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Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics Hardcover – January 1, 1975

• Print length 155 pages
• Language English
• Publisher Columbia University Press
• Publication date January 1, 1975
• ISBN-10 0231038488
• ISBN-13 978-0231038485
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• Publisher ‏ : ‎ Columbia University Press (January 1, 1975)
• Language ‏ : ‎ English
• Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 155 pages
• ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0231038488
• ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0231038485
• Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 15.9 ounces
• #273,646 in Philosophy (Books)

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Onora o'neill.

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• Preface to the original edition
• Introduction to the second edition
• 1. Principles of action
• 2. The problem of relevant act descriptions
• 3. A solution to the problem of relevant descriptions
• 4. Ethical categories
• 5. Applying the categorical imperative
• 6. An assessment of Kant's ethical theory
• 7. Right decisions and assessments of right
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A Comparative Critique of the Moral Philosophies of Alasdair MacIntyre and John Hare

Cognition, content, and the a priori: a study in the philosophy of mind and knowledge, transcendental idealism: kant, autonomy, progress and virtue : why kant has nothing to fear from the overdemandingness objection, schopenhauer, kant and compassion, the philosophy of right, kantian constructivism in moral theory, freedom and reason, kant's ethical thought, the practice of moral judgment, related papers (5), constructions of reason : explorations of kant's practical philosophy, kantian ethics almost without apology, specters of the humean self.

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ACTING ON PRINCIPLE An Essay on Kantian Ethics Second Edition -Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics: Second Edition Onora O'Neill Frontmatter More information

Related Papers

Balabhadra Tripathy

Jochen Bojanowski

In applied ethics, Kant’s moral law is often considered a top-down principle. Particular moral rules or duties are derived from a higher-order principle: the categorical imperative. Yet it is often thought that the moral rules derived from this principle are too rigid, divorced from moral reality in all its complexity. When Kant is pressed on his rigorism, he famously bites the bullet (VRML, AA 08: 426f.). Kant scholars, by contrast, respond to this by turning to the casuistry in Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue. The general strategy is to embrace Kant’s critics by softening his rigorism. Jens Timmermann, for example, claims that the casuistic questions “suffice to draw any simple and easy-to-follow rules of morality (such as ‘Do not kill yourself’) into doubt”. This kind of response is philosophically sound, and it does make Kant’s ethics more plausible. It cannot be made, however, without substantially revising Kant’s ethics. In this paper, I show why the scope of Kant’s casuistry is restricted and does not leave room for genuine exceptions. If we distinguish between two kinds of exceptions, however, we can escape the rigorism charge and make room for a more substantive applied ethics in Kant. With this said, this move will make it necessary to reconsider Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. I believe that Kantians should be committed to the claim that we have a perfect duty to act from the categorical imperative. This claim does not also commit them, however, to particular perfect duties. In giving up on the notion of perfect duties at the material level, we can soften Kant’s rigorism and make room for genuine moral deliberation and interpretation without descending into moral skepticism.

