essay about importance of democracy

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Normative democratic theory deals with the moral foundations of democracy and democratic institutions, as well as the moral duties of democratic representatives and citizens. It is distinct from descriptive and explanatory democratic theory, which aim to describe and explain how democracy and democratic institutions function. Normative democracy theory aims to provide an account of when and why democracy is morally desirable as well as moral principles for guiding the design of democratic institutions and the actions of citizens and representatives. Of course, normative democratic theory is inherently interdisciplinary and must draw on the results of political science, sociology, psychology, and economics in order to give concrete moral guidance.

This brief outline of normative democratic theory focuses attention on seven related issues. First, it proposes a definition of democracy. Second, it outlines different approaches to the question of why democracy is morally valuable at all. Third, it discusses the issue of whether and when democratic institutions have authority and different conceptions of the limits of democratic authority. Fourth, it explores the question of what it is reasonable to demand of citizens in large democratic societies. This issue is central to the evaluation of normative democratic theories. A large body of opinion has it that most classical normative democratic theory is incompatible with what we can reasonably expect from citizens. Fifth, it surveys different accounts of the proper characterization of equality in the processes of representation and the moral norms of representation. Sixth, it discusses the relationship between central findings in social choice theory and democracy. Seventh, it discusses the question of who should be included in the group that makes democratic decisions.

1. Democracy Defined

2.1.1.1 the production of relatively good laws and policies: responsiveness theories, 2.1.1.2 the production of relatively good laws and policies: epistemic theories, 2.1.1.3 character-based arguments, 2.1.2 instrumental arguments against democracy, 2.1.3 grounds for instrumentalism, 2.2.1 liberty, 2.2.2 democracy as public justification, 2.2.3 equality, 3.1 instrumentalist conceptions of democratic authority, 3.2.1 democracy as collective self-rule, 3.2.2 freedom and democratic authority, 3.2.3 equality and authority, 3.3.1 internal limits to democratic authority, 3.3.2 the problem of persistent minorities, 3.3.3 external limits to democratic authority, 4.1 the problem of democratic participation, 4.2.1 elite theory of democracy, 4.2.2 interest group pluralism, 4.2.3 neo-liberalism.

• 4.2.4. The self-interest assumption

4.2.5 The Division of Democratic Labor

4.3.1 the duty to vote, 4.3.2 principled disobedience of the law, 4.3.3 accommodate disagreement through compromise and consensus, 5.1 what sort of representative system is best, 5.2 the ethics of representation, 6. social choice and democracy, 7. the boundary problem: constituting the demos, other internet resources, related entries.

The term “democracy”, as we will use it in this entry, refers very generally to a method of collective decision making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the decision-making process. Four aspects of this definition should be noted. First, democracy concerns collective decision making, by which we mean decisions that are made for groups and are meant to be binding on all the members of the group. Second, we intend for this definition to cover many different kinds of groups and decision-making procedures that may be called democratic. So there can be democracy in families, voluntary organizations, economic firms, as well as states and transnational and global organizations. The definition is also consistent with different electoral systems, for example first-past-the-post voting and proportional representation. Third, the definition is not intended to carry any normative weight. It is compatible with this definition of democracy that it is not desirable to have democracy in some particular context. So the definition of democracy does not settle any normative questions. Fourth, the equality required by the definition of democracy may be more or less deep. It may be the mere formal equality of one-person one-vote in an election for representatives to a parliament where there is competition among candidates for the position. Or it may be more robust, including substantive equality in the processes of deliberation and coalition building leading up to the vote. “Democracy” may refer to any of these political arrangements. It may involve direct referenda of the members of a society in deciding on the laws and policies of the society or it may involve the participation of those members in selecting representatives to make the decisions.

The function of normative democratic theory is not to settle questions of definition but to determine which, if any, of the forms democracy may take are morally desirable and when and how. To evaluate different moral justifications of democracy, we must decide on the merits of the different principles and conceptions of human beings and society from which they proceed.

2. The Justification of Democracy

In this section, we examine different views concerning the justification of democracy. Proposed justifications of democracy identify values or reasons that support democracy over alternative forms of decision-making, such as oligarchy or dictatorship. It is important to distinguish views concerning the justification of democracy from views concerning the authority of democracy, which we examine in section 3 . Attempts to establish democratic authority identify values or reasons in virtue of which subjects have a duty to obey democratic decisions. Justification and authority can come apart (Simmons 2001: ch. 7)—it is possible to hold that the balance of values or reasons supports democracy over alternative forms of decision-making while denying that subjects have a duty to obey democratic decisions.

We can evaluate the justification of democracy along at least two different dimensions: instrumentally, by reference to the outcomes of using it compared with other methods of political decision; or intrinsically, by reference to values that are inherent in the method.

2.1 Instrumentalism

2.1.1 instrumental arguments in favor of democracy.

Two kinds of in instrumental benefits are commonly attributed to democracy: (1) the production of relatively good laws and policies and (2) improvements in the characters of the participants.

It is often argued that democratic decision-making best protects subjects’ rights or interests because it is more responsive to their judgments or preferences than competing forms of government. John Stuart Mill, for example, argues that since democracy gives each subject a share of political power, democracy forces decision-makers to take into account the rights and interests of a wider range of subjects than are taken into account under aristocracy or monarchy (Mill 1861: ch. 3). There is some evidence that as groups are included in the democratic process, their interests are better advanced by the political system. For example, when African Americans regained the right to vote in the United States in 1965, they were able to secure many more benefits from the state than previously (Wright 2013). Economists argue that democracy promotes economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2019). Several contemporary authors defend versions of this instrumental argument by pointing to the robust empirical correlation between well-functioning democratic institutions and the strong protection of core liberal rights, such as rights to a fair trial, bodily integrity, freedom of association, and freedom of expression (Gaus 1996: ch. 13; Christiano 2011; Gaus 2011: ch. 22).

A related instrumental argument for democracy is provided by Amartya Sen, who argues that

no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press. (Sen 1999: 152)

The basis of this argument is that politicians in a multiparty democracy with free elections and a free press have incentives to respond to the expressions of needs of the poor.

Epistemic justifications of democracy argue that, under the right conditions, democracy is generally more reliable than alternative methods at producing political decisions that are correct according to procedure-independent standards. While there are many different explanations for the reliability of democratic decision-making, we outline three of the most prominent explanations here: (1) Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, (2) the effects of cognitive diversity, and (3) information gathering and sharing.

The most prominent explanation for democracy’s epistemic reliability rests on Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (CJT), a mathematical theorem developed by eighteenth-century mathematician the Marquis de Condorcet that builds on the so-called “law of large numbers”. CJT states that, when certain assumptions hold, the probability that a majority of voters support the correct decision increases and approaches one as the number of voters increases. The assumptions are (Condorcet 1785):

• each voter is more likely than not to identify the correct decision (the competence assumption );
• voters vote for what they believe is the correct decision (the sincerity assumption );
• votes are statistically independent of one another (the independence assumption ).

While Condorcet’s original proof was restricted to decisions with only two choices, more recent work argues that CJT can be extended to decisions with three or more choices (List & Goodin 2001). The use of CJT to explain democracy’s reliability is often thought to originate with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s claim that

[i]f, when a sufficiently informed populace deliberates, the citizens were to have no communication among themselves, the general will would always result from the large number of small differences, and the deliberation would always be good. (Rousseau 1762: Book III, ch. IV)

Contemporary theorists continue to rely on CJT, or variants of it, to justify democracy (Barry 1965; Cohen 1986; Grofman and Feld 1988; Goodin & Spiekermann 2019).

The appeal of CJT for epistemic democrats derives from the fact that, if its underlying assumptions are satisfied, decisions produced by even moderately-sized electorates are almost certain to be correct. For example, if the assumptions of CJT hold for an electorate of 10,000 voters, and if each voter is 51 percent likely to identify the correct decision of two options, then the probability that a majority will select the correct decision is 99.97 percent. The formal mathematics of CJT are not subject to dispute. However, critics of CJT-based arguments for democracy argue that the assumptions underlying CJT are rarely, if ever, satisfied in actual democracies (see Black 1963: 159–65; Ladha 1992; Estlund 1997b; 2008: ch. XII; Anderson 2006). First, many have remarked that voters’ opinions are not independent of each other. Indeed, the democratic process seems to emphasize persuasion and coalition building. Second, the theorem does not seem to apply to cases in which the information that voters have access to, and on the basis of which they make their judgments, is segmented in various ways. Segmentation occurs when some sectors of the society do not have the relevant information while others do have it. Modern societies and politics seem to instantiate this kind of segmentation in terms of class, race, ethnic groupings, religion, occupational position, geographical place and so on. Finally, all voters approach issues they have to make decisions on with strong ideological biases that undermine the claim that each voter is bringing a kind of independent observation on the nature of the common good to the vote.

Advocates of CJT-based justifications of democracy generally respond to these sorts of criticisms by attempting to develop variations of CJT with weaker assumptions. These assumptions are more easily satisfied in democracies and so the revised theorems may show that even moderately-sized electorates are almost certain to produce correct decisions (Grofman & Feld 1988; Austen-Smith 1992; Austen-Smith & Banks 1996).

A second common epistemic justification for democracy—which is often traced to Aristotle ( Politics , Book II, Ch. 11; see Waldron 1995)—argues that democratic procedures are best able to exploit the underlying cognitive diversity of large groups of citizens to solve collective problems. Since democracy brings a lot of people into the process of decision making, it can take advantage of many sources of information and perspectives in assessing proposed laws and policies. More recently, Hélène Landemore (2013) has drawn on the “diversity-trumps-ability” theorem of Scott Page and Lu Hong (Hong & Page 2004; Page 2007)—which states that a random collection of agents drawn from a large set of limited-ability agents typically outperforms a collection of the very best agents from that same set—to argue that democracy can be expected to produce better decisions than rule by experts. Both Page and Hong’s original theorem and Landemore’s use of it to justify democracy are subject to dispute (see Quirk 2014; Brennan 2014; Thompson 2014; Bajaj 2014).

A third common epistemic justification for democracy relies on the idea that democratic decision-making tends to be more informed than other forms of decision-making about the interests of citizens and the causal mechanisms necessary to advance those interests. John Dewey argues that democracy involves “a consultation and a discussion which uncovers social needs and troubles”. Even if experts know how best to solve collective problems, they need input from the masses to correct their biases tell them where the problems lie (Dewey 1927 [2012: 154–155]; see also Anderson 2006; Knight & Johnson 2011).

Many have endorsed democracy on the grounds that democracy has beneficial effects on the characters of subjects. Many agree with Mill and Rousseau that democracy tends to make people stand up for themselves more than other forms of rule do because it makes collective decisions depend on their input more than monarchy or aristocracy do. Hence, in democratic societies individuals are encouraged to be more autonomous. Relatedly, by giving citizens a share of control over political-decision-making, democracy cultivates citizens with active and productive characters rather than passive characters. In addition, it has been argued that democracy tends to get people to think carefully and rationally more than other forms of rule because it makes a difference to political outcomes whether they do or not. Finally, some argue that democracy tends to enhance the moral qualities of citizens. When they participate in making decisions, they have to listen to others, they are called upon to justify themselves to others and they are forced to think in part in terms of the interests of others. Some have argued that when people find themselves in this kind of circumstance, they can be expected genuinely to think in terms of the common good and justice. Hence, some have argued that democratic processes tend to enhance the autonomy, rationality, activity, and morality of participants. Since these beneficial effects are thought to be worthwhile in themselves, they count in favor of democracy and against other forms of rule (Mill 1861 [1991: 74]; Elster 1986 [2003: 152]; Hannon 2020).

Some argue in addition that the above effects on character tend to enhance the quality of legislation as well. A society of autonomous, rational, active, and moral decision-makers is more likely to produce good legislation than a society ruled by a self-centered person or a small group of persons who rule over slavish and unreflective subjects. Of course, the soundness of any of the above arguments depends on the truth of the causal theories of the consequences of different institutions.

Not all instrumental arguments favor democracy. Plato argues that democracy is inferior to various forms of monarchy, aristocracy and even oligarchy on the grounds that democracy tends to undermine the expertise necessary to the proper governance of societies (Plato 1974, Book VI). Most people do not have the kinds of intellectual talents that enable them to think well about the difficult issues that politics involves. But in order to win office or get a piece of legislation passed, politicians must appeal to these people’s sense of what is right or not right. Hence, the state will be guided by very poorly worked out ideas that experts in manipulation and mass appeal use to help themselves win office. Plato argues instead that the state should be ruled by philosopher-kings who have the wisdom and moral character required for good rule. He thus defends a version of what David Estlund calls “epistocracy”, a form of oligarchy that involves rule by experts (Estlund 2003).

Mill defends a form of epistocracy that is sometimes referred to as the “plural voting” scheme (1861: ch. 4). While all rational adults get at least one vote under this scheme, some citizens get a greater number of votes based on satisfying some measure of political expertise. While Mill identifies the relevant measure of expertise in terms of formal education, the plural voting scheme is consistent with other measures. This scheme might be thought to combine the instrumental value of political expertise with the intrinsic value of broad inclusion.

One objection to any form of epistocracy—the demographic objection —holds that any criterion of expertise is likely to select demographically homogeneous individuals who are be biased in ways that undermine their ability to produce political outcomes that promote the general welfare (Estlund 2003).

Hobbes argues that democracy is inferior to monarchy because democracy fosters destabilizing dissension among subjects (Hobbes 1651: chap. XIX). On his view, individual citizens and even politicians are apt not to have a sense of responsibility for the quality of legislation because no one makes a significant difference to the outcomes of decision making. As a consequence, citizens’ concerns are not focused on politics and politicians succeed only by making loud and manipulative appeals to citizens in order to gain more power, but all lack incentives to consider views that are genuinely for the common good. Hence the sense of lack of responsibility for outcomes undermines politicians’ concern for the common good and inclines them to make sectarian and divisive appeals to citizens.

