cuban missile crisis short essay

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What was the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis?

Should the united states maintain the embargo against cuba that was inflamed by the cuban missile crisis.

• What was the Cold War?
• How did the Cold War end?
• Why was the Cuban missile crisis such an important event in the Cold War?

Cuban missile crisis

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• HistoryNet - Inside the Cuban Missile Crisis
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• The National Security Archive - The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: The 40th Anniversary
• Cuban missile crisis - Children's Encyclopedia (Ages 8-11)
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What was the Cuban missile crisis?

The Cuban missile crisis was a major confrontation in 1962 that brought the United States and the Soviet Union close to war over the presence of Soviet nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in Cuba.

When did the Cuban missile crisis take place?

The Cuban missile crisis took place in October 1962.

The Cuban missile crisis marked the climax of an acutely antagonistic period in U.S.-Soviet relations. It played an important part in Nikita Khrushchev ’s fall from power and the Soviet Union’s determination to achieve nuclear parity with the United States. The crisis also marked the closest point that the world had ever come to global nuclear war.

Whether the U.S. should maintain its embargo against Cuba that was inflamed by the Cuban Missile Crisis is hotly debated. Some say Cuba has not met the conditions required to lift it, and the US will look weak for lifting the sanctions. Others say the 50-year policy has failed to achieve its goals, and Cuba does not pose a threat to the United States. For more on the Cuba embargo debate, visit ProCon.org .

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Cuban missile crisis , (October 1962), major confrontation that brought the United States and the Soviet Union close to war over the presence of Soviet nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba .

Having promised in May 1960 to defend Cuba with Soviet arms, the Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev assumed that the United States would take no steps to prevent the installation of Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Such missiles could hit much of the eastern United States within a few minutes if launched from Cuba. The United States learned in July 1962 that the Soviet Union had begun missile shipments to Cuba. By August 29 new military construction and the presence of Soviet technicians had been reported by U.S. U-2 spy planes flying over the island, and on October 14 the presence of a ballistic missile on a launching site was reported.

After carefully considering the alternatives of an immediate U.S. invasion of Cuba (or air strikes of the missile sites), a blockade of the island, or further diplomatic maneuvers, U.S. Pres. John F. Kennedy decided to place a naval “quarantine,” or blockade, on Cuba to prevent further Soviet shipments of missiles. Kennedy announced the quarantine on October 22 and warned that U.S. forces would seize “offensive weapons and associated matériel” that Soviet vessels might attempt to deliver to Cuba. During the following days, Soviet ships bound for Cuba altered course away from the quarantined zone. As the two superpowers hovered close to the brink of nuclear war, messages were exchanged between Kennedy and Khrushchev amidst extreme tension on both sides. On October 28 Khrushchev capitulated , informing Kennedy that work on the missile sites would be halted and that the missiles already in Cuba would be returned to the Soviet Union. In return, Kennedy committed the United States to never invading Cuba. Kennedy also secretly promised to withdraw the nuclear-armed missiles that the United States had stationed in Turkey in previous years. In the following weeks both superpowers began fulfilling their promises, and the crisis was over by late November. Cuba’s communist leader, Fidel Castro , was infuriated by the Soviets’ retreat in the face of the U.S. ultimatum but was powerless to act.

The Cuban missile crisis marked the climax of an acutely antagonistic period in U.S.-Soviet relations. The crisis also marked the closest point that the world had ever come to global nuclear war. It is generally believed that the Soviets’ humiliation in Cuba played an important part in Khrushchev’s fall from power in October 1964 and in the Soviet Union’s determination to achieve, at the least, a nuclear parity with the United States.

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Course: US history   >   Unit 8

• John F. Kennedy as president
• Bay of Pigs Invasion
• Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis

• Lyndon Johnson as president
• Vietnam War
• The Vietnam War
• The student movement and the antiwar movement
• Second-wave feminism
• The election of 1968
• 1960s America

• In October 1962, the Soviet provision of ballistic missiles to Cuba led to the most dangerous Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union and brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.
• Over the course of two extremely tense weeks, US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev negotiated a peaceful outcome to the crisis.
• The crisis evoked fears of nuclear destruction, revealed the dangers of brinksmanship , and invigorated attempts to halt the arms race.

The Cuban Revolution

Origins of the cuban missile crisis, negotiating a peaceful outcome, consequences of the cuban missile crisis, what do you think.

• Sergo Mikoyan, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012), 225-226.
• Strobe Talbott, ed. Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), 494.
• See Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Random House, 2008); and Timothy Naftali and Aleksandr Fursenko, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997).
• See James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers after the Cuban Missile Crisis (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
• Paul S. Boyer, Promises to Keep: The United States since World War II (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 179.

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Cuban Missile Crisis

By: History.com Editors

Updated: April 20, 2023 | Original: January 4, 2010

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in a tense, 13-day political and military standoff in October 1962 over the installation of nuclear-armed Soviet missiles on Cuba, just 90 miles from U.S. shores. In a TV address on October 22, 1962, President John F. Kennedy (1917-63) notified Americans about the presence of the missiles, explained his decision to enact a naval blockade around Cuba and made it clear the U.S. was prepared to use military force if necessary to neutralize this perceived threat to national security. Following this news, many people feared the world was on the brink of nuclear war. However, disaster was avoided when the U.S. agreed to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s (1894-1971) offer to remove the Cuban missiles in exchange for the U.S. promising not to invade Cuba. Kennedy also secretly agreed to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey.

Discovering the Missiles

After seizing power in the Caribbean island nation of Cuba in 1959, leftist revolutionary leader Fidel Castro (1926-2016) aligned himself with the Soviet Union . Under Castro, Cuba grew dependent on the Soviets for military and economic aid. During this time, the U.S. and the Soviets (and their respective allies) were engaged in the Cold War (1945-91), an ongoing series of largely political and economic clashes.

Did you know? The actor Kevin Costner (1955-) starred in a movie about the Cuban Missile Crisis titled Thirteen Days . Released in 2000, the movie's tagline was "You'll never believe how close we came."

The two superpowers plunged into one of their biggest Cold War confrontations after the pilot of an American U-2 spy plane piloted by Major Richard Heyser making a high-altitude pass over Cuba on October 14, 1962, photographed a Soviet SS-4 medium-range ballistic missile being assembled for installation.

President Kennedy was briefed about the situation on October 16, and he immediately called together a group of advisors and officials known as the executive committee, or ExComm. For nearly the next two weeks, the president and his team wrestled with a diplomatic crisis of epic proportions, as did their counterparts in the Soviet Union.

A New Threat to the U.S.

For the American officials, the urgency of the situation stemmed from the fact that the nuclear-armed Cuban missiles were being installed so close to the U.S. mainland–just 90 miles south of Florida . From that launch point, they were capable of quickly reaching targets in the eastern U.S. If allowed to become operational, the missiles would fundamentally alter the complexion of the nuclear rivalry between the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which up to that point had been dominated by the Americans.

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had gambled on sending the missiles to Cuba with the specific goal of increasing his nation’s nuclear strike capability. The Soviets had long felt uneasy about the number of nuclear weapons that were targeted at them from sites in Western Europe and Turkey, and they saw the deployment of missiles in Cuba as a way to level the playing field. Another key factor in the Soviet missile scheme was the hostile relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. The Kennedy administration had already launched one attack on the island–the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961–and Castro and Khrushchev saw the missiles as a means of deterring further U.S. aggression.

Watch the three-episode documentary event, Kennedy . Available to stream now.

Kennedy Weighs the Options

From the outset of the crisis, Kennedy and ExComm determined that the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba was unacceptable. The challenge facing them was to orchestrate their removal without initiating a wider conflict–and possibly a nuclear war. In deliberations that stretched on for nearly a week, they came up with a variety of options, including a bombing attack on the missile sites and a full-scale invasion of Cuba. But Kennedy ultimately decided on a more measured approach. First, he would employ the U.S. Navy to establish a blockade, or quarantine, of the island to prevent the Soviets from delivering additional missiles and military equipment. Second, he would deliver an ultimatum that the existing missiles be removed.

In a television broadcast on October 22, 1962, the president notified Americans about the presence of the missiles, explained his decision to enact the blockade and made it clear that the U.S. was prepared to use military force if necessary to neutralize this perceived threat to national security. Following this public declaration, people around the globe nervously waited for the Soviet response. Some Americans, fearing their country was on the brink of nuclear war, hoarded food and gas.

HISTORY Vault: Nuclear Terror

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Showdown at Sea: U.S. Blockades Cuba

A crucial moment in the unfolding crisis arrived on October 24, when Soviet ships bound for Cuba neared the line of U.S. vessels enforcing the blockade. An attempt by the Soviets to breach the blockade would likely have sparked a military confrontation that could have quickly escalated to a nuclear exchange. But the Soviet ships stopped short of the blockade.

Although the events at sea offered a positive sign that war could be averted, they did nothing to address the problem of the missiles already in Cuba. The tense standoff between the superpowers continued through the week, and on October 27, an American reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba, and a U.S. invasion force was readied in Florida. (The 35-year-old pilot of the downed plane, Major Rudolf Anderson, is considered the sole U.S. combat casualty of the Cuban missile crisis.) “I thought it was the last Saturday I would ever see,” recalled U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1916-2009), as quoted by Martin Walker in “The Cold War.” A similar sense of doom was felt by other key players on both sides.

Key Moments in the Cuban Missile Crisis

These are the steps that brought the United States and Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war in 1962.

A Timeline of US‑Cuba Relations

Before Fidel Castro and the Cold War chill, America and Cuba shared close economic and political ties.

JFK Was Completely Unprepared For His Summit with Khrushchev

'He just beat the hell out of me,' Kennedy said.

A Deal Ends the Standoff

Despite the enormous tension, Soviet and American leaders found a way out of the impasse. During the crisis, the Americans and Soviets had exchanged letters and other communications, and on October 26, Khrushchev sent a message to Kennedy in which he offered to remove the Cuban missiles in exchange for a promise by U.S. leaders not to invade Cuba. The following day, the Soviet leader sent a letter proposing that the USSR would dismantle its missiles in Cuba if the Americans removed their missile installations in Turkey.

Officially, the Kennedy administration decided to accept the terms of the first message and ignore the second Khrushchev letter entirely. Privately, however, American officials also agreed to withdraw their nation’s missiles from Turkey. U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy (1925-68) personally delivered the message to the Soviet ambassador in Washington , and on October 28, the crisis drew to a close.

Both the Americans and Soviets were sobered by the Cuban Missile Crisis. The following year, a direct “hot line” communication link was installed between Washington and Moscow to help defuse similar situations, and the superpowers signed two treaties related to nuclear weapons. The Cold War was and the nuclear arms race was far from over, though. In fact, another legacy of the crisis was that it convinced the Soviets to increase their investment in an arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U.S. from Soviet territory.

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The Cold War

The cuban missile crisis.

On October 14th 1962, an American U-2 spy plane completed a relatively routine run over the island of Cuba, taking reconnaissance photographs (see picture) from an altitude of 12 miles. When the film was developed it revealed evidence of missiles being assembled and erected on Cuban soil. CIA and military analysts identified them as Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The presence of these weapons in neighbouring Cuba meant the Soviets could launch attacks on locations in the southern and eastern United States. This would give the Soviet Union a first-strike capacity, giving cities like Washington DC, New York and Philadelphia just a few minutes’ warning. President John F. Kennedy was briefed about the missiles four days later (October 18th). By the end of the day, Kennedy had formed an ‘executive committee’ (EXCOMM), a 13-man team to monitor and assess the situation and formulate response options. EXCOMM’s members included vice-president Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy’s brother Robert, defence secretary Robert McNamara and other advisors from the military and Department of State.

Over the next few days, Kennedy and EXCOMM weighed their options. They agreed that the US could not tolerate the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Diplomatic pressure on the Soviets to withdraw the missiles was also ruled out. Advice from EXCOMM suggested the Soviets would respond poorly to belligerent language or actions. An offer of exchange, such as the withdrawal or dismantling of US missile bases in Europe, might make the Kennedy administration appear weak, handing the Russians a propaganda victory. Kennedy’s military hierarchs recommended an airstrike to destroy the missiles, followed by a ground invasion of Cuba to eliminate Fidel Castro and his regime. But Kennedy – now more wary of military advice since the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba – wanted to avoid a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Instead, he authorised a naval blockade of the island. The US would draw a firm line around Cuba while seeking to avoid hostile action that risked triggering a nuclear war.

On October 22nd, Kennedy addressed the nation by television, announcing a “quarantine” of the Cuban island. He also said his administration would regard any missile attack launched from Cuba as an attack by the USSR, necessitating a full retaliatory response. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev described Kennedy’s quarantine as a “pirate action” and informed Kennedy by telegram that Soviet ships would ignore it. Kennedy reminded Khrushchev that the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba breached an earlier promise by the Soviet government. US Navy warships initiated their quarantine of Cuba. They allowed some small freighters through but stopped larger vessels for inspection, finding no military equipment. Meanwhile, American U-2s continued their missions over Cuba, flying every two hours. These overflights reported no pause or slow-down in the assembly of Soviet missiles.

There was no change in the situation after four days of quarantine. Kennedy came under pressure from his generals, who urged an airstrike to destroy the missiles before they became operational. At this point, a military confrontation between the US and USSR seemed almost inevitable, generating fear about a possible nuclear exchange. All levels of government hastily organised civil defence measures such as public bomb shelters; in most cases, these were capable of sheltering barely one-third of the population. Some citizens constructed their own shelters and stockpiled tinned food and other necessities. Many gathered in prayer in their local churches. Others packed up their belongings and took extended vacations with family members in remote areas where nuclear missiles were less likely to fall. In Soviet Russia, press censorship meant that most citizens were largely unaware of the crisis unfolding in the Caribbean.

The stalemate was broken by a series of developments across two days. On October 25th Adlai Stevenson, the US ambassador to the United Nations, confronted the Soviet ambassador in the Security Council with photographic evidence of the Cuban missiles. Given their previous denials, this publicly exposed Soviet dishonesty during the crisis. Around this time the White House also received a backroom offer to resolve the crisis, passed to a Washington reporter by a Soviet agent. On October 26th, the US State Department received a long, rambling letter, purportedly from Khrushchev. This letter promised to withdraw the Cuban missiles, provided the US pledged to never attack or invade Cuba. A follow-up message proposed a more direct exchange: the removal of the Cuban missiles, in return for the removal of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy. Kennedy agreed to this, provided the deal was not made public. The arrangement was finalised on the evening of October 27th, though it almost fell through after an American U-2 was shot down over Cuba by a Soviet surface-to-air missile. Kennedy resisted considerable pressure from his generals to retaliate. It later emerged the Soviets in Cuba had fired on the U-2 without authorisation from Moscow.

“The die was cast when the president met with his Executive Committee in the Oval Room at 2.30pm. It was a long and, toward the end, an unexpectedly bitter session. The choices put toward Kennedy that afternoon were two: begin with the naval blockade and, if need be, move up the ladder of military responses, rung by rung; or begin with an air strike then move almost certainly to a full-scale invasion of Cuba… The president paused gravely before speaking his mind. He said that he preferred to start with limited action. An air attack, he felt, was the wrong way to start… Kennedy was still expecting a Soviet move against Berlin, whatever happened in Cuba.” Elie Abel, journalist

The Cuban missile crisis was arguably the ‘hottest’ point of the Cold War, the closest the world has come to nuclear destruction. As US Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted toward the end of the crisis, “We were eyeball to eyeball and the other guy just blinked”. Information revealed years later suggested that the crisis could easily have deteriorated into a nuclear exchange. Soviet officers in Cuba were equipped with about 100 tactical nuclear weapons – and the authority to use them if attacked. Castro, convinced that an American invasion was imminent, urged both Khrushchev and Soviet commanders in Cuba to launch a pre-emptive strike against the US. And during the naval quarantine, a US destroyer dropped depth charges on a Soviet submarine which, unbeknownst to the Americans, was armed with a 15 kiloton nuclear missile and authority to use it. Given that several Soviet officers were authorised to fire nuclear weapons of their own accord, Kennedy’s delicate handling of the situation seems judicious. In the wake of the crisis, the Soviets reorganised their command structure and nuclear launch protocols, while the White House and Kremlin installed a ‘hotline’ to ensure direct communication in the event of a similar emergency.

1. The Cuban missile crisis unfolded in October 1962, following the discovery by US spy planes of Soviet missile sites being installed on nearby Cuba.

2. Missiles in Cuba gave the Soviet Union a ‘first-strike’ capacity. Unwilling to tolerate this, President Kennedy formed a committee to orchestrate their removal.

3. Considering all options from diplomatic pressure to an airstrike or invasion, EXCOMM settled on a naval “quarantine” of all Soviet ships sailing to Cuba.

4. The Cuban crisis and the US blockade carried a significant risk of military confrontation between the US and USSR, with the consequent risk of nuclear war.

5. The crisis was eventually resolved through a secret deal, in which the Soviets withdrew the Cuban missiles in return for the withdrawal of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy.

A CIA appraisal of the political, economic and military situation in Cuba (August 1962) A CIA report on the Soviet-backed military build up in Cuba (September 1962) US intelligence report says the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba is unlikely (September 1962) The first intelligence reports of Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba (October 1962) An evaluation of the Soviet missile threat in Cuba, by US intelligence bodies (October 1962) Kennedy and his advisors discuss a response to the Cuban missiles (October 1962) President John F Kennedy announces a naval quarantine of Cuba (October 1962) Castro responds to Kennedy’s announcement of a blockade (October 1962) Adlai Stevenson confronts Soviet ambassador Zorin in the UN Security Council (October 1962) Khrushchev’s letter to Kennedy urging a resolution of the crisis (October 1962) Delegates from the US and USSR debate the Cuban missile crisis in the UN (October 1962) Kennedy’s alternative speech announcing an attack on Cuba (October 1962) The Missiles of October (1974 film) Thirteen Days (2000 film) Robert McNamara reflects on the Cuban missile crisis (2003)

Content on this page is © Alpha History 2018. This content may not be republished or distributed without permission. For more information please refer to our Terms of Use . This page was written by Jennifer Llewellyn, Jim Southey and Steve Thompson. To reference this page, use the following citation: J. Llewellyn et al, “The Cuban missile crisis”, Alpha History, accessed [today’s date], https://alphahistory.com/coldwar/cuban-missile-crisis/.

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Cuban missile crisis, for thirteen days in october 1962 the world waited—seemingly on the brink of nuclear war—and hoped for a peaceful resolution to the cuban missile crisis..

In October 1962, an American U-2 spy plane secretly photographed nuclear missile sites being built by the Soviet Union on the island of Cuba. President Kennedy did not want the Soviet Union and Cuba to know that he had discovered the missiles. He met in secret with his advisors for several days to discuss the problem.

After many long and difficult meetings, Kennedy decided to place a naval blockade, or a ring of ships, around Cuba. The aim of this "quarantine," as he called it, was to prevent the Soviets from bringing in more military supplies. He demanded the removal of the missiles already there and the destruction of the sites. On October 22, President Kennedy spoke to the nation about the crisis in a televised address.

Click here to listen to the Address in the Digital Archives  (JFKWHA-142-001)

No one was sure how Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev would respond to the naval blockade and US demands. But the leaders of both superpowers recognized the devastating possibility of a nuclear war and publicly agreed to a deal in which the Soviets would dismantle the weapon sites in exchange for a pledge from the United States not to invade Cuba. In a separate deal, which remained secret for more than twenty-five years, the United States also agreed to remove its nuclear missiles from Turkey. Although the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba, they escalated the building of their military arsenal; the missile crisis was over, the arms race was not.

Click here to listen to the Remarks in the Digital Archives (JFKWHA-143-004)

In 1963, there were signs of a lessening of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. In his commencement address at American University, President Kennedy urged Americans to reexamine Cold War stereotypes and myths and called for a strategy of peace that would make the world safe for diversity. Two actions also signaled a warming in relations between the superpowers: the establishment of a teletype "Hotline" between the Kremlin and the White House and the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on July 25, 1963.

In language very different from his inaugural address, President Kennedy told Americans in June 1963, "For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

Visit our online exhibit:  World on the Brink: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Milestones: 1961–1968

The cuban missile crisis, october 1962.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was a direct and dangerous confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and was the moment when the two superpowers came closest to nuclear conflict. The crisis was unique in a number of ways, featuring calculations and miscalculations as well as direct and secret communications and miscommunications between the two sides. The dramatic crisis was also characterized by the fact that it was primarily played out at the White House and the Kremlin level with relatively little input from the respective bureaucracies typically involved in the foreign policy process.

After the failed U.S. attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion, and while the Kennedy administration planned Operation Mongoose, in July 1962 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev reached a secret agreement with Cuban premier Fidel Castro to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter any future invasion attempt. Construction of several missile sites began in the late summer, but U.S. intelligence discovered evidence of a general Soviet arms build-up on Cuba, including Soviet IL–28 bombers, during routine surveillance flights, and on September 4, 1962, President Kennedy issued a public warning against the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. Despite the warning, on October 14 a U.S. U–2 aircraft took several pictures clearly showing sites for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. These images were processed and presented to the White House the next day, thus precipitating the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Kennedy summoned his closest advisers to consider options and direct a course of action for the United States that would resolve the crisis. Some advisers—including all the Joint Chiefs of Staff—argued for an air strike to destroy the missiles, followed by a U.S. invasion of Cuba; others favored stern warnings to Cuba and the Soviet Union. The President decided upon a middle course. On October 22, he ordered a naval “quarantine” of Cuba. The use of “quarantine” legally distinguished this action from a blockade, which assumed a state of war existed; the use of “quarantine” instead of “blockade” also enabled the United States to receive the support of the Organization of American States.

That same day, Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev declaring that the United States would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba, and demanded that the Soviets dismantle the missile bases already under construction or completed, and return all offensive weapons to the U.S.S.R. The letter was the first in a series of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the Kremlin throughout the remainder of the crisis.

The President also went on national television that evening to inform the public of the developments in Cuba, his decision to initiate and enforce a “quarantine,” and the potential global consequences if the crisis continued to escalate. The tone of the President’s remarks was stern, and the message unmistakable and evocative of the Monroe Doctrine: “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a military readiness status of DEFCON 3 as U.S. naval forces began implementation of the quarantine and plans accelerated for a military strike on Cuba.

On October 24, Khrushchev responded to Kennedy’s message with a statement that the U.S. “blockade” was an “act of aggression” and that Soviet ships bound for Cuba would be ordered to proceed. Nevertheless, during October 24 and 25, some ships turned back from the quarantine line; others were stopped by U.S. naval forces, but they contained no offensive weapons and so were allowed to proceed. Meanwhile, U.S. reconnaissance flights over Cuba indicated the Soviet missile sites were nearing operational readiness. With no apparent end to the crisis in sight, U.S. forces were placed at DEFCON 2—meaning war involving the Strategic Air Command was imminent. On October 26, Kennedy told his advisors it appeared that only a U.S. attack on Cuba would remove the missiles, but he insisted on giving the diplomatic channel a little more time. The crisis had reached a virtual stalemate.

That afternoon, however, the crisis took a dramatic turn. ABC News correspondent John Scali reported to the White House that he had been approached by a Soviet agent suggesting that an agreement could be reached in which the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba if the United States promised not to invade the island. While White House staff scrambled to assess the validity of this “back channel” offer, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a message the evening of October 26, which meant it was sent in the middle of the night Moscow time. It was a long, emotional message that raised the specter of nuclear holocaust, and presented a proposed resolution that remarkably resembled what Scali reported earlier that day. “If there is no intention,” he said, “to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.”

Although U.S. experts were convinced the message from Khrushchev was authentic, hope for a resolution was short-lived. The next day, October 27, Khrushchev sent another message indicating that any proposed deal must include the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. That same day a U.S. U–2 reconnaissance jet was shot down over Cuba. Kennedy and his advisors prepared for an attack on Cuba within days as they searched for any remaining diplomatic resolution. It was determined that Kennedy would ignore the second Khrushchev message and respond to the first one. That night, Kennedy set forth in his message to the Soviet leader proposed steps for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba under supervision of the United Nations, and a guarantee that the United States would not attack Cuba.

It was a risky move to ignore the second Khrushchev message. Attorney General Robert Kennedy then met secretly with Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, and indicated that the United States was planning to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey anyway, and that it would do so soon, but this could not be part of any public resolution of the missile crisis. The next morning, October 28, Khrushchev issued a public statement that Soviet missiles would be dismantled and removed from Cuba.

The crisis was over but the naval quarantine continued until the Soviets agreed to remove their IL–28 bombers from Cuba and, on November 20, 1962, the United States ended its quarantine. U.S. Jupiter missiles were removed from Turkey in April 1963.

The Cuban missile crisis stands as a singular event during the Cold War and strengthened Kennedy’s image domestically and internationally. It also may have helped mitigate negative world opinion regarding the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Two other important results of the crisis came in unique forms. First, despite the flurry of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the Kremlin—perhaps because of it—Kennedy and Khrushchev, and their advisers, struggled throughout the crisis to clearly understand each others’ true intentions, while the world hung on the brink of possible nuclear war. In an effort to prevent this from happening again, a direct telephone link between the White House and the Kremlin was established; it became known as the “Hotline.” Second, having approached the brink of nuclear conflict, both superpowers began to reconsider the nuclear arms race and took the first steps in agreeing to a nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

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JFK and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Listen in on the signature crisis of JFK's presidency

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the signature moment of John F. Kennedy's presidency. The most dramatic parts of that crisis—the famed "13 days"—lasted from October 16, 1962, when President Kennedy first learned that the Soviet Union was constructing missile launch sites in Cuba, to October 28, when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev publicly announced he was removing the missiles from the island nation. 

Tensions continued, however, until November 20, when Kennedy lifted the blockade he had placed around Cuba after confirming that all offensive weapons systems had been dismantled, and that Soviet nuclear-capable bombers were to be removed from the island.

The potential for a nuclear war was real,  and the following Miller Center exhibits from our Kennedy collection capture the president's thoughts and the advice he was receiving.

Date :  Oct 19, 1962 Time :  9:45 a.m. Participants :  John Kennedy, Curtis LeMay

While discussing various options for dealing with the threat posed by Soviet missiles in Cuba, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, after criticizing calls to blockade the island, sums up the president's political and military troubles.

