joseph, a computer science professor at the University at Buffalo, and a graduate student there, Yuhao Du, to create a computer simulation of a workplace. We call our simulated workplace “NormCorp.” Here’s how it works.

NormCorp is a simple company. Employees do projects, either alone or in pairs. These succeed or fail, which affects a score we call “promotability.” Twice a year, employees go through performance reviews, and the top scorers at each level are promoted to the next level.

NormCorp employees are affected by the kinds of gender bias that are endemic in the workplace. Women’s successful solo projects are valued slightly less than men’s , and their successful joint projects with men accrue them less credit . They are also penalized slightly more when they fail . Occasional “stretch” projects have outsize rewards, but as in the real world, women’s potential is underrecognized compared with men’s, so they must have a greater record of past successes to be assigned these projects. A fraction of women point out the unfairness and are then penalized for the perception that they are “self-promoting.” And as the proportion of women decreases, those that are left face more stereotyping .

We simulated 10 years of promotion cycles happening at NormCorp based on these rules, and here is how women’s representation changed over time.

Simulation of Normcorp promotions over 10 years, with female performance undervalued by 3 percent

Simulation results over time

These biases have all been demonstrated across various professional fields. One working paper study of over 500,000 physician referrals showed that women surgeons receive fewer referrals after successful outcomes than male surgeons. Women economists are less likely to receive tenure the more they co-author papers with men. An analysis at a large company found that women’s, as well as minority men’s, performance was effectively “discounted” compared with that of white men.

And women are penalized for straying from “feminine” personality traits. An analysis of real-world workplace performance evaluations found that more than three-quarters of women’s critical evaluations contained negative comments about their personalities, compared with 2 percent of men’s. If a woman whose contributions are overlooked speaks up, she may be labeled a self-promoter, and consequently face further obstacles to success . She may also become less motivated and committed to the organization . The American Bar Association found that 70 percent of women lawyers of color considered leaving or had left the legal profession entirely, citing being undervalued at work and facing barriers to advancement.

Our model does not take into account women, such as Lenore Blum, who quit their jobs after experiencing an unmanageable amount of bias. But it visualizes how these penalties add up over time for women who stay, so that by the time you reach more senior levels of management, there are fewer women left to promote. These factors not only prevent women from reaching the top ranks in their company but for those who do, it also makes the career path longer and more demanding.

Small change, big difference

Even a tiny increase in the amount of gender bias could lead to dramatic underrepresentation of women in leadership roles over time..

Women’s performance is valued 3 percent less

Women’s performance is valued 5 percent less

Half as many women at level 7 and

only 2 percent of women at C-suite.

Half as many women at level 7 and only 2 percent of women at C-suite.

Women’s performance is valued 3% less

Women’s performance is valued 5% less

When we dig into the trajectory of individual people in our simulation, stories begin to emerge. With just 3 percent bias, one employee — let’s call her Jenelle — starts in an entry-level position, and makes it to the executive level, but it takes her 17 performance review cycles (eight and a half years) to get there, and she needs 208 successful projects to make it. “William” starts at the same level but he gets to executive level much faster — after only eight performance reviews and half Jenelle’s successes at the time she becomes an executive.

Our model shows how large organizational disparities can emerge from many small, even unintentional biases happening frequently over a long period of time. Laws are often designed to address large events that happen infrequently and can be easily attributed to a single actor—for example, overt sexual harassment by a manager — or “pattern and practice” problems, such as discriminatory policies. But women’s progress is hindered even without one egregious incident, or an official policy that is discriminatory.

Women’s path to success might be longer and more demanding

Career paths for employees that reached level 7 by the end of the simulation..

successful projects

“William”

started at the entry-level and reached level 7 in 4 years.

It took “Jenelle”

8.5 years to get

to the same level.

Entry level

1 year of promotions

started at the entry-

level and reached level 7 in 4 years.

8.5 years to get to the same level.

It took “Jenelle” 8.5 years to get to the same level.

Gender bias takes on different dimensions depending on other intersecting aspects of a person’s identity, such as race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability and more. Another American Bar Association study found that white women and men of color face similar hurdles to being seen as competent, but women of color face more than either group.

Backlash, too, plays out differently for women of different racial groups, points out Erika Hall, an Emory University management professor. A survey of hundreds of women scientists she helped conduct found that Asian American women reported the highest amount of backlash for self-promotion and assertive behavior. An experimental study by the social psychologist Robert Livingston and colleagues, meanwhile, found that white women are more penalized for demonstrating dominant behavior than Black women. Our model does not account for the important variations in bias that women of different races experience.