Many contemporary theorists expand on these Platonic and Hobbesian criticisms. A good deal of empirical data shows that citizens of large-scale democracies are ill-informed and apathetic about politics. This makes room for special interests to control the behavior of politicians and use the state for their own limited purposes all the while spreading the costs to everyone. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that democratic citizens often engage in motivated reasoning that unconsciously aims to affirm their existing political identities rather than arrive at correct judgments (Lord, Ross, & Lepper 1979; Bartels 2002; Kahan 2013; Achen & Bartels 2016). Some theorists argue that these considerations justify abandoning democracy altogether, while modest versions of these arguments have been used to justify modification of democratic institutions (Caplan 2007; Somin 2013; Brennan 2016). Relatedly, some theorists argue that rather than having beneficial effects on the characters of subjects as Mill and others argue, democracy actually has deleterious effects on the subjects’ characters and relationships (Brennan 2016: ch. 3).

Pure instrumentalists argue that these instrumental arguments for and against the democratic process are the only bases on which to evaluate the justification of democracy or compare it with other forms of political decision-making. There are a number of different kinds of argument for pure instrumentalism. One kind of argument proceeds from a more general moral theory. For example, classical utilitarianism has no room in its monistic axiology for the intrinsic values of fairness and liberty or the intrinsic importance of an egalitarian distribution of political power. Its sole concern with maximizing utility—understood as pleasure or desire satisfaction—guarantees that it can provide only instrumental arguments for and against democracy.

But one need not be a thoroughgoing utilitarian to argue for instrumentalism in democratic theory. There are arguments in favor of instrumentalism that pertain directly to the question of democracy and collective decision making generally. One argument states that political power involves the exercise of power of some over others. And it argues that the exercise of power of one person over another can only be justified by reference to the protection of the interests or rights of the person over whom power is exercised. Thus no distribution of political power could ever be justified except by reference to the quality of outcomes of the decision making process (Arneson 1993 [2002: 96–97]; 2003; 2004; 2009). Another sort of argument for instrumentalism proceeds negatively, attempting to show that the non-instrumental values most commonly used in attempted justifications for democracy do not actually justify democracy, and that an instrumental justification for democracy is therefore the only available sort of justification (Wall 2007).

Other arguments question the coherence of the idea of intrinsically fair collective decision making processes. For instance, social choice theory questions the idea that there can be a fair decision making function that transforms a set of individual preferences into a rational collective preference. The core objection is that no general rule satisfying reasonable constraints can be devised that can transform any set of individual preferences into a rational social preference. And this is taken to show that democratic procedures cannot be intrinsically fair (Riker 1982: 116). Ronald Dworkin argues that the idea of equality, which is for him at the root of social justice, cannot be given a coherent and plausible interpretation when it comes to the distribution of political power among members of the society. The relation of politicians to citizens inevitably gives rise to inequality; the process of democratic deliberation inevitably gives those with superior argument making abilities and greater willingness to participate more influence and therefore more power, than others, so equality of political power cannot be intrinsically fair or just (Dworkin 2000). In later work, Dworkin has pulled back from this originally thoroughgoing instrumentalism (Dworkin 1996).

2.2 Non-instrumentalism

Few theorists deny that political institutions must be at least in part evaluated in terms of the outcomes of having those institutions. Some argue in addition, that some forms of decision making are morally desirable independent of the consequences of having them. A variety of different approaches have been used to show that democracy has this kind of intrinsic value.

One prominent justification for democracy appeals to the value of liberty. According to one version of the view, democracy is grounded in the idea that each ought to be master of his or her life. Each person’s life is deeply affected by the larger social, legal and cultural environment in which he or she lives. Only when each person has an equal voice and vote in the process of collective decision-making will each have equal control over this larger environment. Thinkers such as Carol Gould conclude that only when some kind of democracy is implemented, will individuals have a chance at self-government (Gould 1988: 45–85). Since individuals have a right of self-government, they have a right to democratic participation. The idea is that the right of self-government gives one a right, within limits, to do wrong. Just as an individual has a right to make some bad decisions for himself or herself, so a group of individuals have a right to make bad or unjust decisions for themselves regarding those activities they share.

One major difficulty with this line of argument is that it appears to require that the basic rule of decision-making be consensus or unanimity. If each person must freely choose the outcomes that bind him or her then those who oppose the decision are not self-governing. They live in an environment imposed on them by others. So only when all agree to a decision are they freely adopting the decision (Wolff 1970: ch. 2). The trouble is that there is rarely agreement on major issues in politics. Indeed, it appears that one of the main reasons for having political decision making procedures is that they can settle matters despite disagreement.

One liberty-based argument that might seem to escape this worry appeals to an irreducibly collective right to self-determination. It is often argued that political communities have a right as a community to organize themselves politically in accordance with their values, principles, or commitments. Some argue that the right to collective self-determination requires democratic institutions that give citizens collective control over their political and legal structure (Cassese 1995). However, many argue democratic institutions are sufficient but not necessary to realize the right to collective self-determination because political communities might exercise this right to implement non-democratic institutions (Altman & Wellman 2009; Stilz 2016).

Another non-instrumental justification of democracy appeals to the ideal of public justification. The idea behind this approach is that laws and policies are legitimate to the extent that they are publicly justified to the citizens of the community. Public justification is justification to each citizen as a result of free and reasoned debate among equals.

Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory of deliberative democracy has been highly influential in the development of this approach. Habermas analyses the form and function of modern legal systems through the lens of his theory of communicative action. This analysis yields the Democratic Principle:

[O]nly those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted. (Habermas 1992 [1996: 110])

Habermas advances a conception of democratic legitimacy according to which law is legitimate only if it results from a free and inclusive democratic process of “opinion and will-formation”. What might such a process look like in a complex and differentiated society? Habermas answers by advancing a “two-track” model that understands democratic legitimation in terms of the relationship between institutionalized deliberative bodies (e.g legislatures, agencies, courts) and informal communication in the public sphere, which is “wild”, and not centrally coordinated.

One possible objection to this view is that free and inclusive democratic procedures are insufficient to satisfy the demand for deliberative consensus embodied in the Democratic Principle. This demand is unlikely to be satisfied in diverse societies, since deep disagreements about which laws ought to be enacted is likely to remain after the relevant process of opinion and will-formation. The Democratic Principle might thus be thought to embody an overly idealistic conception of democratic legitimacy (Estlund 2008: ch.10). Another possible worry is that the Discourse Principle is not a genuine moral principle, but a principle that embodies the felicity conditions of practical discourse. As such, the Discourse Principle cannot ground a conception of democratic legitimacy that yields robust moral prescriptions (Forst 2016).

Drawing on Habermas and John Rawls, among others, Joshua Cohen (1996 [2003]) develops a conception of democracy in which citizens justify laws and policies on the basis of mutually acceptable reasons. Democracy, properly understood, is the context in which individuals freely engage in a process of reasoned discussion and deliberation on an equal footing. The ideas of freedom and equality provide guidelines for structuring democratic institutions.

The aim of Cohen’s conception of democracy as public justification is reasoned consensus among citizens. But a serious problem arises when we ask about what happens when disagreement remains. Two possible replies have been suggested. It has been urged that forms of consensus weaker than full consensus are sufficient for public justification and that the weaker varieties are achievable in many societies. For instance, there may be consensus on the list of reasons that are acceptable publicly but disagreement on the weight of the different reasons. Or there may be agreement on general reasons abstractly understood but disagreement about particular interpretations of those reasons. What would have to be shown here is that such weak consensus is achievable in many societies and that the disagreements that remain are not incompatible with the ideal of public justification.

The basic principle seems to be the principle of reasonableness according to which reasonable persons will only offer principles for the regulation of their society that other reasonable persons can reasonably accept. One only offers principles that others, who restrain themselves in the same way, can accept. Such a principle implies a kind of principle of restraint which requires that reasonable persons avoid proposing laws and policies on the basis of controversial moral or philosophical principles. When individuals offer proposals for the regulation of their society, they ought not to appeal to the whole truth as they see it but only to that part of the whole truth that others can reasonably accept. To put the matter in the way Rawls puts it: political society must be regulated by principles on which there is an overlapping consensus (Rawls 2005: Lecture IV). This is meant to obviate the need for a complete consensus on the principles that regulate society.

However, it is hard to see how this approach avoids the need for a complete consensus, which is highly unlikely to occur in any even moderately diverse society. The reason for this is that it is not clear why it is any less of an imposition on me when I propose legislation or policies for the society that I must restrain myself to considerations that other reasonable people accept than it is an imposition on others when I attempt to pass legislation on the basis of reasons they reasonably reject. For if I do restrain myself in this way, then the society I live in will not live up to the standards that I believe are essential to evaluating the society. I must then live in and support a society that does not accord with my conception of how it ought to be organized. It is not clear why this is any less of a loss of control over society than for those who must live in a society that is partly regulated by principles they do not accept. If one is a problem, then so is the other, and complete consensus is the only solution (Christiano 2009).

Many democratic theorists have argued that democracy is a way of treating persons as equals when there is good reason to impose some kind of organization on their shared lives but they disagree about how best to do it. Peter Singer argues that when people insist on different ways of arranging matters properly, each person in a sense claims a right to be dictator over their shared lives (Singer 1973: 30–41). But these claims to dictatorship cannot all hold up. Democracy embodies a kind of peaceful and fair compromise among these conflicting claims to rule. Each compromises equally on what he claims as long as the others do, resulting in each having an equal say over decision making. In effect, democratic decision making respects each person’s point of view on matters of common concern by giving each an equal say about what to do in cases of disagreement (Singer 1973; Waldron 1999: chap. 5).

What if people disagree on the democratic method or on the particular form democracy is to take? Are we to decide these latter questions by means of a higher order procedure? And if there is disagreement on the higher order procedure, must we also democratically decide that question? The view seems to lead to an infinite regress.

An alternative way of justifying democracy on the basis of equality is to ground democracy in public equality. Public equality is a principle of equality which ensures that people can see that they are being treated as equals. This view arises from three ideas. First, there is the basic egalitarian idea that people’s interests ought to be equally advanced, or at least that they ought to have equal opportunities to advance them. Second, human beings generally have highly fallible and biased understandings of their own and other people’s interests. Third, persons have fundamental interests in being able to see that they are being treated as equals. Public equality is an egalitarian principle that can be seen to be realized among persons despite the dramatically incomplete forms of knowledge people have. It is not all of justice, but it is essential that the principle be realized in a pluralistic society.

Democracy is a uniquely publicly egalitarian way to make collective decisions when there is substantial disagreement and conflict of interest among persons about how to shape the society they share. Each can see that the only plausible way of overcoming persistent disagreement over how to shape the society they all live in, while still publicly treating all persons as equals in the face of bias and fallibility, is to give each person an equal say in the process of shaping that society. Thus, democracy is necessary to the realization of public equality in a political society. Within the framework determined by this publicly realized equality, persons are permitted to attempt to bring about their more particular ideas about justice and the common good that they think are right.

The idea of public equality also grounds limits to democratic decision making. The thought is that a society cannot democratically decide to abolish the democratic rights of some of its members. Public equality also requires that basic liberal and civil rights be respected as well, by the democratic process and so serves as a limit to democratic decision making (Christiano 2008; Valentini 2013).

A number of worries attend this kind of view. First, it is generally thought that majority rule is required for treating persons as equals in collective decision making. This is because only majority rule is neutral towards alternatives in decision making. Unanimity tends to favor the status quo as do various forms of supermajority rule. But if this is so, the above view raises the twin dangers of majority tyranny and of persistent minorities, i.e., groups of persons who find themselves always losing in majority decisions. Surely these latter phenomena must be incompatible with public equality. Second, the kind of view defended above is susceptible to the worry that political equality is not a coherent ideal in any modern state with a complex division of labor and the need for representation. This last worry will be discussed in more detail in the next sections on democratic citizenship and legislative representation. The first worry will be discussed more in the discussion on the limits to democratic authority.

A related approach grounds democracy in the ideal of relational equality . A concern with relational equality is a concern for

human relationships that are, in certain crucial respects at least, unstructured by differences of rank, power, or status. (Scheffler 2010: 225)

Niko Kolodny argues that democratic institutions are an essential component of relational equality (Kolodny 2014a,b). One line of Kolodny’s argument holds that political decisions involve the use of coercive force. Inequalities in the power to use force undermine equal social status at least in part because the power to use force is “the power that usually determines the distribution of other powers” (Kolodny 2014b: 307). Individuals who have superior power to use force on others have a superior social status. An egalitarian distribution of political power is thus essential for realizing social equality. And only democratic institutions provide an egalitarian distribution of political power. We will discuss the relationship between relational equality and democracy further when we discuss the authority of democracy in Part 3 below.

3. The Authority of Democracy

Since democracy is a collective decision process, the question naturally arises about whether there is any duty of citizens to obey democratic decisions when they disagree with it.

There are three main concepts of the legitimate authority of the state. First, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that it is morally justified in coercively imposing its rule on the members. Legitimate authority on this account has no direct implications concerning the obligations or duties that citizens may hold toward that state. It simply says that if the state is morally justified in doing what it does, then it has legitimate authority. Second, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that its directives generate duties in citizens to obey. The duties of the citizens need not be owed to the state but they are real duties to obey. The third is that the state has a right to rule that is correlated with the citizens’ duty to it to obey it. This is the strongest notion of authority and it seems to be the core idea behind the legitimacy of the state. The idea is that when citizens disagree about law and policy it is important to be able to answer the question, who has the right to choose?

Instrumental arguments for democracy give some reason for why one ought to respect the democracy when one disagrees with its decisions. There may be many instrumental considerations that play a role in deciding on the question of whether one ought to obey. And these instrumental considerations are pretty much the same whether one is considering obedience to democracy or some other form of rule.

There is one instrumentalist approach which is quite unique to democracy and that seems to ground a strong conception of democratic authority. That is the epistemic approach inspired by the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which we discussed in section 2.1.1.2 above. There, we discussed a number of difficulties with the application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to the case of voting in elections and referenda in large-scale democracies, including lack of independence, informational segmentation, and the existence of ideological biases.

One further worry about the Jury Theorem’s epistemic conceptions of authority is that it would prove too much since it undermines the common practice of the loyal opposition in democracies. If the background conditions of the Jury Theorem are met, a large-scale democracy majority is practically certain to produce the right decisions. On what basis can citizens in a political minority rationally hold on to their competing views? The members of the minority have a powerful reason for shifting their allegiance to the majority position, since each has very good reason to think that the majority is right. The epistemic conception of authority based on the Jury Theorem thus threatens to be objectionably authoritarian, since it looks like it demands not only obedience of action but obedience of thought as well. Even in scientific communities the fact that a majority of scientists favor a particular view does not make the minority scientists think that they are wrong, though it does perhaps give them pause (Goodin 2003: ch. 7).