Kant-Studien

In Groundwork III, Kant attempts to give a deduction of the categorical imperative. There is widespread disagreement as to how Kant’s argument is supposed to proceed. Many com-mentators believe that Kant’s deduction fails because some of its argumentative moves are unjustified. In particular, Kant makes a mistaken inference from theoretical freedom to prac-tical freedom, and his axiological ‘superiority claim’ regarding the noumenal world’s priority over the sensible world is unjustified. According to the standard incompatibilist story, Kant came to see that his deduction was flawed by the time he wrote the Critique of Practical Reason, at which point he claimed that the truth of the moral law does not require a deduc-tion since it is a “fact of pure reason”. The moral law is no longer the conclusion of his argu-ment; instead, it functions as the premise of an argument that establishes our freedom. Other commentators endorse a compatibilist reading, according to which the justification of the moral law in Groundwork III and the second Critique are compatible because Kant never attempted to give the strong kind of deduction that he rightly rejects in the second Critique. On the view I develop here, the particular argumentative moves that the standard incompat-ibilist takes issue with are not flawed and incompatible with Kant’s second Critique. I argue for a compatibilist reading of these moves. I think the compatibilist is right to claim that the deduction Kant considered impossible in both the Groundwork and the second Critique is what I call a strong deduction. I also agree with compatibilists that the deduction he actually delivers in Groundwork III is only a weak deduction that makes use of a merely problematic conception of transcendental freedom. However, I do think that Kant’s argument in Groundwork III remains question begging in the final analysis. The facticity claim in the se-cond Critique, by contrast, can provide a non-question-begging account of moral obligation. Here, I agree with the optimistic incompatibilist, who views the argument in the second Cri-tique as an improvement on his argument in the Groundwork. However, in my novel account of Kant’s argument, I endorse what I call ‘radical incompatibilism’ because it concerns the roots of Kant’s approach to the justification of the moral law. What is novel about my ac-count is the claim that the deduction in Groundwork III rests on the false assumption that practical cognition, like theoretical cognition, requires a critique of pure reason. In the se-cond Critique, Kant revised his argument because he realized that, in contrast to synthetic a priori judgments of theoretical cognition, the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments of practical cognition can be derived from the actuality of a “deed”. With respect to pure prac-tical reason, the second Critique proceeds metaphysically—i.e. dogmatically—rather than critically. Hence Kant came to view a deduction of the categorical imperative as unnecessary and abandoned the project of a critique of pure practical reason. We should, for this reason, resist the generality of Kant’s claim in the first Critique to the effect that, for all synthetic judgments a priori, “if not a proof then at least a deduction of the legitimacy of its assertion must unfailingly be supplied” (CPR, B 286).

Kyla Ebels-Duggan

I articulate and defend the most central claims of contemporary Kantian moral theory. I also explain some of the most important internal disagreements in the field, contrasting two approaches to Kantian ethics: Kantian Constructivism and Kantian Realism. I connect the former to Kant’s Formula of Universal Law and the latter to his Formula of Humanity. I end by discussing applications of the Formula of Humanity in normative ethics.

Anthony Beavers

First Paragraph: The dynamic interplay between individuation and universality has been a source of contention in moral discourse since Kant first announced that he could derive the moral law from the a priori structures of pure reason. A typical response to this attempt faults Kant for an overly rational approach to morals that advocates the universal over the individual to the point that concrete persons are lost in intellectual abstraction. The moral requirement that my subjective principle of volition, or maxim, must accord with a universalized version of the same means that I must not be willing to allow myself or anyone else an exception to the law, or to put the matter in Kant's language, morality hangs on the universality of law as such. Coupled with Kant's insistence that heteronomy cannot provide a determining ground for the moral will, which means, in turn, that feelings like care and compassion have no place in ethics and can actually lead to moral confusion, Kant's valorization of universality seems to transform a natural and humane ethical impulse into obedience to some type of totalitarian system that is just to the point of being cold and that cannot respect the concrete individual. This critique of Kant has become so commonplace—particularly in discussions on gender and ethics, where emotional response is seen to be antithetical to the autonomy that underlines Kant's practical philosophy—that citations on this point are scarcely necessary.

Chin=Tai Kim

Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy

Dennis A. De Vera

Eric Watkins (ed.), Kant on Persons and Agency. Cambridge UP: 2018.

Pauline Kleingeld

Eighteenth-Century Studies

Revista de Estudios Kantianos

Álvaro Rodríguez-González Barredo

The “received view” on Kantian ethics holds that perfect duties enjoy absolute priority over imperfect duties. More recently, several Kantian scholars have reassessed this situation, arguing that imperfect duties may remain binding even if they imply breaching a perfect duty. In this article, I argue that both positions rely on a misunderstanding of the bindingness of Kantian duties. Genuine Kantian duties, I claim, remain binding even when they cannot be fulfilled. We must always strive for a total completion of our duties; what it means for us to strive for it, however, will vary depending on our peculiar situation.

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1 Introduction

In essay 2 , I argued that utilitarianism is inadequate as a theory of ethics because it focuses too narrowly on happiness (construed as pleasure and the absence of pain) as the only thing of moral significance. Here we are apt to think first of sensations: a bee sting is painful; a caress is pleasurable. But emotions, moods, and various states of mind and bodily conditions can also be painful or pleasurable and must be included in the purview of utilitarianism. For example: sorrow/joy; gloomy/cheerful; ashamed/proud; nausea/euphoria.