Date:  Oct 22, 1962 Participants:  John Kennedy, Dwight Eisenhower

President Kennedy had taken pains to be sure Eisenhower was briefed on the Cuban Missile Crisis by John McCone, first on October 17 to give him the news of the deployment and then again on October 21 to tell the former president about the blockade-ultimatum decision. Having already heard from McCone about Eisenhower's supportive reaction, President Kennedy wants to discuss his dilemma directly with one of the few living men who will truly understand what he faces. Despite the distance between the two men in age, experience, and political stance, it is not the first time they have confided in each other, and it will not be the last. 

Date :  Oct 24, 1962 Time :  10:00 a.m. Participants : John F. Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, C. Douglas Dillon, Roswell Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Robert Kennedy, Robert G. Kreer, Arthur Lundahl, John McCone, General McDavid, Robert McNamara, Paul Nitze, Kenneth O’Donnell, Dean Rusk, Theodore Sorensen, Maxwell Taylor, Jerome Wiesner 

In this recording, President Kennedy consults with the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (commonly referred to as simply the Executive Committee or ExComm) about possible reactions to the growing Cuban Missile Crisis. 

Date :  Oct 26, 1962 Time :  9:59 a.m. Participants :  John F. Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, C. Douglas Dillon, Roswell Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Robert Kennedy, Robert G. Kreer, Arthur Lundahl, John McCone, General McDavid, Robert McNamara, Paul Nitze, Kenneth O’Donnell, Dean Rusk, Theodore Sorensen, Maxwell Taylor, Jerome Wiesner 

In this recording, President Kennedy consults with the ExComm about the unfolding of the Cuban Missile Crisis and how the situation might be resolved. 

Date :  Oct 26, 1962 Time :  6:30 p.m. Participants :  John F. Kennedy, Harold Macmillan

Kennedy placed this call after having held crisis meetings with advisers all day. Macmillan received the call around midnight London time. U Thant, acting secretary-general of the United Nations, had been holding round-the-clock talks in New York. In the latest development, US Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, had met with U Thant earlier that day in New York. U Thant, in turn, had been talking Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations Valerian Zorin.

Date :  Oct 27, 1962 Time :  4:00 p.m. Participants :  John F. Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Alexis Johnson

President Kennedy and his advisers consider the ramifications of trading Jupiter missiles in Turkey for Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Epic Misadventure

"who would want to read a book on disasters”.

Miller Center expert Marc Selverstone examines Kennedy's foreign policy struggles

Essay: The Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis

For 13 chilling days in October 1962, it seemed that John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev might be playing out the opening scenes of World War III. The Cuban missile crisis was a uniquely compact moment of history. For the first time in the nuclear age, the two superpowers found themselves in a sort of moral road test of their apocalyptic powers.

The crisis blew up suddenly. The U.S. discovered that the Soviet Union, despite repeated and solemn denials, was installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. An American U-2 spy plane came back with photographs of the bases and their support facilities under construction: clear, irrefutable evidence. Kennedy assembled a task force of advisers. Some of them wanted to invade Cuba. In the end, Kennedy chose a course of artful restraint; he laid down a naval quarantine. After six days, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet missiles would be dismantled.

The crisis served some purposes. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have had no comparable collision since then. On the other hand, the humiliation that Khrushchev suffered may have hastened his fall. The experience may be partly responsible for both the Soviet military buildup in the past two decades and whatever enthusiasm the Soviets have displayed for nuclear disarmament.

Now, on the 20th anniversary of the crisis, six of Kennedy’s men have collaborated on a remarkable joint statement on the lessons of that October. It contains some new information, particularly in Point Eight, and at least one of their conclusions is startling and controversial: their thought that, contrary to the widespread assumption of the past two decades, the American nuclear superiority over the Soviets in 1962 had no crucial influence with Washington or Moscow at the time—and that in general, nuclear superiority is insignificant.

The authors are Dean Rusk, then Secretary of State; Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense; George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Theodore Sorensen, special counsel to the President; and McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to the President for national security affairs. Their analysis:

In the years since the Cuban missile crisis, many commentators have examined the affair and offered a wide variety of conclusions. It seems fitting now that some of us who worked particularly closely with President Kennedy during that crisis should offer a few comments, with the advantages both of participation and of hindsight.

FIRST: The crisis could and should have been avoided. If we had done an earlier, stronger and clearer job of explaining our position on Soviet nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere, or if the Soviet government had more carefully assessed the evidence that did exist on this point, it is likely that the missiles would never have been sent to Cuba. The importance of accurate mutual assessment of interests between the two superpowers is evident and continuous.

SECOND: Reliable intelligence permitting an effective choice of response was obtained only just in time. It was primarily a mistake by policymakers, not by professionals, that made such intelligence unavailable sooner. But it was also a timely recognition of the need for thorough overflight, not without its hazards, that produced the decisive photographs. The usefulness and scope of inspection from above, also employed in monitoring the Soviet missile withdrawal, should never be underestimated. When the importance of accurate information for a crucial policy decision is high enough, risks not otherwise acceptable in collecting intelligence can become profoundly prudent.

THIRD: The President wisely took his time in choosing a course of action. A quick decision would certainly have been less carefully designed and could well have produced a much higher risk of catastrophe. The fact that the crisis did not become public in its first week obviously made it easier for President Kennedy to consider his options with a maximum of care and a minimum of outside pressure. Not every future crisis will be so quiet in its first phase, but Americans should always respect the need for a period of confidential and careful deliberation in dealing with a major international crisis.

FOURTH: The decisive military element in the resolution of the crisis was our clearly available and applicable superiority in conventional weapons within the area of the crisis. U.S. naval forces, quickly deployable for the blockade of offensive weapons that was sensibly termed a quarantine, and the availability of U.S. ground and air forces sufficient to execute an invasion if necessary, made the difference. American nuclear superiority was not in our view a critical factor, for the fundamental and controlling reason that nuclear war, already in 1962, would have been an unexampled catastrophe for both sides; the balance of terror so eloquently described by Winston Churchill seven years earlier was in full operation. No one of us ever reviewed the nuclear balance for comfort in those hard weeks. The Cuban missile crisis illustrates not the significance but the insignificance of nuclear superiority in the face of survivable thermonuclear retaliatory forces. It also shows the crucial role of rapidly available conventional strength.

FIFTH: The political and military pressure created by the quarantine was matched by a diplomatic effort that ignored no relevant means of communication with both our friends and our adversary. Communication to and from our allies in Europe was intense, and their support sturdy. The Organization of American States gave the moral and legal authority of its regional backing to the quarantine, making it plain that Soviet nuclear weapons were profoundly unwelcome in the Americas. In the U.N., Ambassador Adlai Stevenson drove home with angry eloquence and unanswerable photographic evidence the facts of the Soviet deployment and deception.

Still more important, communication was established and maintained, once our basic course was set, with the government of the Soviet Union. If the crisis itself showed the cost of mutual incomprehension, its resolution showed the value of serious and sustained communication, and in particular of direct exchanges between the two heads of government.

When great states come anywhere near the brink in the nuclear age, there is no room for games of blindman’s buff. Nor can friends be led by silence. They must know what we are doing and why. Effective communication is never more important than when there is a military confrontation.

SIXTH: This diplomatic effort and indeed our whole course of action were greatly reinforced by the fact that our position was squarely based on irrefutable evidence that the Soviet government was doing exactly what it had repeatedly denied that it would do. The support of our allies and the readiness of the Soviet government to draw back were heavily affected by the public demonstration of a Soviet course of conduct that simply could not be defended. In this demonstration no evidence less explicit and authoritative than that of photography would have been sufficient, and it was one of President Kennedy’s best decisions that the ordinary requirements of secrecy in such matters should be brushed aside in the interest of persuasive exposition. There are times when a display of hard evidence is more valuable than protection of intelligence techniques.

SEVENTH: In the successful resolution of the crisis, restraint was as important as strength. In particular, we avoided any early initiation of battle by American forces, and indeed we took no action of any kind that would have forced an instant and possibly ill-considered response. Moreover, we limited our demands to the restoration of the status quo ante, that is, the removal of any Soviet nuclear capability from Cuba. There was no demand for “total victory” or “unconditional surrender.” These choices gave the Soviet government both time and opportunity to respond with equal restraint. It is wrong, in relations between the superpowers, for either side to leave the other with no way out but war or humiliation.

EIGHTH: On two points of particular interest to the Soviet government, we made sure that it had the benefit of knowing the independently reached positions of President Kennedy. One assurance was public and the other private.

Publicly we made it clear that the U.S. would not invade Cuba if the Soviet missiles were withdrawn. The President never shared the view that the missile crisis should be “used” to pick a fight to the finish with Castro; he correctly insisted that the real issue in the crisis was with the Soviet government, and that the one vital bone of contention was the secret and deceit-covered movement of Soviet missiles into Cuba. He recognized that an invasion by U.S. forces would be bitter and bloody, and that it would leave festering wounds in the body politic of the Western Hemisphere. The no-invasion assurance was not a concession, but a statement of our own clear preference—once the missiles were withdrawn.

The second and private assurance—communicated on the President’s instructions by Robert Kennedy to Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin on the evening of Oct. 27—was that the President had determined that once the crisis was resolved, the American missiles then in Turkey would be removed. (The essence of this secret assurance was revealed by Robert Kennedy in his 1969 book Thirteen Days, and a more detailed account, drawn from many sources but not from discussion with any of us, was published by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. in Robert Kennedy and His Times in 1978. In these circumstances, we think it is now proper for those of us privy to that decision to discuss the matter.) This could not be a “deal”—our missiles in Turkey for theirs in Cuba—as the Soviet government had just proposed. The matter involved the concerns of our allies, and we could not put ourselves in the position of appearing to trade their protection for our own. But in fact President Kennedy had long since reached the conclusion that the outmoded and vulnerable missiles in Turkey should be withdrawn. In the spring of 1961 Secretary Rusk had begun the necessary discussions with high Turkish officials. These officials asked for delay, at least until Polaris submarines could be deployed in the Mediterranean. While the matter was not pressed to a conclusion in the following year and a half, the missile crisis itself reinforced the President’s convictions. It was entirely right that the Soviet government should understand this reality.

This second assurance was kept secret because the few who knew about it at the time were in unanimous agreement that any other course would have had explosive and destructive effects on the security of the U.S. and its allies. If made public in the context of the Soviet proposal to make a “deal,” the unilateral decision reached by the President would have been misread as an unwilling concession granted in fear at the expense of an ally. It seemed better to tell the Soviets the real position in private, and in a way that would prevent any such misunderstanding. Robert Kennedy made it plain to Ambassador Dobrynin that any attempt to treat the President’s unilateral assurance as part of a deal would simply make that assurance inoperative.

Although for separate reasons neither the public nor the private assurance ever became a formal commitment of the U.S. Government, the validity of both was demonstrated by our later actions; there was no invasion of Cuba, and the vulnerable missiles in Turkey (and Italy) were withdrawn, with allied concurrence, to be replaced by invulnerable Polaris submarines. Both results were in our own clear interest, and both assurances were helpful in making it easier for the Soviet government to decide to withdraw its missiles.

In part this was secret diplomacy, including a secret assurance. Any failure to make good on that assurance would obviously have had damaging effects on Soviet-American relations. But it is of critical importance here that the President gave no assurance that went beyond his own presidential powers; in particular he made no commitment that required congressional approval or even support. The decision that the missiles in Turkey should be removed was one that the President had full and unquestioned authority to make and execute.

When it will help your own country for your adversary to know your settled intentions, you should find effective ways of making sure that he does, and a secret assurance is justified when a) you can keep your word, and b) no other course can avoid grave damage to your country’s legitimate interests.

NINTH: The gravest risk in this crisis was not that either head of government desired to initiate a major escalation but that events would produce actions, reactions or miscalculations carrying the conflict beyond the control of one or the other or both. In retrospect we are inclined to think that both men would have taken every possible step to prevent such a result, but at the time no one near the top of either government could have that certainty about the other side. In any crisis involving the superpowers, firm control by the heads of both governments is essential to the avoidance of an unpredictably escalating conflict.

TENTH: The successful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis was fundamentally the achievement of two men, John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev. We know that in this anniversary year John Kennedy would wish us to emphasize the contribution of Khrushchev; the fact that an earlier and less prudent decision by the Soviet leader made the crisis inevitable does not detract from the statesmanship of his change of course. We may be forgiven, however, if we give the last and highest word of honor to our own President, whose cautious determination, steady composure, deep-seated compassion and, above all, continuously attentive control of our options and actions brilliantly served his country and all mankind. –

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• People-Places-Things--Russian
• Historical Summary
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• Image (gif, jpg, tiff)

In the fall of 1962, the Soviet Union began construction on ballistic missile launch sites in Cuba. The United States responded with a naval blockade. For thirteen days, the fear of impending nuclear war continued until an agreement was reached for the removal of the weapons. Painting, watercolor on paper; by Richard Genders; 1962; unframed dimensions 20H X 28W. Accession#: 88-190-BT.

In the fall of 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union came as close as they ever would to global nuclear war. Hoping to correct what he saw as a strategic imbalance with the United States, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev began secretly deploying medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Fidel Castro's Cuba. Once operational, these nuclear-armed weapons could have been used on cities and military targets in most of the continental United States. Before this happened, however, U.S. intelligence discovered Khrushchev's brash maneuver. In what became known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, President   John F. Kennedy  and an alerted and aroused American government, military, and public compelled the Soviets to remove not only their missiles, but also all of their offensive weapons, from Cuba.

The U.S. Navy played a pivotal role in this crisis, demonstrating the critical importance of naval forces to the national defense. The Navy, in cooperation with the other U.S. armed forces and allies, strategically employed military power in such a way that the President did not have to resort to war to protect vital Western interests. Khrushchev realized that his missile and bomber forces were no match for the Navy's powerful Polaris missile-firing submarines and the Air Force's land-based nuclear delivery systems once they became fully operational. Naval forces under the U.S. Atlantic Command, headed by Admiral  Robert L. Dennison , steamed out to sea, intercepting both merchant shipping enroute to Cuba and Soviet submarines operating in the area. U.S. destroyers and frigates, kept on station through underway replenishment by oilers and stores ships, maintained a month-long naval quarantine of the island. Radar picket ships, supported by Navy fighters and airborne early warning planes, assisted the Air Force's Air Defense Command in preparing to defend American airspace from Soviet and Cuban forces. Playing a vital role, Navy aerial photographic and patrol aircraft observed the deployment of Soviet offensive weapons into Cuba (and eventually monitored their withdrawal by sea).

As the unified commander for the Caribbean, Dennison was responsible for readying Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy assault forces for a possible invasion of Cuba. He also served as the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. The aircraft carriers, destroyers, and Marine forces of the subordinate Second Fleet, under Vice Admiral  Alfred G. Ward , were poised to launch air, naval gunfire, and amphibious strikes from the sea against Soviet and Cuban forces ashore. With speed and efficiency, other fleet units reinforced the Marine garrison at Guantanamo on Cuba's southeastern tip and evacuated American civilians. Dennison also coordinated the maritime support operations carried out by Canadian, British, Argentine, and Venezuelan forces.

Khrushchev, faced with the armed might of the United States and its allies, had little choice but to find some way out of the difficult situation in which he had placed himself and his country. President Kennedy did not press the advantage that the strength of U.S. and allied naval and military forces gave him. Thus, the Soviet leader was able to peacefully disengage his nation from this most serious of Cold War confrontations.

Suggested Reading

• Online Reading Room: Cuban Missile Crisis
• CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis
• Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath
• Department of State: The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962
• National Security Archive: The Cuban Missile Crisis
• U.S. Navy Ships and Units Which Received the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for Participating in the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
• John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum: Cuban Missile Crisis
• Department of Defense Cuban Missile Crisis Briefing Materials
• The Naval Quarantine of Cuba, 1962
• The Naval Quarantine of Cuba, 1962: Quarantine, 22–26 October
• A New Look at the Cuban Missile Crisis
• “Cordon of Steel: The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis” by Curtis A. Utz  (5.6 MB pdf download)
• “More Bang for the Buck:” U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Missile Development 1945–1965
• Cuban Missile Crisis: U.S. Naval Aviation Operations  (29 KB pdf download)

Selected Imagery

Cuban leader Fidel Castro, left, meets with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the United Nation in New York, September 1960. (National Archives photograph 306-PS-60-16402)

Low altitude reconnaissance photograph of medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) launch site number 1 in San Cristobal, Cuba showing missile shelter tents, launch pad, transporters, and other equipment. United States. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Cuban Missile Crisis Briefing Materials. (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston. Accession Number: PX66-20:16)

Photographers and cameramen swarm President Kennedy at his desk in the Oval Office upon signing the Cuba Quarantine order, 23 October 1962. (National Archives identifier: 6817196)

Cuban Missile Crisis. Low-level aerial photograph of Mariel Naval port, Cuba, taken 2 November 1962, showing missile support equipment at the port being prepared for loading on Soviet ships for removal from Cuba. Soviet ships present are Divnogorsk , Bratsk , and Metallurg Anosov . (National Archives. Catalog#: USN 711210)

Cuban Missile Crisis. Soviet freighter Fizik Kurchatov at sea, 7 November 1962, just after leaving Cuba to return six missiles to the USSR. (National Archives. Catalog#: USN 711208)

Cuban Missile Crisis. Soviet freighter Volgoles carrying missiles away from Cuba on 9 November 1962. USS Vesole (DDR-878) is alongside. The wingtip of the photo plane, SP-2 Neptune, is also visible. (National Archives. Catalog#: USN 711204)

High altitude aerial reconnaissance photograph of medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) launch site number 2 in San Cristobal, Cuba, 14 October 1962. United States. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Cuban Missile Crisis Briefing Materials. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston. (Accession number: PX66-20:8)

Low altitude aerial photograph made over a portion of the Remedios-area military camp in Cuba on 25 October 1962, showing a Soviet FROG missile with transporter and launcher, 130mm rocket launchers, SU-100 assault guns, T-54 tanks, and other weapons, vehicles, and associated equipment. United States. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Cuban Missile Crisis Briefing Materials. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston. Accession Number: PX66-20:82.

USS Canberra (CAG-2) underway at sea during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 28 October 1962. Taken by Photographer's Mate First Class C.C. Fulps. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph, from the collections of the Naval History and Heritage Command. Catalog#: NH 98391)

Cuban Missile Crisis. Aerial reconnaissance photos of Mariel Naval port, Cuba, and vicinity, taken 4 November 1962, showing missiles and support equipment being prepared for removal from Cuba. The three Soviet freighters in the center photo are Divnogorsk at left, Metallurg Anosov at top center, and Bratsk at right, at end of pier. (National Archives. Catalog#: USN 711211)

Cuban Missile Crisis. Soviet freighter Labinsk bound home from Cuba during the removal of missiles from that nation, 9 November 1962. (National Archives. Catalog#: USN 711203)

Soviet freighter Kasimov at sea, with 15 IL-28 Beagle bombers on deck, 11 in crates which were opened by the Soviet crew for U.S. air inspection, 2 December 1962. Planes were then being withdrawn from Cuba. (National Archives. Catalog#: USN 711262)

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Cuban Missile Crisis

At the height of the Cold War, for two weeks in October 1962, the world teetered on the edge of thermonuclear war. Earlier that fall, the Soviet Union, under orders from Premier Nikita Khrushchev, began to secretly deploy a nuclear strike force in Cuba, just 90 miles from the United States. President John F. Kennedy said the missiles would not be tolerated and insisted on their removal. Khrushchev refused. The standoff nearly caused a nuclear exchange and is remembered in this country as the Cuban Missile Crisis. For 13 agonizing days—from October 16 through October 28—the United States and the Soviet Union stood on the brink of nuclear war. The peaceful resolution of the crisis with the Soviets is considered to be one of Kennedy’s greatest achievements.

Research Resources

• Military Resources: Bay of Pigs Invasion & Cuban Missile Crisis
• John F. Kennedy Library Research Subject Guide: Cuban Missile Crisis
• Cuban Missile Crisis Chronology
• Department of Defense Cuban Missile Crisis Briefing Materials
• CIA-prepared personality studies of Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro
• Satellite images of missile sites under construction
• Secret correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev
• National Archives Catalog Subject Finding Aid for Cuban Missile Crisis (Still Picture Branch)
• JFK’s doodles from October 1962
• Aerial Photograph of Missiles in Cuba (1962) , Milestone Documents

President John F. Kennedy signs the Cuba Quarantine Order, October 23, 1962. ( Kennedy Library )

Audio and Video

• President Kennedy’s radio and television address to the American people on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba, October 22, 1962 
• President Kennedy’s radio and television remarks on the dismantling of Soviet missile bases in Cuba, November 2, 1962
• Telephone conversation between President Kennedy and former President Eisenhower, October 28, 1962
• Telephone recordings, Cuban Missile Crisis Update, October 22, 1962
• Atomic Gambit: JFK Library podcast for 60th anniversary
• Poise, Professionalism and a Little Luck, the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 (panel discussion)
• Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (author lecture)

Kennedy Library Forums

• Cuban Missile Crisis: An Historical Perspective (October 6, 2002)
• On the Brink: The Cuban Missile Crisis (October 20, 2002)
• The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Eyewitness Perspective (October 17, 2007)
• Presidency in the Nuclear Age: Cuban Missile Crisis and the First Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (October 12, 2009)
• 50th Anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 14, 2012)

The Cuban Missile Crisis: Lessons for Today (October 22,2022)

Articles and Blog Posts

• One Step from Nuclear War—The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50  (Prologue)
• Forty Years Ago: The Cuban Missile Crisis  (Prologue)
• Cuban Missile Crisis, Revisited (Text Message blog)

60th Anniversary: The Cuban Missile Crisis (Unwritten Record)

Education Resources

• The Cuban Missile Crisis: How to Respond?  (high school curriculum resource)
• World on the Brink: JFK and the Cuban Missile Crisis (online exhibit)

Find answers to your questions on History Hub

National Museum of Nuclear Science & History

Nuclear Close Calls: The Cuban Missile Crisis

• Cold War History

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were largely prevented from engaging in direct combat with each other due to the fear of mutually assured destruction (MAD). In 1962, however, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world perilously close to nuclear war.

“Why not throw a hedgehog at Uncle Sam’s pants?”

Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to put nuclear missiles in Cuba was precipitated by two major developments. The first was the rise of the Cuban communist movement, which in 1959 overthrew President Fulgencio Batista and brought Fidel Castro to power. The Cuban Revolution was an affront to the United States, which took control of the island following the Spanish-American War of 1898. After granting Cuba its independence several years later, the United States remained a close ally. Under the directive of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the CIA prepared to overthrow the Castro government. The resulting Bay of Pigs Invasion, ordered by President John F. Kennedy in April 1961, saw the defeat of approximately 1,500 American-trained Cuban exiles at the hands of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, was motivated to assist the fledgling communist government that had somewhat surprisingly come to power without any support or influence from Moscow. Despite the Americans’ humiliating defeat at the Bay of Pigs, the Soviets feared that the United States would continue to oppose and delegitimize the Castro regime. As Khrushchev explained, “The fate of Cuba and the maintenance of Soviet prestige in that part of the world preoccupied me. We had to think up some way of confronting America with more than words. We had to establish a tangible and effective deterrent to American interference in the Caribbean. But what exactly? The logical answer was missiles” (Gaddis 76).

The other factor which led Khrushchev to his decision was the disparity between American and Soviet nuclear capabilities. According to physicist Pavel Podvig, Soviet bombers at the time “could deliver about 270 nuclear weapons to U.S. territory.” By contrast, the United States had thousands of warheads that it could deliver via 1,576 Strategic Air Command bombers as well as 183 Atlas and Titan intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 144 Polaris missiles via nine nuclear submarines, and ten newly-built Minuteman ICBMs (Rhodes 93).

The Soviets did not yet have a reliable source of ICBMs, but they did have effective medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). If these weapons were deployed in Cuba, only 90 miles from the American mainland, it would in the eyes of Khrushchev equalize “what the West likes to call the ‘balance of power’” (Sheehan 438). From the Soviet perspective, nuclearizing Cuba would also serve as an effective response to the American Jupiter missiles deployed in Turkey. “Why not throw a hedgehog at Uncle Sam’s pants?” quipped Khrushchev at a meeting in April 1962 (Gaddis 75).

Operation Anadyr

From July to October 1962, the Soviets secretly transported troops and equipment to Cuba. If all went according to plan, the Americans would find out about the operation only after it was too late to stop it. 41,902 soldiers were deployed—most wearing civilian clothes and introduced to an unconvinced Cuban population as “agricultural specialists”—before the crisis started. Thirty-six R-12 missiles and twenty-four launchers were successfully deployed on the island as well as a number of tactical cruise missiles designed to stop an invading American force (Sheehan 441). After the end of the Cold War, Russian officials revealed that 162 nuclear weapons were stationed in Cuba when the crisis broke out (Rhodes 99).

The CIA was unaware of the operation until October, as it had little presence in Cuba following the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Furthermore, a series of international incidents involving U-2 spy planes had caused the United States to put a five-week moratorium on aerial reconnaissance over Cuba. The missions resumed on October 14, when Air Force Major Richard Heyser flew over the island and recorded video evidence of the R-12 sites. Coupled with information from Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a CIA spy in the Soviet Military Intelligence, there was no denying the harsh truth: the Soviet Union was deploying missiles in Cuba.

Quarantining Nuclear Missiles

Kennedy wisely ruled out a military strike, noting that it was likely to miss at least some of the missiles and would prompt Soviet retaliation, probably against a vulnerable West Berlin. He ultimately chose the second option proposed by the CIA, but with one crucial difference. Rather than publicly calling it a “blockade,” which as McCone noted would have required a declaration of war, Kennedy instead termed it a “quarantine.” His military advisers nevertheless continued to push for an attack, to which Kennedy sardonically quipped, “These brass hats have one great advantage in their favor. If we listen to them, and do what they want us to do, none of us will be alive later to tell them that they were wrong” (Sheehan 445). Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara later affirmed that an American invasion would have prompted Soviet forces in Cuba “to use their nuclear weapons rather than lose them” (Rhodes 100).