Some theories of democratic authority combine instrumental and non-instrumental considerations. David Estlund argues that democratic procedures have legitimate authority because they are better than random and epistemically the best of the political systems that are acceptable to all reasonable citizens (Estlund 2008). They must be better than random because, otherwise, why wouldn’t we use a fair random procedure like a lottery or coin flip? Democratic authority must have an epistemic element. And the justification of democratic procedure must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens in order to respect their freedom and equality. Estlund’s conception of democratic authority—which he calls “epistemic proceduralism”— thus combines the ideal of public justification with a concern for the tendency of democracies to produce good decisions.

3.2 Intrinsic Conceptions of Democratic Authority

Some theorists argue that there is a special relation between democracy and legitimate authority grounded in the value of collective self-rule. John Locke argues that when a person consents to the creation of a political society, they necessarily consent to the use of majority rule in deciding how the political society is to be organized (Locke 1690: sec. 96). Locke thinks that majority rule is the natural decision rule when there is disagreement. He argues that a society is a kind of collective body that must move in the direction of the greater force. One way to understand this argument is as follows. If we think of each member of society as an equal and if we think that there is likely to be disagreement beyond the question of whether to join society or not, then we must accept majority rule as the appropriate decision rule. This interpretation of the greater force argument assumes that the expression “greater force” is to be understood in terms of the equal worth of each person’s interests and rights, so the society must go in the direction in which the greater number of persons wants it to go.

Locke thinks that a people, which is formed by individuals who consent to be members, could choose a monarchy by means of majority rule and so this argument by itself does not give us an argument for democracy. But Locke refers back to this argument when he defends the requirement of representative institutions for deciding when property may be regulated and taxes levied. He argues that a person must consent to the regulation or taxation of his property by the state. But he says that this requirement of consent is satisfied when a majority of the representatives of property holders consent to the regulation and taxation of property (Locke, 1690: sec. 140). This does seem to be moving towards a genuinely democratic conception of legitimate authority.

Rousseau argues that when individuals consent to form a political community, they agree to put themselves under the direction of the “general will” (Rousseau 1762). The general will is not a mere aggregation of individuals’ private wills. It is, rather, the will of the political community as a whole. And since the general will can only emerge as the product of a properly organized democratic procedure, individuals consent to put themselves under the direction of a properly organized democratic procedure. On one interpretation of Rousseau, democratic procedures are properly organized only when they (1) define rights that apply equally to all, (2) via a procedure that considers everyone’s interests equally, and (3) everyone who is coerced to obey the laws has a voice in that procedure.

There are at least two ways of understanding the idea of the general will. On what might be called the constitutive interpretation, the general will is constituted by the results of a properly organized democratic procedure. That is, the results of a properly organized democratic procedure are the general will in virtue of the fact that they emerge from a properly organized democratic procedure, and not because they reflect some procedure-independent truth about the common good. On what might be called the epistemic interpretation, the results of a properly organized democratic procedure are the way of tracking the procedure-independent truth about the common good. As we discussed in section 3.1 , Rousseau is often interpreted as appealing to Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to support the epistemic credentials of a properly organized democratic procedure.

Anna Stilz develops an account of democratic authority that appeals to the value of “freedom as independence” (Stilz 2009). Freedom as independence is freedom from being subject to the will of another. In order not to be subject to the will of others, individuals need property rights and a protected sphere of autonomy to pursue one’s plans. Drawing on Kant, Stilz argues that attempts by particular individuals, no matter how conscientious, to define and secure rights to property and autonomy in a state of nature will be inconsistent with freedom as independence. Such attempts unilaterally impose new obligations on others through acts of private will in the face of competing claims. But even if individuals in a state of nature do agree to a resolution of their competing claims, they are dependent on the will of others to honor this agreement. Stilz thus argues that justice must be administered by an authoritative legal system which can coercively impose one set of objective rules—rules we must respect even when we disagree—to adjudicate our conflicting claims. But if such a system is to be consistent with the freedom of subjects, it cannot be imposed by the private wills of rulers. The solution, Stilz argues, lies in Rousseau’s idea of the general will. When subjects obey the general will, they are not obeying the private will of any individual; they are obeying a will that arises from all and applies to all.

One worry with this account is that those who oppose democratically-enacted laws or policies can complain that those laws or policies are imposed against their will. Perhaps they are not subject to the will of a particular individual, but they are subject to the will of a majority. This might be thought to constitute a significant threat to individuals’ freedom as independence. Another worry, which Stilz’s view arguably inherits from Rousseau, is that the conditions for the general will to emerge are so demanding that the view implies that no state that exists or has existed has legitimate political authority. Stilz’s view might thus be thought to entail what A.J. Simmons calls “a posteriori anarchism” (Simmons 2001).

Another approach to democratic authority asserts that failing to obey the decisions of a democratic assembly amounts to treating one’s fellow citizens as inferiors (Christiano 2008: ch. 6). In the face of disagreement about substantive law and policy, democracy realizes a kind of public equality by giving each individual an equal say in determining which laws or policies will be enacted. Citizens who skirt laws made by suitably egalitarian procedures act contrary to the equal right of all citizens to have a say in making laws. Those who refuse to pay taxes or respect property laws on the grounds that they are unjust are affirming a superior right to that of others in determining how the shared aspects of social life ought to be arranged. Thus, they violate the duty to treat others publicly as equals. And there is reason to think this duty must normally have some pre-eminence. Public equality is the most important form of equality and democracy is required by public equality. The other forms of equality in play in substantive disputes about law and policy are ones about which people can have reasonable disagreements (within limits specified by the principle of public equality). Citizens thus have obligations to abide by the democratic process even if their favored conceptions of justice or equality are passed by in the decision making process.

Daniel Viehoff develops an egalitarian conception of democratic authority based on the ideal of relational equality (Viehoff 2014; see section 2.2.3 above for more on relational equality). Viehoff argues that relational equality is threatened by “subjection” in a relationship, which occurs when individuals have significantly different power over how they interact with and relate to one another. According to Viehoff, obeying the outcomes of egalitarian democratic procedures is necessary and sufficient for citizens to achieve coordination on common rules without subjection. It is sufficient because democratic procedures distribute decision-making power equally, which ensures that coordination is not determined by unequal power advantages. It is necessary because parties must set aside the considerations of greater and lesser power to realize non-subjection in their relationship.

Fabienne Peter develops a fairness-based conception of democratic authority that incorporates epistemic considerations (Peter 2008; 2009). Drawing on insights from proceduralist epistemology, Peter’s “pure epistemic proceduralism” holds that suitably egalitarian democratic decisions are binding at least in part because they result from a fair procedure of knowledge-production. This account differs from Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism (see section 5.1 above) because it does not condition the authority of democratic procedures on their ability to produce decisions that track the procedure-independent truth. Rather, the authority of democratic procedures is grounded in their fairness. And it differs from pure procedural accounts because the relevant notion of fairness is fairness in knowledge-production.

3.3 Limits to the Authority of Democracy

What are the limits to democratic authority? A limit to democratic authority is a principle violation of which defeats democratic authority. When the principle is violated by the democratic assembly, the assembly loses its authority in that instance or the moral weight of the authority is overridden. A number of different views have been offered on this issue. We can distinguish between internal and external limits to democratic authority. An internal limit arises from the constitutive requirements of the democratic process or from the principles that ground democracy. An external limit arises from principles that are independent of the values or requirements that ground democracy.

External limits to democratic authority are rebutting limits, which are principles that weigh against—and may sometimes outweigh the principles that ground democracy. So in a particular case, an individual may see that there are reasons to obey the assembly and some reasons against obeying the assembly and in the case at hand the reasons against obedience outweigh the reasons in favor of obedience. Internal limits to democratic authority are undercutting limits. These limits function not by weighing against the considerations in favor of authority, they undercut the considerations in favor of authority altogether; they simply short circuit the authority. When an undercutting limit is in play, it is not as if the principles which ground the limit outweigh the reasons for obeying the democratic assembly, it is rather that the reasons for obeying the democratic assembly are undermined altogether; they cease to exist or at least they are severely weakened.

Some have argued that the democratic process ought to be limited to decisions that are not incompatible with the proper functioning of the democratic process. So they argue that the democratic process may not legitimately take away the political rights of its citizens in good standing. It may not take away rights that are necessary to the democratic process such as freedom of association or freedom of speech. But these limits do not extend beyond the requirements for proper democratic functioning. They do not protect non political artistic speech or freedom of association in the case of non political activities (Ely 1980: chap. 4).

Another kind of internal limit is a limit that arises from the principles that underpin democracy. And the presence of this limit would seem to be necessary to making sense of the first limit because in order for the first limit to be morally important we need to know why a democracy ought to protect the democratic process.

Locke gives an account of the internal limits of democracy in his idea that there are certain things to which a citizen may not consent (Locke 1690: ch. XI). She may not consent to arbitrary rule or the violation of fundamental rights including democratic and liberal rights. Since consent is the basis of democratic authority for Locke, this account provides an explanation of the idea behind the first internal limit, that democracy may not be suspended by democratic means but it goes beyond that limit to suggest that rights that are not essentially connected with the exercise of the franchise may also not be violated because one may not consent to their violation.

More recently, Ronald Dworkin has defended an account of the limits of democratic authority (Dworkin 1996). He argues that democracy is justified by appeal to a principle of self-government. He argues that self-government cannot be realized unless all citizens are treated as full members of the political community, because, otherwise, they are not able to identify as members of the community. Among the conditions of full membership, he argues, are rights to be treated as equals and rights to have one’s moral independence respected. These principles support robust requirements of non-discrimination and of basic liberal rights.

The conception of democratic authority that grounds it in public equality also provides an account of the limits of that authority (Christiano 2008: ch. 6). Since democracy is founded in public equality, it may not violate public equality in any of its decisions. The basic idea is that overt violation of public equality by a democratic assembly undermines the claim that the democratic assembly embodies public equality. Democracy’s embodiment of public equality is conditional on its protecting public equality. To the extent that liberal rights are grounded in public equality and the provision of an economic minimum is also so grounded, this suggests that democratic rights and liberal rights and rights to an economic minimum create a limit to democratic authority. This account also provides a deep grounding for the kinds of limits to democratic authority defended in the first internal limit and it goes beyond these to the extent that protection of rights that are not connected with the exercise of the franchise is also necessary to public equality.

This account of the authority of democracy also provides some help with a vexing problem of democratic theory. This problem is the difficulty of persistent minorities. There is a persistent minority in a democratic society when that minority always loses in the voting. This is always a possibility in democracies because of the use of majority rule. If the society is divided into two or more highly unified voting blocks in which the members of each group votes in the same ways as all the other members of that group, then the group in the minority will find itself always on the losing end of the votes. This problem has plagued some societies, particularly those with indigenous peoples who live within developed societies. Though this problem is often connected with majority tyranny it is distinct from the problem of majority tyranny because it may be the case that the majority attempts to treat the minority well, in accordance with its conception of good treatment. It is just that the minority never agrees with the majority on what constitutes proper treatment. Being a persistent minority can be highly oppressive even if the majority does not try to act oppressively. This can be understood with the help of the very ideas that underpin democracy. Persons have interests in being able to correct for the cognitive biases of others and to be able to make the world in such a way that it makes sense to them. These interests are set back for a persistent minority since they never get their way.

The conception of democracy as grounded in public equality can shed light on this problem. It can say that the existence of a persistent minority violates public equality (Christiano 2008: chap. 7). In effect, a society in which there is a persistent minority is one in which that minority is being treated publicly as an inferior because it is clear that its fundamental interests are being set back. Hence to the extent that violations of public equality undercut the authority of a democratic assembly, the existence of a persistent minority undermines the authority of the democracy at least with respect to the minority. This suggests that certain institutions ought to be constructed so that the minority is not persistent.

One natural kind of limit to democratic authority is the external kind of limit. Here the idea is that there are certain considerations that favor democratic decision making and there are certain values that are independent of democracy that may be at issue in democratic decisions. For example, many theories recognize core liberal rights—such as rights to property, bodily integrity, and freedom of thought and expression—as external limits to democratic authority. Locke is often interpreted as arguing that individuals have natural rights to property in themselves and the external world that democratic laws must respect in order to have legitimate authority (Locke 1690).

Some views may assert that there are only external limits to democratic authority. But it is possible to think that there are both internal and external limits. Such an issue may arise in decisions to go to war, for example. In such decisions, one may have a duty to obey the decision of the democratic assembly on the grounds that this is how one treats one’s fellow citizens as equals but one may also have a duty to oppose the war on the grounds that the war is an unjust aggression against other people. To the extent that this consideration is sufficiently serious it may outweigh the considerations of equality that underpin democratic authority. Thus one may have an overall duty not to obey in this context. Issues of foreign policy in general seem to give rise to possible external limits to democracy.

4. The Demands of Democratic Participation

In this section, we examine the demands of participation in large-scale democracies. We begin by examining a core challenge to the idea that democratic citizens are capable of governing a large and complex society. We then explore different proposed solutions to the core challenge. Finally, we examine the moral duties of democratic citizens in large-scale democracies in light of the core challenge.

A vexing problem of democratic theory has been to determine whether ordinary citizens are up to the task of governing a large and complex society. There are three distinct problems here:

• Plato argued that some people are more intelligent and informed about political matters than others and have a superior moral character, and that those persons ought to rule ( The Republic , Book VI)
• Others have argued that a society must have a division of labor. If everyone were engaged in the complex and difficult task of politics, little time or energy would be left for the other essential tasks of a society. Conversely, if we expect most people to engage in other difficult and complex tasks, how can we expect them to have the time and resources sufficient to devote themselves intelligently to politics?
• Since individuals have so little impact on the outcomes of political decision making in large societies, they have little sense of responsibility for the outcomes. Some have argued that it is not rational to vote since the chances that an individual’s vote will a decide the outcome of an election (i.e., will determine whether a candidate gets elected or not) are nearly indistinguishable from zero. For example, one widely accepted estimate puts the odds of an individual casting the deciding vote in a United States presidential election at 1 in 100 million. Many estimates put the odds much lower. Worse still, Anthony Downs has argued that almost all of those who do vote have little reason to become informed about how best to vote (Downs 1957: ch.13). On the assumption that citizens reason and behave roughly according to the Downsian model, either the society must in fact be run by a relatively small group of people with minimal input from the rest or it will be very poorly run. As we can see these criticisms are echoes of the sorts of criticisms Plato and Hobbes made.