The problem with this is that it overlooks the importance of the lives of creatures— the importance of those lives to the creatures themselves . To illustrate the point, I introduced Luna, an aging dog who can no longer play and explore like she once did, but who still enjoys life. The greatest happiness would be served by arranging to have a new puppy born to replace her, then quickly and painlessly killing her. I ended with this rhetorical question: “Even though Luna lacks the capacity to plan for the future and has no projects to complete or goals to achieve, doesn’t she have an interest in having her life continue, at least so long as she is enjoying it?”

Luna’s presumed interest in continuing to live can only be construed from within the constraints of utilitarianism as her prospect for future happiness. Of course, this doesn’t mean she must actually think about the future. The idea will be that the longer she lives the more happiness she is likely to experience overall in her life. The problem is that it is by no means certain that this is true, let alone that there will be more total happiness in the world. If anything, at some point aging tends to bring less happiness for all concerned. Total life pleasure might be increased only at the expense of an even greater increase in total pain = less happiness overall. So, if Luna does have an interest in continuing to live, we have yet to see why. It’s time to move beyond utilitarianism.

2 Aristotle & Kant: a new deontology

What I say below borrows heavily from the work of contemporary philosopher Christine Korsgaard in her 2018 book, Fellow Creatures: Our Obligation to the Other Animals , and in her 2020 article, “The Origin of the Good and Our Animal Nature,” The Journal of Ethical Reflections 1 (2): 7-28.

Korsgaard combines ideas from Aristotle and Kant to develop an impressive deontological theory. The difference between utilitarianism and deontology is that utilitarianism judges the morality of an action by its consequences, whereas deontology judges the morality of an action by the intention behind it.

2.1 All good is tethered.

Korsgaard starts with the premise that all good, all importance, is tethered . By this she means that all good (and all importance) is good for (or important to ) a sentient creature. There is no such thing as something that is good or important in itself —nothing that is intrinsically valuable. Things are valuable because they are valued, not the reverse. This might strike some readers as counterintuitive, but it makes for a naturalized ethical theory in the sense that it doesn’t require positing hypothetical intrinsic values to explain the moral quality of actions. And it makes for a superior ethical theory, as we shall see.

To help us get a handle on this, consider a hypothetical chunk of chert that is good for making spearpoints. You can imagine a paleolithic hunter using it for this purpose. The spearpoint itself, if skillfully made, will be good for killing a mammoth. And a dead mammoth will be good for feeding and clothing the hunter and his family. But the chunk of chert is not intrinsically good. It’s not intrinsically bad either, of course. It just is. The same for the spearpoint.

2.2 Functional goods and final goods

The thing to note here is that all these goods are what Aristotle calls functional goods. They are good for something. A spearpoint is good for killing game. It is a good spearpoint if it fulfills this function well. Korsgaard calls this functional goodness evaluative goodness because we typically evaluate the goodness of something by how well it functions for an intended purpose.

This leads to an interesting question. What about the purpose for making a spearpoint, which is to keep the hunter and his family alive—what is that good for? Perpetuation of the species? We can say this, but then what is that good for? One idea is that it’s not good for anything, it’s just good—intrinsically good. Another possibility is that it’s not good for anything, period.

Aristotle has a different answer. According to him, the functions of plants are nutrition and reproduction, and the functions of animals are the same plus something additional. Korsgaard says this something additional is:

“. . . characterized by an additional set of powers that determine the way they carry out the nutritive and reproductive functions—namely, the powers of perception and action, where action is understood basically as locomotion guided by perception. . . the idea is that the way an animal functions is by having instinctive evaluative attitudes—desire and aversion, pleasure and pain, fear and interest—towards things that affect her functioning.” ( The Origin of the Good , page 18.)

We can summarize this by saying that the function of an animal’s powers of perception and action is to keep him alive and in good functioning condition, which is his final good . And by pursuing his final good (by, say, making spear points and killing mammoths), he ipso facto affirms the value of his life and claims the status of an end-in-himself. (More about this in connection with Kant below.) This twist on Aristotle gives us the answer to our question about Luna: Luna has an interest in her life continuing because she is not a mere means to an end, but an end in herself!