Kennedy announced the blockade on October 22 in a speech that evoked the Monroe Doctrine, a nineteenth century policy which established the United States’ sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere by opposing any future European colonization in the Americas: “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.” Kennedy also ordered the Strategic Air Command (SAC) into Defense Condition 3 (DEFCON 3) and two days later upped it to DEFCON 2, only one step short of nuclear war. Among other preparations, 66 B-52s carrying hydrogen bombs were constantly airborne, replaced with a fresh crew every 24 hours.

The gambit was designed to exert maximum pressure on the Soviet Union. U.S. officials made sure that the Soviets would pick up the communications ordering the American nuclear forces on high alert. At the United Nations, American Ambassador Adlai Stevenson famously sparred with Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin over the crisis. “Well, let me say something to you, Mr. Ambassador—we do have the evidence [of missile sites],” asserted Stevenson. “We have it, and it is clear and it is incontrovertible. And let me say something else—those weapons must be taken out of Cuba” (Hanhimaki and Westad 485).

The B-59 Submarine

Perhaps the most dangerous moment of the Cuban Missile Crisis came on October 27, when U.S. Navy warships enforcing the blockade attempted to surface the Soviet B-59 submarine. It was one of four submarines sent from the Soviet Union to Cuba, all of which were detected and three of which were eventually forced to surface. The diesel-powered B-59 had lost contact with Moscow for several days, and thus was not informed of the escalating crisis. With its air conditioning broken and battery failing, temperatures inside the submarine were above 100ºF. Crew members fainted from heat exhaustion and rising carbon dioxide levels.

American warships tracking the submarine dropped depth charges on either side of the B-59 as a warning. The crew, unaware of the blockade, thought that perhaps war had been declared. Vadim Orlov, an intelligence officer aboard the submarine, recalled how the American ships “surrounded us and started to tighten the circle, practicing attacks and dropping depth charges. They exploded right next to the hull. It felt like you were sitting in a metal barrel, which somebody is constantly blasting with a sledgehammer.”

Unbeknownst to the Americans, the B-59 was equipped with a T-5 nuclear-tipped torpedo. It was capable of a blast equivalent to 10 kilotons of TNT, roughly two-thirds the strength of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Firing without a direct order from Moscow, however, required the consent of all three senior officers on board. Orlov remembered Captain Valentin Savitsky shouting, “We’re going to blast them now! We will die, but we will sink them all—we will not disgrace our Navy!” Political officer Ivan Semonovich Maslennikov agreed that they should launch the torpedo.

The last remaining officer, Second Captain Vasili Alexandrovich Arkhipov, dissented. They did not know for sure that the ship was under attack, he argued. Why not surface and then await orders from Moscow? In the end, Arkhipov’s view prevailed. The B-59 surfaced near the American warships and the submarine set off north to return to the Soviet Union without incident.

Armageddon Averted

Although the Americans and the Soviets ultimately reached an agreement, it took almost a week of tense negotiations following the institution of the blockade. Meanwhile, the fate of the world continued to hang in the balance. On October 26, Khrushchev sent a private letter to Kennedy proposing a resolution to the crisis: “We, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.” A deal was on the table—the Soviet Union would remove the missiles if the United States was willing to accept Castro’s communist regime in Cuba.

Once again, Kennedy refused to retaliate. Unbeknownst to many of his advisors, the President instructed his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to meet secretly with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. The United States was willing remove the missiles from Turkey within five months, but under the condition that it not be part of any public resolution to the conflict. Given that Turkey was a member of NATO, an admission that the United States was trading missiles in Turkey to resolve the situation in Cuba would have undermined the alliance. The secret agreement was not revealed until decades later.

The next day, Khrushchev sent a letter to Kennedy agreeing to the terms and announced an effective end to the crisis on Radio Moscow: “The Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as ‘offensive,’ and their crating and return to the Soviet Union.” Kennedy hailed the decision as “an important and constructive contribution to peace” while warning of “the compelling necessity for ending the arms race and reducing world tensions.”

The Soviet Union began to dismantle the nuclear sites in Cuba within a day of the agreement. Fidel Castro—furious with Khrushchev’s decision to give in to American demands—refused to let in any U.N. inspectors to verify the removal of the missiles. The Soviets had to resort to loading missiles on ship decks and uncovering them at sea, where they could be photographed by American planes. The United States lifted the blockade on November 20 and removed the Jupiter missiles from Turkey by April 1963. In the end, however, the removal of the missiles was a fairly meaningless gesture as the new Minuteman ICBMs had rendered the Jupiters obsolete.

The shock of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a highly influential factor in the success of future arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as the ban on atmospheric testing. As Khrushchev affirmed only days after the end of the crisis, “We fully agree with regard to three types of tests or, so to say, tests in three environments. This is banning of tests in atmosphere, in outer space and under water” (Hanhimaki and Westad 488). Less than a year later, the two superpowers signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) , which included the principles outlined by Khrushchev. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) followed in 1968.

Nevertheless, the years after the crisis also saw a massive increase in the construction of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union. The Soviet stockpile tripled by the end of the decade and peaked at over 40,000 warheads during the 1980s. This phenomenon can be explained in part by the fact that Soviet leaders felt they had little choice but to capitulate during the crisis given the comparative weakness of their nuclear arsenal. As Soviet lieutenant general Nikolai Detinov explained, “Because of the strategic [imbalance] between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union had to accept everything that the United States dictated to it and this had a painful effect on our country and our government…. All our economic resources were mobilized [afterward] to solve this problem” (Rhodes 94).

The crisis also prompted the creation of the Moscow-Washington hotline, a direct telephone link between the Kremlin and the White House designed to prevent future escalations. Kennedy also ordered the creation of the nuclear “football” which would give him and future presidents the means to order a nuclear strike within minutes.

U.S. invasion plan of Cuba, 1962

A U.S. Navy Lockheed P-2 Neptune flies over a Soviet freighter, 1962

CIA map of “reconnaissance objectives in Cuba,” October 5, 1962

NPIC Deputy Director David Parker shows photographic evidence of missiles in Cuba at the UN, October 25, 1962

​Hanhimaki, Jussi M. and Odd Arne Westad, eds. The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History . New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2005.

Rhodes, Richard. Arsenals of Folly . New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007.

Sheehan, Neil. A Fiery Peace in a Cold War . New York, NY: Random House, 2009.

"The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962:" Documents from the National Security Archive

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Events, news & press, the cuban missile crisis as intelligence failure.

Fifty years of reluctance to draw an unwelcome conclusion

T he cuban missile crisis marks its 50 th anniversary this year as the most studied event of the nuclear age. Scholars and policymakers alike have been dissecting virtually every aspect of that terrifying nuclear showdown. Digging through documents in Soviet and American archives, and attending conferences from Havana to Harvard, generations of researchers have labored to distill what happened in 1962  — all with an eye toward improving U.S. foreign policy.

Yet after half a century, we have learned the wrong intelligence lessons from the crisis. In some sense, this result should not be surprising. Typically, learning is envisioned as a straight-line trajectory where time only makes things better. But time often makes things worse. Organizations (and individuals) frequently forget what they should remember and remember what they should forget.

One of the most widely accepted lessons of that frightening time — that the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba constituted a stunning American intelligence success — needs to be challenged. An equally stunning intelligence-warning failure has been downplayed in Cuban missile crisis scholarship since the 1960 s. Shifting the analytic lens from intelligence success to failure, moreover, reveals surprising and important organizational deficiencies at work. Ever since Graham Allison penned Essence of Decision in 1971 , a great deal of research has focused on the pitfalls of individual perception and cognition as well as organizational weaknesses in the policymaking process. Surprisingly little work, however, has examined the crucial role of organizational weaknesses in intelligence analysis. Many of these same problems still afflict U.S. intelligence agencies today.

The pre-crisis estimates of 1962

T he empirical record of U.S. intelligence assessments leading up to the crisis is rich. We now know that between January and October 1962 , when Soviet nuclear missile sites were ultimately discovered, the cia ’s estimates office produced four National Intelligence Estimates ( nie s) and Special National Intelligence Estimates ( snie s) about Castro’s communist regime, its relationship with the Soviet Bloc, its activities in spreading communism throughout Latin America, and potential threats to the United States.

These were not just any intelligence reports. nie s and snie s were — and still are — the gold standard of intelligence products, the most authoritative, pooled judgments of intelligence professionals from agencies across the U.S. government. Sherman Kent, the legendary godfather of cia analysis who ran the cia ’s estimates office at the time, described the process as an “estimating machine,” where intelligence units in the State Department, military services, and cia would research and write initial materials; a special cia estimates staff would write a draft report; an interagency committee would conduct “a painstaking” review; and a “full-dress” version of the estimate would go down “an assembly line of eight or more stations” before being approved for dissemination 1

The four pre-crisis estimates of 1962 reveal that U.S. intelligence officials were gravely worried about the political fallout of a hostile communist regime so close to American shores and the possibility of communist dominoes in Latin America. But they were not especially worried about risk of a military threat from Cuba or its Soviet patron. The first estimate, released January 17, 1962 (snie 80–62 ), was a big-think piece that assessed threats to the United States from the Caribbean region over the next 20 years. Although the estimate considered it “very likely” that communism across the region would “grow in size” during the coming decade, it concluded that “the establishment of . . . Soviet bases is unlikely for some time to come ” because “their military and psychological value, in Soviet eyes, would probably not be great enough to override the risks involved” (emphasis mine). The time horizon is important, suggesting confidence that Khrushchev would be unwilling to risk establishing a Cuban base for at least several years. Indeed, the estimate later noted that its judgment about Soviet bases “might not extend over the entire period under review.” Considering that the review period stretched 20  years into the future, this is quite a statement; the intelligence community’s long-term estimate anticipated no short- or even medium-term crisis brewing.

The second estimate was issued March 21, 1962 (nie 85–62 ) , and had a narrower time horizon and scope: analyzing “the situation in Cuba and the relationships of the Castro regime with both the Soviet Bloc and Latin American Republics” over the coming year. Again, the estimate discounts heavily the possibility that the Soviet Union would defend Cuba or establish offensive military capabilities there. The estimate notes that despite Castro’s vigorous efforts to secure a security guarantee, the Soviet Bloc “has avoided any explicit military commitment to defend Cuba.” Later, the assessment uses much stronger estimative language, stating that, “the ussr would almost certainly not intervene directly with its own forces” were Castro’s regime overthrown by internal or external forces and that although the Soviets would respond to an overthrow with strong political action, the ussr “ would almost certainly never intend to hazard its own safety for the sake of Cuba” (all emphases mine). These terms are not just thrown around. Carefully chosen and reviewed in the estimates process, they are meant to convey a high degree of certainty. In fact, Khrushchev made the decision to deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba about ten weeks later, between May and June of 1962 . Massive numbers of Soviet troops were roaming about the island by fall (although total numbers were not known for the next 25  years), and nuclear missiles began arriving in early September.

The third estimate was disseminated on August 1, 1962 (nie 85–2–62 ), just a couple of weeks after intelligence began indicating a major Soviet arms buildup in Cuba. Although the estimate notes that Soviet bloc “military advisors and instructors” were believed to be in Cuba, along with “Bloc-supplied arms and equipment,” the estimate once again notes that the Soviet Union “has avoided any formal commitment to protect and defend the regime in all contingencies.” The assessment further states, “We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations” or that “the Bloc will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate.”

The fourth and crucial estimate before the crisis was released September 19, 1962 (snie 85–3–62 ). This time, however, the situation was vastly changed: Starting in mid-July, a stream of intelligence reporting from both technical and human sources began indicating a massive arms buildup. This reporting increased dramatically in August and September, and the estimate’s heading reflected these developments. Whereas the March and August estimates were blandly titled, “The Situation and Prospects in Cuba,” the Special National Intelligence Estimate of September 19 th carried a more ominous title: “The Military Buildup in Cuba.” The estimate notes that between mid-July and early September, approximately 70 ships had delivered Soviet weaponry and construction equipment. That number was three to four times greater than total Soviet shipments for the entire first half of 1962 . Indeed, so concerned was President Kennedy by the new intelligence that he made explicit public warnings on September 4 th and again on September 13 th that if the Soviets placed offensive weapons in Cuba, “the gravest issues would arise,” a warning understood to imply potential nuclear confrontation.

Nevertheless, this crucial intelligence estimate still concluded that “Soviet policy remains fundamentally unaltered.” For the fourth time in nine months, a national intelligence estimate asserted that Soviet activities in Cuba were meant to deter an American attack there and sustain a vital ideological victory for the communist cause. Engrossed by the political threat of a strengthened communist regime in the Western hemisphere, the estimate considered but ultimately dismissed the possibility of a major offensive Soviet base. “The establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which could be used against the U.S. would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it,” the estimate starkly concluded. The estimate justified this judgment at some length, noting that the Soviets had never placed any such weapons even in Soviet satellite countries before, 2  that missiles would pose significant command and control problems, that they would require “a conspicuously larger number of Soviet personnel” in Cuba, and that the Soviets would “almost certainly” know that such a move would provoke “a dangerous U.S. reaction.”

Two years later, Sherman Kent categorically concluded that the September 19 th estimate’s judgments about Soviet intentions turned out to be wrong; Khrushchev had “zig[ged] violently out of the track of ‘normal,’” and U.S. intelligence agencies had missed it. More recently declassified Soviet archives reveal that the intelligence community’s mistakes were not confined to misjudging Khrushchev’s intentions. They also included erroneous conclusions about what Kent terms “indisputable facts.” For example, the estimate confidently asserts that Soviet military personnel increased from 350 to 4,000 during 1962 , and that “conspicuously larger” numbers of Soviet personnel would have to be present to indicate a potential nuclear missile site. It turns out that conspicuously larger numbers of Soviet military forces actually were in Cuba at the time — we just didn’t know it. Soviet forces numbered 41,900 , a figure ten times higher than the September estimate. cia estimators assumed this key indicator of a Soviet strategic missile base would be easy to see. Indeed, it would be “conspicuous.” Instead, U.S. intelligence officials were unaware of the full size of the Soviet troop deployment for the next 25  years.

The intelligence success narrative

F or decades, scholars and practitioners have been reluctant to call the pre-crisis intelligence estimates of 1962  a strategic warning failure. Instead, the intelligence narrative of the Cuban missile crisis has taken two contradictory forms. One argues that intelligence warning succeeded, the other admits that no accurate warning was possible and that U.S. intelligence estimators did the best that anyone could.

The first success narrative conflates causes and outcomes. Because the crisis ended without nuclear confrontation and gave Khrushchev a major political defeat, there is a natural tendency to conclude that the U.S. intelligence warning worked well. As James Blight and David Welch note, “American intelligence did positively identify Soviet missiles prior to their becoming operational, which permitted the Kennedy administration to seize the initiative in attempting to secure their removal.” 3 Raymond Garthoff echoes these sentiments, writing, “Intelligence did do its job.” 4  

Yet two arguments suggest otherwise. First, although it is clear that U.S. intelligence officials discovered Soviet missiles in Cuba days before they became operational, it is equally clear that they utterly failed to anticipate the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba every day before then. As Cynthia Grabo notes in her classic work Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning , the essence of warning is not presenting a list of iron-clad facts but anticipating and preventing the looming and murky danger of strategic surprise. To be sure, for most of 1962 , there were no nuclear missiles in Cuba to be found. 5  Still, none of the intelligence estimates sounded the alarm to be on the lookout for such a possibility; indicated specifically what factors, other than large numbers of troops, might conceivably change the assessment of Khrushchev’s intentions; or urged policymakers to take seriously the idea that the Soviets could be up to something more. Quite the contrary. All four of the estimates had a distinctly reassuring quality to them, highlighting inferences and evidence in ways that suggested policymakers need not worry about a Soviet offensive base in Cuba. Rather than inoculating the Kennedy administration against the horrors of a possible Soviet missile surprise in Cuba, the estimates made the surprise all the more sudden, shocking, and total.

Second, the contingency of history also cautions against finding intelligence warning success in chancy, happy outcomes. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, each passing decade brings new and frightening evidence of how Kennedy’s “seizing the initiative” after seeing those u2 photographs of missile sites nearly led to nuclear disaster, not American victory. Transcripts of Kennedy’s secret Excomm meetings reveal that had the president made his decision on the first day of the crisis rather than the seventh, the United States would have launched an air strike against Soviet missiles in Cuba that could very well have triggered thermonuclear war. Scott Sagan has chronicled numerous instances during the crisis where mistakes (an American u2 pilot who accidentally flew into Soviet airspace, bringing with him American f102-a interceptors armed with Falcon nuclear air-to-air missiles) or routine military procedures (including a previously scheduled test tape of a Soviet missile attack that ran during the crisis and was mistakenly identified as a real incoming strike) nearly spiraled out of control. In 2002 , scholars unearthed terrifying new evidence that one Soviet submarine captain actually did order preparations to launch a nuclear-tipped torpedo off the American coast. On October 27 , bombarded by U.S. Navy depth charges and running out of air, the Soviet Captain gave the order to prepare a nuclear weapon for firing. “We’re going to blast them now! We will die, but we will sink them all. We will not disgrace our navy,” the Soviet intelligence report quotes the Soviet captain as saying. But in the heat of the moment, another submarine officer, Vasili Arkhipov, convinced him to await further instructions from Moscow. 6 In short, the mounting evidence of narrow misses during the crisis suggests that luck played a pivotal role, and that the outcome could easily have been tragic. One wonders whether observers would feel quite the same about the performance of U.S. intelligence agencies had Soviet ss-4  nuclear missiles landed in South Florida.

The second variant of the success narrative maintains that U.S. intelligence estimators may have been wrong, but they did the best that anyone could. Sherman Kent himself wrote in 1964 , “By definition, estimating is an excursion out beyond established fact into the unknown.” An estimator, he notes, will undoubtedly be wrong from time to time. “To recognize this as inevitable,” however, “does not mean that we estimators are reconciled to our inadequacy; it only means we fully realize that we are engaged in a hazardous occupation.” In this particular case, Kent admits to being dead wrong but then claims no one could possibly have predicted Khrushchev’s irrational behavior. “No estimating process,” he concludes, “can be expected to divine exactly when the enemy is about to make a dramatically wrong decision.” With a few exceptions, examinations of the Cuban missile crisis have picked up this theme.

Blaming the adversary for his unpredictable behavior is an odd argument, to say the least. The logic suggests, for example, that U.S. intelligence agencies should also criticize the Chinese for their surprise entry into the Korean War, the Indians and Pakistanis for their unexpected 1998 nuclear tests, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for his strange letters and on again/off again nuclear saber rattling (can’t these people act more predictably?). This argument also contradicts one of the most important maxims of intelligence warning: Good warning analysis does not discount anomalies, it targets them. Grabo’s primer, which has been required reading for warning analysts for years, notes, “While not all anomalies lead to crises all crises are made up of anomalies.” By this measure, the Cuban missile crisis seems a textbook case of anomaly leading to crisis. The Soviets had never taken such risks before. Nor had they ever provided such an extraordinary level of military aid to Cuba. But starting in the spring of 1962 , ships were sailing, and by summer, crates of weapons — lots of them — were being unloaded. Something different was definitely afoot, and U.S. intelligence officials knew it. Yet their estimates confronted these anomalies and declared them more of the same.

The benefits of calling a failure a failure

C alling something a  success or failure is not simply an exercise in semantics. The categorization itself directs researchers to examine different questions, mount different arguments, or as Allison put it so many years ago, fish in different conceptual ponds. In this case, viewing the Cuban missile crisis as an intelligence warning failure naturally shifts the explanatory lens from “showing why warning was so hard” to “identifying what went so wrong.”

Doing so reveals significant research gaps. Seeking to explain “why warning was so hard,” intelligence research on the crisis has focused primarily on cognitive psychology and the pitfalls inherent in human cognition. Organizational explanations, by contrast, have remained an under-tilled area. While much has been made of bureaucratic politics in presidential decision-making, little has been done to examine the silent but deadly role of organizational weaknesses in intelligence during the Cuban missile crisis. But more recent analyses of the September 11  terrorist attacks and the faulty estimates of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction suggest that organizational weaknesses in intelligence can have devastating effects. And regarding the Cuban missile crisis, there are lingering questions surrounding such weaknesses.

Why did estimators miss the signals of Khrushchev’s true intentions?

Signals and noise have been a major part of every intelligence post-mortem since Pearl Harbor. Roberta Wohlstetter, who coined the terms, observed that intelligence warning requires analysts to separate “signals,” or clues that point to an adversary’s future action, from a background that is filled with “noise,” or intelligence indicators that turn out to be irrelevant, confusing, or just plain wrong. After the fact, of course, the signals are obvious. “Like the detective-story reader who turns to the last page first,” Wohlstetter writes, “we find it easy to pick out the clues.” 7 Detecting the right signals before  disaster strikes, however, is another matter.

Wohlstetter’s important insight warns against the perils of hindsight bias. But it has also generated analytic pathologies of its own, focusing our sites more on the ratio of signals to noise and the analytic techniques to improve individual perception than the organizational  forces that cause signals to get noticed or missed. Each time an intelligence surprise occurs, commissions, congressional committees, and scholars are quick to ask, “How many signals were there? How much noise existed? What analytic mistakes were made?” The answer is always the same: too few signals, too much noise, too many erroneous assumptions or inferences. Rarely, however, do we examine the silent organizational structures and processes that determine whether signals get noticed or ignored, amplified or dispersed. We have missed the crucial role of organizations.

A brief comparison of the Cuban missile crisis and the September 11 terrorist attacks illustrates the point. Immediately after the Cuban missile crisis, the steady refrain was that intelligence noise was tremendous while signals were scarce. cia Director John McCone wrote that his agency received 3,500 human intelligence reports from agents and Cuban refugees (who were debriefed at a special cia center in Opa Locka, Florida) claiming to spot Soviet missiles on the island before the crisis. Nearly all were wildly off the mark. According to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, just 35 of these reports turned out to be signals indicating the actual Soviet deployment. McCone finds even fewer, writing, “only eight in retrospect were considered as reasonably valid indicators of the deployment of offensive missiles to Cuba.” 8  And Sherman Kent, who was responsible for the pre-crisis estimates, contends that at most, only three of these signals “should have stopped the clock.”

McCone, Kent, Wohlstetter, Garthoff, and others argue forcefully that these were terrible odds for detecting signals of Khrushchev’s nuclear gambit. But were they really? Looking back, the numbers actually look pretty darn good. Intelligence officials working in the weeks and months before the September 11 terrorist attacks would gladly have traded signals-to-noise ratios with their Cuban missile crisis counterparts. In 1962 , there were just 5,000 computers worldwide, no fax machines, and no cell phones. By 2001 , the National Security Agency was intercepting about 200 million e-mails, cell phone calls, and other signals a day . Although processing technology had improved dramatically, it was nowhere near enough. The collection backlogs at nsa alone were so enormous that less than 1 percent of the intake was ever decoded or processed. Against this astounding noise level, signal detection remained about the same as it was in 1962 . I found that in the two years before 9/11 , U.S. intelligence officials picked up a grand total of 23  signals that al-Qaeda was planning a major attack on the U.S. homeland.

As the comparison suggests, quantifying signals and noise tells part of the warning story, but not the most important part. In both cases, the crucial warning problem was not the precise number of signals; whether there were three or 30 or even 300 signals made little difference in the end. Instead, the crucial problem had to do with organizational deficiencies that ensured every  signal, once detected, would eventually get lost in the bureaucracy. Chief among these organizational deficiencies was structural fragmentation — jurisdictional divisions within and across intelligence agencies that dispersed and isolated signals in different places.

Seven weeks before 9/11 , for example, three of the fbi ’s 56 U.S. field offices independently uncovered what turned out to be three key signals. In Phoenix, Special Agent Kenneth Williams identified a pattern of jihadists attending U.S. flight schools and wrote a memo urging that flight schools be contacted, specific individuals be investigated, and other intelligence agencies, including the cia , be notified. In Minneapolis, fbi agents arrested Zacarias Moussaoui, a suspicious extremist who wanted to fly 747 s and paid $6,000 in cash to use a flight simulator but lacked all of the usual credentials. He became the only person convicted in the U.S. for his connection to the attacks. Third and finally, the fbi ’s New York field office began searching for Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, two suspected al-Qaeda operatives who ultimately hijacked and crashed American Airlines Flight 77  into the Pentagon.

Yet because the fbi field office structure was highly decentralized, none of the agents working these cases knew about the others. And because a gaping divide separated domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, the cia and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community never seized these or other fbi leads in time, either. Instead, the Phoenix memo gathered dust, alerting no one. Moussaoui’s belongings (which included additional leads to the 9/11 plot) sat unopened for weeks as Minneapolis agents tried to obtain a search warrant — unaware of the Phoenix memo or the existence of another terrorist in fbi custody who could have identified Moussaoui from al-Qaeda’s training camps. An fbi agent went searching blindly for al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi in New York hotels, unaware that the Bureau’s San Diego field office had an informant who knew both terrorists. In these cases, and 20  others, someone somewhere in the intelligence bureaucracy noticed something important. These and other signals were not drowned out by the noise. They were found, and then subsequently lost in the bowels of the bureaucracy.

Even a cursory look at the Cuban missile crisis suggests that structural fragmentation appears to have played a similar role then, isolating and weakening signals rather than concentrating and amplifying them. In 1962 , just as in 2001 , the Central Intelligence Agency was central in name only. Created just fifteen years earlier, the cia had been hobbled from birth by existing intelligence agencies in the State, Justice, War, and Navy Departments, all of which vigorously protected their own missions, budgets, and power. The cia , in fact, did not control the intelligence budgets or activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, or any of the military intelligence services, all of which reported to the secretary of defense. What’s more, the Bay of Pigs debacle of April 1961 made a weak cia even weaker. Kennedy’s own distrust was so great that he sacked cia  Director Allen W. Dulles and replaced him with a man none of his inner circle trusted: John McCone, a Republican businessman with staunch anticommunist leanings and no professional intelligence experience.