These observations pose challenges for any robustly egalitarian or deliberative conception of democracy. Without the ability to participate intelligently in politics one cannot use one’s votes to advance one’s aims nor can one be said to participate in a process of reasoned deliberation among equals. So, either equality of political power implies a kind of self-defeating equal participation of citizens in politics or a reasonable division of labor seems to undermine equality of power. And either substantial participation of citizens in public deliberation entails the relative neglect of other tasks or the proper functioning of the other sectors of the society requires that most people do not participate intelligently in public deliberation.

4.2 Proposed Solutions to the Problem of Democratic Participation

Some modern theorists of democracy, called elite theorists, have argued against any robustly egalitarian or deliberative forms of democracy in light of the problem of democratic participation. They argue that high levels of citizen participation tend to produce bad legislation designed by demagogues to appeal to poorly informed and overly emotional citizens. They look upon the alleged uninformedness of citizens evidenced in many empirical studies in the 1950s and 1960s as perfectly reasonable and predictable. Indeed they regard the alleged apathy of citizens in modern states as highly desirable social phenomena.

Political leaders are to avoid divisive and emotionally charged issues and make policy and law with little regard for the fickle and diffuse demands made by ordinary citizens. Citizens participate by voting but since they know very little they are not effectively the ruling part of the society. The process of election is usually just a fairly peaceful way of maintaining or changing those who rule (Schumpeter 1942 [1950: 269]).

On Schumpeter’s view, however, citizens do have a role to play in avoiding serious disasters. When politicians act in ways that nearly anyone can see is problematic, the citizens can throw the bums out.

So the elite theory of democracy does seem compatible with some of the instrumentalist arguments given above but it is strongly opposed to the intrinsic arguments from liberty, public justification and equality. To be sure, there can be an elite deliberative democracy wherein elites deliberate, perhaps even out of sight of the population at large, on how to run the society.

A view akin to the elite theory but less pessimistic about citizens’ political agency and competence argues that a well-functioning representative democracy can function as a kind of “defensible epistocracy” (Landa & Pevnick 2020). This view holds that, under the right conditions, elected officials can be expected to exercise political power more responsibly than citizens in a direct democracy because each official is far more likely to cast the deciding vote in legislative assemblies (the “pivotality effect”) and officials have more incentive to exercise power with due regard for the general welfare (the “accountability effect”). Moreover, under the right conditions, representative democracy allows individuals to assess the competence of candidates for office and to select candidates who are best able to help the community pursue its commitments.

One approach that is in part motivated by the problem of democratic citizenship but which attempts to preserve some elements of equality against the elitist criticism is the interest group pluralist account of politics. Robert Dahl’s early statement of the view is very powerful.

In a rough sense, the essence of all competitive politics is bribery of the electorate by politicians… The farmer… supports a candidate committed to high price supports, the businessman…supports an advocate of low corporation taxes… the consumer…votes for candidates opposed to a sales tax. (Dahl 1959: 69)

In this conception of the democratic process, each citizen is a member of an interest group with narrowly defined interests that are closely connected to their everyday lives. On these subjects citizens are supposed to be quite well informed and interested in having an influence. Or at least, elites from each of the interest groups that are relatively close in perspective to the ordinary members are the principal agents in the process. On this account, democracy is not rule by the majority but rather rule by coalitions of minorities. Policy and law in a democratic society are decided by means of bargaining among the different groups.

This approach is conceivably compatible with the more egalitarian approach to democracy. This is because it attempts to reconcile equality with collective decision making by limiting the tasks of citizens to ones which they are able to perform reasonably well. It is not particularly compatible with the deliberative public justification approach because it takes the democratic process to be concerned essentially with bargaining among the different interest groups where the preferences are not subject to further debate in the society as a whole.

A third approach inspired by the problem of participation may be called the neo-liberal approach to politics favored by public choice theorists such as James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock (1962). Against elite theories, they contend that elites and their allies will tend to expand the powers of government and bureaucracy for their own interests and that this expansion will occur at the expense of a largely inattentive public. For this reason, they argue for severe restrictions on the powers of elites. They argue against the interest group pluralist theorists that the problem of participation occurs within interest groups more or less as much as among the citizenry at large. Only powerful economic interests are likely to succeed in organizing to influence the government and they will do so largely for their own benefit. Since economic elites will advance their own interests in politics while spreading the costs to others, policies will tend to be more costly (because imposed on everyone in society) than they are beneficial (because they benefit only the elites in the interest group.)

Neo-liberals infer that one ought to transfer many of the current functions of the state to the market and limit the state to the enforcement of basic property rights and liberties. These can be more easily understood and brought under the control of ordinary citizens.

But the neo-liberal account of democracy must answer to two large worries. First, citizens in modern societies have more ambitious conceptions of social justice and the common good than are realizable by the minimal state. The neo-liberal account thus implies a very serious curtailment of democracy of its own. More evidence is needed to support the contention that these aspirations cannot be achieved by the modern state. Second, the neo-liberal approach ignores the problem of large private concentrations of wealth and power that are capable of pushing small states around for their own benefit and imposing their wills on populations without their consent.

Somin (2013) also argues that government be significantly reduced in size so that citizens have a lesser knowledge burden to carry. But he calls for government decentralization so that citizens can vote with their feet in favor of or against competing units of government, in effect creating a kind of market in governments among which citizens can choose.

4.2.4 The self-interest assumption

A considerable amount of the literature in political science and the economic theory of the state are grounded in the assumption that individuals act primarily and perhaps even exclusively in their self-interest narrowly construed. The problem of participation and the accounts of the democratic process described above are in large part dependent on this assumption. When the preferences of voters are not assumed to be self-interested the calculations of the value of participation change. For example, if a person is a motivated utilitarian, the small chance of making a difference is coupled with a huge accumulated return to many people if there is a significant difference between alternatives. It may be worth it in this case to become reasonably well informed (Parfit 1984: 74). Even more weakly altruistic moral preferences could make a big difference to the rationality of becoming informed, for example if one had a preference to comply with perceived civic duty to vote responsibly (see section 4.3.1 for discussion of the duty to vote). Any moral preference can be formulated in consistent utility functions.

Moreover, defenders of deliberative democracy often claim that concerns for the common good and justice are not merely given prior to politics but that they can evolve and improve through the process of discussion and debate in politics (Elster 1986 [2003]; Gutmann & Thompson 2004; Cohen 1989 [2009]). They assert that much debate and discussion in politics would not be intelligible were it not for the fact that citizens are willing to engage in open minded discussion with those who have distinct morally informed points of view. Empirical evidence suggests that individuals are motivated by moral considerations in politics in addition to their interests (Mansbridge 1990).

Public deliberation in any large-scale democracy will occur within a complex and differentiated “deliberative system”, a

wide variety of institutions, associations, and sites of contestation accomplish political work. (Mansbridge et. al. 2012)

Moreover, the deliberative system of a complex democracy will be characterized by a division of democratic labor , with different parts of the system making different contributions to the overall system. The question arises: what is the appropriate role for a citizen in this division of labor? Philosophically, we should ask two questions. What ought citizens have knowledge about in order to fulfill their role? What standards ought citizens’ beliefs live up to in order to be adequately supported? One promising view is that citizens must think about what ends the society ought to aim at and leave the question of how to achieve those aims to experts (Christiano 1996: ch 5). The rationale for this division of labor is that expertise is not as fundamental to the choice of aims as it is to the development of legislation and policy. Citizens are capable in their everyday lives of understanding and cultivating deep understandings of values and of their interests. And if citizens genuinely do choose the aims and others faithfully pursue the means to achieving those aims, then citizens are in the driver’s seat in society and they can play this role as equals.

To be sure, citizens need to know who to vote for and whether those they vote for are genuinely advancing their aims. This would appear to require some basic knowledge of about how best to achieve their political aims. How is this possible without extensive knowledge? In addition, there is empirical evidence that those who are better informed have more influence on representatives (Erikson 2015). So, if this task requires some kind of knowledge to do well, how can this be compatible with equality?

One promising response is that ordinary citizens do not need individually to have a lot of knowledge of social science and particular facts in order to make political decisions based on such knowledge. Recent research in cognitive science indicates the individuals use “cognitive shortcuts” to save on time in acquiring information about the world they live in (Lupia & McCubbins 1998). This use of shortcuts is common and essential throughout economic and political life. In political life, we see part of the rationale for the many intermediate institutions between government and citizens (Downs 1957: 221–229). Citizens save time by making use of institutions such as the press, unions and other interest group associations, political parties, and opinion leaders to get information about politics. They also rely on interactions in the workplace as well as conversations with friends and families. Political parties can connect ordinary citizens in various ways to expertise because each one contains a division of labor within them that mirrors that in the state. Experts in parties have incentives to make their expertise intelligible to other members (Christiano 2012). In addition, under favorable conditions, political parties stimulate the development of citizens’ normative perspectives and facilitate a healthy public competition of political justifications based on those perspectives (White & Ypi 2016).

People are dependent on social networks in other ways in a democracy. People receive “free” information (which they do not deliberately seek out) about politics and law in school, through their jobs, in discussion with friends, colleagues and family and incidentally through the media. And this can form a better or worse basis on which to pursue other information. Institutions can make a difference to the stream of free information individuals receive. Education can be distributed in a more or less egalitarian way. The circumstances of work can provide more or less free information about politics and law. People who have jobs with a significant amount of power such as lawyers, business persons, government officials will be beneficiaries of very high quality free information. They need to know about law and politics to do their jobs properly. Those who hold low skilled and non-unionized jobs will receive much less free information about politics at work. To the extent that we can alter the economic division of labor by for example giving more place to unions or having greater worker participation, we might be able to reduce inequalities of information among citizens.

4.3 The Moral Duties of Democratic Citizens

What are the moral duties of democratic citizens in complex democracies? In this section, we discuss three important democratic duties: (1) the duty to vote, (2) the duty to promote justice through principled disobedience of the law, and (3) duties to accommodate disagreement through compromise and consensus.

It is often thought that democratic citizens have a moral duty to vote in elections. But this is not obvious. Individual votes are a causally insignificant contribution to the democratic process. In large-scale democracies, the chance that any particular citizen’s vote will decide the outcome of an election is minuscule. What moral reason do democratic citizens have to participate in politics even though they’re almost certain not to make the difference to who gets elected? Why shouldn’t they seek to promote the good or justice in other ways?

Parfit develops an act-utilitarian answer to this question (Parfit 1984: 73–75). Act-utilitarians hold that morally right actions maximize the total expected sum of the utilities of all persons in the society. Parfit argues that voting might nonetheless maximize expected utility if one candidate is significantly superior to the other(s). If we add the benefits to each member of the society of having the superior candidate win, we get a very large difference in value. So when we multiply that value by the probability of casting the deciding vote, which is often thought to be about 1/100,000,000 in a United States presidential election, we might still get a reasonably high expected value. When we subtract the cost to the voter and others of voting, which is often quite low, from this number, we may still have a good reason to vote.

One worry with Parfit’s view is that it faces a version of what Jason Brennan calls “the particularity problem” (Brennan 2011). This is the problem of explaining why citizens ought to promote value through political participation as opposed to through non-political acts. Voting is just one way of promoting overall utility; we need to know the expected utility of the different acts they might perform instead. Even if the argument above is correct, it might be the case that many individuals maximize expected utility by not voting and doing something even more beneficial with their time.

Alex Guerrero argues that citizens have moral reasons to vote because candidates who win by a larger proportion of votes can claim a greater “normative mandate” to govern (Guerrero 2010). Still each individual vote makes only a tiny contribution to the proportion of votes a candidate receives. So, we might doubt the strength of the reason to vote that Guerrero identifies.

Some theorists argue that individuals have a moral duty to vote in order to absolve themselves of complicity in state injustices (Beerbohm 2012; Zakaras 2018). All states commit injustices—they make and enforce unjust laws, wage unjust wars, and much else. And citizens of large-scale democracies have a kind of standing responsibility, by paying taxes and obeying laws, for their state’s injustices of which they must actively absolve themselves The complicity account argues that citizens avoid shared responsibility for their state’s injustices if they oppose those injustices through voting and of public advocacy (Beerbohm 2012).

One worry is that it is unclear why voting and publicly advocating against injustice should be thought to absolve responsibility that is established by paying taxes and obeying laws. Another worry is that one’s concern to oppose injustice should derive from a more direct concern for the wrongs suffered by victims of injustice rather than a concern with keeping one’s hands clean.

One sort of account that avoids this worry grounds the moral duty to vote in the importance of doing one’s fair share of the demands of political justice consistent with public equality. The demands of creating and sustaining just institutions distribute fairly among all citizens (Maskivker 2019). If one fails to do one’s fair share of these demands, then one fails to show due regard for the eventual victims of injustice. Furthermore, voting provides citizens with a mechanism for doing their fair shares of the demands of making their institutions just in a way that is consistent with respecting the public equality of fellow citizens. By showing up and casting a vote, citizens can contribute to the collective achievement of justice while maintaining equal decision-making power with fellow citizens.

Civil disobedience has long been recognized as a central mechanism through which democratic citizens may legitimately promote political justice in their society. According to the standard view, civil disobedience is a public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law that aims to change laws or government policies. People who engage in civil disobedience are willing to accept the legal consequences of their actions in order to show fidelity to the law (Bedau 1961; Rawls 1971: ch. 55). The standard definition of civil disobedience has been subjected to challenge. For example, some argue that the private acts in which the disobedient seeks to evade legal consequences can count as instances of civil disobedience (Raz 1979; Brownlee 2004, 2007, 2012).

Perhaps the most common way of justifying civil disobedience argues that the same considerations that ground the pro tanto duty to obey the law sometimes make it appropriate to engage in civil disobedience of the law (see, e.g., Rawls 1971: ch. 57; Sabl 2001; Markovits 2005; Smith 2011). For example, Rawls argues that while citizens of a “nearly just” society have a pro tanto duty to obey its laws in virtue of it being nearly just, civil disobedience can be justified as a way of making the relevant society more just (Rawls 1971: ch. 57). Similarly, Daniel Markovits argues that members of a society with suitably egalitarian and inclusive democratic procedures have a general duty to obey its laws because they are produced by procedures that are suitably egalitarian and inclusive, but that civil disobedience can be justified as a way of making the relevant procedures more egalitarian or inclusive (Markovits 2005).