Red Rock Lake in Centennial Valley, Montana © Kirk Robinson

2.3 Final goods are uncomparable

You might think, “Well, okay, Luna’s life is good for her, and maybe she does have an interest in continuing to live, but this doesn’t mean I have to regard her life as good, let alone equally important as mine.”

Quite right. But remember, all goodness, all importance, is tethered. Luna’s life is good for her and yours is good for you, but there is no independent perspective from which you can judge that your life (or human life in general) is somehow better or more important than hers. The value of a lizard’s life, a vulture’s life, and a human being’s life are all literally uncomparable. Once you see this, it seems perfectly obvious. In essay 2, I quoted John Stuart Mill as saying it is better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. This declarative sentence seems grammatically normal and so one would expect it to be either true or false. But it is neither true nor false because there is no perspective from which a comparison is possible.

Even so, we still don’t know why we should regard the lives of other animals as having ethical importance. For that matter, why should any of us regard the life of another human being as having ethical importance? Maybe the only law is the “law of the jungle” = every creature for itself!

3 Kant on rationality

“I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers who maintain that of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important . . . it is summed up in that short but imperious word ought , so full of high significance.” (Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man , p. 70)

Was Darwin just echoing the common sentiment of his time or is there something more to consider?

According to 18 th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant, we human beings are not only capable of means-end reasoning, which many other animals are also capable of to some extent, we can reflect on our reasons for doing something and evaluate them, asking ourselves if they are good reasons. In doing so, we assess the action plus the reason together (action + reason) as either good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable. Unless prevented from doing so, we can then intentionally act on the verdict. This capacity makes us rational animals in a way that other animals, whose actions and reasoning are governed by instinct, are not. It makes us autonomous rational animals.

This claim of human exceptionalism appears to mark an absolute distinction between human beings and other animals. For example, a chimpanzee’s use of instrumental reason for devising a way to take termites from a termite mound is wholly subservient to instinct, while a person’s rational choices are made on a higher level and can direct her behavior. Rationality in this sense requires taking a detached and disinterested point of view on the facts and is the wellspring of both science and ethics.

Not only do we humans have the capacity for re-evaluating our reasons for doing something, we can also employ reason to determine whether an action is (or would be) moral. This is the most distinctive form of our rationality according to Kant, who is famous in this connection for something known as the categorical imperative , a rule for assessing an action for moral rightness. There is no evidence (so far) that any other species of animal does anything like it.

3.1 The categorical imperative

One formulation of the categorical imperative states, “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” For example, if you are contemplating selling your car to your neighbor without informing her that it needs a new transmission, the maxim of your action will be *Deceive others when it is to your advantage.*

Now, in applying the categorical imperative (universalizing the maxim of your action), you attempt to make it your will that people always deceive each other when it is to their advantage. This means you must will that you deceive others when it is to your advantage and that they do the same to you. In other words, you must will something that is both to your advantage and against your advantage, which is contradictory and irrational. This tells you that the action you are contemplating is morally wrong. Obedience to the verdict, however, is another matter. It requires respect for the moral law as prescribed by the categorical imperative.

Another formulation of the categorical imperative says, “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.”

This means respecting the dignity of an autonomous rational being as an “end in itself” by not deceiving, coercing, forcing, or cheating her. The two formulations are two facets of the same rule and yield the same results.

We know that many animals exhibit empathy, compassion, and cooperation, which are no doubt the evolutionary roots of morality; but so far as we know, only human beings engage in moral reasoning. In Darwin’s words, this capacity (along with conscience) is the “moral sense” that is “summed up in that short but imperious word ought , so full of high significance.”

Now comes the big question: What has all this got to do with how we ought to treat other animals? Kant’s answer is that since other animals are not rational, and so are not capable of participating in a “kingdom of ends” whose members engage in reciprocal legislation of the moral law, we are not morally obligated to treat them as ends-in-themselves. We are free to treat them like tools, simply as means to our ends. But we should not be cruel to them because that will tend to weaken our own moral character.