This structure meant that intelligence reporting and analysis of the Cuban situation was handled by half a dozen different agencies with different missions, specialties, incentives, levels of security clearances, access to information, interpretations of the findings, and no common boss to knock bureaucratic heads together short of the president. The Defense Intelligence Agency photographed deck cargoes of Soviet ships en route from the Soviet Union. The Navy conducted air reconnaissance of ships entering and leaving Cuba. The cia ran human agents in Cuba, but jointly operated a special Cuban refugee debriefing center in Florida with the military. The State Department handled diplomatic dispatches. The National Security Agency intercepted communications indicating Soviet ship movements, radio transmissions in Cuba, and other signals intelligence. At first the cia , and then the Strategic Air Command, manned u2 reconnaissance flights over Cuba. Estimates, finally, were technically produced by the cia ’s Office of National Estimates but coordinated and approved by an interagency group called the U.S. Intelligence Board. In short, in 1962 , as in 2001 , there were many bureaucratic players and no one firmly in charge of them all.

Although a more thorough organizational analysis of how every signal was processed through the bureaucracy lies beyond the scope of this essay, initial evidence does suggest that organizational fragmentation existed, and that it had the effect of delaying action and hindering signal consolidation. For example, retrospective examinations by both the cia and the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board ( pfiab ) found that there was “rigid compartmentation” between aerial imagery collectors and cia analysts and that this structural divide kept the cia from disseminating reports and information about the possibility of offensive Soviet weapons in Cuba before the October 14 th discovery of missile installations. The pfiab report on the crisis, which was completed in February 1963 , finds that before October 14 , cia analysts did not publish any information indicating a potential offensive buildup in Cuba in the president’s daily intelligence checklist, the most important current intelligence product. The reason: The agency’s rules required that any report that could be verified by photographic evidence first had to be sent to the National Photographic Interpretation Center ( npic ), a separate cia unit located in the Directorate of Science and Technology. For cia analysts housed inside the agency’s Directorate of Intelligence, this was the bureaucratic equivalent of Lower Slobovia. What’s more, there was no systematic process to inform analysts about the status of their aerial verification requests to npic , so requests could languish or simply disappear without any further action. Without any idea whether further action would ever be taken, analysts simply withheld information from their written products. The pfiab  found that analysts mistakenly interpreted the verification rule as an outright ban on publishing all reports of offensive Soviet weapons without definitive photographic proof.

This same rigid bureaucratic division between analysis and photographic collection created a filter that appears to have hindered initial signal detection as well. According to the pfiab chronology, a September 9 th report from Castro’s personal pilot claimed that there were “many mobile ramps for intermediate range rockets,” an item subsequently deemed significant. At the time, however, it was given only “routine” precedence because the cia  analyst who saw it was charged with identifying information relevant for aerial surveillance, and thought the information was “too general” to be of targeting use.

In short, preliminary evidence suggests that the same organizational barriers operating on 9/11  were also at work during the missile crisis. Indeed, given the long and sordid history of intelligence coordination problems, it seems unlikely that Cuban intelligence reporting constituted a shining exception where intelligence warning signals were collected, assessed, and disseminated by a well-oiled coordination machine. Instead, in both cases, bureaucratic jurisdictions and standard operating procedures ended up creating invisible fault lines within and across intelligence agencies that kept signals from converging. Structural fragmentation made it likely that signals would get lost, even after they had been found.

Why were all four of the pre-crisis estimates so consistent, even in the face of alarming new evidence of a Soviet military buildup?

The four pre-crisis intelligence estimates of 1962 raise a second perplexing question: Why were these formal intelligence products so consistent even when intelligence reporting showed a dramatic uptick in Soviet military deployments to Cuba? Or more precisely, why did that final September 19 th special estimate draw old conclusions about Khrushchev’s intentions despite new evidence that the Soviets were sending weapons and personnel in unprecedented numbers at unprecedented rates in August and September?

Recall that the estimate clearly indicated conditions on the ground had changed since the previous estimate, which was published on August 1, 1962 . The September 19 th estimate begins by defining its task as assessing “the strategic and political significance of the recent military buildup in Cuba and the possible future development of additional military capabilities there.” And it devotes substantial attention to discussing the precise nature of the buildup, declaring as fact that “In July the Soviets began a rapid effort to strengthen Cuban defenses against air attack and major seaborne invasion.” Notably, there are few estimative caveats in this section such as “we judge,” or “we assess,” or “it is likely.” Instead, the estimate states as a point of fact three developments: That “the bulk of the material delivered” to Cuba is related to the installation of twelve sa-2 surface-to-air missile sites on the Western part of the island; new shipments also include tanks, self-propelled guns, other ground force equipment, and eight “Komar” class guided missile patrol boats to augment Cuban defenses; and a “substantial increase in the number of Soviet military personnel from about 350 early this year to the current level of about 4,000 .” The estimate is more speculative and less certain about other aspects of the buildup: when existing sam sites would be operational, the possible installation of additional surface-to-air missile sites on the eastern half of the island, the number of mig-21 interceptors deployed, future deliveries and missile capabilities of Komar class patrol boats, and the identification of recent crates, large boxes, and vans, which were believed to contain electronics and communications gear. Although the estimate notes that mig  fighters could be used for offensive purposes, it concludes, “Nevertheless, the pattern of Soviet military aid to date appears clearly designed to strengthen the defense of the island.”

Other than the mig discussion, the estimate confines its assessment of possible offensive weapons — including a submarine or strategic missile base — to a different section titled “Possibilities for expansion of the Soviet buildup.” This report structure had the effect of sharply distinguishing present intelligence reporting about the military buildup from speculation about future possibilities. According to the estimate, intelligence about the buildup clearly showed the Soviets adopting a defensive posture, just as earlier assessments had concluded. The estimate does ponder the future, noting, “The ussr  could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the establishment of a Soviet submarine base there.” However, it concludes that “Either development . . . would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it.” In other words, earlier judgments about Soviet objectives and intentions still held.

In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, Kent took a great deal of criticism for the September 19 th estimate. Nearly all of it centered on analytic misjudgments, particularly mirror imaging or the tendency for analysts to believe an adversary will behave as they would. And as noted above, more recent scholarly work also focuses on problems of perception and cognition. According to this work, American estimators failed to see the world or weigh the costs and benefits of the missile deployment through Soviet eyes.

But mirror imaging was not the only problem hindering the estimates process. Organizational pressures were also driving strongly toward conformity and consistency across the four Cuba estimates. These reports were not the product of a single mind, a single view, or even a single agency. They were collective  reports that required interagency coordination and consensus. And that organizational fact of life tilted the whole estimating machine toward consistency over time. Why? Because consistency was what policymaking customers expected to find. Presidential advisors did not need to be convinced that the world essentially looked the same today as it did last month. But they did need to be convinced that the world looked different. Where consistency was a given, inconsistency had to be explained, justified, and defended. Changing a previous estimate required taking a fresh look, marshaling both new and old facts, and laying out what had shifted, and why. That, in turn, meant overcoming immense bureaucratic inertia — convincing every intelligence agency involved in the estimating process that what it said or assessed or wrote or agreed to the last time should be discarded or modified this time. Changing an earlier estimate did not just take more work inside each agency. It took more work negotiating new agreement across them. Generating interagency consensus on a new estimate that said “we have changed our collective minds” was invariably harder than producing a report that said “once again, we agree with what we wrote last time.” In short, organizational dynamics naturally gave consistency the upper hand.

Political considerations exacerbated these problems. By political considerations, I do not mean to suggest that estimators bent their judgments to curry favor or told policymakers what they wanted to hear. Instead, my point is that switching course on an analytic judgment is always harder when the political stakes for the country and the administration are known to be high. In these situations, any new estimate that revises earlier judgments can be seized, however unjustifiably, as proof that earlier estimates were wrong.

The political atmosphere surrounding the Cuba estimates was intense. The Cold War stakes had never been greater and the cia  had already caused Kennedy a devastating defeat in the Bay of Pigs invasion just eighteen months earlier. Now, with midterm congressional elections just weeks away, the pressure to “get Cuba right” was tremendous. In this environment, an intelligence estimate that gave serious consideration to a new, more ominous reading of the Soviet buildup would almost certainly have been read as an indictment of earlier, less alarming estimates. And it would have contradicted earlier public assurances by the president himself, as well as his closest advisors, that the Soviet buildup was purely defensive in nature. Such considerations may not have been in the foreground of the estimates process, but it is hard to imagine that they were not in the background. At that precise moment, on that particular topic, consistency was a safe and prudent course while inconsistency carried substantial risks, both for the intelligence community and the president.

Why didn’t anyone offer dissenting views in the intelligence estimates?

The above discussion helps illuminate why the estimates were consistent even when confronting dramatically new facts. It does not, however, explain why the estimates failed to contain any dissenting views. As noted earlier, footnotes were used to provide dissenting opinions in estimates of other subjects written during the same period. Why, then, were they not used in the pre-crisis estimates of 1962 , particularly the September 19 th assessment?

The usual explanation is that no strong dissenting opinions existed. As Wohlstetter writes, “let us remember that the intelligence community was not alone. It had plenty of support from Soviet experts, inside and outside the Government. At any rate, no articulate expert now claims the role of Cassandra.” But there was at least one: cia  Director John McCone, who suspected Soviet missiles from the start. McCone was a paranoid anticommunist who always seemed to find signs of aggressive Soviet behavior, and was often wrong. This time, however, his hunch proved correct.

McCone was no wallflower. In fact, the historical record shows that he forcefully advocated his hypothesis about Soviet missiles with senior Kennedy advisors on several occasions, starting in August 1962 . And after sam sites were discovered, he sent a series of cables to Washington from his European honeymoon, again strenuously asserting his hypothesis (the sam sites, he believed, had to be guarding something important) and requesting additional reconnaissance. The cia  director was not afraid to make his case or make it often. The question, then, is why he never did so in the national intelligence estimates.

Some argue that McCone refrained from foisting his opinions or judgments on the estimates process, and conclude that this was a good thing. “ dci McCone deserves credit for allowing snie 85–3–62 to contain conclusions that clearly contradicted his views,” writes James Wirtz. “If McCone had interfered in the snie in a heavy-handed way . . . analysts would have objected to what inevitably would have been viewed as politicization of their estimate.” 9  Organization theory, however, suggests a very different possibility: that the estimating machine may have been working so smoothly, it failed utterly.

The key idea is a phenomenon called structural secrecy. Briefly put, the notion is that all organizations specialize to increase efficiency, and specialization turns out to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, dividing labor into subunits enables experts to tackle specialized tasks in specialized ways. On the other hand, however, specialization generates organizational structures and standard operating procedures that filter out information and keep an organization from learning. Standard ways of writing reports, assembly line production processes, and rigid communication channels — all of these things help managers work across sub-units efficiently. But they also keep ideas that do not fit into the normal formats and channels from getting heard. Reports, for example, are written in certain ways, with certain types of information, for certain purposes, and certain audiences. This setup is designed to create a standard product precisely by weeding out nonstandard ideas and approaches. Organizations are filled with these kinds of standard formats and operating procedures. The trouble is that the more that things get done the same way each time, the harder it is to do things differently. The entire system becomes a well-oiled machine that, by its very existence, keeps alternative ideas or ways of operating from getting through. Information that could be valuable to the organization remains hidden. Organizational structure creates its own kind of secrecy.

The estimates process in the Cuban missile crisis seemed ripe for structural secrecy problems. It was highly specialized, with multiple units, offices, and agencies collecting and analyzing different pieces of the Cuba intelligence puzzle. It was also highly routinized. Kent himself describes the estimates process as a “machine,” with specific stations, regularized processes, and an “assembly line” production. The process was well-honed, and the product was highly standardized. Notably, one of the key features of the estimating machine was its evidentiary standard for revising earlier estimates or voicing dissenting views. Kent writes extensively about what it would have taken to revise the September 19 th estimate or offer a dramatically different, stronger view of the buildup and concludes that the evidence was simply not there. “These pre-October 14  data almost certainly would not, indeed should not, have caused the kind of shift of language in the key paragraphs that would have sounded the tocsin,” he writes. The same was true of footnotes, which were ordinarily used for airing disagreements about evidence.

In other words, the estimating process was all about data: collecting it, interpreting it, distilling it, and assessing what it meant. The machine started with evidence and ended with judgments. The cia  director’s approach never fit into this standard operating procedure. Indeed, McCone had it backwards. He did not have evidence in search of a judgment. He had a hypothesis in search of evidence. And there was no place in the National Intelligence Estimates or Special National Intelligence Estimates for such things. No wonder McCone never tried to inject himself into those reports. Instead, he worked within the estimating machine, requesting additional photographic reconnaissance to get the proof he needed. And while he waited for the estimating gears to grind, he made his case — in meeting after meeting, cable after cable — to Kennedy and his top advisors. Structural secrecy led the estimating machine to run smoothly into failure.

Lessons for today

F ifty years after the Cuban missile crisis, intelligence warning is still plagued by many of the same challenges. Evidence misleads. Enemies deceive. Analysts misjudge. Failures result. The September 11 attacks and the faulty estimates of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction are potent reminders that intelligence warning remains, as Kent put it 48  years ago, “a hazardous occupation.”

And yet, some of the most powerful barriers to effective intelligence warning remain relatively unexplored. Intelligence, at its core, is a collective enterprise. Organizations are not passive players, where individuals do all of the hard thinking and make all of the tough calls. Instead, organizations powerfully influence whether signals get amplified or weakened, whether analysis looks backward at continuity or leans forward toward disjuncture, and whether dissent gets highlighted or hidden.

1 Sherman Kent, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Crucial Estimate Relived,” originally published in Studies in Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency,  Spring 1964 ).

2 We know now that the Soviets had, in fact, deployed nuclear missiles to East Germany briefly in 1959 and that some U.S. intelligence officials suspected as much before the Cuban missile crisis broke. A January 4, 1961 , memo from Hugh S. Cumming to the secretary of state, “Deployment of Soviet Medium Range Missiles in East Germany,” notes that a “special intelligence working group has recently prepared a report” which concluded that “as many as 200 mrbm ’s [medium range ballistic missiles] may have been moved into East Germany between 1958 and the fall of 1960 .” Yet this working group and its judgments never made it into the September 19, 1962 , Cuba Special National Intelligence Estimate. Nor did the possibility of a precedent-setting Soviet nuclear missile deployment to a satellite country appear to reach the president. In the October 22, 1962 , ExComm meeting, President Kennedy told his colleagues that no Soviet Eastern European satellite had nuclear weapons and that “this would be the first time the Soviet Union had moved these weapons outside their own” territory. Why the East German special intelligence report seems to have been unknown or disregarded by the estimating machine and its policymaking customers remains unclear.

3 James G. Blight and David A. Welch, “What Can Intelligence Tell Us about the Cuban Missile Crisis, and What can the Cuban Missile Crisis Tell Us about Intelligence?” Intelligence and National Security 13:3 (1998 ).

4 Raymond L. Garthoff, “U.S. Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Intelligence and National Security 13:3 (1998 ).

5  Nor did Khrushchev give any indications that something was afoot. The Soviets mounted a substantial denial and deception program to keep the deployment secret.

6 Marion Lloyd, “Soviets Close to Using A-Bomb in 1962 Crisis, Forum Is Told,” Boston Globe (October 13, 2002 ).

7 Roberta Wohlstetter, “Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight,” Foreign Affairs 43 (1964–65 ).

8 John McCone, Memorandum for the President (February 28, 1963 ). Reprinted in Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., cia Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis ( cia History Staff, October 1992 ).

9 James J. Wirtz, “Organizing for Crisis Intelligence: Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Intelligence and National Security 13:3 ( 1998 ).

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• Cuban Missile Crisis

Contextual Essay

Topic: How did the Cuban Missile Crisis affect the United States’ foreign policy in Cuba during the Cold War?

• Introduction

Despite the short geographical distance between the two countries, Cuba and the United States have had a complicated relationship for more than 150 years owing to a long list of historical events. Among all, the Cuban Missile Crisis is considered as one of the most dangerous moments in both the American and Cuban history as it was the first time that these two countries and the former Soviet Union came close to the outbreak of a nuclear war. While the Crisis revealed the possibility of a strong alliance formed by the former Soviet Union and Cuba, two communist countries, it also served as a reminder to U.S. leaders that their past strategy of imposing democratic ideology on Cuba might not work anymore and the U.S. needed a different approach. It was lucky that the U.S. was able to escape from a nuclear disaster in the end, how did the Cuban Missile Crisis affect the U.S. foreign policy in Cuba during the Cold War?

            To answer my research question, I searched on different academic databases related to Latin American studies, history, and political science. JSTOR, Hispanic American Historical Review, and Journal of American History were examples of databases that I used. I also put in keywords like “Cuban Missile Crisis,” “Cuba and the U.S.,” and “U.S. cold war foreign policy” to find sources that are related to my research focus. Furthermore, I have included primary and secondary sources that address the foreign policies the U.S. implemented before and after the Cuban Missile Crisis. In order to provide a more comprehensive picture of the impact of the Crisis on the U.S. foreign policy in Cuba, the primary sources used would include declassified CIA documents, government memos, photos, and correspondence between leaders. These sources would be the best for my project because they provided persuading first-hand information for analyzing the issue. I cut sources that were not trustworthy and did not relate to my topic. This research topic was significant because it reflected the period when Cuban-U.S. relations became more negative. By understanding the change in foreign policy direction after the Cuban Missile Crisis, we could gain a better understanding of the development of Cuban-U.S. relations since the Cold War. On top of that, it was also a chance for us to reflect upon the decision-making process and learn from the past. 

In my opinion, the Cuban Missile Crisis affected U.S. foreign policy in Cuba during the Cold War in three ways. First, the Crisis allowed the U.S. government to realize the importance of flexible and planned crisis management. Second, the Crisis reinforced the U.S. government’s belief in the Containment Policy. Third, the Crisis reminded the U.S. of the importance of multilateralism when it came to international affairs. 

In October 1962, the United States detected that the former Soviet Union had deployed medium-range missiles in Cuba. This discovery then led to a tense standoff that lasted for 13 days, which was later known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. In response to the Soviet Union’s action, the Kennedy administration quickly placed a “quarantine” naval blockade around Cuba and demanded the destruction of missile sites. [1] This decision was made carefully by the U.S. government because any miscalculation would lead to a nuclear war between Cuba, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. After weighing possible options, the former Soviet Union finally announced the removal of missiles for an American pledge not to reinvade Cuba. [2] On the other hand, the U.S. also agreed to secretly remove its nuclear missiles from Turkey in a separate deal. [3] The Crisis was then over and the three countries involved were able to escape from a detrimental nuclear crisis.

After World War II, the United States and the former Soviet Union began battling indirectly through a plethora of ways like propaganda, economic aid, and military coalitions. This was known as the period of the Cold War. [4] The Cuban Missile Crisis happened amid the Cold War then caused the escalation of tension between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Despite the removal of nuclear missiles by the U.S.S.R., Moscow still decided to upgrade the Soviet nuclear strike force. This decision allowed the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to further their nuclear arms race as a result. [5] The Cold War tensions only softened after the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was negotiated and signed by both superpowers. [6] Additionally, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. reflected upon the dangerous nuclear crisis and established the “Hotline” to reduce the possibility of war by miscalculation. [7]

• Crisis management

To begin, the success of solving the Cuban Missile Crisis has proven to the U.S. the importance of planning and flexibility when it came to crisis management with a tight time limit. This was supported by the CIA document “Major Consequences of Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba” and the Dillon group discussion paper “Scenario for Airstrike Against Offensive Missile Bases and Bombers in Cuba.” Rather than devoting to existing plans, the Kennedy administration came up with flexible plans. Depending on the potential reactions of Cuba towards different hypothetical scenarios of the United States’ response after the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, the CIA document listed several modes of blockade and warnings that the U.S. could use to avoid a nuclear war. [8] The CIA document also presented the meanings of different military strategies to the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and Cuba.[9] In addition, the Dillon group discussion paper included the advantages and disadvantages of using airstrikes against Cuba.[10] Not only did these documents reveal the careful planning process that the U.S. government underwent under a pressurized time limit, but they also allowed the U.S. government to realize the uncertainty in the U.S.-Cuban relations and the U.S.-Soviet relations. The U.S. would need to have flexible military plans prepared to protect itself from a similar crisis and to sustain harmonious relationships with the U.S.S.R. and Cuba in the long run.  

• Containment Policy

Furthermore, the Cuban Missile Crisis has allowed the U.S. government to reflect upon the extent of the application of the Containment Policy to prevent the spread of communism. Since the U.S. became a superpower after World War II, it seldom faced threat from countries that were close to its border. The Crisis then was an opportunity for the U.S. to learn that it was possible that itself could be trapped by the “containment policy” by other communist countries like the Soviet Union and Cuba. This could explain why the U.S. chose not to invade or attack Cuba but to compromise with the U.S.S.R. by trading nuclear missiles for those in Cuba, despite intended to actively suppress communism. [11]

As mentioned in the White House document, “two extreme views on the proper role of force in the international relations were wrong – the view which rejects force altogether as an instrument of foreign policy; and the view that force can solve everything,” the Crisis made the U.S. understand that forceful use of containment policy on communist countries might not work all the time. [12] The U.S. would need to change its focus and turn to other diplomatic strategies to better protect its national interest.

• Multilateralism

In addition, the success of solving the Cuban Missile Crisis allowed the United States to understand the importance of multilateralism when it came to international conflicts with communist countries. Amid the Crisis, the U.S. actively sought support from different countries. This was clearly noted in the CIA daily report “The Crisis USSR/Cuba” that many countries like Spain, France, and Venezuela showed public support for the U.S. quarantine blockade policy on Cuba.[13] On top of the support of other countries, the U.S. also sought justification of the quarantine through the Organization of American States and made good use of the United Nations to communicate with the Soviets on the size of the quarantine zone.[14] All these measures made it difficult for Moscow or Cuba to further escalate the Crisis or interpret American actions as a serious threat to their interests. With the clever use of multilateralism, the U.S. was able to minimize the danger of the Crisis smoothly before any escalation of tensions. This experience also served as a good resource for solving troubling diplomatic problems with Cuba or other communist countries in the future.

            In conclusion, the Cuban Missile Crisis has several effects on the United States’ foreign policy in Cuba during the Cold War. To begin, the success of solving the Cuban Missile Crisis has proven to the U.S. the importance of planning and flexibility when it came to crisis management with a tight time limit. Additionally, the Cuban Missile Crisis has allowed the U.S. government to reflect upon the extent of the application of the Containment Policy to prevent the spread of communism. Furthermore, the Cuban Missile Crisis provided the United States a chance to understand the importance of multilateralism when it came to solving international conflicts with communist countries. By understanding more about the effects that the Cuban Missile Crisis had on U.S. foreign policy in Cuba, we were able to realize the vulnerability and insecurity in Cuban-U.S. relations. This allowed us to gain a more diverse view of the causes of the conflicting U.S.-Cuban relations in the 20th and 21st centuries.

• Primary Sources (10-15 sources)

CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Major Consequences of Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba,” October 20, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621020cia.pdf.

CIA daily report, “The Crisis USSR/Cuba,” October 27, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621027%20The%20Crisis%20USSR-Cuba.pdf   

Dillon group discussion paper, “Scenario for Airstrike Against Offensive Missile Bases and Bombers in Cuba,” October 25, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621025dillon.pdf

White House, “Post Mortem on Cuba,” October 29, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621029mortem.pdf

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. “Cuban Missile Crisis,” Accessed February 25, 2020. https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/ .

The U-2 Plane. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19.jpg

October 5, 1962: CIA chart of “reconnaissance objectives in Cuba.”

Graphic from Military History Quarterly of the U.S. invasion plan, 1962.

CIA reference photograph of Soviet cruise missile in its air-launched configuration.

October 17, 1962: U-2 photograph of first IRBM site found under construction.

[1] “The Cold War,” JFK Library, accessed May 5, 2020, https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/the-cold-war .

[3] “Cuban Missile Crisis.” JFK Library. Accessed May 5, 2020. https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/cuban-missile-crisis.

[4]  “The Cold War,” JFK Library, accessed May 5, 2020, https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/the-cold-war .

[8] CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Major Consequences of Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba,” October 20, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621020cia.pdf .

[10] Dillon group discussion paper, “Scenario for Airstrike Against Offensive Missile Bases and Bombers in Cuba,” October 25, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621025dillon.pdf

[11] CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Major Consequences of Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba,” October 20, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621020cia.pdf .

[12]  White House, “Post Mortem on Cuba,” October 29, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621029mortem.pdf

[13] CIA daily report, “The Crisis USSR/Cuba,” October 27, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621027%20The%20Crisis%20USSR-Cuba.pd

[14] “TWE Remembers: The OAS Endorses a Quarantine of Cuba (Cuban Missile Crisis, Day Eight).” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed May 4, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/blog/twe-remembers-oas-endorses-quarantine-cuba-cuban-missile-crisis-day-eight.

Syllabus Edition

First teaching 2016

Last exams 2025

The Cuban Missile Crisis ( Edexcel GCSE History )

Revision note.

Was the Cuban Missile Crisis Inevitable? - Timeline & Summary

Why did the Cuban Missile Crisis Happen?

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a result of decades of tension between the USA and the Soviet Union

The causes of the Cuban Missile Crisis

Khrushchev decided to place nuclear weapons in Cuba because:

NATO had missiles pointing at the Soviet Union in Turkey . The Soviet Union wanted the USA to experience what this nuclear threat felt like. Khrushchev may have wanted the missiles removed from Turkey

Khrushchev was under political pressure in the Soviet Union. His colleagues saw him as a weak leader after the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 . A victory in Cuba could restore his power and reputation

The Soviet Union became increasingly worried about the military power of the USA . Khrushchev needed Cuba to remain communist to strengthen the Soviet Union

Kennedy's Options to Deal With Cuba

Missiles in Cuba worried the USA

Soviet missiles on Cuba had significant political consequences for the USA . The US government felt determined to stop the Soviet missiles from arriving in Cuba

The US Defence Secretary , Robert McNamara, told Kennedy that the Soviet missiles would become operational two weeks after their arrival . This gave Kennedy time pressure to make his decision about how to react to missiles in Cuba

What options did Kennedy have to deal with Cuba?