It is easy to see why this constitutes an attractive way of justifying civil disobedience, since it justifies it by appeal to the same values that ground the pro tanto duty to obey the law. On the other hand, as Simmons notes, if there is no general duty to obey the law, there would seem to be no presumption in favor of obedience and thus no special need for a justification of civil disobedience; obedience and disobedience would stand equally in need of justification (Simmons 2007: ch 4).

Advocates of the standard approach generally assume that only civil disobedience can be justified in this way. However, some argue civil disobedience does not enjoy a special normative presumption over uncivil disobedience. The core idea that insofar as the values that ground a pro tanto duty to obey the law—for example, justice or democratic equality—are sometimes best served by civil disobedience of the law, they are sometimes best served by covert, evasive, anonymous, or even violent disobedience of the law (Delmas 2018; Lai 2019; Pasternak 2018).

Disagreement about what laws, policies, or principles ought to be implemented is a persistent feature of democratic societies. It is often argued that citizens and officials have duties to moderate their political activity in order to accommodate the competing views of fellow citizens or officials. Two duties of accommodation are widely discussed in the literature: duties of compromise and duties of public justification.

A compromise can be understood as an agreement between parties to advance laws or policies that all regard as suboptimal because they disagree about which laws or policies are optimal (May 2005). While it is widely accepted that there are sometimes compelling instrumental reasons to compromise, whether there are intrinsic moral reasons to compromise is more controversial. Some defend intrinsic reasons to compromise based on democratic values like inclusion, mutual respect, and reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson 2014; Wendt 2016; Weinstock 2013). However, Simon May argues that such arguments fail and that all reasons to compromise are pragmatic (May 2005).

Advocates of the public justification approach to democracy (see section 2.2.2 ) often argue that democratic citizens and officials have individual moral duties of public justification. John Rawls argues for a “duty of civility” that requires citizens and officials to be prepared to give mutually acceptable justifications for important laws when voting and engaged in public advocacy. Given the inevitability of disagreement about comprehensive moral and philosophical truth in free democracies, the duty of civility requires citizens to appeal to a reasonable “political” conception of justice that can be the object of an “overlapping consensus” between different comprehensive doctrines. While different theorists motivate duties of public justification in different ways, many appeal to the need for exercises of coercive political authority to respect citizens’ freedom and equality.

5. Democratic Representation

Representation is an essential part of the division of labor of large-scale democracies. In this section, we examine two moral questions concerning representation. First, what sort of representative system is best? Second, by what moral principles are representatives bound?

A number of debates have centered on the question of what kinds of representative systems are best for a democratic society. What choice we make here will depend heavily on our underlying moral justification of democracy, our conception of citizenship as well as on our empirical understanding of political institutions and how they function. The most basic types of formal political representation available are single member district representation, proportional representation and group representation. In addition, many societies have opted for multicameral legislative institutions. In some cases, combinations of the above forms have been tried.

Single member district representation returns single representatives of geographically defined areas containing roughly equal populations to the legislature and is prominent in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, among other places. The most common form of proportional representation is party list proportional representation. In a simple form of such a scheme, a number of parties compete for election to a legislature that is not divided into geographical districts. Parties acquire seats in the legislature as a proportion of the total number of votes they receive in the voting population as a whole. Group representation occurs when the society is divided into non-geographically defined groups such as ethnic or linguistic groups or even functional groups such as workers, farmers and capitalists and returns representatives to a legislature from each of them.

Many have argued in favor of single member district legislation on the grounds that it has appeared to them to lead to more stable government than other forms of representation. The thought is that proportional representation tends to fragment the citizenry into opposing homogeneous camps that rigidly adhere to their party lines and that are continually vying for control over the government. Since there are many parties and they are unwilling to compromise with each other, governments formed from coalitions of parties tend to fall apart rather quickly. The post war experience of governments in Italy appears to confirm this hypothesis. Single member district representation, in contrast, is said to enhance the stability of governments by virtue of its favoring a two party system of government. Each election cycle then determines which party is to stay in power for some length of time.

Charles Beitz argues that single member district representation encourages moderation in party programs offered for citizens to consider (Beitz 1989: ch. 7). This results from the tendency of this kind of representation towards two party systems. In a two party system with majority rule, it is argued, each party must appeal to the median voter in the political spectrum. Hence, they must moderate their programs to appeal to the median voter. Furthermore, they encourage compromise among groups since they must try to appeal to a lot of other groups in order to become part of one of the two leading parties. These tendencies encourage moderation and compromise in citizens to the extent that political parties, and interest groups, hold these qualities up as necessary to functioning well in a democracy.

In criticism, advocates of proportional and group representation have argued that single member district representation tends to muffle the voices and ignore the interests of minority groups in the society (Mill 1861; Christiano 1996). Minority interests and views tend to be articulated in background negotiations and in ways that muffle their distinctiveness. Furthermore, representatives of minority interests and views often have a difficult time getting elected at all in single member district systems so it has been charged that minority views and interests are often systematically underrepresented. Sometimes these problems are dealt with by redrawing the boundaries of districts in a way that ensures greater minority representation. The efforts are invariably quite controversial since there is considerable disagreement about the criteria for apportionment.

In proportional representation, by contrast, representatives of different groups are seated in the legislature in proportion to citizens’ choices. Minorities need not make their demands conform to the basic dichotomy of views and interests that characterize single member district systems so their views are more articulated and distinctive as well as better represented.

Advocates of group representation, like Iris Marion Young, have argued that some historically disenfranchised groups may still not do very well under proportional representation (Young 1990: ch. 6). They may not be able to organize and articulate their views as easily as other groups. Also, minority groups can still be systematically defeated in the legislature and their interests may be consistently set back even if they do have some representation. For these groups, some have argued that the only way to protect their interests is legally to ensure that they have adequate and even disproportionate representation.

One worry about group representation is that it tends to freeze some aspects of the agenda that might be better left to the choice of citizens. For instance, consider a population that is divided into linguistic groups for a long time. And suppose that only some citizens continue to think of linguistic conflict as important. In the circumstances a group representation scheme may tend to be biased in an arbitrary way that favors the views or interests of those who do think of linguistic conflict as important.

What moral norms apply to representatives carrying out their official duties? We can get a better handle on possible answers by introducing Hannah Pitkin’s famous distinction between trustees and delegates (Pitkin 1967). Representatives who act as trustees rely on their own independent judgments in carrying out their duties. Norms of trusteeship are supported in recognition that, given a natural division of democratic labor, officials are in a much better position to make well-reasoned and well-informed political decisions than ordinary citizens.

Representatives who act as delegates defer to the judgments of their citizens. These norms might be thought to reflect the value of democratic accountability. Because the people authorize representatives to govern, it is natural to think that representatives are accountable to the people to enact their judgments. If representatives are not accountable in this way, citizens lose democratic control over their representatives’ actions.

Which norms should win out when they conflict? Pitkin argues that the answer varies by context. This seems plausible. For example, if we take the view that citizens primarily have the role of determining the aims of the society, we might think that representatives ought to be delegates with regard to the aims, but trustees with regard to the ways of realizing the aims (Christiano 1996). See Suzanne Dovi’s discussion of representation for a deeper and more nuanced discussion of these issues.

Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem is thought by some to provide a major set of difficulties for democratic theory (Arrow 1951). William Riker, Russell Hardin, and others have thought that the impossibility theorem shows that there are deep problems with democratic ideals (Riker 1982; Hardin 1999). Neither of these thinkers are opposed to democracy itself, they both think that there are good instrumental reasons for having democracy.

The basic results of social choice theory are laid out in detail elsewhere in the encyclopedia (List 2013). Here we will simply articulate the basic result and an illustration. The question of Arrowian social choice theory is: how do we determine a social preference for a society overall on the basis of the set of the individual preferences of the members? Arrow shows that a social choice function that satisfies a number of plausible constraints cannot be defined when there are three or more alternatives to be chosen by the group. He lays out a number of conditions to be imposed on a social choice function. Unlimited domain : The social choice function must be able to give us a social preference no matter what the preferences of the individuals over alternatives are. Non dictatorship : the social choice function must not select the preference of one particular member regardless of others’ preferences. Transitivity and completeness : The individual preferences orderings must be transitive and complete orderings and the social preference derived from them must be transitive and complete. Independence of irrelevant alternatives : the social preference between two alternatives must be the result only of the individual orderings between those two alternatives. Pareto condition : if all the members prefer an alternative x over y , then x must be ranked above y in the social preference. The theorem says that no social choice function over more than two alternatives can satisfy all of these conditions.

A useful illustration of this idea involves an extension of majority rule to cases of more than two alternatives. The Condorcet rule says that an alternative x wins when, for every other alternative, a majority prefers x over that alternative. For example, suppose we have three persons A , B and C and three alternatives x , y and z . A prefers x over y , y over z ; B prefers y over z and z over x ; C prefers x over z and z over y . In this case, x is the Condorcet winner since it beats y , and it beats z . The problem with this plausible sounding rule is the case of a majority cycle. Suppose you have three persons A , B and C , and three alternatives, x , y and z . In the case in which A prefers x over y and y over z , while B prefers y over z and z over x , and C prefers z over x and x over y , the Condorcet rule will yield a social preference of x over y , y over z and z over x . One can see here that the Condorcet rule satisfies all the conditions except transitivity of social preference. One way to avoid intransitivity is to restrict the domain of preferences from which the social preference arises. Another is to introduce cardinal information that compares the how much people prefer alternatives (violating independence). Another might be to make one person a dictator. So, this case nicely illustrates that one cannot satisfy all of the constraints simultaneously.

Riker argues that the theorem shows that the idea that the popular will can be the governing element in a society is false. If an existence condition for a popular will is a restricted set of preferences the question naturally arises as to whether such a condition is always or normally met in a moderately complex society. We might wonder whether a highly pluralistic society with a very complex division of labor is likely to satisfy the restricted preference set condition necessary to avoid cycles or other pathologies of social choice. Some have argued that we have empirical evidence to the effect that modern societies do normally satisfy such conditions (Mackie 2003). Others have argued that this seems unlikely (Riker 1982; Ingham 2019). This is not merely a defense of unlimited domain. It is a defense of the thesis that normally the collections of preferences in modern societies are not likely to have the properties that enable them to avoid cycles.

The fairness critique from social choice theory is based on the idea that when a voting process meets requirements of fairness, the fairness of the process and the preferences may not generate determinate outcomes. If cycles are pervasive, the outcomes of democratic processes may be determined by clever strategies and not by the fairness of the procedures (Riker 1982). Three remarks are in order here. First, it is compatible with the process being completely fair that the outcomes of the process are indeterminate. After all, coin flips are fair. Second, there is some question as to how prominent the cycles are. Third, one might think that if the conditions which enable opposing sides to strategize effectively are themselves roughly equal, then the concerns for fairness are fully met. If resources for persuasion and organization are distributed in an egalitarian way, perhaps the fairness account is vindicated after all. This point can be made more compelling when we consider Sean Ingham’s account of political equality. He includes intensity of preference in his account of fairness. This is a departure from the Arrowian approach, but it is in many ways a realistic one. The idea is that majorities have equal control over policy areas when they are able to get what they want with the same amount of intensity of preferences. And equality holds generally when all groups of the same size have the same control (Ingham 2019). There remains an extreme case in which all majorities have equal intensity of preference and are caught in a majority cycle. But the chances of this happening are very slim, even if the chances of majority cycles more generally are not as small. Even if there are a lot of majority cycles, if the issues are resolved in such a way that those majorities that have most at stake in the conflict are the ones that get their way, then we can have fairness in a quite robust sense even while having pervasive majority cycles.

If democratic societies allow members to participate as equals in collective decision making, a natural question arises: who has the right to participate in making collective decisions? We can ask this question within a particular jurisdiction (ought all adults have the right to participation? Ought children have the right to participation? Ought all residents have such rights?). But we can also ask what the extent of the jurisdiction ought to be. How many of the people in the world ought to be included in the collective decision-making? An easy, though slightly misleading, way of asking this question is, what ought the physical boundaries of a particular institution of collective decision-making be? We see partially democratic societies within the confines of the modern nation-state. But we might ask, why should we restrict the set of persons who participate in making decisions of the modern state just to those who happen to be the physical inhabitants of those states? Surely there are many other persons affected by decisions made by democratic states aside from those persons. For example, activities in one society A can pollute another society B . Why shouldn’t the members of B have a say in the decisions regarding the polluting activities in A ? And there can be many other effects that activities in A can have on B .

Some have suggested that the boundaries of a state ought to be determined through a principle of national self-determination. We identify a nation as an ongoing group of persons who share certain cultural, historical and political norms and who identify with each other and with a piece of land. Then we determine the boundaries of the territory by appeal to the size of the group of people and the land they cherish (Miller 1995; Song 2012). This is an appealing idea in many ways: shared nationality breeds a willingness to share the sacrifices that arise from collective decision making; it generates a sense of at-homeness for people. But it is hard to use as a general principle for dividing land among persons when one of the central facts for many societies is that a diversity of nations, ethnic groups and cultures co-mingle on the very same land.

Is there a democratic solution to the boundary problem? A number of ideas have been suggested. The first idea is that the people ought to decide what the boundaries are. But this suggestion, while it may be a pragmatic resolution to the problem, seems to beg the question about who the members are and who are not (Whelan 1983).

A second theoretical solution that has some democratic credentials is to invoke the principle that all who are subjected to decision making, in the sense of who are coerced or have duties imposed upon them, ought to have a say in the decision making (Abizadeh 2008). This principle is plausible enough, but it doesn’t get at enough cases. The pollution case above is not a case of subjection.

A third proposed theoretical solution is the all-affected principle. One formulation is “all affected persons ought to have a say in the decisions that affect them”. This does suggest that when the activities in one state affect those of another state, the people of the other state ought to have a say in those activities. Some have thought that this principle tends to lead to a kind of politically cosmopolitan principle in support of world government (Goodin 2007).