So what’s to be done? Diversity trainings are common in companies, educational institutions and health care settings, but these may not have much effect when it comes to employees’ career advancement. The sociologists Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev found that after mandatory diversity trainings, the likelihood that women and men of color became managers either stayed the same or decreased , possibly because of backlash. Some anti-bias trainings have been shown to change behavior, but any approach needs to be evaluated, as psychologist Betsy Levy Paluck has said, “on the level of rigorous testing of medical interventions.”

We also explored a paradox. Research shows that in many fields, a greater proportion of men correlates with more bias against women . At the same time, in fields or organizations where women make up the majority, men can still experience a “glass escalator,” being fast-tracked to senior leadership roles. School superintendents, who work in the women-dominated field of education but are more likely to be men, are one example. To make sense of this, we conceptualized bias at work as a combination of both organizational biases that can be influenced by organizational makeup and larger societal biases.

What we found was that if societal biases are strong compared with those in the organization, a powerful but brief intervention may have only a short-term impact. In our simulation, we tested this by introducing quotas — requiring that the majority of promotions go to women — in the context of low, moderate, or no societal bias. We made the quotas time-limited, as real world efforts to combat bias often take the form of short-term interventions.

Our quotas changed the number of women at upper levels of the corporate hierarchy in the short term, and in turn decreased the gender biases against women rising through the company ranks. But when societal biases were still a persistent force, disparities eventually returned, and the impact of the intervention was short-lived.

Quotas may not be enough

In the presence of societal biases, the effect of a short-term program of quotas disappears over time..

Societal bias has moderate effect

100% of executives

Quotas are introduced. 70% of all promotions go to women.

Majority of executives are men

YEARS OF PROMOTIONS

Societal bias has no effect

Equal representation

representation

What works? Having managers directly mentor and sponsor women improves their chance to rise. Insisting on fair, transparent and objective criteria for promotions and assignments is essential, so that decisions are not ambiguous and subjective, and goal posts aren’t shifting and unwritten. But the effect of standardizing criteria, too, can be limited, because decision-makers can always override these decisions and choose their favored candidates.

Ultimately, I found in my research for the book, the mindset of leaders plays an enormous role. Interventions make a difference, but only if leaders commit to them. One law firm I profiled achieved 50 percent women equity partners through a series of dramatic moves, from overhauling and standardizing promotion criteria, to active sponsorship of women, to a zero-tolerance policy for biased behavior. In this case, the chief executive understood that bias was blocking the company from capturing all the available talent. Leaders who believe that the elimination of bias is essential to the functioning of the organization are more likely to take the kind of active, aggressive, and long-term steps needed to root out bias wherever it may creep into decision making.

Gender Inequality Essay

500+ words essay on gender inequality.

For many years, the dominant gender has been men while women were the minority. It was mostly because men earned the money and women looked after the house and children. Similarly, they didn’t have any rights as well. However, as time passed by, things started changing slowly. Nonetheless, they are far from perfect. Gender inequality remains a serious issue in today’s time. Thus, this gender inequality essay will highlight its impact and how we can fight against it.

  About Gender Inequality Essay

Gender inequality refers to the unequal and biased treatment of individuals on the basis of their gender. This inequality happens because of socially constructed gender roles. It happens when an individual of a specific gender is given different or disadvantageous treatment in comparison to a person of the other gender in the same circumstance.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Impact of Gender Inequality

The biggest problem we’re facing is that a lot of people still see gender inequality as a women’s issue. However, by gender, we refer to all genders including male, female, transgender and others.

When we empower all genders especially the marginalized ones, they can lead their lives freely. Moreover, gender inequality results in not letting people speak their minds. Ultimately, it hampers their future and compromises it.

History is proof that fighting gender inequality has resulted in stable and safe societies. Due to gender inequality, we have a gender pay gap. Similarly, it also exposes certain genders to violence and discrimination.

In addition, they also get objectified and receive socioeconomic inequality. All of this ultimately results in severe anxiety, depression and even low self-esteem. Therefore, we must all recognize that gender inequality harms genders of all kinds. We must work collectively to stop these long-lasting consequences and this gender inequality essay will tell you how.

How to Fight Gender Inequality

Gender inequality is an old-age issue that won’t resolve within a few days. Similarly, achieving the goal of equality is also not going to be an easy one. We must start by breaking it down and allow it time to go away.

Firstly, we must focus on eradicating this problem through education. In other words, we must teach our young ones to counter gender stereotypes from their childhood.

Similarly, it is essential to ensure that they hold on to the very same beliefs till they turn old. We must show them how sports are not gender-biased.

Further, we must promote equality in the fields of labour. For instance, some people believe that women cannot do certain jobs like men. However, that is not the case. We can also get celebrities on board to promote and implant the idea of equality in people’s brains.