3.2 Korsgaard’s correction of Kant

By striving to stay alive and in good functioning condition, we human beings necessarily regard ourselves as ends in ourselves. However, while our capacity to understand and apply the categorical imperative allows us to appreciate this fact and its moral significance, it is not what makes us ends in ourselves in the first place. We do this by striving to stay alive and in good functioning condition. Furthermore, since each sentient creature does this in the way natural to it, they are all ends in themselves! It follows that they all have moral standing. And this means we have a moral obligation to respect them for what they are.

Look at it this way: Our capacity to understand and apply the categorical imperative is part of our final good as human beings, just as being a skillful hunter is part of a wolf’s final good, but it doesn’t mean we have moral standing and wolves don’t or that our moral standing is higher than a wolf’s. Somehow, for all his brilliance, Kant missed this implication of his own theory. Korsgaard summarizes:

“So viewed, morality is just the human way of being an animal. . . The claim of the other animals to the standing of ends in themselves has the same ultimate foundation as our own claim does, the same ultimate foundation as morality—the essentially self-affirming nature of life itself.” ( Fellow Creatures: Our Obligation to the Other Animals : 8.6.1)

Prairie Rattlesnake ( Crotalus viridis ) Paintrock Canyon, Wyoming © Kirk Robinson

4 Conclusion and implications

Kant’s ethical theory is superior to utilitarianism by accommodating our moral intuition that individual human beings matter morally quite apart from how happy they are in utilitarian terms. Korsgaard’s “correction” of Kant does him one better by recognizing that other animals are also ends in themselves and so have moral standing too. It follows that we ought not harm them without good reason. Here is a list of important steps in the reasoning:

• All value is tethered = good for . . ., important to . . .
• Functional (evaluative) good: x is good for
• L’s final good (her life) is a kind of functional good: Her life is good for
• The final goods of different species are uncomparable.
• By pursuing what is good for her, an animal claims the status of end-in-itself.
• The categorical imperative commands respect for all ends-in-themselves.
• We ought not to harm other animals without good reason.

In the next essay in this series, we will assess the adequacy of the theory for how well it lends itself to a consideration of wildlife conservation and rewilding. What are our obligations to wild animals, species, and ecosystems? The crux of the issue is the fact that the final goods of different animals, even among members of the same species, frequently conflict: nature red in tooth and claw. This introduces a host of issues. Foremost among them is whether it is ever ethical for a human being to harm another sentient creature. And if so, why, and under what circumstances? One answer is that it is only permissible when the other creature’s good is irreconcilable with one’s own, but when is that? Another possible answer is that it is permissible when it will produce a greater good by benefiting the biotic community. But again, when is that?

Kirk grew up in Bountiful, Utah between the shore of the Great Salt Lake and the foothills of the Wasatch Mountains. As a child, he loved roaming the foothills looking for wild animals and visiting Farmington Bay Bird Refuge. Naturally, he fell in love with the land and its wildlife. Since those early years, he has spent a big part of his life exploring the deserts, rivers, and mountains of the West.

In the 1990s, Kirk and some friends from the Utah Wilderness Association began working to reform Utah wildlife governance and management to make it more democratic, ecologically sound, and compassionate. This led to the founding of a non-profit organization, Western Wildlife Conservancy , to address the issues. Of particular concern is the scientifically and ethically misguided way that native carnivores such as mountain lions, black bears, and gray wolves are treated. The vital role that these intelligent and magnificent creatures play in maintaining the health of ecosystems goes unappreciated, as evidenced by a long history of persecution. In addition to being Executive Director of Western Wildlife Conservancy, Kirk is on the Leadership Council of The Rewilding Institute and the Advisory Committee of Wildlife For All.

Prior to Western Wildlife Conservancy, Kirk was a Professor of Philosophy. He has a PhD in Philosophy from the University of Cincinnati and has taught at universities in Montana and Utah. In 2004, he graduated from the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah with a certificate in Natural Resource Law to better equip him for work on wildlife conservation issues. In his free time, he enjoys backpacking, x-c skiing, river trips, playing the acoustic guitar, and time spent with friends and with his dog Bingo.

Related Rewilding Earth Articles

The Heart of the Wild: Essays on Nature, Conservation, and the Human Future

The Ethics of Wildlife Conservation: Part 2

The Ethics of Wildlife Conservation

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