But the all-affected principle is conceptually quite uncertain and morally deeply problematic, and it provides very little, if anything, in the way of a solution to the boundary problem.

First, “having a say” is not clear. Does it require having a vote in collective decision-making? Or is it also satisfied by a person’s being able to modify another’s action by negotiating with them, as we see when there is bargaining over an externality? This latter version would undermine the idea that the all-affected principle has direct implications for the boundary problem. When the United States permits activities that produce acid rain in Canada, Canada can negotiate with the United States to lessen the production of acid rain and/or to compensate Canada for the harm. As long as there is a fair and effective system of negotiation, this would seem to satisfy the all-affected principle without giving Canadians a vote in American politics or Americans a vote in Canadian politics.

Second, it is not clear what “being affected” means. One, does a person being affected just mean that there is a change in the person’s situation or must the effect involve the setting back of one’s preferences, or interests, or legitimate interests, or exercise of one’s capacities or one’s good? Two, are one’s interests affected by a decision only when they are advanced or set back relative to some baseline (either the present state of affairs or some morally defined baseline like what you have promised me), or am I affected by decisions that could be to my advantage or disadvantage but end up making no difference? For example, if I am drowning in a pool and you are deciding whether to save me or go buy yourself a candy bar, am I affected by your buying the candy bar? If I am not affected when no change occurs, then who is affected by a decision often depends on who participates in the decision and we have no solution to the problem of inclusion. If I am affected, then the principle has some quite extraordinary implications. Now it turns out that impoverished persons in South Asia are affected by my buying a candy bar, since I could have sent the money to them (Goodin 2007).

The all-affected principle is a merely suggestive and rhetorically effective phrase. It is a conversation starter and a list of topics to be discussed, not a genuine principle. For example, if I must include everyone possibly affected by my decision for every decision I make, I will not be able to make many decisions and my decision making will no longer enable me to give a shape to my own life and my relations with others. My life becomes fragmented and lacks integrity (Williams 1973). An analog of this problem would arise for political societies, presumably. Each society would have to include a variety of different persons in each decision. It is hard to see how any society could take on any particular character if this is the case.

A more plausible principle that encompasses some of the suggestions of the all-affected principle is that a framework of institutions should be set up so that people have power to advance and protect their legitimate interests in life.

But if we understand the principle in this way, it is not clear that it helps us much with the boundary problem. First of all, there are different ways in which people can be said to possess power over their lives. One kind of power is the power to participate as an equal in a collective decision-making process. Another kind is to be able to advance one’s interests in a decentralized process like a market or a system of agreement making like international law. Recalling our pollution problem above, we could give the state of which they are members power to negotiate with the polluting state terms that are mutually agreeable. Only the power to participate as an equal in collective decision-making involves the boundaries of collective decision-making.

Another solution to the boundary problem is a conservative one. The basic idea is to keep the boundaries of states roughly as they are except if there is a pressing need to change them. Trying to alter the boundaries of political societies is a recipe for serious conflict because there is no institution that has the legitimacy or power actually to resolve problems at an international level and there is likely to be a lot of disagreement on how to do it. States as we know them, are by far the most powerful political entities in the international system. They have developed more effective practices of accountability of power than any other entity in the system. They have created unified societies with highly interdependent populations. Finally, states and the individuals in them can be made accountable to some degree to other individuals and states through the process of negotiation and international law making. The origin of these boundaries may be arbitrary, but it is not, for all that, irrelevant. To be sure, there are clear cases where borders can be changed. One source of pressing need is serious injustice within a country. Another might be the existence of permanent minorities that are sectionally defined. Here, we ask only how to revise boundaries and the basis of such revision is that it is a remedy for serious injustice (Buchanan 1991).

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By the People: Essays on Democracy

Harvard Kennedy School faculty explore aspects of democracy in their own words—from increasing civic participation and decreasing extreme partisanship to strengthening democratic institutions and making them more fair.

Winter 2020

By Archon Fung , Nancy Gibbs , Tarek Masoud , Julia Minson , Cornell William Brooks , Jane Mansbridge , Arthur Brooks , Pippa Norris , Benjamin Schneer

The basic terms of democratic governance are shifting before our eyes, and we don’t know what the future holds. Some fear the rise of hateful populism and the collapse of democratic norms and practices. Others see opportunities for marginalized people and groups to exercise greater voice and influence. At the Kennedy School, we are striving to produce ideas and insights to meet these great uncertainties and to help make democratic governance successful in the future. In the pages that follow, you can read about the varied ways our faculty members think about facets of democracy and democratic institutions and making democracy better in practice.

Explore essays on democracy

Archon fung: we voted, nancy gibbs: truth and trust, tarek masoud: a fragile state, julia minson: just listen, cornell william brooks: democracy behind bars, jane mansbridge: a teachable skill, arthur brooks: healthy competition, pippa norris: kicking the sandcastle, benjamin schneer: drawing a line.

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• Democracy Essay for Students in English

Essay on Democracy

Introduction.

Democracy is mainly a Greek word which means people and their rules, here peoples have the to select their own government as per their choice. Greece was the first democratic country in the world. India is a democratic country where people select their government of their own choice, also people have the rights to do the work of their choice. There are two types of democracy: direct and representative and hybrid or semi-direct democracy. There are many decisions which are made under democracies. People enjoy few rights which are very essential for human beings to live happily. 

Our country has the largest democracy. In a democracy, each person has equal rights to fight for development. After the independence, India has adopted democracy, where the people vote those who are above 18 years of age, but these votes do not vary by any caste; people from every caste have equal rights to select their government. Democracy, also called as a rule of the majority, means whatever the majority of people decide, it has to be followed or implemented, the representative winning with the most number of votes will have the power. We can say the place where literacy people are more there shows the success of the democracy even lack of consciousness is also dangerous in a democracy. Democracy is associated with higher human accumulation and higher economic freedom. Democracy is closely tied with the economic source of growth like education and quality of life as well as health care. The constituent assembly in India was adopted by Dr B.R. Ambedkar on 26 th November 1949 and became sovereign democratic after its constitution came into effect on 26 January 1950.

What are the Challenges:

There are many challenges for democracy like- corruption here, many political leaders and officers who don’t do work with integrity everywhere they demand bribes, resulting in the lack of trust on the citizens which affects the country very badly. Anti-social elements- which are seen during elections where people are given bribes and they are forced to vote for a particular candidate. Caste and community- where a large number of people give importance to their caste and community, therefore, the political party also selects the candidate on the majority caste. We see wherever the particular caste people win the elections whether they do good for the society or not, and in some cases, good leaders lose because of less count of the vote.

India is considered to be the largest democracy around the globe, with a population of 1.3 billion. Even though being the biggest democratic nation, India still has a long way to becoming the best democratic system. The caste system still prevails in some parts, which hurts the socialist principle of democracy. Communalism is on the rise throughout the globe and also in India, which interferes with the secular principle of democracy. All these differences need to be set aside to ensure a thriving democracy.

Principles of Democracy:

There are mainly five principles like- republic, socialist, sovereign, democratic and secular, with all these quality political parties will contest for elections. There will be many bribes given to the needy person who require food, money, shelter and ask them to vote whom they want. But we can say that democracy in India is still better than the other countries.

Basically, any country needs democracy for development and better functioning of the government. In some countries, freedom of political expression, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, are considered to ensure that voters are well informed, enabling them to vote according to their own interests.

Let us Discuss These Five Principles in Further Detail

Sovereign: In short, being sovereign or sovereignty means the independent authority of a state. The country has the authority to make all the decisions whether it be on internal issues or external issues, without the interference of any third party.

Socialist: Being socialist means the country (and the Govt.), always works for the welfare of the people, who live in that country. There should be many bribes offered to the needy person, basic requirements of them should be fulfilled by any means. No one should starve in such a country.

Secular: There will be no such thing as a state religion, the country does not make any bias on the basis of religion. Every religion must be the same in front of the law, no discrimination on the basis of someone’s religion is tolerated. Everyone is allowed to practice and propagate any religion, they can change their religion at any time.

Republic: In a republic form of Government, the head of the state is elected, directly or indirectly by the people and is not a hereditary monarch. This elected head is also there for a fixed tenure. In India, the head of the state is the president, who is indirectly elected and has a fixed term of office (5 years).

Democratic: By a democratic form of government, means the country’s government is elected by the people via the process of voting. All the adult citizens in the country have the right to vote to elect the government they want, only if they meet a certain age limit of voting.

Merits of Democracy:

better government forms because it is more accountable and in the interest of the people.

improves the quality of decision making and enhances the dignity of the citizens.

provide a method to deal with differences and conflicts.

A democratic system of government is a form of government in which supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodic free elections. It permits citizens to participate in making laws and public policies by choosing their leaders, therefore citizens should be educated so that they can select the right candidate for the ruling government. Also, there are some concerns regarding democracy- leaders always keep changing in democracy with the interest of citizens and on the count of votes which leads to instability. It is all about political competition and power, no scope for morality.

Factors Affect Democracy:

capital and civil society

economic development

modernization

Norway and Iceland are the best democratic countries in the world. India is standing at fifty-one position.

India is a parliamentary democratic republic where the President is head of the state and Prime minister is head of the government. The guiding principles of democracy such as protected rights and freedoms, free and fair elections, accountability and transparency of government officials, citizens have a responsibility to uphold and support their principles. Democracy was first practised in the 6 th century BCE, in the city-state of Athens. One basic principle of democracy is that people are the source of all the political power, in a democracy people rule themselves and also respect given to diverse groups of citizens, so democracy is required to select the government of their own interest and make the nation developed by electing good leaders.

FAQs on Democracy Essay for Students in English

1. What are the Features of Democracy?

Features of Democracy are as follows

Equality: Democracy provides equal rights to everyone, regardless of their gender, caste, colour, religion or creed.

Individual Freedom: Everybody has the right to do anything they want until it does not affect another person’s liberty.

Majority Rules: In a democracy, things are decided by the majority rule, if the majority agrees to something, it will be done.

Free Election: Everyone has the right to vote or to become a candidate to fight the elections.

2. Define Democracy?

Democracy means where people have the right to choose the rulers and also people have freedom to express views, freedom to organise and freedom to protest. Protesting and showing Dissent is a major part of a healthy democracy. Democracy is the most successful and popular form of government throughout the globe.

Democracy holds a special place in India, also India is still the largest democracy in existence around the world.

3. What are the Benefits of Democracy?

Let us discuss some of the benefits received by the use of democracy to form a government. Benefits of democracy are: 

It is more accountable

Improves the quality of decision as the decision is taken after a long time of discussion and consultation.

It provides a better method to deal with differences and conflicts.

It safeguards the fundamental rights of people and brings a sense of equality and freedom.

It works for the welfare of both the people and the state.

4. Which country is the largest democracy in the World?

India is considered the largest democracy, all around the world. India decided to have a democratic Govt. from the very first day of its independence after the rule of the British. In India, everyone above the age of 18 years can go to vote to select the Government, without any kind of discrimination on the basis of caste, colour, religion, gender or more. But India, even being the largest democracy, still has a long way to become perfect.

5. Write about the five principles of Democracy?

There are five key principles that are followed in a democracy. These Five Principles of Democracy of India are -  secular, sovereign, republic, socialist, and democratic. These five principles have to be respected by every political party, participating in the general elections in India. The party which got the most votes forms the government which represents the democratic principle. No discrimination is done on the basis of religion which represents the secular nature of democracy. The govt. formed after the election has to work for the welfare of common people which shows socialism in play.

The importance of democracy

How our system of government impacts our lives.

Governments have existed in some form for at least 5,000 years and throughout history, we’ve seen many approaches to running civilisations. Nowadays, the method of rule that most countries live under is democracy. We take a look at what it is, what the alternatives are, and why it’s essential in world politics.

What is democracy? 

The word ‘democracy’ comes from the Greek word ‘demokratia’, which means ‘rule by the people.’ It’s used to describe a system of government where power is held by the citizens. They can impact important decisions, either directly or through the people they elect. 

Democracy can help to make society equal by distributing power. . It’s often described as the ‘rule of the majority’, as important decisions are based on the votes of the people. This can either be:

• Through direct democracy . Everyone gets the chance to vote on the outcome of a decision. An example is the UK’s Brexit referendum in 2016.
• Through representative democracy . People vote to elect officials to make decisions on their behalf, such as the US Congress and UK Parliament.

What other systems are used? 

Today, there are around 75 countries in the world that have democracies of some kind. However, some countries have different systems of government: 

• Oligarchy . While democracies give power to the many, oligarchies give power to the few. It’s a system where a small number of people hold power, usually thanks to their wealth, social status, education, or business interests. Power is often passed from one group to the next without the majority of the population voting. Some present-day examples include Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.
• Autocracy . In autocracies, a single person possesses absolute power to rule over the country. This ‘autocrat’ is often above the laws that apply to everyone else. For example, the North Korean dictatorship is currently the longest enduring autocratic regime post World War II.
• Constitutional monarchy . In constitutional monarchies, a singular person (a monarch - usually a king or queen) has agreed to share power with a form of government. Monarchs usually achieve their position through hereditary succession, meaning they are born into it through their family. Common examples include Britain, Belgium, and Spain.

What are the benefits of democracy?

Winston Churchill once famously said, ‘democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.’ Although not perfect, democracy aims to bring the most benefits to the most number of people. These include: 

• Protecting the interests of citizens . People get the chance to vote on the key issues affecting their country or can elect representatives to make these decisions.
• Promoting equality . One principle of democracy is that all people are equal in the eyes of the law, and every person gets a vote. For example, Canada has a universal franchise decree in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which explicitly allows every citizen of Canada the right to vote in any Canadian election.
• Preventing abuse of power . In democracies, elected officials are responsible for carrying out the will of those who elected them. If they misuse their position, they won’t be re-elected.

What are the problems with democracy? 