All in all, humanity needs men and women to continue. Thus, inequality will get us nowhere. To conclude the gender inequality essay, we need to get rid of the old-age traditions and mentality. We must teach everyone, especially the boys all about equality and respect. It requires quite a lot of work but it is possible. We can work together and achieve equal respect and opportunities for all genders alike.

FAQ of Gender Inequality Essay

Question 1: What is gender inequality?

Answer 1: Gender inequality refers to the unequal and biased treatment of individuals on the basis of their gender. This inequality happens because of socially constructed gender roles. It happens when an individual of a specific gender is given different or disadvantageous treatment in comparison to a person of the other gender in the same circumstance.

Question 2: How does gender inequality impact us?

Answer 2:  The gender inequality essay tells us that gender inequality impacts us badly. It takes away opportunities from deserving people. Moreover, it results in discriminatory behaviour towards people of a certain gender. Finally, it also puts people of a certain gender in dangerous situations.

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Home — Essay Samples — Social Issues — Gender Discrimination — Discrimination Against Women: A Persistent Social Issue

Discrimination Against Women: a Persistent Social Issue

• Categories: Gender Discrimination Sex, Gender and Sexuality

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Published: Aug 1, 2024

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Gender Discrimination Causes Inequality

Gender discrimination: inequality starts in childhood.

Every girl and boy deserves an equal chance to survive and thrive. As the leading expert on childhood, Save the Children has been championing equal rights for every child for over 100 years – in fact, we invented the concept. Today, we are the leading champion for the human rights of the world’s 2.2 billion girls and boys.

Yet, gender discrimination, starting in childhood, continues to rob children of their childhoods and limit their chances – disproportionately affecting the world’s girls. A girl is far more likely to be denied her rights, kept from school, forced to marry and subjected to violence – her voice undervalued, if it’s heard at all. This assault on childhood also deprives nations of the energy and talent they need to progress.

At the current rate of change, it will take over 200 years [1]  to achieve gender equality, and that’s just in the U.S. This is unacceptable. Together, we can create a more equal world, right from the start. Make a one-time donation to the Children's Emergency Fund or join Team Tomorrow to connect with the causes you care about - like  inequality - through your monthly donation.

To stay current and receive more tools and tips from our experts, sign up here. 

What is gender discrimination?

Gender discrimination means any exclusion or restriction made on the basis of gender that creates barriers for girls, boys, women and/or men in recognizing, enjoying or exercising their full and equal human rights.

What is gender inequality?

Gender inequality is discrimination on the basis of sex or gender causing one sex or gender to be routinely privileged or prioritized over another.

Gender equality is a fundamental human right and that right is violated by gender-based discrimination. Gender disparity starts in childhood and is right now limiting the lifelong potential of children around the world – disproportionately affecting girls.

Around the world, while contexts and gender roles vary from place to place, we can see that gender inequalities occur everywhere; and at every stage of life, beginning with childhood or even before birth. 

At Save the Children, we put gender equality at the heart of everything we do. Our vision is a world in which all people – girls, boys, women and men – have equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities, regardless of gender norms, identities or expressions. A world where everyone is equally recognized, respected and valued.

Is gender discrimination against the law?

Gender discrimination is prohibited under almost every human rights treaty. This includes international laws providing for equal gender rights between men and women, as well as those specifically dedicated to the realization of women’s rights, such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [2] – considered the international bill of rights for women.

Federal, state and local laws protect individuals from gender discrimination and gender inequality in the United States. Additionally, it is recognized in both law and policy that promoting gender equality is critical to achieving foreign policy objectives for a more prosperous and peaceful world.

What are the causes of gender inequality?

Gender prejudice and resulting gender discrimination begin in childhood. From the moment they’re born, girls and boys face unequal gender norms  as well as social norms regarding expectations and access to resources and opportunities, with lifelong consequences – in their homes, schools and communities.

For example, the world’s boys are often encouraged to go to school and get an education to prepare for work, while girls carry heavy household responsibilities that keep them from school, increasing the odds of child marriage and pregnancy.

Join us in celebrating Womens' History Month with a gift that truly makes a difference – gift boxes from Save the Children. This gift box talks about inequalities and the ways we’re working to make all children equal. A great gift for an amazing girl or woman in your life.

What are the effects of gender inequality?

Despite worldwide progress, gender inequality persists. The COVID-19 pandemic has threatened to put years of hard-won progress at risk. Far too many girls, especially those from the poorest families, still face gender discrimination in education, child marriage and pregnancy, sexual violence and unrecognized domestic work. These are some types of gender inequality. 