A concept map showing the three options available to the USA over the issue of Cuba in 1962

Before making a decision, Kennedy had to consider:

How the American public would react to missiles on Cuba. Little to no reaction by the US government could cause widespread panic in the USA

How his decision would affect election results. Elections for the US Congress were in November. If Kennedy failed to deal with the situation in Cuba effectively, it would damage the success of his political colleagues, the Democrats

The impact of his decision on other Cold War issues . Kennedy worried that a strong reaction to Cuba would encourage Khrushchev to become more aggressive over the issue of Berlin

Kennedy had limited options to deal with Cuba

The US government had already attempted an invasion of Cuba during the Bay of Pigs incident in 1961

Kennedy knew that this would be unpopular in Cuba and may cause a major conflict within the country.

Bombing Cuba would make the USA look aggressive

Depending on the bomb that the USA used, it could cause a significant number of civilian deaths in Cuba

The Cold War was a war of propaganda

Kennedy had to make the best decision that would not damage the USA's reputation internationally

The Thirteen Days, 16th- 28th October 1962

The 'Thirteen Days' refers to the period of 16th October to 28th October 1962

Between these 13 days, the world became the closest it had ever been to nuclear war

Kennedy made a series of decisions about how to deal with the missile sites in Cuba

What happened in the Thirteen Days?

A flow diagram showing the progression of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the Thirteen Days of 16th October to 28th October 1962

The Soviet ships' reluctance to break the naval blockade  of Cuba was a key moment in the Cuban Missile Crisis

Kennedy had prepared the US military to sink the Soviet ships. This would have triggered a war between the USA and the Soviet Union

The actions of the Soviet ships proved that the Soviet Union was unwilling to cause direct armed conflict with the USA

The events of the Thirteen Days shocked the world

Kennedy's announcement had warned the US public about the possibility of nuclear warfare if the Soviet ships ignored the blockade

Internationally, people became even more afraid of the threat of nuclear warfare

Students are often overwhelmed by the amount of events that happened in a short space of time in the Cuban Missile Crisis. This revision note displays these events in a flow diagram and in a timeline. This should help you visualise how one event triggered the next event to happen. Knowing the order of the events in the Thirteen Days is crucial if a question asks you to write a narrative account of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The Solution to the Cuban Missile Crisis

On 26th October, Khrushchev telegrammed Kennedy to resolve the issue of missiles in Cuba

He promised to remove the missile launch pads from Cuba if Kennedy promised not to invade the country

The next day (27th October), Kennedy received a further request from Khrushchev

Khrushchev added that he wanted the USA to remove the NATO missiles from Turkey

Kennedy's brother, Robert, secretly met with the Soviet ambassador in Washington

They verbally agreed to the removal of the US missiles in Turkey

The Hawks in the US government pressured Kennedy to go to war over Cuba

Kennedy refused to succumb to this pressure

By 28th October, Kennedy and Khrushchev had resolved the Cuban Missile Crisis

Kennedy agreed not to invade Cuba in return for the removal of the missile launch pads in the country

The US public had no knowledge of the removal of the US missiles in Turkey

Consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis on US-Soviet Relations

While both countries continued to threaten war, the Cuban Missile Crisis made the world safer

Khrushchev and Kennedy faced pressure from their government and the public to start a full-scale war with each other. They did not do this

The USA and the Soviet Union had more motivation to avoid a situation like the Cuban Missile Crisis from occurring again

Post-1962 agreements between the USA and the Soviet Union

The Cuban Missile Crisis had significant impacts on Kennedy and Khrushchev

Kennedy's popularity increased

The US public believed that Kennedy had dealt with the Cuban Missile Crisis effectively. Kennedy looked stronger as the removal of US missiles in Turkey was unknown to the public

Kennedy had stood up against the Hawks in his government. The Cuban Missile Crisis had proved that he was a strong leader

Kennedy gained more confidence in dealing with the Soviet Union

Khrushchev's popularity decreased

While Khrushchev interpreted the Cuban Missile Crisis as a success for the Soviet Union, his military did not. His government believed that Khrushchev had humiliated the country by withdrawing their missiles from Cuba

Leonid Brezhnev ousted Khrushchev from power in 1964  

Overall, US-Soviet relations improved

Worked Example

Explain one consequence of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

One consequence of the Cuban Missile Crisis was better regulation of nuclear weapons. The Cuban Missile Crisis had shown how dangerous the nuclear arms race had been. When the Soviet Union planned to place missiles on Cuba, it showed the US public the real threat of nuclear technology. If ICBMs had been placed in Cuba, the Soviet Union could have destroyed every major city in the USA. When nuclear war was avoided in 1962, it highlighted to the world the need to control the testing and production of nuclear weapons. For example, the Test Ban Treaty (August 1963) and The Outer Space Treaty (1967) restricted where nuclear weapons could be tested. This made the possibility of nuclear warfare between the USA and the Soviet Union less likely.

In this example, you can see the development of wider knowledge of the period. The example has linked the development of ICBMs to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The existence of this type of nuclear weapon is significant to understanding why the Cuban Missile Crisis increased tensions between the USA and the Soviet Union. This answer would not be effective if it only discussed ICBMs. The example is linked back to the consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the creation of the Test Ban Treaty (August 1963) and The Outer Space Treaty (1967) to help better regulate nuclear weapons.

This question has previously asked you to explain two consequences . In the Superpower Relations exam paper for 2025 , this question will ask you to explain one consequence. However, there will be two different "Explain one consequence of" questions, each worth four marks.

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Author: Zoe Wade

Zoe has worked in education for 10 years as a teaching assistant and a teacher. This has given her an in-depth perspective on how to support all learners to achieve to the best of their ability. She has been the Lead of Key Stage 4 History, showing her expertise in the Edexcel GCSE syllabus and how best to revise. Ever since she was a child, Zoe has been passionate about history. She believes now, more than ever, the study of history is vital to explaining the ever-changing world around us. Zoe’s focus is to create accessible content that breaks down key historical concepts and themes to achieve GCSE success.

Cuban Missile Crisis Management Essay

• To find inspiration for your paper and overcome writer’s block
• As a source of information (ensure proper referencing)
• As a template for you assignment

Introduction

Managing of cuban missile crisis, reference list.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a battle that arose between the United States, Cuba and Soviet Union in 1962. United States unsuccessful efforts to overthrow Cuban regime (Operation Mongoose) prompted Soviet to furtively erect bases in Cuba to provide medium and intermediate range of airborne nuclear artilleries to prove to the world its military supremacy.

The artilleries had a capability of striking continental America. The installation of missiles in Cuba was a Soviet mission done privately to facilitate surprise attack to continental America (White, 1997, p.69).

The US administration of the time believed that Moscow‘s activities in Cuba were a threat to International security, hence; the ballistic missiles deployed in Cuba enhanced a major security blow to the leadership of United States. To curb potential danger caused by the situation, John F. Kennedy effected strategies which proved useful in calming the situation

Managing the Cuban Missile Crisis was a complex issue by John F. Kennedy administration. Perhaps, the United States intelligence was convinced that Soviet would not succeed in installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. However, this was not the case; the Soviet had gone ahead and installed the missiles without prior knowledge of United States security intelligent.

To mitigate the risk, the Kennedy administration discussed various options to reduce the likelihood of a full blown crisis. Mitigation measures adopted included; military, quarantine and diplomacy among other measures

The John Kennedy administration embraced using military to designate Missile sites in Cuba by using military prowess. United States Military interventions were well developed thus the Kennedy administration found it easy to order posting to strategic sites on the Atlantic Ocean. Besides, the Army, marine, and navy had a tough program if they were not engaged; they were systematically ordered to the sea (White, 1997, p.79).

Concentrated air monitoring in Atlantic was instigated, tracking more than 2,000 foreign ships in the area. The government was determined in case the Soviet Union launched nuclear assault; United States military was standby to answer.

Beginning 20th October, 1962, The United States’ Strategic Air Command began diffusing its aircraft, fully equipped on an upgraded alert. According to White (1997, p.109), heavy aircraft such as B-52 began a significant aerial vigilance that involved 24 hour flights and instant standby response for every aircraft that landed.

Besides, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile troops assumed analogous vigilant authority. Moreover, the POLARIS submarines were deployed to reassigned locations in the sea bordering United States and Cuba. The supreme nuclear weapons of Kennedy administration were installed to forestall any hasty battle poised by the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Divine (1998,p.97) points out that United States air defense troops, under the operational control of North America Defense Command, were also organized. Combatant interceptors, NIKE-HERCULES and HAWK missile hordes, were tactically relocated to southeast part to enhance local air defense (White, 1997, p.118).

The John Kennedy constituted its Air Force, Army and Navy in October. When command organizations were officially constituted, the Commander in Chief Atlantic was chosen to lead the team and provide a unified authority.

The John F. Kennedy administration implemented all these plans through the Joint Chiefs of Staff who later named Chief of Naval Operations to administer all necessary actions and subsequent execution.

Military intervention instituted by John Kennedy administration deterred Soviet Union intention of installing Missile center in Cuba of which would have posed a serious threat not only to America but entire America’s continent (Divine, 1998, p.123).

The John F. Kennedy administration imposed a quarantine to exert more pressure on Soviet Union with a view of subverting possible war. This was one of the flexible methods unlike others that US government embraced. Quarantine was aimed at constraining buildup of offensive military weapons en-route to Cuba.

To thoroughly execute the strategy, all kinds of ships en-route to Cuba from whichever country or port were scrutinized to confirm the presence of aggressive artilleries. Byrne (2006, p.29) explains that if toxic artillery were located, the ship was forced to unwind the voyage or risk being confiscated.

This quarantine was stretched to other kinds of cargoes and carriers. Quarantine provided more opportunity to Soviet Union to reconsider their position and destroy all offensive military apparatus in Cuba. Quarantine was believed as a precise strategy in solving the Cuban Missile Crisis because, the US government thought that it will be easier to start with a limited steps towards stringent measures for implementation (Byrne, 2006, p 86).

Though it started at a low pace, it exerted more pressure on Soviet Union thus yielding to United States demands. This proved to be an effective strategy. Soviet Union sentiment was that United States was contravening international law.

However, it was hard for the Soviet to test the applicability of this strategy. They knew if they dare rise the situation at hand would become even worse. The Soviets acknowledged installing missiles in Cuba to secure it against the US invasion. The Kennedy administration accordingly accepted to invade Cuba.

John Kennedy and ExComm (John F. advisers) team prodded every probable diplomatic system to truncate a nuclear holocaust. The Cuban Missile Crisis deepened diplomatic relations between the United States and Soviet Union with a choice of evading more emergency or perhaps war.

According to Byrne (2006, p.125), Kennedy himself was skillful and embraced compulsion to gain a diplomatic success. He sustained emphasis upon Khrushchev vehemently but adeptly. Potency was used shrewdly by Kennedy administration as a powerful, discreet component to urge Soviets cede the plan without embarrassment. His persistence was unwavering.

United States and the Soviet exchanged letters and intensified communication both formal and informal. The Soviet through Khrushchev dispatched letters to Kennedy administration explaining the circumstances of Missiles in Cuba and peaceful intention of Soviet Union.

Further, diplomatic efforts were strengthened by more letters from Soviet Union explaining the intent of dismantling the missile installations in Cuba and subsequent personnel relocation. This was only after United States dismantled its missile it had installed in Italy and Turkey.

Kennedy’s respond to crisis diplomacy is lauded as a contributory factor which barred the Cuban Missile Crisis resulting in nuclear conflict.

Byrne (2006, p.132) alleges that, if Kennedy’s responses were altered, it would have led to another world war. hence his diplomatic finesse succeeded in convincing Soviet Union to dismantle its Missiles in Cuba under United Nations supervision whereas the honoring its commitment in removing its missile installations in the continental Europe.

John F. Kennedy administration amicably responded to Cuban Missile Crisis in an effective way. Measures undertaken such as; military intervention, quarantine and skillful diplomacy necessitated subversion of the crisis.

Failure of which would have resulted in another World War. Besides, the plans facilitated the Kennedy administration to effectively prove to the world it was capable of handling similar magnitude of threats to enhance world peace and security.

Byrne, P. J. (2006). The Cuban Missile Crisis: To the Brink of War , Minneapolis: Compass Point Books

Divine, R. A. (1988). The Cuban Missile Crisis. New Jersey: Markus Wiener Publishers

White, M. J. (1997). Missiles In Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro, And The 1962 Crisis , Texas: University of Texas

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The Cuban Missile Crisis Essay

The Cuban Missile Crisis The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war. The crisis was a major confrontation between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The confrontation was caused by the Soviets putting missiles in Cuba , just 90 miles off the coast of the United States of America. The world was in the hands of President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khruchchev. These two men would have to reach a compromise or else the results would be fatal. During the cold war John F. Kennedy and the Soviet premier met to discuss the was between the east and west but they resolved nothing and Khrushchev left thinking that Kennedy was a weak leader. The Soviets …show more content…

Kennedy was informed the the missiles that very same day and his advisors told him that they wanted an air strike followed by an invasion put up in Cuba. Kennedy knew that if the US invaded the Soviets would use their missiles. On one of the following days, Kennedy asked if the Air Force could take out all of the missiles in Cuba. The Air Force then told the President that with that process there would be 10-20,000 civilian casualties. Kennedy then decided to set up a blockade around Cuba. US ships prepared for a quarantine. The press then learned about the nuclear missles and questioned them about it, the President asked the reporters not to reveal the news so he could announce it to the American people on TV. The Soviets had instrustion to launch the missiles within minutes of Kennedy’s speech. After Castro listened to the President’s speech he moblized all of Cuba’s military forces. The Organization of American States approved the US quarantine of Cuba and by the end of the day the US ships were in line and were prepared to destroy and ship that failed to stop at that line. On Wednesday, October 24th the Soviets ships approached the quarantine line. Soviets ship stopped when they received a radio message from Moscow. On Thursday, October 25th the Military alert was raised to DEFCON 2, the highest ever in US history. At any moment the US could launch an attack on Cuba or the

Pros And Cons Of Brinkmanship During The Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis all started in October, 1962, when an American spy plane spotted and secretly photographed missile sites being built on the island of Cuba by the Soviet Union. President Kennedy did not tell the Soviet Union right away that we had found their nuclear missile site. But days later, President Kennedy meet secretly with his advisors to discuss the situation. President Kennedy and his advisors though long and hard about what to do and the finally came up with an idea. Kennedy decided to put a naval blockade around the island of Cuba. The purpose of this was so Cuba could not get anymore military supplies for the Soviet Union. President Kennedy demanded that the missiles that were already there be disabled and that the sit be destroyed. Later on, Kennedy told America what was happening on a televised address. Everyone was anxious about what the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, would say about the naval blockade. But both President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev recognized that the devastation that a nuclear war will bring is too much.

The Pros And Cons Of The Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis began October 16, 1962. It was at the height of the Cold War that this potentially lethal confrontation arose between the United States and the Soviet Union. A United States reconnaissance plane discovered a military stockpile of Soviet nuclear missiles and bombers in Cuba. Some historians point out that Khrushchev's real intention in deploying the missiles into Cuba was to control West Berlin. They would be used in this context as a sufficient reason for the Western powers (The USA, UK, and France) to allow him to achieve his plan. However, The government of Washington, along with President John F. Kennedy at its head, believed this to be a threat and was not willing to tolerate such a threat so close to home.

Americans and Cubans Approaches to the Platt Amendment

On October 15, 1962, a photograph proved the existence of the missile being constructed on Cuba, and for the U.S., the nightmare began. After a week of intense debating with his closest advisors, President Kennedy made a decision. He decided to impose quarantine, of sorts, around Cuba to ensure there were no more missiles arriving. The Soviet Union demanded the

The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Minute Towards Countdown

People on both sides wondered if this would cause World War III. On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy appeared on national television to speak about the crisis; the people need to know what was going on directly (Edwards, 9). President Kennedy said the missiles stationed in Cuba could strike Washington, DC, or the Panama Canal. They could also strike Cape Canaveral, Florida, or Mexico City; nowhere in the US was safe. He explicated that he warned Cuba not to strike any American cities; this meant cities in Central American and South America, too (Edwards, 9). President Kennedy also shared with the American people his plan of surrounding Cuba with the US Navy. Now, it was just a matter a

How Did Kennedy Handled The Cuban Missile Crisis

He revealed the evidence of Soviet missiles in Cuba and how he called for their removal. During Kennedy’s speech he “imposed a naval blockade on Cuba and declared that any missile launched from Cuba would warrant a full-scale retaliatory attack by the United States against the Soviet Union” (Cuban Missile Crisis). Until the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle the missile sites, there should be no additional missiles shipped to Cuba. On day eight the ships of the naval quarantine fleet move into place around Cuba. Soviet submarines threaten the quarantine by moving into the Caribbean area. In the evening Robert Kennedy meets with Ambassador Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy. After the quarantine is endorsed, President Kennedy asks Khrushchev to halt any Russian ships heading toward Cuba. On day nine Chairman Khrushchev replies to President Kennedy's October 23 letter and states that he thinks Kennedy is trying to threaten him or Kennedy will use force. Day ten Kennedy knows that some missiles in Cuba are now operational and this pushes JFK to personally draft a letter to Khrushchev again urging him to change the course of events. Day eleven more photographic evidence is found showing accelerated construction of the missile sites. In a private letter, Fidel Castro urges Nikita Khrushchev to initiate a nuclear first strike against the United States in the event of an American invasion

John F Kennedy: America's Greatest President

There was a suspicious report that there was a nuclear threat from Soviet that might've been based on Cuba with missiles aiming to bomb America. On 29 August President John F. Kennedy ordered periodic flights over to Cuba by high-speed, high-altitude U-2 spy planes. A quote that relates and explains more about this is "Although U-2 flights through 7 October showed Soviet antiaircraft missile (SAM) sites under construction and the introduction of Soviet-built patrol boats, they turned up no hard evidence of offensive missile sites or introduction of such missiles" (The Cold War Continued: The Cuban Missile Crisis). The evidence shows that the prior statement confirms Kennedy's swift action to protect the safety of the American people. This led Kennedy to send forces to examine if Cuba actually had missiles; which they didn't. He always made sure that this country was protected. His priorities was straight and he knew exactly what had to be

How Did The Cold War Turn Hot

invaded the Bay of Pigs in April of 1961. The two nations decided to place nuclear missiles in Cuba to stop further advances from the United States. President Kennedy and ExCom decided that missiles being in Cuba was unacceptable, so the decision was made to deploy a naval blockade around Cuba to prevent the Soviet Union from sending more missiles and other military equipment to Cuba, and JFK issued an ultimatum that the missiles needed to be removed or military force would be used. On October 22nd, 1962 President Kennedy notified the American public about the presence of missiles in Cuba, explained the blockade, and assured the citizens that the U.S. Military was prepared to neutralize the threat to the nation. Two days later the Soviet Union ships attempted to break through the Naval blockade, but stopped just short of the barrier.

John F Kennedy's Quarantine

President John F. Kennedy yesterday ordered a naval Quarantine of Cuba. Such measures are to be put in place in order to prevent any further Soviet Missiles reaching Cuban shores. The quarantine comes after the U.S. recently discovered the existence of missile sites and launch pads in Cuba that, although seemed to be not yet operational would soon harbour the ability to fire at American shores. This announcement came as a shock to many as the possibility of a nuclear war has now arisen. The world will today be waiting on the result of the quarantine knowing that the fate of America rests solely on the success of the quarantine. President Kennedy condemned the course of action undertaken by the soviets referring to it as a ‘clandestine, reckless,

Fidel Castro's Role in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

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It is evident that the US had been flagrantly deceived. Then Kennedy called for a naval blockade of Cuba. Kennedy used political negotiations with Khrushchev to come to an agreement in the removal of the weapons. Throughout negotiations, there were incidents that occurred which amplified tensions. Such as on the noon of October 27th, a U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba. In those moments, both the US and the Soviet Union assumed that it was Castro who commanded the fire of low-flying U.S. planes on October 27th. Although Castro had certainly commanded Cuban antiaircraft artillery to fire, there is no indication that he had also ordered Soviet artillery to fire. Another occurrence is Castro’s letter to Khrushchev insisting that the Soviet Union should launch a first-strike nuclear attack on the United States.

Cuban Missile Crisis Essay examples

• 6 Works Cited

In 1962, Cuba was convinced that the USA was planning to attack them and asked the Soviet Union for military assistance. The USSR sent Cuba materials to build missile bases and launch sites. When President Kennedy realized that Cuba could launch missiles into America, he demanded that the USSR remove its weapons and troops. The Americans formed a naval blockade as the world stood nervously on the edge of a nuclear war. The USSR removed its weapons despite protests from Cuban leader Fidel Castro.

John F Kennedy Assassination

The photographs were shown to Kennedy two days later on October 16, and a general consensus was reached by the president and his committee that the missile sites being built in Cuba by the U.S.S.R were offensive in nature and therefore posed an immediate nuclear threat to the United States and its Allies. President John F. Kennedy faced a major dilemma: if he gave the authorization for the United States to attack the sites, it may have lead to a global nuclear conflict with the U.S.S.R., but if he did nothing then the United states would be confronted with the greatly increased threat from the medium range nuclear missiles, as well as the United states would appear to the rest of the world to be less committed to the defence of the western hemisphere. In late October 1962, president Kennedy authorized a quarantine of all offencive weapon imports bound for Cuba, which lead to the U.S.S.R. backing down and removing the missile sites from Cuba. The implementation of the blockade effectively blocked the installment of the medium range missiles, and eventually helped lead to the the Nuclear test ban treaty, and resulted in one of JFK’s many great achievements as

Argumentative Essay On The Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the only devastating event in U.S. to ever bring the country into DEFCON-2. Ever since World War 2, the U.S. and the Soviet Union have been rivals(Jeffery, Riley, 4). The Soviets later aligned themselves with the small country of Cuba. It is a small piece of land in enemy territory, but it is very important to them because they have to protect their allies at all times. For this reason, The USSR placed missiles in Cuba to keep them prepared for an invasion. In 1962, The two huge superpowers brought the Cold War to a nuclear crisis in Cuba which led to DEFCON-2, the closest point to a nuclear war(The Choices Program)

Realist Perpective on the Cuban Missile Crisis Essay

In October of 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union reached a near-nuclear experience when in a short fourteen days; Russia was caught building nuclear missile bases in Cuba. With the Second World War just barely in the past, the United States was still on their toes making sure they were in the clear. When they sent the U-2 spy plane to monitor Cuba they found missile bases that were armed and ready to wipe out the western hemisphere. Considering the military, economy, and diplomacy of the U.S., Kennedy could take no chances.

How To Solve The Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a 13-day political and military standoff occurring in October of 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis came about after the Bay of Pigs. Krushchev gave Castro some of the Soviet military equipment to avoid a follow-up American invasion of Cuba causing Americans to become alarmed. In September 1962, the Soviets said they had no intention of placing nuclear missiles in Cuba; which was a lie. The Cuban Missile Crisis was over the installation of nuclear-armed soviet missiles on Cuba, just 90 miles away from U.S. shores. This tense political and military standoff include leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. On October 22, 1962 president John F. Kennedy told Americans about the missiles, he also explained his decision to enact a naval blockade around Cuba and he also made it clear that the United States would use military force if needed.

What Are The Causes Of The Cuban Missile Crisis

A 13-day political and military standoff on October 1962 over the installation of nuclear armed Soviet missiles on Cuba, just 90 miles from U.S. shores was the Cuban Missile Crisis. The US responded after news that Cuba obtained nuclear power the US performed a naval blockade making it clear that the US was prepared to use military force to neutralize the threat if necessary. Huge tensions were created because of this as the idea of a nuclear war was very possible. Both superpowers the US and USSR wanted more nuclear capabilities than the other and were reluctant to give out their advantage over. However through the enormous tensions that were built up both sides managed to make a deal. Khrushchev sent a message to Kennedy in which he offered

Related Topics

• Cuban Missile Crisis
• Soviet Union
• Nikita Khrushchev
• John F. Kennedy

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Analysis of The Cuban Missile Crisis

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mch, vol. 9, no. 1

Historiographical essay, the cuban missile crisis at 60, where do we stand.

by William M. Morgan, PhD

https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2023090103

PRINTER FRIENDLY PDF ePub Audiobook

During the past 60 years, our understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis has evolved from the initial portrayal of the situation as an American victory achieved by brilliant crisis management by John F. Kennedy and his advisors to a more deeply researched and nuanced description of a dangerous draw reached only after misconceptions, miscalculation, last-minute compromise, and good luck.

Pro-Kennedy insider accounts dominated early writings. Kennedy’s confidante and speechwriter, Theodore C. Sorensen, quickly produced a vivid biography of 781 pages a year and a half after the president’s assassination. In 1965, renowned historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., a special assistant in the White House, used more than 1,100 pages to describe the “Thousand Days” of Kennedy’s tenure. The journalist Elie Abel’s popular history emerged from background interviews with insiders. The classic insider account was Robert Kennedy’s Thirteen Days , drafted to boost his presidential bid and heavily edited by Sorenson for publication after Robert Kennedy’s 1968 assassination. These early writings portrayed a heroic president and his brother making the aggressive Soviets back down. This image still lives in the public mind, though few living Americans know much about the crisis. 1

A second wave of “insider” writings appeared from the 1970s, less devoted to polishing the Kennedy legacy but still claiming victory. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and others produced memoirs. On the Soviet side, Nikita Khrushchev’s posthumous memoirs, though self-serving, provided the first glimpse of Soviet internal politics. 2 A 1971 blockbuster by political scientist Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis , a blending of factual narrative and analytical theory, dominated the literature of the 1970s and, via a 1999 rewrite with historian Philip Zelikow, remains an important study. 3

The 1980s saw the emergence of new U.S. and Soviet sources. The discovery of Kennedy’s White House taping system initiated the slow but steady release of transcripts through the supposedly final batch, released in 2004. Transcripts of the meetings of the executive committee of the National Security Council, the president’s hand-picked secret advisory group, hugely illuminated the administration’s debate of options. 4 Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost policy led to the first documentary releases from Soviet archives. The end of the Cold War accelerated the flow of information from the Russian side. A series of international conferences of crisis participants as well as scholars began in the late 1980s, initially between Russians and Americans, with Cubans, including Fidel Castro, soon joining. Not only did participants provide startling and previously unknown detail, such as the presence of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons on the island, but their accounts were often accompanied by supporting documents. 5

By the late 1990s, much more information became available. On the U.S. side, the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volumes for the Kennedy administration appeared, as well as other material declassified by the 1967 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process initiated by scholars and organizations such as the National Security Archive of George Washington University and the Cold War International History Project of the Wilson Center. Russian archives opened a bit, and former Soviet officials and military officers published memoirs. During the past 10–20 years, scholars digested the new information, which has continued to emerge, albeit slowly.