Democracy isn’t always perfect, and it has been criticised for a number of different reasons. Some of the most common complaints about democracy include: 

• Not everyone exercises their right to vote . In some countries, like Australia, voting is mandatory by law for certain elections - but this is not the case in other democratic countries. Although everyone living in a democracy has the right to vote (at a certain age), not everyone actually does it, which means that in the end, not every voice gets heard. For example, only 55% of voting-age citizens cast their vote in the 2016 US presidential election.
• Not everyone has the right to vote . In some democratic countries, there are laws that stop some people from voting. For example, the 1983 Representation of the People Act in the UK prevents people who have been convicted of crimes from voting while they are in prison.
• Decisions can take a long time . The process of changing laws and making decisions about the country has to go through various stages of voting before they come into effect. This means that carrying out what people want often takes a long time. For example, the United States has an extensive process in which a bill (first draft of a law before it is passed) must be supported by several levels of government, such government committees, congress members, public officials, and the executive office.
• Not everyone who votes is well-informed . Although ordinary citizens are asked to vote on essential issues or who should make decisions for them, not everyone has the specialist knowledge needed to understand the full implications of their vote. And of course, politicians themselves often spread misinformation during campaigns, which only makes it harder to stay well-informed. For example, after the 2016 Brexit referendum which saw the majority of the British public vote to leave the EU, GoogleTrends noted a huge spike in search requests on what would happen if Britain were to leave.

Why is democracy important for young people? 

People who vote have a hand in shaping the world. Politicians of all nations have a history of ignoring young people and focusing on policies that benefit older people – because older people are much more likely to vote. At the 2019 UK general election, just 47% of 18- to 24-year-olds voted, compared to 74% of people over 65. So politicians might look at those figures and decide to either:

• Make policies that benefit the 2.6 million people aged 18–24 who are engaged in politics.
• Make policies that benefit the 9 million people over 65 who are engaged in politics.

For the best chance of winning next time, they might be sensible to choose number 2. But if more young people voted, governments would hopefully realise that they need to do more to appeal to young people.

In the US and in England and Northern Ireland, you must be 18 before you can vote. In Scotland and Wales, you can vote at 16 (but 18 for UK-wide elections). But in a democracy, you can still make your voice heard if you are younger than that. For example:

• In the UK, organisations such as the British Youth Council encourage young people to get involved in matters that affect them. They help people under the age of 25 make a difference in their local, national, and international communities.
• Generation Citizen in the US takes a similar approach. They help young people to develop the skills needed to participate in their democracy.
• The Spanish Youth Council ( Consejo de la Juventud de España, CJE) helps young people to get involved with the political, social, economic, and cultural development of Spain.
• Many countries allow the right to peaceful protest. If there’s a cause that you believe in, you can often attend rallies and protests to show your support.

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Essay on Democracy in 100, 300 and 500 Words

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• Jan 15, 2024

The oldest account of democracy can be traced back to 508–507 BCC Athens . Today there are over 50 different types of democracy across the world. But, what is the ideal form of democracy? Why is democracy considered the epitome of freedom and rights around the globe? Let’s explore what self-governance is and how you can write a creative and informative essay on democracy and its significance. 

Today, India is the largest democracy with a population of 1.41 billion and counting. Everyone in India above the age of 18 is given the right to vote and elect their representative. Isn’t it beautiful, when people are given the option to vote for their leader, one that understands their problems and promises to end their miseries? This is just one feature of democracy , for we have a lot of samples for you in the essay on democracy. Stay tuned!

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What is democracy , sample essay on democracy (100 words), sample essay on democracy (250 to 300 words), sample essay on democracy for upsc (500 words).

Democracy is a form of government in which the final authority to deliberate and decide the legislation for the country lies with the people, either directly or through representatives. Within a democracy, the method of decision-making, and the demarcation of citizens vary among countries. However, some fundamental principles of democracy include the rule of law, inclusivity, political deliberations, voting via elections , etc. 

Did you know: On 15th August 1947, India became the world’s largest democracy after adopting the Indian Constitution and granting fundamental rights to its citizens?

Must Explore: Human Rights Courses for Students 

Must Explore: NCERT Notes on Separation of Powers in a Democracy

Democracy where people make decisions for the country is the only known form of governance in the world that promises to inculcate principles of equality, liberty and justice. The deliberations and negotiations to form policies and make decisions for the country are the basis on which the government works, with supreme power to people to choose their representatives, delegate the country’s matters and express their dissent. The democratic system is usually of two types, the presidential system, and the parliamentary system. In India, the three pillars of democracy, namely legislature, executive and judiciary, working independently and still interconnected, along with a free press and media provide a structure for a truly functional democracy. Despite the longest-written constitution incorporating values of sovereignty, socialism, secularism etc. India, like other countries, still faces challenges like corruption, bigotry, and oppression of certain communities and thus, struggles to stay true to its democratic ideals.

Did you know: Some of the richest countries in the world are democracies?

Must Read : Consumer Rights in India

Must Read: Democracy and Diversity Class 10

As Abraham Lincoln once said, “democracy is the government of the people, by the people and for the people.” There is undeniably no doubt that the core of democracies lies in making people the ultimate decision-makers. With time, the simple definition of democracy has evolved to include other principles like equality, political accountability, rights of the citizens and to an extent, values of liberty and justice. Across the globe, representative democracies are widely prevalent, however, there is a major variation in how democracies are practised. The major two types of representative democracy are presidential and parliamentary forms of democracy. Moreover, not all those who present themselves as a democratic republic follow its values.

Many countries have legally deprived some communities of living with dignity and protecting their liberty, or are practising authoritarian rule through majoritarianism or populist leaders. Despite this, one of the things that are central and basic to all is the practice of elections and voting. However, even in such a case, the principles of universal adult franchise and the practice of free and fair elections are theoretically essential but very limited in practice, for a democracy. Unlike several other nations, India is still, at least constitutionally and principally, a practitioner of an ideal democracy.

With our three organs of the government, namely legislative, executive and judiciary, the constitutional rights to citizens, a multiparty system, laws to curb discrimination and spread the virtues of equality, protection to minorities, and a space for people to discuss, debate and dissent, India has shown a commitment towards democratic values. In recent times, with challenges to freedom of speech, rights of minority groups and a conundrum between the protection of diversity and unification of the country, the debate about the preservation of democracy has become vital to public discussion.

Did you know: In countries like Brazil, Scotland, Switzerland, Argentina, and Austria the minimum voting age is 16 years?

Also Read: Difference Between Democracy and Dictatorship

Democracy originated from the Greek word dēmokratiā , with dēmos ‘people’ and Kratos ‘rule.’ For the first time, the term appeared in the 5th century BC to denote the political systems then existing in Greek city-states, notably Classical Athens, to mean “rule of the people.” It now refers to a form of governance where the people have the right to participate in the decision-making of the country. Majorly, it is either a direct democracy where citizens deliberate and make legislation while in a representative democracy, they choose government officials on their behalf, like in a parliamentary or presidential democracy.

The presidential system (like in the USA) has the President as the head of the country and the government, while the parliamentary system (like in the UK and India) has both a Prime Minister who derives its legitimacy from a parliament and even a nominal head like a monarch or a President.

The notions and principle frameworks of democracy have evolved with time. At the core, lies the idea of political discussions and negotiations. In contrast to its alternatives like monarchy, anarchy, oligarchy etc., it is the one with the most liberty to incorporate diversity. The ideas of equality, political representation to all, active public participation, the inclusion of dissent, and most importantly, the authority to the law by all make it an attractive option for citizens to prefer, and countries to follow.

The largest democracy in the world, India with the lengthiest constitution has tried and to an extent, successfully achieved incorporating the framework to be a functional democracy. It is a parliamentary democratic republic where the President is head of the state and the Prime minister is head of the government. It works on the functioning of three bodies, namely legislative, executive, and judiciary. By including the principles of a sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic republic, and undertaking the guidelines to establish equality, liberty and justice, in the preamble itself, India shows true dedication to achieving the ideal.

It has formed a structure that allows people to enjoy their rights, fight against discrimination or any other form of suppression, and protect their rights as well. The ban on all and any form of discrimination, an independent judiciary, governmental accountability to its citizens, freedom of media and press, and secular values are some common values shared by all types of democracies.

Across the world, countries have tried rooting their constitution with the principles of democracy. However, the reality is different. Even though elections are conducted everywhere, mostly, they lack freedom of choice and fairness. Even in the world’s greatest democracies, there are challenges like political instability, suppression of dissent, corruption , and power dynamics polluting the political sphere and making it unjust for the citizens. Despite the consensus on democracy as the best form of government, the journey to achieve true democracy is both painstaking and tiresome. 

Did you know: Countries like Singapore, Peru, and Brazil have compulsory voting?

Must Read: Democracy and Diversity Class 10 Notes

Democracy is a process through which the government of a country is elected by and for the people.

Yes, India is a democratic country and also holds the title of the world’s largest democracy.

Direct and Representative Democracy are the two major types of Democracy.

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Democracy Essay

Democracy is derived from the Greek word demos or people. It is defined as a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people. Democracy is exercised directly by the people; in large societies, it is by the people through their elected agents. In the phrase of President Abraham Lincoln, democracy is the “Government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” There are various democratic countries, but India has the largest democracy in the world. This Democracy Essay will help you know all about India’s democracy. Students can also get a list of CBSE Essays on different topics to boost their essay-writing skills.

500+ Words Democracy Essay

India is a very large country full of diversities – linguistically, culturally and religiously. At the time of independence, it was economically underdeveloped. There were enormous regional disparities, widespread poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, and a shortage of almost all public welfare means. Since independence, India has been functioning as a responsible democracy. The same has been appreciated by the international community. It has successfully adapted to challenging situations. There have been free and fair periodic elections for all political offices, from the panchayats to the President. There has been a smooth transfer of political power from one political party or set of political parties to others, both at national and state levels, on many occasions.

India: A Democratic Country

Democracy is of two, i.e. direct and representative. In a direct democracy, all citizens, without the intermediary of elected or appointed officials, can participate in making public decisions. Such a system is only practical with relatively small numbers of people in a community organisation or tribal council. Whereas in representative democracy, every citizen has the right to vote for their representative. People elect their representatives to all levels, from Panchayats, Municipal Boards, State Assemblies and Parliament. In India, we have a representative democracy.

Democracy is a form of government in which rulers elected by the people take all the major decisions. Elections offer a choice and fair opportunity to the people to change the current rulers. This choice and opportunity are available to all people on an equal basis. The exercise of this choice leads to a government limited by basic rules of the constitution and citizens’ rights.

Democracy is the Best Form of Government

A democratic government is a better government because it is a more accountable form of government. Democracy provides a method to deal with differences and conflicts. Thus, democracy improves the quality of decision-making. The advantage of a democracy is that mistakes cannot be hidden for long. There is a space for public discussion, and there is room for correction. Either the rulers have to change their decisions, or the rulers can be changed. Democracy offers better chances of a good decision. It respects people’s own wishes and allows different kinds of people to live together. Even when it fails to do some of these things, it allows a way of correcting its mistakes and offers more dignity to all citizens. That is why democracy is considered the best form of government.

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Democracy Arguments For and Against Essay

Introduction, arguments for democracy, arguments against democracy, works cited.

Contrary to other ideas in political science such as justice and liberty, democracy is a term that can be easily explained. It mainly relates to the government by the majority. Although characterizing democracy is not difficult, the latest political theory is often left this out. No strong argument is provided by political theorists regarding the reason for representative democracy.

On the other hand, if any is given, it lacks strength. One would anticipate that great literature can be created from the reasons for the promotion and institution of democracy. On the contrary, popular literature does not delve so much into why democracy is desirable, but instead, get to explain the reasons for the improvement of the current democracy. This essay examines what different philosophers have had to argue both for and against democracy.

One of the arguments is that democracy is important because it can be embraced and made deliberative. This implies that deliberation of a dialogical nature is vital to the democratic society. When democracy is made deliberate in a given society, instead of people’s mere adaptation to circumstance, their preferences are not only informed but also made clear.

Democracy also helps to remove points of difference among people without necessarily making them agree. At times, democracy requires that people be compelled to embrace a general perspective. As such, both their imagination and empathy are stretched. In the same vein of the deliberateness of democracy, selfish concerns can be separated from public-oriented considerations thus encouraging public reasoning for participants who are free and equal (Sosa & Villanueva 287-288).

Research also indicates that making democratic to be more deliberative is likely to result to other benefits such as legitimizing all decisions that are arrived at, encouraging the powerless to voice their concerns in decision making, promoting transparency among group members and enhancing outcomes that are just.

Another argument that favors the importance of democracy in deliberation is one that aims at making deliberation democratic and not vice versa. This implies that whenever there is democratic deliberation, then the probability of reaching the truth based on reliability increases with the presence of a democratic decision-making regime.

Moreover, democracy enhances the proper allocation of resources to appropriate uses. This argument is supported by the fact dictatorial leaders are not fully accountable to citizens and do not have motivations to put the total output into maximum use. Instead, they focus on their selfish ends.

Consequently, democracy ensures that property rights are protected hence allowing investors to have a long term perspective. Besides, allowing free flow of information ensures that the quality of economic decisions made is high (Dahl 448).

In attempting to argue against democracy, Gordon takes on several philosophers who have argued in favor of democracy. He does this by revealing how such arguments fail to hold water when based on democracy because, in his perspective, the proponents of democracy do not express the desirability of democracy as it were. A good example of writers who have omitted this fact is Bernard Barber.

He dismisses other philosophers on this matter arguing that a just political order can only be reached at through a discussion and not by avoiding it. Questions of distributive justice can properly be dealt with by individuals rather than by philosophers alone since it would be undemocratic to do the reverse. However, Barber does not clearly explain why people should value democracy.

His concern is that individuals thinking on their own can reach wiser decisions than a group of individuals discussing the same issue. He’s satisfied with the fact that Rousseau concurs with the issue. If he were to be correct about this empirical matter, then it would be sound to conclude that if democratic governance would guide a society, then it would be prudent to arrive at decisions in such a society through discussions.

Although this point is still devoid of the desirability of democracy, it centers on the importance of democracy in discussing policy publicly. Deliberating on issues publicly is not a compulsory ingredient for democracy. For instance, during the nineteenth century, there was no democracy in the British government although public issues could be discussed broadly (Gordon para.5).

Plato presents a couple of arguments against democracy. First, Plato describes democracies as societies that are anarchic. He believes that societies that are democratic are marked with anarchy. For example, his attack describes governments that are democratic for being libertarian in such a manner every citizen can carry out their life issues in a way that appeals to them.

In this way, he asserts that people mistake anarchy for freedom. Plato criticizes democratic societies again by asserting that since they are characterized with anarchy, they are devoid of unity. They are not united on two fronts. First, due to the lack of political structure and are not politically organized. Second, democratic societies do not have a leadership structure since everyone can speak on political issues.