Gender Inequality Examples:

• Gender inequality in girls education. Even before the pandemic, girls were more likely than boys to never set foot in a classroom and be denied equal opportunities. Conflict, poverty and other forms of social disadvantage also magnify gender inequality in education. Girls living in countries affected by conflict, for example, are 2.5 times more likely to be out of school than boys. Some 9.7 million children were at risk of being forced out of school by the end of 2020, with girls facing an increased risk.
• Child marriage . Child marriage is a form of gender-based violence and a result and driver of gender inequality and gender discrimination. Experts predict that the COVID-19 pandemic is set to reverse 25 years of progress, which saw child marriage rates decline. In fact, Save the Children analysis revealed a further 2.5 million girls at risk of marriage by 2025 because of the  pandemic —the greatest surge in child marriage rates in nearly three decades.  
• Gender-based violence . Gender-based violence occurs everywhere around the world across all economic and social groups. While both boys and girls are negatively impacted, girls are particularly at risk. An estimated 1 in 3 women globally have experienced physical or sexual violence in their lifetime, mostly at the hands of their partners. Types of violence may include: prenatal sex selection, female infanticide, neglect, female genital mutilation, rape, child marriage, forced prostitution, honor killing and dowry killing. Many of these gross violations of human rights have been used as weapons of war around the world. Refugee children are particularly vulnerable.
• Child labor. There are currently 152 million children engaged in child labor around the world. [3] Child labor makes it difficult for children to attend school or limits their attendance, putting them at risk of falling behind their peers. Boys and girls are affected differently by child labor and parents’ decisions are often influenced by wider social norms about the different roles that they should play in the home and in society. Girls are much more likely to shoulder the responsibility for household chores while boys are more likely to engage in harmful work such as construction. Girls are usually pulled out of school earlier than boys and are more likely to face sexual exploitation and slavery.

What is the importance of gender equality?

Gender equality is not only a fundamental human right, but a necessary foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable future. Eradicating gender issues means a world where women and men, girls and boys all enjoy equal rights, resources, opportunities and protections.

Empowering girls from the start is proven to have lasting and compounding benefits over the course of their lives. When girls are supported to be active in civic and political spaces, in particular, they are empowered with the tools and skills they need to be drivers of positive change in their families and communities. Girls are the experts of their own experiences, priorities and needs, and are powerful catalysts for a world where gender equality flourishes.

Promoting gender equality is also central to ensuring child protection and the fulfillment of child rights, as abuse, neglect, violence against women and exploitation both reflect and reinforce gender inequalities

What are the effects of gender equality on society?

When girls are empowered to lead their lives, speak their minds and determine their futures, everyone benefits. History suggests that when we fight gender oppression, societies are more stable, safe and prosperous, with happier, better educated citizens. 

Investing in gender equality can have large-scale benefits:

• Every $1 invested in women’s and children’s health can generate a $20 return – according to the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health
• A girl’s eventual income will increase by up to 20% for every year she stays in school – according to UN Women . It also encourages girls to marry later and have fewer children, and leaves them less vulnerable to violence.
• Advancing women’s equality could add up to $28 trillion to global annual growth by 2025 – according to the McKinsey Global Institute .

How does Save the Children challenge gender discrimination and promote gender equality?

Gender equality is a basic right for all people, including both girls and boys. Based on this understanding, Save the Children believes that it is critical to directly address gender discrimination and gender inequality in order to ensure that no harm comes to children, and to advance our vision for a world where every child attains their equal right to grow up healthy, educated and safe.

A focus on gender equality is essential to close inequality gaps and ensure that we reach every last child, including those who are most vulnerable. Gender inequalities intersect with and exacerbate other factors contributing to vulnerability, including age, race, socio-economic class, gender identity, geography, health status and ability.

To build a more equal, inclusive future, free from gender discrimination, we need to start in childhood. Thanks to supporters like you, Save the Children reaches hundreds of millions of children every year, promoting gender equality and empowering girls, right from the start.

Promoting gender equality works! Since 2000, Save the Children helped achieve a 25% decline in child marriage worldwide, empowering 11 million girls to stay in school or transition to work, deciding for themselves when they’re ready for marriage and motherhood.

In addition, Save the Children is proud to be the first nonprofit to be Gender Fair-certified for our commitment to advancing gender equality and empowering the world’s girls.

[1] Equality Can't Wait  |  [2]  U.N Women |  [3] Child Labour Position

**Sources: Unless otherwise noted, gender inequality facts and gender inequality statistics have been sourced from Save the Children’s program and monitoring and evaluation experts, as well as  published reports , including our  gender equality reports .

You can help challenge gender discrimination as a monthly donor!

When you support Save the Children – whether it’s by donating, advocating or participating in an event challenge – you challenge gender discrimination and gender inequality around the world, helping bridge the gap between the challenges girls face and the futures they deserve. You’re helping ensure all children have equal opportunities to grow up healthy, educated and safe.

Join  Team Tomorrow  to connect with the causes you care about — like inequality — through your monthly donation.

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