Recent scholarly writing falls into two categories: overviews and specialized monographs. The earliest overviews of the crisis focused on the famous “Thirteen Days” from Kennedy learning of the missiles in Cuba on 16 October through Khrushchev’s letter on 28 October announcing he would withdraw the missiles. Recent overviews have become increasingly detailed and more nuanced, tending to see the crisis not as an American victory but as, simultaneously, a lucky draw and a near-catastrophe. Two fresh overviews exemplify the trend. The late Martin J. Sherwin’s Gambling with Armageddon nested the Cuban Missile Crisis in post–World War II American nuclear policy and included the latest archival discoveries. Harvard professor Serhii Plokhy burrowed into the unit histories and officer memoirs of the Soviet forces sent to Cuba in Nuclear Folly . Many of these units had been based in Ukraine and had many Ukrainian soldiers. Because Ukrainian records were more accessible than archives in Moscow, Plokhy filled in some blank areas in the historical record. 6

Targeted studies of underexamined aspects of the crisis dove deeper into precrisis events such as the Bay of Pigs (April 1961), the Khrushchev-Kennedy summit in Vienna (June 1961), and the 1961 Berlin Wall confrontation, all of which shaped the subsequent approaches of both Khrushchev and Kennedy during the 1962 crisis. Scholars also surveyed the impact of domestic/internal factors on Khrushchev’s motivations to deploy the missiles and Kennedy’s resolve that the missiles be removed. Lastly, they cast new light on the difficult post-crisis Soviet-American and Soviet-Cuban negotiations over implementing the general commitments of Kennedy and Khrushchev.

Origins of the Crisis

Recent scholarship has explored—even back to the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration—four shaping factors (political atmospherics) that made the October 1962 crisis so dangerous. One powerful shaping factor was fierce high technology competition with the Soviet Union that increased dramatically with the Sputnik launches in 1957. Americans feared the United States had fallen behind in the high technology field, and disastrous attempts to quickly catch up, such as the Vanguard satellite-carrying missile that exploded on the launch pad in early 1958, enhanced the feeling of inferiority. Consequently, both Eisenhower and Kennedy accelerated satellite and manned mission programs. The Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) programs were already underway but received even more resources. Most importantly, as Philip Nash noted in his outstanding monograph The Other Missiles of October , the Sputnik launches triggered the deployment of American intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to Europe to “restore U.S. strategic credibility in post-Sputnik alliance politics” by restoring Allied confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. This deployment proved a crucial causal building block in the eventual 1962 crisis. Sixty Thor missiles went to Britain, 30 Jupiters to Italy, and 15 Jupiters to Turkey. 7

A second shaping factor was the myth of the nuclear missile gap, a key issue in the 1960 presidential election. According to the myth, the United States lagged the Soviet Union in ICBMs and strategic bombers. Better intelligence in 1961–62, much aided by the first generation of reconnaissance satellites, proved that rather than a gap, the United States had a decisive advantage in strategic weapons. A widely publicized speech in October 1962 by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric destroyed the myth, but while it lasted, it intensified Soviet-American tensions and contributed to the U.S. deployment of missiles in Europe. 8

A third shaping factor was more than a century of contentious U.S.-Cuba relations, culminating in the Communist revolution that brought Castro to power in December 1958. Castro’s seizure of American oil companies and other corporations in Cuba and his harsh repression of dissent convinced U.S. officials that he was unpredictable and possibly dangerous. 9

A final shaping factor was the impact of internal politics on the leaders of both countries, and their mutual ignorance of each other’s problems. Khrushchev did not understand Kennedy’s determination not to look weak, either to Khrushchev or to the American people. Led by Republican New York senator Kenneth B. Keating, domestic critics claimed Kennedy’s Cuban policy was timid. They pointed to the Bay of Pigs failure, the lack of progress at the Vienna summit, and the building of the Berlin Wall as signs of weakness. Cuba was Kennedy’s domestic Achilles heel. For the first two years of his presidency, Kennedy enjoyed significant Democratic majorities. If he misplayed Cuban policy, his Democratic party might lose seats, perhaps even its majority, in the November 1962 midterm elections. Khrushchev knew and cared little about Kennedy’s political struggles.

For their part, Kennedy and his advisors ignored Khrushchev’s domestic troubles. His much-touted agricultural reform program foundered. Despite some successes in space, Russia’s ICBM program was grossly inferior in quality and numbers. Soviet missiles were liquid fueled, a process which took several hours. The fueled missiles could only remain launch-ready for a couple of days because the toxic fuel eroded the tanks. The missiles had to be defueled and taken off alert. By contrast, the American Minuteman ICBM and Polaris SLBM used inert solid fuel and were always prepared to launch. Moreover, the Soviets had far fewer ICBMs. Khrushchev implemented a big shakeup in the ICBM program, but even his hand-picked advisors told him it would be years before the Soviets could match U.S. missile technology or ICBM numbers. Lastly, Khrushchev had few diplomatic successes; he needed a win.

Four Precrisis Events Worsen Tensions

Besides broad shaping forces, four events worsened tensions and made the 1962 crisis more likely. First was the May 1960 shoot-down over the Soviet Union of an American Lockheed U-2 piloted by Captain Francis Gary Powers. Because the Soviets produced both wreckage and, miraculously, a live pilot, they reaped a huge propaganda windfall. The incident ruined a Geneva meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev and scuttled a promised Eisenhower visit to the USSR. Thus, Kennedy took office amid strained bilateral relations. 10

A second event was the inept Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961. From 1961 to the present, scholars and policymakers alike have judged the Bay of Pigs as a major error by Kennedy, who failed to think through the plan or challenge its faulty assumptions. While all scholars have seen the episode as a failure, pro-Kennedy insiders like Sorensen and Schlesinger asserted that Kennedy inherited a flawed invasion plan from the Eisenhower administration, and so the blame for failure should be spread around. Their interpretation persisted until quite recently. In his excellent recent study, Irwin Gellman demonstrated that although Eisenhower approved limited training of exiles as early as March 1960, he never approved or ordered an amphibious assault plan for Cuba. The final, failed plan—chiefly a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) product—emerged during the first months of the Kennedy administration. Kennedy never liked the CIA plan and watered it down a bit (which decreased its already minimal chances for success), but in bad judgment let the invasion proceed to its tragic end. 11

For Khrushchev and Castro, the Bay of Pigs fiasco strengthened their belief that the United States intended to topple the Castro regime. Khrushchev thought that Kennedy was young, inexperienced, and weak, unable to control all the elements of his government, especially the military and intelligence organizations. For Kennedy, the failed invasion soured his trust in the CIA and to a lesser extent his military advisors. He soon replaced CIA director Allen W. Dulles with John A. McCone and forced the resignation of Air Force lieutenant general Charles P. Cabell, the agency deputy director, and Richard Bissell, the deputy director for plans.

Third, the June 1961 Vienna summit gave the leaders powerful but skewed personal impressions of each other. They committed to the summit soon after Kennedy’s inauguration, despite Khrushchev’s anger at the Bay of Pigs debacle. In a masterful chapter in his book Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century , David Reynolds concluded that Khrushchev did not want a crisis over Berlin in the summer of 1961. Rather, he hoped to use Berlin as a lever to obtain a broader settlement of German issues. 12 Kennedy sought to convince Khrushchev of the reasonableness of the American position. Each man thought if he “played it tough, the other man would come around. Each had fundamental blind spots about his adversary.” 13 Kennedy expected Khrushchev to be rational, open to argument. But he encountered a rigid ideologue for whom the Berlin issue was vital. For his part, Khrushchev discovered that Kennedy would not be pushed around at the summit table, but he did not completely rid himself of his presummit impression of Kennedy as young and inexperienced, someone who might flinch under certain circumstances. 14

For some years, it was thought that Kennedy lost the Vienna summit, partly because of his later lament to journalist Joseph Alsop that Khrushchev had rolled right over him. Unprepared for Khrushchev’s rants, Kennedy felt postsummit that he had looked weak. But in reality, he made no concessions, as the State Department summary of the 4 June meeting makes clear. 15 Indeed, as Martin J. Sherwin explains, Kennedy revamped American foreign and security policies to demonstrate strength to Khrushchev. The president emphasized support for West Berlin in tough speeches, warning that any attempt to block access to West Berlin would be confronted: “The NATO shield was long ago extended to cover West Berlin—and we have given our word that an attack on that city will be regarded as an attack upon us all.” 16 He obtained from Congress blanket authority to mobilize Reserve and National Guard units. Presummit, there had been discussion of pulling the obsolete Jupiters out of Turkey and replacing their deterrent value with a Polaris ballistic missile submarine in the eastern Mediterranean. But postsummit, Kennedy agreed with the State-NATO-DOD recommendation that withdrawal “might seem a sign of weakness” given Khrushchev’s hard line at Vienna. Kennedy let construction proceed on the launch sites. The first site, manned by Americans, became operational in March 1962. In a peculiar coincidence, after Turkish technicians completed training in the United States, the Turks assumed control of the first launch site on 22 October 1962, the day of Kennedy’s naval quarantine speech. 17

The contentious Berlin Wall dispute constituted the fourth milestone event. In 1949, Britain, France, and the United States merged their occupation zones into the Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany. It became fully sovereign on 5 May 1955 and joined NATO four days later. Khrushchev wanted East Germany, set up in 1949 in response, to have the same control inside its borders as West Germany now had. As revealed in Frederick Kempe’s deeply researched monograph, Berlin 1961 , and in Hope Harrison’s nuanced article, Khrushchev was under great pressure from Walter Ulbricht, the East German leader. East Germany’s Communist economy steadily lost ground to that of West Germany. Young, talented, and educated East Germans fled to the West by passing through East Berlin into West Berlin and then onward to West Germany via the air and ground corridors permitted to the Western powers. From 1945 to 1961, approximately 2.8–4 million people, perhaps 1 in 6 East Germans, escaped to the West. This immense brain drain hindered the economy and was an embarrassing example of the poor conditions in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. To curb the exodus, Khrushchev allowed the East Germans to build a wall through the city. Harrison concluded that “the Wall, although proposed by Ulbricht, ended up being Khrushchev’s compromise solution for preserving East Germany while not provoking the West.” 18

Though most scholars have praised Kennedy’s handling of Berlin, Kempe criticizes his actions. Well aware of the brain drain problem, in late July 1961, Kennedy told his advisor, Walt Rostow, that Khrushchev might use “perhaps a wall” to curb the refugee flow, but he did not intend to prevent it. He could get NATO to defend West Berlin, he said, but not the eastern part of the city. 19 Kempe judges Kennedy’s Berlin policy as weak and inept: “As the Cuban Crisis would later show, Kennedy’s inaction in Berlin only encouraged greater Soviet misbehavior.” 20 He criticizes Kennedy for signaling that West Berlin was the main concern, thereby freeing Khrushchev to use the wall to cut off East Berlin and stem the outflow. 21

His criticism is overdone. He is probably correct that when Democratic Arkansas senator J. William Fulbright said in a July 1961 television interview that the East Germans had a right to close the Berlin border and Kennedy did not repudiate the statement, Khrushchev was reassured that the Americans would not react. That is not quite the same as signaling. It is also likely that this was a rare occasion when Khrushchev read Kennedy—and probable American policy—correctly. More importantly, what was Kennedy’s prudent alternative? Soviet and East German forces heavily outnumbered American forces isolated in the middle of East Germany. Resupplying U.S. forces in combat would have been virtually impossible. The Soviet Army was dominant in conventional forces. U.S.-NATO war plans for Berlin relied on the use of nuclear weapons. Compared to the disaster that would have resulted from a Soviet-American nuclear shooting war over Berlin, accepting the wall was a wise if distasteful course of action.

Why Did Khrushchev Send Nuclear Weapons to Cuba?

While the roots of the crisis lay in previous years, the famous 13 days began on 16 October, when National Security advisor McGeorge Bundy told Kennedy—in his pajamas and reading the morning papers in his bedroom—that a U-2 flight discovered strategic missiles in Cuba. For decades, a central question has been “Why did Khrushchev send strategic nuclear missiles to Cuba?” As Kennedy wrote to Khrushchev during the crisis, “The step which started the current chain of events was the action of your government secretly furnishing offensive weapons to Cuba.” 22

Regarding Khrushchev’s motives, several explanations are common in the literature. 23 There were several significant possible motives.

• A desire to partially rectify the strategic missile imbalance. The Soviet Union was grossly inferior to the United States in strategic weaponry, possessing only a few dozen missiles that could reach the United States from Soviet bases, and some of those were unready. However, the western Soviet Union held more than 500 intermediate and medium-range missiles that could reach most European targets. Placing some of those in Cuba would double or triple the number of warheads that could reach the United States, though even that amount paled compared to the 1962 American arsenal. Khrushchev had reorganized his missile development teams and, within 10 years, the Soviets would catch up in the ICBM race; but the impatient premier did not want to wait.
• A guarantee of Cuban defense. Khrushchev believed—more strongly than his KGB analysts—that the United States intended to invade Cuba in the near term. After all, the United States had cut diplomatic relations with Cuba, applied sanctions, and attempted the Bay of Pigs invasion. Though Khrushchev did not know the details of Operation Mongoose (November 1961), the CIA program to topple or kill Castro, there were clear signs of an American clandestine program. And the United States held large military exercises for a possible invasion, including a 1962 exercise in the Caribbean to remove a dictator called Ortsac (Castro spelled backward). Khrushchev was personally fond of Castro, whose spirit reminded him of his own revolutionary youth.
• A risky gamble to secure a badly needed win. There was grumbling in the top ranks of the Soviet Communist party. Khrushchev’s much-touted agricultural reforms had collapsed. He failed to cow Kennedy over Berlin. His ICBM program was a shambles. After Gilpatric’s speech destroyed the myth of the missile gap, Khrushchev lost that intimidating diplomatic lever. And inside Cuba, supporters of Beijing’s Communist model seemed on the rise. Castro exiled Anibal Escalante, the pro-Soviet executive secretary of the Cuban revolutionary party. Che Guevara, who urged hemisphere-wide Maoist-style insurgency programs, was on the rise. Khrushchev needed something to rebuild his prestige and influence.
• A trade for American Jupiter missiles in Turkey. To Khrushchev, the Jupiters were much more an emotional issue than a strategic one. Fifteen obsolete and vulnerable rockets hardly contributed to the USSR’s strategic inferiority. Rather, their deployment was an insult to Khrushchev’s sense of self-respect—an insult he frequently mentioned to colleagues during the creation of the nuclear arms package. He sought a tit-for-tat payback, calling it “throwing a hedgehog down Uncle Sam’s pants,” forcing Kennedy to accept a deployment close to home, just as Khrushchev endured. As Philip Nash pointed out in his definitive study of the Jupiter deployments, at the Vienna summit Khrushchev strongly displayed his dislike of hostile missiles on Soviet borders. After Vienna, Khrushchev embraced an analogy: if the Americans could put missiles in Turkey and he had to accept that fact, surely Kennedy would have to accept the fact of Soviet missiles in Cuba. 24 Though understandable, the false analogy led him to ignore Kennedy’s fear of appearing weak and his consequent insistence on the removal of the missiles.
• A trump card to trade for a Western withdrawal from Berlin. At the beginning of the 13 days, Kennedy and others initially thought the Berlin issue lay behind the missile deployment. Graham Allison’s original book suggested this was likely Khrushchev’s chief motivation. However, during the crisis Khrushchev never raised the Berlin issue. In his mind, it was not connected to the missile deployment.

How to rank the motivations for deployment? Would any one of the motivations mentioned have been sufficient to trigger deployment? In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, no motivation appears strong enough to have caused deployment on its own, but Cuban defense and rejiggering the strategic balance are the two strongest. Probably the best we can do, barring new archival discoveries, is declare those two motivations as the chief drivers of the crisis, followed by the other three. Multicausal events are common in history. And as Sergey Radchenko notes, Khrushchev likely had multiple motivations that to his mind may have been inseparable. For example, the strategic missiles might have made it riskier for the United States to attack Cuba, and they simultaneously improved Russian strategic inferiority. 25

Over the years, the Berlin trump card explanation (no. 5) has all but disappeared, simply because no one has been able to make a persuasive case for it. Partial rectification of the strategic missile imbalance has remained at the top, recently joined by the Cuban defense argument. The third and fourth motivations—a gamble for a win and an emotion-driven trade for the Jupiters, have gained supporters. Both are intertwined with Khrushchev’s emotional personality, ideological beliefs, political vulnerabilities, and cognitive practices. As Robert Jervis put it, “To separate power-political from ideological-identity motives is probably impossible . . . but the latter have gained [the] most currency over the years.” 26 (This trend will be discussed below.)

That Khrushchev personally invented the missile deployment plan now seems beyond question. April and early May 1962 were bad times for the premier. Part of Khrushchev’s calculations involved the possible weakening of pro-Moscow elements in the Cuban government. Castro had soured on Escalante, an ambitious man well-liked in Moscow because he was cautious about supporting revolutionary movements throughout Latin America, but whose loyalty to Castro appeared weak. Escalante fled to Moscow. He claimed that Chinese influence was growing in the Castro regime. Alarmed, the Kremlin pondered how to retain Castro’s confidence. In early April, the Central Committee publicly supported Castro’s criticisms of Escalante. The Kremlin’s desire to retain Castro’s good will peaked during consideration of military aid options. 27

Khrushchev decided to beef up Cuban defense. Besides the obvious military benefits, this step might also solidify Castro’s trust in the Soviet Union. On 12 April 1962, the State Council Presidium approved an initial draft plan of sending over a hundred V-75 antiaircraft missiles, a battery of Sopka shore-to-ship cruise missiles, and a 650-troop Soviet military training mission. Moreover, Cuba would jump ahead of Egypt in the V-75 delivery queue, receiving the missiles in the next few months. 28

In May, Khrushchev made an official visit to Bulgaria where, he claimed in his memoirs, he got the idea of sending strategic nuclear missiles to Cuba. 29 This would further defend Cuba, he reasoned, please Castro, strengthen pro-Soviet elements in Cuba, and help rectify the strategic imbalance with the United States. His assistant, Oleg Troyanovsky, later recalled that “Khrushchev had a rich imagination, and when some idea took hold of him, he was inclined to see in its implementation an easy solution to a particular problem, a sort of cure-all. . . . He could stretch even a sound idea to the point of absurdity.” 30 Indeed, in his definitive biography of Khrushchev, William Taubman titled the chapter on the missile crisis “The Cuban Cure-all.” The son of a diplomat, Troyanovsky grew up in the United States and graduated from Swarthmore College, but Khrushchev did not ask his opinion about the probable American reaction to the plan, which Troyanovsky believed would be hostile. Nor did the premier consult his KGB/GRU intelligence analysts. He did run the idea by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who told him that deploying nuclear missiles to Cuba would create a political explosion in the United States. 31 Miscalculating, Khrushchev did not change his mind.

Returning from Bulgaria on 21 May 1962, Khrushchev pitched his nuclear deployment idea to the State Council Presidium, meeting only open opposition from his deputy in the Council of Ministers, the practical and cautious Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan. The presidium approved the plan. Defense Minister Malinovsky assigned the planning to a small cadre, including Major General Anatoli Gribkov, whose book, Operation Anadyr , is the best account of the Soviet deployment. 32

Gribkov and colleagues greatly expanded the April draft plan. As Khrushchev ordered, the strategic missiles now composed the vital heart of the new arms package: 36 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with a 1,770-kilometer range and 24 IRBMs with a 4,025-kilometer range. Though construction started on the launch facilities for both types in early September, the IRBMs did not make it to Cuba. The missiles were still on the water when the U.S. blockade went into effect, so Khrushchev sent them back home. 33 The Soviets also sent shorter-range, dual-use (conventional or nuclear-capable) systems: 36 Luna surface-to-surface missiles and, for coastal defense against invasion, 80 front cruise (FKR) missiles and 32 Sopka cruise missiles. The Soviets included six nuclear-capable Ilyushin IL-28 light bombers. 34 A final, significant step was adding four mechanized infantry regiments. Soviet personnel totaled about 43,000 by mid-October.

From July to October 1962, the Soviets sent a torrent of ships to Cuba, all monitored by U.S. planes and naval vessels. But the Russians had carefully masked the cargoes, loading the missiles into deep-hulled cargo ships with nothing on the decks to betray their presence. The thousands of troops aboard were kept below deck in the daytime. The first shipments were chiefly the V-75 surface-to-air missile systems and the technicians and construction workers needed to install them. V-75 installation began in August; a U-2 mission of 29 August photographed some of them. The strategic (and other) missiles arrived later; the first MRBMs arrived on 9 September. They were unloaded at night and then, during two to three days, trucked to their launch sites. They were not photographed until 14 October.

For the various missiles, the Soviets sent 164 nuclear warheads to Cuba aboard two ships, one arriving on 4 October and the second on 25 October, just before the blockade went into effect. The warheads were hidden in the cargo holds. There were 36  1-megaton warheads for the MRBMs, 24 for the IRBMs, 80 2-to-20-kiloton warheads for the FKR cruise missiles, 12 2-kiloton warheads for the Luna surface-to-surface missiles (added by Khrushchev in early September), 6 warheads for Sopka shore defense missiles, and 6 gravity bombs for the IL-28 bombers. 35

When American reconnaissance flights finally spotted the strategic missiles on 14 October, analysts and decisionmakers properly assumed that warheads for the strategic missiles were nearby, as MRBMs and IRBMs were useless in a conventional role. But the dispatch of the additional 104 tactical warheads was unknown. These warheads had not been photographed, and more importantly, U.S. civilian and military officials did not presume that tactical warheads had been sent for the FKR, Luna, and Sopka dual-use missiles. After the crisis ended, the Soviets removed their missiles and the U.S. Navy took pictures of them on board the ships. But the Soviets never told the United States that tactical warheads had been on the island. They removed the warheads secretly, and U.S. intelligence did not spot the warheads on their way back to the Soviet Union. American policymakers were therefore unaware of the presence of the tactical warheads for 30 years. In 1992, at a U.S.-Russia-Cuba conference in Havana, General Gribkov revealed their presence, stunning McNamara and other American participants.

Khrushchev’s public diplomacy for the deployments was ill-considered, indeed counterproductive. Several aides and Cuban officials urged him to announce simply a conventional (nonnuclear) arms package and the signing of a Soviet-Cuban defense pact. Their thinking was that the presence of more than 40,000 Soviet military with modern weapons—including surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)—would deter a U.S. invasion. Or Khrushchev could have announced the conventional arms and troops, the defense pact, and even the supply of the tactical nukes, whose shorter range could not endanger the American homeland but could deter an invasion force.

Khrushchev rejected both suggestions, but if Cuban defense was his main goal, he should have accepted them. The United States might have been deterred from any action. But even if the Americans did react, it would surely be less confrontational than the discovery of secretly shipped strategic nuclear weapons that would reach most of the United States. That discovery might well trigger a massive air strike and possibly an invasion. In sum, adding strategic nuclear missiles to the arms package was counterproductive. Instead of making Cuba safer from American intrusion, Khrushchev endangered it.

The Tardy Timing of Discovery

We now know much more about why the missiles were discovered on 14 October rather than earlier or later. The tardy timing of discovery was critical as it severely limited the menu of options considered by the president and the executive committee. Earlier discovery would have allowed more time for diplomacy, as missile construction would have been in the earliest stages. A later discovery date might have meant dealing with many installed, operational nuclear-tipped missiles. The facts are these: the first MRBMs arrived in a Cuban port on 9 September 1962. 36 After being unloaded at night, they were transported to the first launch site in San Cristobal, where installation began as early as 15 September. 37 A U-2 mission over San Cristobal might have detected the initial MRBM shipload on 15 September.

Thanks to an excellent article by Max Holland followed by a book cowritten with David Barrett, we know that infighting between cautious White House and State Department officials and more proactive CIA and DIA analysts derailed the twice-monthly U-2 flights over the middle of Cuba, a schedule and route that had been followed for months. On 30 August 1962, an American U-2 strayed over Soviet airspace for more than an hour, as Soviet fighters scrambled to intercept it. On 8 September, the Chinese shot down a Taiwanese U-2 using the Soviet V-75 missile that brought down Gary Powers’s U-2 over the USSR in 1960 and which was being emplaced all over Cuba. A small, very senior group headed by Bundy met on 10 September and decided that, at least for the moment, the regular flights over the center of the island were too risky. Crucially, this led to a five-week pause in such flights just when the missiles arrived. Instead of direct overflights, the overly cautious Bundy group authorized only flights on the edge of Cuban territory, with cameras taking less-accurate distant photographs from an oblique angle. Four of these restricted missions were flown: 26 and 29 September and 5 and 7 October. They saw nothing. Meanwhile, the internal pressure from the CIA and DIA for direct overflights grew stronger as reliable human intelligence reports worked their way through the system. The Bundy group finally blessed a direct overflight that, delayed several days by cloudy weather, discovered MRBMs in San Cristobal on 14 October. 38

Fresh studies have given us a clearer picture of the super-charged reconnaissance efforts undertaken after discovery. William B. Ecker and Kenneth V. Jack ably recount the extensive low-level reconnaissance mission, called Blue Moon, flown by the U.S. Air Force McDonnell RF-101 Voodoos and U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Vought RF-8 Crusaders. 39 During the crisis, the U-2s flew constantly, as well. In his heavily detailed series of books, the latest in 2015, British pilot and U-2 expert Chris Pocock has covered virtually all aspects of that remarkable aircraft. 40 Though an interesting read, another book about the U-2 missions, Above and Beyond: John F. Kennedy and America’s Most Dangerous Cold War Spy Mission , contains factual errors as well as an unproven claim that the Soviets fired V-75 missiles at a U-2 on 25 October, two days before they did shoot down a U-2 over eastern Cuba, killing the pilot, Major Rudolph Anderson Jr. 41 Besides U-2s and low-level reconnaissance flights, the United States had early October photographs from the new Corona spy satellite, but as Joseph Caddell’s recent article explains, the resolution of the early Corona equipment did not allow image interpreters to identify the missile sites. In 1962, the Corona could only resolve objects about 13 feet in diameter, good enough to image airfields and bases. The U-2 was roughly five times better, with resolution of targets as small as two to three feet, permitting analysts to “see” missiles and launchers. 42

How Was the Crisis Settled?

Recent writing has not substantially changed the standard interpretation of the Kennedy administration’s internal deliberations of options. An airstrike was initially considered, but led by the president, opinion slowly coalesced around a naval blockade. An airstrike would not destroy all the missiles, would kill plenty of Russians, and would leave no room for diplomacy. As a final check, on 21 October, Kennedy spoke personally with Tactical Air Command chief General Walter C. Sweeney, who confirmed that even a large air strike would destroy only 90–95 percent of the strategic missiles. Kennedy announced the blockade in a national television address on 22 October. 43 He thought of the blockade as an intermediate step to pressure Khrushchev to stop missile installation. If that did not work, the president would bless air strikes alone or coupled with an invasion.

On Saturday morning 27 October, the executive committee considered a rambling, stream-of-consciousness letter from Khrushchev that ended with a proposal to withdraw the missiles if the United States promised never to invade Cuba. As the Americans pondered, a more businesslike second letter arrived, adding the condition that the United States withdraw the Jupiters from Turkey. For years, it was thought that a worried Khrushchev, alone in his office on Friday night, and perhaps sipping vodka, wrote the first rambling letter. The second letter was thought to come from other members of the State Council Presidium who wanted to extract an additional concession—the Jupiters—from the United States. Scholars are now sure that Khrushchev wrote both letters.

The president and his advisors debated that Saturday whether to answer only the first letter by making the noninvasion pledge—this was the majority executive committee view—or by giving up the Jupiters as well, as the second letter requested. The president clearly favored adding the Jupiters, knowing they were obsolete and thinking the crisis would be more quickly resolved if Khrushchev could portray the Jupiter withdrawal as a win. Repeatedly during the debate, he kept returning to the Jupiter trade. Interrupting the discussion, the Air Force reported that a U-2 on a routine air-sampling mission had strayed into Soviet airspace. It was soon learned that the Soviets had shot down Major Anderson’s U-2 over Cuba. Kennedy had previously declared that a U-2 shootdown would trigger an attack against the offending V-75 site, and possibly other V-75 sites. But now he decided against a strike that would kill Soviets and escalate the crisis just as Khrushchev offered a deal. No one could explain, however, why the Soviets destroyed the U-2 just as they reached out; the two actions seemed contradictory.

In fact, the U-2 shootdown was not ordered by Moscow. Khrushchev had forbidden his forces to shoot down a U-2, thinking such a move would escalate the crisis. But the crew of a V-75 battery in eastern Cuba tracked Major Anderson’s U-2. Worried that the photographs would be used in the invasion everybody thought imminent, the crew called headquarters. General Issa A. Pliyev was out, but his deputy, Lieutenant General Andrei Grechko, authorized the shootdown. Defense Minister Malinovsky later told Pliyev that the action had been “too hasty,” but no officer received punishment. 44

Meanwhile, the executive committee agreed that Kennedy’s reply to Khrushchev should be only a noninvasion offer, with no mention of the Jupiters. That formal letter was sent, and the president adjourned the committee at 1945. Kennedy asked Robert Kennedy and a few of his innermost circle to remain, telling them he intended to offer the Jupiter withdrawal as a secret pledge to be carried out in four or five months. He swore them to secrecy. 45 Kennedy sent his brother to pass the offer to Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and stress the need for an answer within one day. Khrushchev and the State Council Presidium, meeting Sunday morning 28 October in Moscow, accepted the deal. The main crisis was over, though touchy issues between Cuba and the Soviet Union, and between them and the United States, took several months to work out. 46

While the overall picture of events during 16–28 October has not changed much, historians have provided more granularity about several key aspects. An example is a well-known but inaccurate scene in the 2000 movie Thirteen Days , when McNamara and Admiral George W. Anderson, chief of naval operations, angrily clashed over how the Navy would execute the tracking and “hold down” of Soviet submarines. When blockade emerged as a likely option, Kennedy asked questions about implementation methods. Following up, McNamara and his deputy, Gilpatric, fretted over the Navy’s procedures for signaling Soviet submarines to surface. To be sure the Soviets would understand the signals, he ordered the Navy to prepare a signaling system, called Submarine Surfacing and Identification Procedures. Passed to the Kremlin during the crisis, there is no evidence that it reached the captains of the four nuclear-armed, diesel-powered Foxtrot -class submarines already in Cuban waters. As Svetlana Savranskaya explained, signaling American warships would drop harmless explosive devices along with a specified underwater sound to advise the subs to surface. 47 Until they did, the warships would hover above the subs, dropping the signaling charges and pinging with sonar. The subs attempted to evade until they were forced to surface to recharge batteries and ventilate the putrid internal air.

In the real meeting, McNamara did not berate the admiral, but there was indeed a confrontation. According to Gilpatric, he and McNamara “weren’t being told anything; we were just being assured that this overall type of action was being implemented, and the navy would take care of everything.” They went to the admiral’s office and found

a phalanx of fifteen or twenty, at least, navy brass all lined up around him. We were the two civilians. And Anderson was very high in color and obviously very, very angry about the whole [ sic ], what he regarded as intrusion. And he listened to a whole series of questions from McNamara that he hadn’t got answers to. And then Anderson just sort of exploded. And I don’t know whether he said goddamn it, but he used some very strong expletives to the effect that, “This is none of your goddamn business. This is what we’re here to do. We know how to do this. We’ve been doing this ever since the days of John Paul Jones, and if you’ll just go back to your quarters, Mr. Secretary, we’ll take care of this.” And during this tirade I could see the color rising in McNamara’s countenance. 48

Visibly angry, McNamara controlled his temper, and as he and Gilpatric walked back to their offices, the secretary of defense muttered, “That’s the end of Anderson. I’ll never. . . . He won’t be reappointed, and we’ve got to find a replacement for him. As far as I’m concerned, he’s lost my confidence.” But in the short run, McNamara got what he wanted. After the clash, every half hour the chief of naval operations sent an officer to the secretary’s office to brief any details he wanted. 49

Most writers once considered executive committee deliberations a highly rational process of evaluating options under Kennedy’s purposeful guidance. With the recordings released, most scholars now agree that, at a minimum, the process had nonrational elements. Sociologist David R. Gibson’s fascinating “conversational analysis” of the deliberations examines how the way participants talked to each other influenced decisions. He analyzes what people said overall and in individual sentences. Did they interrupt or talk over each other? Did they coalesce around certain participants or band together against others? In particular, Gibson explores how blockade became the option of choice even though no one could make a case that it alone would force Khrushchev to withdraw the missiles. Gibson argues that the dynamics of the meetings and

the need to reach consensus at each stage required the [executive committee] to avoid, or cease, consideration of some of the risks: the risk of having to bomb operational missiles if the blockade failed; the risk that letting the Bucharest pass [the blockade] would leave Khrushchev with the impression that Kennedy was weak; and the risk that by accepting Khrushchev’s first offer and ignoring his second, the first real path out of the crisis (like-for-like missile withdrawal) would be sacrificed. 50

Though Kennedy initially favored an air strike, he came to favor a blockade because it would minimize loss of life, allow Khrushchev time to reflect, and still allow an air strike or invasion if Khrushchev would not remove the missiles. Gibson concludes that, aware of the president’s leanings, the executive committee debate adjusted to them.

Scholars have clarified three important aspects of the worst day of the crisis—Saturday 27 October—when Kennedy and Khrushchev were jolted by unplanned events into the realization that they were sliding over the brink. First, as mentioned, there is now scholarly consensus that Khrushchev wrote both letters the executive committee assessed. After proposing missile withdrawal in exchange for a noninvasion pledge, Khrushchev reflected for several hours and decided he could obtain the Jupiter withdrawal as well. Why the delay? Why did Khrushchev not simply make both demands in a single letter? Just after sending the first letter, Khrushchev read a translation of Walter Lippman’s 25 October column in the New York Herald-Tribune suggesting “a face-saving agreement” that would swap the Jupiters for the Soviet missiles in Cuba. 51 Khrushchev promptly wrote the second letter and directed it be announced by Radio Moscow, so Washington would receive it around the time that the first cabled letter arrived. It is possible, though unproven, that with Kennedy’s blessing, an administration official informed Lippman that the missile swap was a feasible option, hoping that the columnist would give Khrushchev a hint. 52

Erratic and unpredictable behavior by Soviet officers and Castro made Khrushchev feel events were slipping out of his control, forcing him to consider how to end the crisis. Soviet troops built and staffed the V-75 missile batteries. Falsely overconfident in the degree of camouflaging done at the MRBM and IRBM sites, Khrushchev forbade the V-75 units from shooting at the U-2 flights, which might trigger American counterstrikes. Yet, Soviet generals, convinced that an invasion was imminent, destroyed Major Anderson’s midday flight on 27 October.

Likewise convinced of impending American landings, Castro stormed over to the Soviet embassy and, using Soviet ambassador Alexander Ivanovich Alekseyev as notetaker, dictated a letter intended to stiffen Khrushchev’s spine. Castro asserted that any invasion would end up with a massive exchange of nuclear missiles. Therefore, the Soviets should launch a full-scale nuclear strike should America invade, eliminating the American danger forever “through a legitimate act of self-defense, however harsh and terrible the solution would be.” Taken aback, Alekseyev asked if Castro wanted him to write that “we should be first to launch”? Castro replied that he did not want to say that directly, but that is definitely the meaning that Khrushchev correctly took away from the missive.

Coupled with the unordered U-2 shootdown, Castro’s emotional, irrational letter contributed to Khrushchev’s growing sense of unease and to his ultimate compromise. Khrushchev later wrote to Alekseyev that “aside from other factors, your telegram also played a role in our being forced to accept Kennedy’s conditions. . . . So we made this decision [to remove our missiles from Cuba] literally a day later.” 53 In fact, Alekseyev’s “head’s up” telegram reached Moscow at 1400 on 27 October, and the completed letter arrived at 1300 the following day.

Though even before the U-2 shootdown and the Castro letter, the premier had sent his two crucial messages to Kennedy, the deal had not been closed. The frightening sequence of the U-2 shootdown and the apocalyptic letter made him even more determined to cement the agreement with Kennedy, which he did on Sunday by accepting the public noninvasion pledge and Kennedy’s secret promise to remove the Jupiters. 54

Regarding nuclear weapons in Cuba, American civilian policymakers, senior military leaders, and intelligence specialists failed in three respects. First, they overlooked evidence—which they had already collected and assessed—that the Soviet Union had secretly deployed nuclear-tipped weapons outside its borders once before. In 1959, the Soviets deployed medium-range ballistic missiles in East Germany, north of Berlin, for six months, apparently to bring the United Kingdom within range. Though unknown to American intelligence at the time, CIA analysts later connected the dots and in January 1961 published a report that strangely never surfaced during the Cuban crisis. The CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate of 19 September 1962 claimed that deployment of strategic missiles would be unique, an aberration in Soviet policy, and that there were no signs of such a policy change. The writers had, for some reason, not seen the January 1961 memo. Similarly, in the executive committee and other deliberations, no one mentioned the previous deployment to East Germany. If that episode had resurfaced in September, as it should have, analysts might well have wondered if the Soviets were doing it again, this time in Cuba. They would have increased, not decreased, direct U-2 overflights, probably leading to earlier discovery of the missiles. 55

A second failure was blindness to the implications of the deployment of short-range nuclear-capable missiles, such as the FKRs and Lunas. When reconnaissance discovered the construction of the MRBM and IRBM sites, leaders and advisors assumed that nuclear warheads for those missiles had also been sent, though the United States could not yet identify the warhead storage sites. Hence, nuclear capability of the strategic missiles was factored into American consideration of options such as air strike, blockade, or diplomacy. But in the case of the FKRs, Sopkas, and Lunas, though they were discovered by air reconnaissance, U.S. officials failed to evaluate the impact on an American invasion if these missiles carried nuclear warheads. Not until after Khrushchev’s 28 October concession on missile withdrawal was the topic discussed, and then not very carefully. Why?

Motivated thinking was an important reason, skewing the analysis of contingencies—things that might happen. When pushing for invasion, Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis E. LeMay, Army Chief of Staff Earle G. Wheeler, and others did not imagine that there might be dangerous unknowns. Known unknowns exist in poorly understood situations. An adept planner or analyst knows a knowledge gap exists, but for various reasons, usually a lack of information, cannot close the gap, leading decisionmakers—correctly—to hedge. By contrast, unknown unknowns emerge from completely unpredictable directions that are not possible to discern in advance. Sometimes called “black swans,” they seemingly emerge from nowhere.

The presence of tactical nukes was not a black swan but a known unknown. LeMay and others should have evaluated the probable presence of tactical nukes when creating their best military advice, to use the common term. But because of their motivated thinking—a conviction and strong desire to invade to completely eliminate the Communist threat—the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to temper its pro-invasion advice with an assessment of tactical nukes on the island. Their failure could have been catastrophic if the Soviets used tactical nukes against the landing force.

Civilian analysts did no better. On 26 October, two days before the crisis ended, John McCone showed the president a photograph of a Luna and noted that such weapons were dual use, indicating the possible presence of “tactical nuclear weapons for fighting troops in the field.” 56 This significant statement disappeared into the mist. Nobody pushed for a follow-up, certainly not the invasion advocates.

More understandable was a third failure—a lack of imagination by all analysts. The CIA team that created the 19 September Special National Intelligence Estimate could have been more imaginative in trying to assess Khrushchev’s feeling of Soviet weakness (a feeling he had for many months), which might have led them to look for signs of a risky gamble to try to rebalance relative nuclear power. Admittedly, this was a difficult task. Even Khrushchev’s colleagues in the Presidium found him unpredictable, often surfacing—and pushing—strange new ideas. Moreover, as Amy Zegart persuasively recounts, the CIA’s process for separating the wheat from the chaff of human field reports was slow, though Sherman Kent, the legendary director of analysis, defended it as careful and professional. 57 The CIA had field agents in Cuba who sent reports; CIA analysts also debriefed Cuban refugees at a special facility in Opa-locka, Florida. It must be remembered that the strategic weapons did not arrive until mid-September; Serhii Plokhy concludes the first batch arrived 9 September. Of the roughly 1,000 human reports and debriefs received after that date, perhaps only a dozen or so were significant. But in the three to four weeks after the missiles arrived in Cuba, the CIA processed and circulated a few reliable human intelligence reports that suggested unusual activity near San Cristobal in western Cuba. These reports helped proactive officers in the intelligence community lobby successfully for the resumption of direct overflights, which promptly discovered the missiles.

Could the Crisis Have Led to Nuclear Exchanges?

The crisis could easily have led to nuclear exchanges. Yet, even with the discovery more than 30 years after the crisis that there were at least 104 tactical nukes plus 60 warheads for the MRBMs and IRBMs on the island and that the four Foxtrots being harassed by the U.S. Navy had nuclear-tipped torpedoes, some observers are reluctant to accept that we came close to nuclear exchanges. They say the obvious: “Nobody knows what would have happened.” This is a dodge, a cop-out, for whenever we assess alternatives or counterfactuals of any event, we never know what would have happened. But counterfactual analysis allows deeper understanding of events. The relevant task is to examine the forces at play and assess probabilities. Admittedly, counterfactuals must be handled carefully. Some are much more realistic, relevant, and useful than others.

In the Cuban crisis, relevant and realistic counterfactuals suggest a likely nuclear exchange. Had Kennedy and Khrushchev not settled the crisis on 28 October, Kennedy intended to order air strikes and an invasion to remove the strategic missiles. He warned the military to be ready to implement that plan on 29 or 30 October. How do we assess the most likely counterfactuals had invasion occurred? 58

First and most dangerous was a Russian intent to use tactical nukes to destroy the 5,000-person Marine garrison and facilities in Guantánamo. As Michael Dobbs revealed in his ground-breaking account, the Russians deployed a detachment of three FKR missiles armed with 14-kiloton nuclear warheads (Hiroshima-size weapons) near Guantánamo to await launch orders. As Dobbs makes clear, it is probable that an American invasion meant nuclear destruction of Guantánamo and thousands of Americans dead. 59 Very likely, the U.S. response would have been use of nuclear weapons, probably against several Russian missile sites or, if identified, against storage areas for Russian nuclear warheads. Whether a tactical nuclear exchange inside Cuba would have escalated to a strategic weapons exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States is less likely, but certainly possible, as emotional and muddled thinking (both had already appeared in earlier stages of the crisis) distorted a more rational response.

Second, should an invasion have occurred, it is quite likely that the Soviets would have used tactical nukes to defend their units. Why else had the tactical weapons been sent to the island? In addition to strategic missile forces and antiair missile units, the Soviets had four infantry regiments, which, more capable than the Cuban forces, would have been the main targets of U.S. landing forces. Initially the Soviet commander, General Issa Pliyev, had authority to use the tactical nukes for defense against landing forces, which is why shore-to-ship missiles with warheads had been sent to Cuba. Kennedy warned on 7 September that if offensive missiles were found to be in Cuba, “the gravest consequences” would occur. Deterrence theory suggests that deterrence increases if defenders clearly communicate red lines as well as the consequences that would result if the red lines were violated. But instead of making Khrushchev cautious, the warning made him more committed to giving his conventional forces powerful weapons to defend against an American attack. He ordered additional tactical nuclear weapons delivered to Cuba; they were immediately loaded on the Indigirka and sent speedily to the island. Although Moscow retained authority for their use, Khrushchev would have been under great pressure to permit tactical nukes to defend against an invasion force killing thousands of Soviet soldiers. Again, why send tactical nukes to the island if they were never to be used under any circumstances? And why increase the number of tactical warheads after Kennedy’s warning? If the tactical warheads, both the first and second batches, were intended to deter an invasion, why did Khrushchev not announce their deployment? Rather, the warheads were intended for use depending on circumstances.

Third, there was the possible, even probable use of the weapons on the initiative of local commanders. By 10 October, most warheads had arrived in Cuba and were stored near the launchers. General Nikolai Beloborodov, who managed the warheads, “took partial measures to move the warheads closer to very remote combat units to reduce the amount of time required for their transfer once we received the special orders [to use them].” 60 Once the invasion began, while under attack—the Russians expected an invasion plan to include air strikes on missile sites followed by ground assault—local Soviet commanders would have mated warheads and missiles. It seems logical that they would defend themselves with the most powerful weapons they had. As Beloborodov later wrote, “It was clear that in the conditions of the existing balance of forces in conventional arms, which was ten to one against us, there was only one way we could repel a massive assault—by using tactical nuclear weapons against the invaders.” 61 A good test case was the shootdown of the U-2 on 27 October, an act forbidden by Moscow. But stressed local commanders, believing the U-2 was gathering data on the latest Soviet positions for the imminent invasion, approved the shootdown. This kind of decision under intense stress would have occurred repeatedly across Soviet forces if the U.S. invaded. It is quite likely at least a few of those local decisions would have brought tactical nukes into play. The warheads for the FKR missiles had no security devices and could be launched by a lieutenant and a couple of technicians. 62

Nor would have American airstrikes been able to take out the Russian tactical warheads before the invasion began. As Beloborodov noted, “When I met with the Americans 30 years later, they were very interested to find out about the places where the nuclear warheads were actually located in Cuba in 1962. It is obvious that they did not have accurate information, which in the event of a U.S. military action would have excluded [the possibility] of impact on the warheads.” 63

Finally, regarding a fourth dicey scenario, recent analysis has lowered the probability of a submarine destroying an American warship with a nuclear-tipped torpedo. The USSR sent four Foxtrot submarines to Cuban waters. Each carried a single nuclear-tipped torpedo (range 19 km) for defensive purposes, along with 21 conventional torpedoes. As noted above, the U.S. Navy tracked and pressured these subs using so-called practice depth charges—similar to a hand grenade—to signal that the subs should surface. Commanders would use Morse code sonar signals to transmit “IDKCA,” which meant “rise to surface.” To be considered as nonthreatening under the new U.S. Navy procedures, the subs had to surface and sail an easterly course. Unaware of this new American guidance and unsure if U.S.-Soviet combat had started, the submarine captains attempted to evade the pursuers and remained submerged as long as possible. The temperature inside the subs rose beyond 120 degrees Fahrenheit. Officers and crew were fainting from the heat and bad air. On one destroyer at least, U.S. sailors encased practice depth charges in cardboard, which kept the trigger from popping until the cardboard disintegrated deeper than normal. Detonating beside the subs rather than far above them, the magnified sound was like being in an oil drum struck with a sledgehammer. 64

It now appears that Soviet submarine B-59 —the Foxtrot often associated with use of a nuclear torpedo—was not quite as close to firing as previously thought. Forced to surface with exhausted batteries, noxious air, and the concussions of the practice depth changes, a frazzled Captain Valentin Savitsky climbed into the conning tower to face blinding searchlights, a Lockheed P2 Neptune firing .50-caliber warning shots on each side of the bow, and loudspeaker demands from hovering American destroyers. It is unclear whether these procedures were the ones described to McNamara. Believing he was about to be attacked, Savitsky ordered his watch officers below and yelled that he was going down to launch his nuclear torpedo. Fortunately, one officer, loaded with signaling equipment, briefly blocked the narrow ladder down into the submarine. This delayed Savitsky long enough for the submarine flotilla’s chief of staff, Captain Vasili Arkhipov, on board B-59 and still in the conning tower, to calm Savitsky by pointing out that the American actions were not an attack but aggressive signaling. B-59 quickly signaled the American units to stop their harassment. Monitored by the Navy, B-59 remained on the surface, recharging batteries and cooling the submarine’s interior for more than a day. 65

In the first three scenarios above, tactical nuclear use by the Soviets was likely and so was an American nuclear response. If the United States invaded, all three scenarios would have occurred simultaneously, increasing the probability that at least one of them would have triggered nuclear use. There is ample reason to regard the Cuban Missile Crisis as a nuclear near miss.

The Role of Cognition in Leader Motivation

The nature of the cognitive processes used by the participants played a key but still only partly understood role in the crisis. Scholars increasingly find the concept of strategic empathy useful. Strategic empathy is not sympathy but an understanding of the personality and circumstances of the adversary and how those factors motivate or constrain adversary actions. The lack of strategic empathy by both leaders helped cause the Cuban crisis by preventing them from properly assessing their opponent’s political pressures and circumstances. 66 Instead they “mirror-imaged,” using their own experience and beliefs to explain their adversary’s motives. 67 Until the final days of the crisis, for example, Khrushchev wrongly believed Kennedy would accept the strategic missiles in Cuba just as he had been forced to accept the Jupiters in Turkey. Khrushchev gave little thought to the possibility that Kennedy might see the missile deployment as a disastrous internal political blow and react strongly. Kennedy did a bit better, particularly as the crisis wore on. The executive committee transcripts reveal Kennedy often asked questions about Khrushchev’s motivations.

A powerful reason for Soviet misbehavior in Cuba was not because Khrushchev thought Kennedy was weak on Cuba. More important were Khrushchev’s fears of Soviet strategic and political weakness, as well as his own psychological and political need to strengthen his position in the State Council Presidium. Kennedy’s strong stance on Berlin, his signaling via the Gilpatric speech that the United States had nuclear superiority, and his military and clandestine efforts to demonstrate an ability—if not a clear intent—to topple Cuba increased Khrushchev’s worries. 68

In early 1962, no longer able to play the missile gap card and fearing American invasion of Cuba, Khrushchev tilted toward a policy of extreme brinkmanship, his only remaining tool to influence events. He developed the idea of the meniscus as a model for his dangerous brinkmanship. When a glass is very slowly filled with water, the surface tension of the water might allow a meniscus, or small ring of water, to protrude very slightly above the lip of the glass. Khrushchev’s idea of a meniscus was not scientifically sound, but it explained his intention to practice brinkmanship so extreme that it approached but did not quite “spill over” into conflict. In short, he would accept a lot of risk. 69 It is important to note again that the meniscus strategy emerged from weakness. Alas, akin to touching the meniscus slightly above the rim of a glass of water, his brinkmanship soon spilled over the edge in the Cuban crisis. Kennedy and his advisors did not sense Khrushchev’s weakness; they saw only his bullying and provocations.

Recent progress in political psychology provides new approaches to explain Khrushchev’s risky nuclear deployment. Though Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky developed prospect theory in 1979, in recent years international relations scholars have used it. 70 Simply stated, prospect theory says that humans worry much more about great potential loss than about significant potential gains. Therefore, they adopt riskier actions to prevent major loss than to achieve gains. Khrushchev was operating in the domain of potential loss, though of course he was unaware of his internal cognitive processing. To prevent loss of influence and control he took a risky step—the conventional arms buildup—then doubled down with an even riskier step by adding strategic nuclear arms to the package, partly to slightly remedy the strategic imbalance and partly to prevent the potential loss of Cuba and with it, Soviet prestige and his own prestige. One might assume that Khrushchev’s feeling of weakness would spur caution and curb risk-taking. Instead, his fears led to increasingly risky behavior to avoid the further loss of influence and prestige.

In their insightful article “The Pitsunda Decision,” Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali make this point clearly. 71 In response to the charge by Senator Kenneth Keating and other Republicans that his Cuban policy was timid, Kennedy released the statement on 4 September 1962 declaring that “the gravest issues would arise” if the Soviets placed offensive weapons in Cuba. 72 Kennedy hoped to deter Khrushchev from sending such armaments to Cuba, but as Fursenko and Naftali show, his statement had the opposite effect. Learning of Kennedy’s warning while vacationing at his Black Sea dacha at Pitsunda in Georgia on 7 September, Khrushchev doubled down, adding tactical nuclear warheads for the short-range missiles. As noted above, this decision greatly increased the risk of nuclear weapons use.     

The Influence of Emotion in Decision-making

In the past 10 years, political psychologists have made great progress in illuminating the hidden role of emotion in foreign policy decision-making. For years many foreign policy analysts have used a Rational Actor Model (RAM) as their default approach. 73 RAM assumes that states and the leaders of states assess options by rationally weighing the pros and cons and choosing the option that provides the most advantage. In other words, states or the leaders of states use expected utility theory —another concept from economics—to compare options and choose the one with the most benefit. RAM is a deliberative, logical approach.

What role might emotion or biases play? In his recent book, Thinking, Fast and Slow , Daniel Kahneman describes cognition as having two systems, or tracks. System One is unconscious heuristics, prizing speed, gut feelings, hunches, emotions, and the like. System Two is consciously slow, deliberative measurement of pros and cons. System One allows a big role for emotion and biases; System Two is akin to RAM.

But some of the latest writing in political psychology claims that emotion plays a role in every decision or perception, even in the supposedly factual deliberation of Kahneman’s System Two. Emotion unconsciously influences what one accepts as evidence, how one interprets that evidence, and what action one chooses. In short, emotion is everywhere, skewing factual assessment, minimizing or maximizing threat perception, fostering emotions such as fear and anger. 74

Khrushchev and Kennedy were both influenced by emotion. Khrushchev’s decision to send strategic nuclear weapons to Cuba was partly an emotional payback for the U.S. deployment of Jupiters to Turkey. Kennedy’s anger at Khrushchev when the missiles were discovered was partly emotional, reflected in his purported first reaction: “He can’t do this to me.” Castro’s mid-crisis letter to Khrushchev urging use of the nuclear weapons was clearly emotional. Emotion underlay the motivated thinking of LeMay and other hard-core invasion advocates. When one views the details of the Cuban crisis through this “emotion is everywhere” lens, one finds plenty of examples. Richard Ned Lebow, who along with Janice Gross Stein was one of the first to explore emotional aspects of the Cuban crisis, argues that “Khrushchev acted out of a sense of desperation. He made a high-risk gamble in the belief that inaction would further erode Soviet strategic and foreign policy interests.” Lebow asserts that “Khrushchev also acted out of anger. His emotional arousal clouded his judgment and made empathy with President Kennedy and the constraints under which he [Kennedy] operated all but impossible. It also ruled out a thorough and dispassionate evaluation of the likely repercussions of a Cuban missile deployment.” 75

While Kennedy did not understand Khrushchev’s motives before the crisis, during the crisis he sought to understand the Soviet leader’s reasoning. He sometimes escaped the mirror-imaging problem that afflicted Khrushchev. The executive committee transcripts often reveal Kennedy raised the question of Khrushchev’s motivation and asked others for their assessment. 76 He knew that if he could correctly understand Khrushchev’s real motives, he could devise a more effective policy to counter them. By the end of the crisis, Kennedy was the leading peacenik in the room, convinced that a settlement was best reached by giving Khrushchev a way out that allowed him to portray the settlement as a win.

Among several excellent, recent studies of the role of emotion in threat perception and decision-making, Robin Markwica’s remarkable book Emotional Choices stands out because it examines the Cuban crisis as one of his two case studies (the other is the 1990–91 Gulf War). Markwica asserts that an emotional model operates simultaneously in the decision-maker’s mind with two other approaches, a rationalist model (RAM) and a social constructivist or identity model. The rationalist model uses expected utility, advantages and disadvantages, and cost-benefit calculations to formulate decisions. An identity or social constructivist model privileges the ideas, accepted norms and standards, and practices of the decision-maker’s society or nation. Markwica’s emotional model postulates that five emotions—fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation—influence decision-making. He assesses the importance of emotions in eight major Khrushchev decisions in the missile crisis. He finds that fear influenced Khrushchev in half of his decisions. Markwica wisely resists the temptation to claim fear as the most important determinant in those decisions. Rather, he persuasively explains why the decisions cannot be fully understood without including emotional aspects. 77

Markwica correctly observes that difficulty of use is a disadvantage of an emotional model. A RAM analysis uses factual evidence, mainly material factors, to weigh expected utility. A RAM analyst examines such known or collectable material factors as the size, location, and capability of troop deployments, the location of missile installations, and weapon ranges and destructive power. From those factors, the RAM analyst makes rational inferences to uncover motives and drivers. But an emotional model requires much more information about a leader or leadership group’s patterns of thought, fears, hopes, and other emotions. Much of that information is unknown when a crisis arises and is not immediately collectable by intelligence operations. Only later, as recordings, letters, oral histories, and archival documents emerge is it possible to more accurately assess the impact of emotion, hence Markwica’s justifiable caution about claiming too much for an emotional model. 78 That said, despite unsatisfactory access to Russian and some American archival material, enough is known about the Cuban missile crisis to demonstrate that emotion played an important role.

The Inseparable Nature of Military Advice and Political, Cognitive, and Emotional Factors

This event demonstrates the crucial relationship between military force and diplomacy. It mattered that the crisis occurred just off American shores, so that immense military power could be assembled quickly. Moreover, that military capability had been well-exercised in the preceding year, most prominently in the spring 1962 Caribbean exercises. And from Army general Maxwell D. Taylor, his senior military advisor, and General Walter Sweeney, commander of the Tactical Air Command, Kennedy got accurate, as opposed to overly optimistic, estimates of the percentage of strategic missiles that airstrikes might destroy. Kennedy ultimately chose blockade while pursuing a diplomatic solution and simultaneously readying airstrikes and an invasion. American conventional military dominance subtly but powerfully shaped the decisions made by both sides during the crisis.

It also shows the failure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide high-quality military advice. Already mentioned was the failure of the Joint Chiefs as well as civilian analysts to imagine that an invasion might encounter tactical nuclear weapons, which would hugely escalate the crisis. Military advice in a sudden international crisis may need to be different from military advice in a theater campaign.

In the Cuban missile crisis, best military advice and diplomatic and political advice were inseparable. Airstrike, invasion, blockade, diplomatic bargaining, or simply accepting the Soviet missile deployment (inaction) each required assessment of a broad range of nonmilitary as well as purely military factors. Assessing Soviet motivation for missile deployment was crucial to finding a suitable give-and-take. A strongly motivated Soviet Union would require a major American compromise in a deal, or perhaps the Soviets would not deal at all. Best military advice had to consider the mindset and motivations of Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders. How would they react? Would pressure on Cuba cause the Soviets to attack Berlin or some other vulnerable point? Would an airstrike trigger a broader nuclear exchange? Could the missiles be removed by negotiation rather than by force? And so forth.

What Kennedy got from the Joint Chiefs was advice derived from predisposition toward—or a belief in—certain kinds of actions regardless of circumstances and context. An example was the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting with the president and McNamara in the cabinet room of the White House on Friday, 19 October. At this stage, Kennedy was considering the air strike and blockade options. Stating that an American response to the missile deployment was necessary, he said, “The question is, what kind of response?” General LeMay said he did not share the view that an invasion of Cuba would trigger a Soviet invasion of Berlin. The Soviets would not move if Kennedy simply told Khrushchev that invading Berlin meant war. “This blockade and political action I see [as] leading to war. . . . This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich. . . . I just don’t see any other solution except direct military intervention, right now!” Admiral Anderson said the Navy could execute a blockade but that he did not think “there is any solution to the Cuban problem except a military solution. . . . It’s the same thing as Korea all over again, only on a grander scale.” General Earle Wheeler insisted that airstrikes, blockade, and an invasion were needed: “I feel that the lowest risk is the full gamut of military action by us.” LeMay asserted: “I think that a blockade and political talk would be considered by a lot of our friends and neutrals as a pretty weak response to this. And I’m sure a lot of our citizens would feel that way too.” The president observed that a limited airstrike would be less of an escalation than a major airstrike coupled with invasion and made the key point that “we have to assume that the Soviet response to each of these would have to be different.” After Kennedy and McNamara left the room, and the Joint Chiefs were alone—and unaware that Kennedy’s taping system was still running—they vented their displeasure about the president’s reluctance to commit to a full-scale military action. Marine Commandant David M. Shoup praised LeMay for pulling the rug from under Kennedy’s arguments: “When he says ‘escalation,’ that’s it. If somebody could keep them from doing the goddamn thing piecemeal . . . that’s our problem. You go in there and friggin’ around with the missiles. You’re screwed.” “That’s right,” LeMay growled, “You’re screwed, screwed, screwed.” Kennedy later told his aides Kenneth P. O’Donnell and David F. Powers that LeMay was dead wrong in his certainty that Khrushchev would do nothing if the United States bombed the missiles and killed many Russians. “These brass hats have one great advantage in their favor,” the president remarked. “If we listen to them and do what they want us to do, none of us will be alive later to tell them they were wrong.” 79

General officers creating the best military advice during the Cuban missile crisis needed the same range of skills as policymakers and civilian analysts. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should have seen that the military options on the table had potentially significant political and diplomatic consequences that in turn would affect future military options, but their advice showed no signs of such reflection. Senior civilians had the converse requirement of making policy with a sensitive assessment of military factors. The intertwining of all essential factors—military, political, cognitive/emotional, etc.—in strategic level decision-making is the essence of true “Jointness.”

Other senior commanders understood this imperative. Vice Admiral Alfred G. Ward, who ran the Navy’s blockade forces, noted that although in wartime blockades local commanders decided which enemy ships would be boarded and searched, in the Cuban crisis “we asked instructions on whether or not we should stop a Soviet ship.” Ward agreed with making the decision “at a political level because it was a political decision rather than a military one.” 80

Where Are We Headed?

The Cuban missile crisis will always be worth studying because we know more about it than we do almost any other crisis, so we have greater insight into the challenges faced by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. This is not to say that we know everything that we need to know. As more documents are unsealed, especially in Russia and Cuba, many aspects of the crisis can be further fleshed out. For example, both deterrence failure and success marked the crisis. Khrushchev was not deterred by Kennedy’s warnings of “the gravest consequences” of sending offensive weapons; indeed, the premier doubled his gamble, sending more tactical nuclear warheads. Kennedy was not deterred by the possibility that U.S. action in Cuba would provoke a Soviet assault on Berlin. Both men were deterred from stepping over the brink by their justified fear of the existential threat of global nuclear war. Further scrutiny of the Cuban crisis may sharpen our understanding of deterrence theory.

In addition, continued work by political psychologists in the hopefully larger pool of primary sources may give us greater insights into the most basic level of analysis: the cognitive processes of leaders and leadership groups, and the role of emotions in their decision-making.

Last, analyzing the crisis with a broader range of analytical tools, some derived from the intelligence community, will surely bring rewards. For example, premortem analysis is an excellent technique for stimulating imagination and fresh thinking by analysts. The technique of placement described by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May in their classic Thinking in Time , coupled with greater use of strategic empathy, could prove useful in assessing when, in the future, leaders might be making an atypical, out of the norm move, such as when Khrushchev decided to send strategic nuclear weapons to Cuba. 81

•1775•

• An excellent bibliographical essay (as of 2011) appears in Don Munton and David A. Welch’s fine overview, The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History , 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
• The first appeared in 1970 with a slightly expanded edition in 1976.
• Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis , 2d ed. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999).
• Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1997).
• James A. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littleton, 2002); and James A. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989).
• Martin J. Sherwin, Gambling with Armageddon: Nuclear Roulette from Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1945–1962 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2020); and Serhii Plokhy, Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 2021).
• Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957–1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 26–27, 68, 106–7.
• Address by Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, before the Business Council at The Homestead, Hot Springs, VA, 21 October 1961, CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Forces, Special Collection.
• Irwin F. Gellman, The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952–1961 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 543–55.
• “Francis Gary Powers: U-2 Spy Pilot Shot Down by the Soviets,” CIA.gov, accessed 9 May 2023.
• Gellman, The President and the Apprentic e, 555–62. For a similar analysis based partly on extensive interviews with former officials, see Piero Gleijeses, “Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs,” Journal of Latin American Studies 27, no. 1 (February 1995): 1–42, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X00010154 .
• David Reynolds, Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 198. While Kennedy may have been somewhat overwhelmed by Khrushchev’s lecturing during the morning meeting of the Vienna summit, he held his own, giving no ground, in a long discussion of Germany and Berlin. Soviet Union, Doc. 87, Memorandum of Conversation, 4 June 1961, 1015, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 , vol. 5, eds. Charles S. Sampson and John Michael Joyce (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998).
• Reynolds, Summits , 199.
• Reynolds, Summits , 219.
• Soviet Union, Doc. 87, Memorandum of Conversation; and Reynolds, Summits , 216, 219.
• Sherwin, Gambling with Armageddon , 176.
• Nash, Kennedy and the Jupiters , 101–3.
• Frederick Kempe, Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth (New York: Penguin, 2011); and Hope M. Harrison, Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61 , Cold War International History Project Working Paper no. 5 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1993), 62.
• Kempe, Berlin 1961 , 293.
• Kempe, Berlin 1961 , 489.
• Kempe, Berlin 1961 , 490.
• Kennedy to Khrushchev, 23 October 1962, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 , vol. 11, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath , eds. Edward C. Keefer and Louis J. Smith (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996).
• Perhaps the most comprehensive list can be found in Munton and Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis , 22–26. They discuss seven possible motives.
• Nash, Kennedy and the Jupiters , 100.
• Sergey Radchenko, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Assessment of New, and Old, Russian Sources,” International Relations 26, no. 3 (September 2012): 327–43, https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178124519 .
• Robert Jervis, “Cuban Missile Crisis,” in The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal , eds. Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes (London: Routledge, 2015), 11.
• Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 160–70.
• Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” 170.
• Khrushchev apparently thought of the Jupiters as near the Soviet Union’s borders or “just over the horizon” on the other side of the Black Sea. Yet, the Jupiters were based at Turkey’s Cigli Air Base near Izmir, which fronts the Aegean. Khrushchev’s dacha on the Black Sea was at Pitsunda in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia, now in the Russian-occupied province of Abkhazia in the independent nation of Georgia. Pitsunda is roughly 1,600 kilometers from Cigli Air Base. The placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba was far closer to the United States.
• William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 541.
• Plokhy, Nuclear Folly , 57.
• Gen Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen William Y. Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994). Gen Smith’s half of the book covers the American military’s reaction.
• The 24 nuclear warheads for the IRBMs did make it to Cuba aboard the Aleksandrovsk on 25 October. Sherwin, Gambling with Armageddon , 200.
• Munton and Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis , 34–38; and Sherwin, Gambling with Armageddon , 198–201.
• Plokhy, Nuclear Folly , 125.
• Mary McAuliffe, ed., CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis—1962 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992), 7. Construction had apparently started a week earlier (before 5 September) on an IRBM site in Guanajay, but the IRBMs themselves were en route to Cuba and in fact never made it to the island, though their warheads did.
• David Barrett and Max Holland, Blind Over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2014), 8–9. See also Max Holland, “The ‘Photo Gap’ that Delayed Discovery of Missiles,” Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 4 (2005).
• William B. Ecker and Kenneth V. Jack, Blue Moon Over Cuba: Aerial Reconnaissance During the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Bantam Books, 2012). The Navy squadron was Light Photographic Squadron 62 (VFP-62), and the Marine squadron was Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 2 (VMCJ-2).
• Chris Pocock, The Dragon Lady Today: The Continuing Story of the U-2 Spyplane (self-published, 2015). See also Pocock’s encyclopedic 50 Years of the U-2: The Complete Illustrated History of the “Dragon Lady” (Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 2005).
• Casey Sherman and Michael J. Tougias, Above and Beyond: John F. Kennedy and America’s Most Dangerous Cold War Spy Mission (New York: Public Affairs, 2018). See Col H. Wayne Whitten, review of Above and Beyond: John F. Kennedy and America’s most Dangerous Cold War Spy Mission , by Sherman and Tougias, Air and Space Power Journal , 22 October 2018.
• Joseph Caddell, “Corona over Cuba: The Missile Crisis and the Early Limitations of Satellite Imagery Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 31, no. 3 (April 2016): 416–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2015.1005495.
• John F. Kennedy, “Radio and Television Public Address” (speech, Oval Office, White House, Washington, DC, 22 October 1962).
• Munton and Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis , 78.
• Sherwin, Gambling with Armageddon , 442. Besides his brother Robert, the president asked seven others to remain: Bundy, Sorenson, McNamara, Rusk, Gilpatric, Ball, and Thompson. In direct questioning, occasionally before Congress, several advisors—McNamara and Rusk among them—lied for years that there had been no secret deal to end the crisis.
• For a fresh look at the resolution of what might be called the post-crisis stage, see David G. Coleman, The Fourteenth Day: JFK and the Aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis , rev. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014).
• Svetlana V Savranskaya, “New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (2005): 249–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390500088312.
• Roswell L. Gilpatric oral history interview, JFK#2, 27 May 1970, JFKOH-RLG-02, John F. Kennedy Oral History Collection, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (JFKPLM), 59–61. Note that p. 60 in the source is mistakenly placed after p. 50; the transcript reads 50, 60, 51–59, 61. McNamara’s later account jibes with Gilpatric’s. Adm Anderson remembered the incident differently.
• George W. Anderson Jr. oral history interview, JFK#1, 25 April 1967, JFKOH-GWA-01, John F. Kennedy Oral History Collection, JFKPLM. Anderson was not reappointed as chief of naval operations, but Kennedy appointed him as ambassador to Portugal. For a third and quite different account based on the 1989 recollections of Adm Isaac Kidd Jr., then a captain and one of Anderson’s senior aides, see Robert M. Beer, “The U.S. Navy in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” U.S. Naval Academy Trident Scholar Report , 1990, 161–66.
• David R. Gibson, “Decisions at the Brink,” Nature 487, no. 7405 (5 July 2012): 27–29, https://doi.org/10.1038/487027a. Gibson’s full study is Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012). See also Gibson, “Avoiding Catastrophe: The Interactional Production of Possibility during the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Journal of Sociology 117, no. 2 (September 2011): 361–419, https://doi.org/10.1086/661761.
• Walter Lippmann, “Blockade Proclaimed,” New York Herald-Tribune , 25 October 1962.
• Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 485–88; Sherwin, Gambling with Armageddon , 384–85; and Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight , 199. Sherwin notes that during an executive committee meeting Ball mentioned that he often talked with Lippman. However, Ball’s opposition to the Jupiter trade—calling it “simply a fishing expedition in Moscow”—makes it unlikely that he carried a message to Lippmann. See Sheldon M. Stern, The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 164.
• Sherwin, Gambling with Armageddon , 439; and Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight , 203–5.
• Alekseyev statement in Blight, Allyn, and Walch, Cuba on the Brink , 118.
• Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War , 194–95; and Matthias Uhl and Vladimir Ivkin, “ ‘Operation Atom’ The Soviet Union’s Stationing of Nuclear Missiles in the German Democratic Republic, 1959,” CWIHP Bulletin , no. 12/13 (Winter–Spring 2001), 299–307. Deployed by the beginning of 1959, the missiles were repositioned to Kaliningrad, Russia, in August 1959. Uhl and Ivkin believe U.S. intelligence detected the initial deployment, but the evidence is murky. Amy Zegart notes that a January 1961 report from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department assessed that the Soviets had deployed medium range ballistic missiles in East Germany between 1958 and 1960, but this report was not integrated into the 19 September 1962 CIA report. Zegart notes that Kennedy asserted in an executive committee meeting that the Cuban deployment was the first time the Soviets had deployed nuclear weapons outside the Soviet Union. Amy B. Zegart, “The Cuban Missile Crisis as Intelligence Failure,” Policy Review , no. 175 (October–November 2012): 23–39, FN2.
• Thomas Blanton, “The Cuban Missile Crisis Just Isn’t What It Used to Be,” CWIHP Bulletin , no. 17/18 (Fall 2012): 18, FN33. See also Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight , 145 and endnote on 381.
• Zegart, “Intelligence Failure,” 23–39; and Sherman Kent, “A Crucial Estimate Re-lived,” Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 4 (Spring 1964). Declassified in 2013. Possibly because relevant documents are still classified, no scholar has yet explained how U.S. intelligence missed the assembly of strategic missile units in the USSR and their transport to Cuba.
• A variation would have been air strikes on 29 or 30 October as stand-alone actions rather than as part of the invasion. With this scenario, Khrushchev would have had to accept the air strikes and certain loss of Russian lives and promptly agree to withdraw the surviving missiles, or the United States would invade.
• Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight , 178–81, 205–6.
• Nikolai Beloborodov, “The War Was Averted (Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, 1962): Memoir of Lieutenant General Nikolai Beloborodov, head of the Soviet nuclear arsenal in Cuba,” 1998, trans. Anna Melyakova and Svetlana Savranskaya, National Security Archive, George Washington University, 6, 9.
• Beloborodov, “The War Was Averted (Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, 1962),” 10.
• Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight , 206.
• Beloborodov, “The War Was Averted (Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, 1962),” 6. Beloborodov said “the warheads for the R-12 medium-range missiles were located in the Bejucal region (Romanov), the warheads for the operational-tactical ‘FROG’ were in the region of Managua (Vasyukov), the warheads for the front cruise missile (FKR) in the region of Santiago de Cuba (Trifonov); there were nuclear warheads in other places as well.”
• Blanton, “The Cuban Missile Crisis Just Isn’t What It Used to Be,” 14.
• Svetlana Savranskaya, “The Underwater Cuban Missile Crisis at 60,” Briefing Book #808, National Security Archive, George Washington University, 3 October 2022, 1. This briefing digital book contains Arkhipov’s 1997 account of the incident. See also an article by the captain of another Foxtrot : Capt Ryurik A. Ketov, “The Cuban Missile Crisis as Seen Through a Periscope,” Journal of Strategic Studie s 28, no. 2 (April 2005): 217–31, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390500088304.
• Strategic empathy is not sympathy but rather the ability to understand someone’s underlying drivers and constraints. An excellent introduction is Zachary Shore, A Sense of the Enemy: The High Stakes History of Reading Your Rival’s Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
• Munton and Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis , 30–31, 100. Mirror-imaging is a heuristic, a mental shortcut. When analysts confront the challenge of building a mental model of an adversary but have little real information, they sometimes attribute to the adversary the same tendencies and pressures they would have. Observing an adversary action, they conclude that the motivations and drivers for that action would be the same—a mirror image—of what American decisionmakers would do if placed in the same circumstances. Mirror-imaging can be useful if the adversary thinks and plans the same way as the analyst but is misleading when the adversary is operating under different and unknown pressures and operating principles. Mirror-imaging rests on the fundamental assumption that the adversaries being analyzed think like the analysts themselves.
• Richard Ned Lebow, “Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Traditional and Revisionist Interpretations Reevaluated,” Diplomatic History 14, no. 4 (October 1990): 471–92, 480, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1990.tb00103.x .
• Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War , 414–15.
• Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979): 263–91, https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185 . A classic article is Jonathan Mercer, “Prospect Theory and Political Science,” Annual Review of Political Science 8, no. 1 (15 June 2005): 1–21, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104911 .
• Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “The Pitsunda Decision,” CWIHP Bulletin , no. 10 (March 1998): 223–27.
• Document 411 Editorial Note, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 , vol. 10, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962 , ed. Louis J. Smith and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997).
• For an extensive explanation of the Rational Actor Model, see Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision , 13–47.
• Janice Gross Stein’s masterful overview is a good place to start: “Threat Perception in International Relations,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology , 2d. ed., ed. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 364–88. Kahneman’s two systems may well operate simultaneously, meaning both emotion and rationality would somehow blend. This suggests that complicated decisions have both emotional and rational elements. An excellent case study is Jonathan Mercer, “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War,” International Organization 67, no. 2 (April 2013): 221–48, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000015. See also Jonathan Mercer, “Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International Politics,” Journal of International Relations and Development 9 (2006): 288–303, https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800091 .
• Lebow, “Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 490.
• Robin Markwica, Emotional Choices: How the Logic of Affect Shapes Coercive Diplomacy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018). See also Keren Yarhi-Milo, Who Fights for Reputation: The Psychology of Leaders in International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018); Robert Jervis, Keren Yarhi-Milo, and Don Casler, “Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security,” World Politics 73, no. 1 (January 2021): 167–203, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887120000246 ; and Janice Gross Stein, “The Micro-Foundations of International Relations Theory: Psychology and Behavioral Economics,” International Organization 71, S1 (2017): 249–63, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818316000436 .
• Markwica, Emotional Choices. ​
• Stern, The Week the World Stood Still , 67–71.
• Alfred G. Ward oral history, U.S. Naval Academy, as quoted in Robert M. Beer, The U.S. Navy in the Cuban Missile Crisis , Trident Scholar Project Report no. 165 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Academy, 1990), 159.
• Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Freedom Press, 1986), 157–95.

about the AUTHOR

Dr. William M. Morgan has been a professor of strategic studies and director of the Diplomacy and Statecraft course at the Marine Corps War College, Marine Corps University, since 2010. A former Marine, he also spent 31 years in the Foreign Service of the Department of State.

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Netanyahu Slams Gallant for Questioning the Goal of ‘Total Victory’ in Gaza

A strongly worded statement from the Israeli prime minister’s office accused Yoav Gallant, the defense minister, of harming the chances of reaching a hostage release deal.

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By Adam Rasgon

reporting from Jerusalem

• Aug. 12, 2024

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel blasted his defense minister, Yoav Gallant, on Monday after the Israeli news media reported that Mr. Gallant had disparaged the Israeli leader’s goal of “total victory” over Hamas, the armed Palestinian group Israel has been battling in Gaza.

The strongly worded statement from Mr. Netanyahu’s office was a reflection of a rift within Mr. Netanyahu’s right-wing government, and in Israel more broadly, over the prosecution of the war, now in its 11th month.

Ynet, a centrist Israeli news outlet, reported that Mr. Gallant had told members of the Israeli Parliament’s foreign affairs and defense committee on Monday that Mr. Netanyahu’s “total victory” slogan was “nonsense.” A member of the committee, who spoke on condition of anonymity to disclose details of the closed-door meeting, confirmed Mr. Gallant used the term.

“When Gallant adopts the anti-Israel narrative, he harms the chances of reaching a hostage release deal,” the prime minister’s office said. “Israel has only one choice: To achieve total victory, which means eliminating Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, and releasing our hostages. This victory will be achieved.”

Realizing that goal, Mr. Netanyahu’s office said, was the directive of the prime minister and the cabinet, which everyone in the government, including Mr. Gallant, must follow.

Mr. Gallant, in a post on social media on Monday, seemed to play down his differences with Mr. Netanyahu. “During a security briefing I gave today to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, I emphasized I was determined to achieve the war’s goals and continue fighting until Hamas is dismantled and the hostages are returned,” he said.

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