Second, Plato argues that democratic societies are likely to adhere to what their citizens want hence lacking any concern for the good of all. If anarchy is what features in democracies, then every individual has the freedom to choose what will ultimately benefit him or her. These choices may clash and encourage people to value their own needs rather those of others as well.

This is a clear pursuit of personal desires which may encourage loss of the common good. Since citizens have no idea of what ruling is, it happens that they pursue their passions and not the reason because reason cannot be applied in such pursuits. Any leaders that are elected through democracy are therefore servants who are out to satisfy the individual desires and appetites of the citizens.

Plato further argues that citizens who are guided by democracy are likened to individuals who grope in darkness since they do not have what it takes to execute governance (Kofmel 20). Moreover, Plato lists two more difficulties. First, numerous individuals falsely believe that they have adequate political proficiency that can qualify them to take part in political issues.

Citizens are not bothered by the fact that on account of their political standing, they are entitled to an equal political voice with each other. Second, when people get involved in a philosophical investigation with each other, they are more concerned with winning arguments instead of the following truth.

Therefore, even though citizens may be endowed with enough political expertise, it may be concluded that they will not be able to manage it effectively (Kofmel 21). The best remedy to this problem is to limit popular involvement in politics and allowing those who have sufficient political know-how in matters of governance to take the lead in the political decision-making process. Such are the people who can guide the citizens into achieving their common good.

Democracy is a term that is perceived differently by different people. Arguments put forth in favor of it are that it encourages fair allocation of resources, sound decision making especially by the powerless and allows for transparency and justice through deliberation.

Arguments against democracy are that it is not the best option for decision making, it encourages anarchy and hence lack of unity and that democracy encourages people who do not have sufficient political expertise to be involved in decision making. This results in a lack of common good.

Dahl, Robert. The Democracy Sourcebook. NY: MIT Press, 2003. June 19, 2011.

Gordon, David. What’s the Argument for Democracy? LeRockwell.com, 1992. June 19, 2011.

Kofmel, Erich. Anti-Democratic Thought. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2008. June 19, 2011.

Sosa, Ernest & Villanueva, Enrique. Social, Political and Legal Philosophy, Volume 1. Malden, USA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. June 19, 2011.

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Essay on Importance of Democracy

Students are often asked to write an essay on Importance of Democracy in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Importance of Democracy

What is democracy.

Democracy is a system where people have the power to decide. They choose their leaders by voting.

Freedom of Expression

In a democracy, everyone can share their thoughts. They can speak, write, or protest without fear.

Equality for All

Democracy treats everyone equally. No matter who you are, your vote counts the same.

Change is Possible

If people are unhappy with their leaders, they can vote for change. This keeps leaders responsible.

Democracy is important because it gives power to the people. It promotes freedom, equality, and the possibility of change.

250 Words Essay on Importance of Democracy

Introduction to democracy.

Democracy, derived from the Greek words ‘demos’ (people) and ‘kratos’ (power), signifies the rule of the people. It is a form of government where power is vested in the hands of the citizens, allowing them to participate in the decision-making processes that shape their lives.

Democratic Participation: A Fundamental Right

The cornerstone of democracy is the principle of ‘equal representation’. Every citizen, regardless of their social, economic, or cultural background, has an equal voice. This inclusivity fosters a sense of belonging and encourages active participation in governance. It allows citizens to express their views, choose their representatives, and hold them accountable, thereby ensuring transparency and minimizing corruption.

Democracy: A Catalyst for Social Progress

Democracy promotes social progress by safeguarding fundamental human rights and freedoms. It provides the platform for the free exchange of ideas, fostering innovation and creativity. Democracies are typically more responsive to citizens’ needs, leading to higher levels of societal welfare and development.

The Role of Democracy in Conflict Resolution

Democracy plays a crucial role in conflict resolution. It provides mechanisms like dialogue, negotiation, and legal actions to peacefully resolve disputes. This prevents escalation to violence and contributes to a stable and peaceful society.

Conclusion: The Imperative of Democracy

In conclusion, democracy is not just a form of government; it is a way of life that upholds the dignity and freedom of individuals. It fosters equality, facilitates social progress, and ensures peaceful coexistence. However, it requires active participation and vigilance from citizens to function effectively. Thus, the importance of democracy cannot be overstated.

500 Words Essay on Importance of Democracy

Introduction.

Democracy, a political system that empowers the masses, serves as the cornerstone of modern civilization. It is more than just a governance system; it is a social mechanism that fosters equality, freedom, and participation, facilitating the holistic development of a society.

The Essence of Democracy

At its core, democracy is about the will of the people. It ensures that the government is accountable to its citizens and that everyone has an equal say in decisions that affect their lives. This principle of equality is fundamental to a democratic society, as it ensures that power is not concentrated in the hands of a few.

Democracy and Human Rights

Democracy is intrinsically linked to human rights. It ensures that every individual is protected by law and that their rights are not infringed upon. This protection extends to freedom of speech, religion, and assembly, among others. By providing a platform for people to express their views, democracy fosters an environment of tolerance and mutual respect.

Participatory Governance

Democracy is a participatory form of governance, meaning that citizens have the right to participate in the decision-making processes. This can take the form of voting in elections, participating in public debates, or being part of civic organizations. This participatory nature of democracy fosters a sense of community and encourages citizens to engage with societal issues.

Democracy and Socio-Economic Development

Democracy is also crucial for socio-economic development. It encourages transparency, which is essential for economic growth. By promoting fair competition and providing equal opportunities, it fosters an environment conducive to innovation and progress. Moreover, the equitable distribution of resources that democracy ensures plays a pivotal role in reducing social disparities.

The Challenges of Democracy

Despite its numerous benefits, democracy is not without its challenges. It requires an informed and active citizenry to function effectively. Furthermore, it is susceptible to misuse, with populist leaders occasionally exploiting democratic institutions for personal gain. However, these challenges do not diminish the importance of democracy; instead, they serve as reminders of the need for constant vigilance and active participation from all citizens.

In conclusion, democracy is vital for the development of a just and equitable society. It provides a platform for citizens to voice their opinions, ensures the protection of human rights, and fosters socio-economic development. Despite the challenges it faces, the importance of democracy cannot be overstated. As responsible citizens, it is our duty to uphold democratic values and ensure that they are not compromised.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

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Philosophy World Democracy

 the grace of jean-luc nancy ,  the other beginning of philosophy , science and democracy.

2 January 2022

Image Credit: evidencefordemocracy.ca

This essay provides a historical overview of the complex relations between science and democracy. It contrasts two main positions: The first understands scientific attitudes as applicable to matters of social and political life, while a second opposed view, portrays science as a distinctive activity ill-suited as a model for civic life. During the Cold War, the connections forged between science, industry and the military highlighted the uneven distribution between the cost of scientific programs and their social benefits. Responding to these concerns, many have examined ways to make science more democratic, highlighting how expert knowledge stands in tension with that goal. This has led to a deeper understanding of the nature of expertise and the examination of different forms of citizen participation, one that suggests a more positive alliance between scientific expertise and democratic citizenship.

The proper role of science within democratic society has been a central area of debate over the last several centuries. While science and democracy maintain an important partnership, their relationship remains full of difficulties. Democratic governments face demands for increased citizen participation over decisions that arise from the way science impacts the public. This include requests for greater control over technologies that seem to operate unchecked. In addition, the scientific community complains about the public’s ignorance, while citizens often view scientific experts with suspicion and distrust. Such contemporary concerns are tied to longstanding debates concerning the social organization of scientific research and its political significance. (1) Two main positions have emerged from such disputes. The first understands science as representing a method or attitude that can be further extended to matters of social and political life. In its most ambitious form this view saw modern science as the proper cultural foundation both for democratic politics and the making of moral citizens. A second opposed view, portrays science as a distinctive type of activity dealing with its own problems and therefore ill-suited as a model for civic life. From this perspective, science requires autonomy from the political sphere in order to ensure continued scientific and technological advance. This view was largely successful in supporting attempts to secure government funding for scientific research without the centralized planning that was thought to hamper scientific research and innovation.

During the Cold War, the authority and autonomy granted to science began to be more critically examined. The connections forged between science, industry and the military highlighted the often uneven distribution between the cost of scientific programs and their social benefits. Responding to these concerns, many have examined ways to make science more democratic, further highlighting how expert knowledge may stand in tension with that goal. A number of different models for public participation in scientific and technical decision making have been proposed with varying degrees of success. Recently the application of such models has moved beyond countries such as Canada, Denmark, and the United States to include the social contexts of Asia, especially in Japan, Korea and Taiwan.This has led to a deeper understanding of the nature of expertise and the examination of different forms of citizen participation. The following offers a brief overview of this transition concluding that while science is clearly not the royal road to democracy, increased citizen participation holds the promise of forging a more cooperative alliance between scientific experts and citizens.

Science as Civic Ideal: Scientific Democracy

A central feature of Western thought since the scientific revolution emphasized how the spread of science within community life would further support democratic self-government. This idea was a common theme in the early days of the American republic, and took on more ambitious form in late nineteenth and early twentieth century when science was depicted as a vehicle for strengthening American democratic practices. Advocates of this scientific culture attempted to reconcile what might be seen as the competing demands of scientific research and its democratic legitimacy. On this view, science and democracy should be seen as harmonious and mutually reinforcing components of American life.

These ‘Scientific Democrats’ argued that in addition to technological resources, greater scientific development offered a moral outlook suitable to American democratic life. They were mainly interested in making the central claim that science could help in the forming of moral citizens. The philosopher John Dewey was a leading voice in this call for ‘scientific democracy’. His guiding philosophical conviction saw modern science as containing the resources for an egalitarian democratic culture once extended to the study of human affairs, including the social and political spheres of community life. He further thought that promoting a scientific attitude within American life would help contribute to a more egalitarian democratic society. Such extensions of science to cultural life took many forms as is illustrated by Dewey’s own example. He offered experiment and experimentation as a model for political deliberation and at times presented science as a means of social and moral engineering. (2)

Consensus conferences have had notable successes in terms of their ability to increase public participation without loss of clarity or rationality within the decision making process. In Taiwan their use has demonstrated the effectiveness of interaction between experts and the lay public by increasing scientific literacy concerning controversies in science.

By ‘Democracy’ the scientific democrats simply meant the popular sense of a polity defined by popular sovereignty. Moreover, it was generally assumed that the social influence of science was found in its ability to improve the formation of the public will, where this crucially involved the molding of its citizen’s moral character. While there was resistance to these ideas, the view that science reinforced the values of democratic society was not deeply questioned until during the Cold War. Later thinkers would highlight the myriad ways in which the interests of science and democracy are not identical and further emphasis the importance of increased public participation in scientific decision making, especially when it affects the public.

Some Dissenting Voices: The Need for Scientific Autonomy

During this same period, the differences between science and democracy were vividly depicted by those who criticized the idea of extending scientific ideals to civil society. In Germany the social scientist Max Weber sharply criticized assigning political significance to scientific work. He argued that expertise and specialization were conditions of scientific success and that this type of achievement did not further generalize to addressing the problems of life. Other notable anti-democratic approaches to scientific planning were opposed to the idea of an autonomous science disengaged from political and social life. Examples included Marxian views where cultural conditions were presented as responsible for scientific advance including the idea the technological practice drives theory construction. The Soviet emphasis on scientific planning was also influential. Scientific results were taken to derive from state organization, where the further application of its methods would abolish human dependence on the material world.

The Soviet emphasis on the idea of scientific planning led to an increased interest in the scope of freedom assigned to scientific inquiry, where the focus turned to the crucial issue of scientific autonomy. The American sociologist Robert Merton offered an argument for the autonomy of science with his discussion of the ethos of science involving four key norms: universalism, organized scepticism, “communism” or the sharing of scientific results, and disinterestedness. Merton argued that social integration depends on cultural norms, but that the normative structure of the scientific community was not derived from public standards. This is precisely what made science vulnerable to ‘anti-rationalist’ attempts to exert centralized control over science. For him, the way forward involved recognizing that scientific autonomy is threatened by ideals concerning the cultural extension of science, and that science and democracy are compatible only if the autonomy of science is recognized and maintained.

The scientist Michael Polanyi offered further influential arguments for the autonomy of science by claiming that science did not need political governance since it was already governed by its own traditions. He stressed that scientific method was a non-mechanical activity of discovery based on inarticulate knowledge grounded in tradition. The scientific community was then distinct from the planning mentality of corporate bureaucracy, where such planning would destroy the very community that allows for the freedom of scientific discovery. This further suggested, however, that science shares features of other communities with the importance of strong tradition, free discussion and decisions of conscience. Such commonalities recommend an attitude of mutual respect between science and democracy that Polanyi thought would help highlight how scientific advance is secured through its autonomy.Harvard president James Conant was a further important voice in rejecting the idea that science makes better citizens, and this viewpoint informed his own case studies based education policy. Both he and Polanyi concluded that science should be governed indirectly by facilitating active competition among scientists. The American historian of science Thomas Kuhn further argued that neither science nor its reward systems operated democratically. These views lent increasing support to the idea that the demands of scientific research and the interests of democratic society were not the same.

Postwar Debates: Expertise and Public Participation

In the postwar era the political autonomy and authority given scientific research was challenged by scholars who sought a renewed democratization of scientific practice. The increasing tensions between science as an authoritative technique and science as a vision for civic life would later develop into a political debate over scientific authority and expertise. The connections between science, politics and public interests were now more carefully examined in the attempt to make scientific work more accountable to the public. (3)

The key problem with any deference to the authority of scientific expertise within democratic society stems from its apparent threat to citizen rule. The challenge becomes one of attempting to carefully situate expertise within an ongoing commitment to democratic values. It is here that commentators have recommended the increased public evaluation of scientific results and assumptions made about the social world. The sociologist Stephen Turner argues that in principle expert judgments can themselves be democratically accepted, while remaining both tentative and open to challenge. In the same vein, others emphasis that an increased public evaluation of scientific results can help identify conflicting values among interest groups and further indicate how this impacts public risk. Steven Epstein chronicles how AIDS activists recognized faulty assumptions within the protocols devised by scientists for new drug testing. This enabled them to further question both the ethics and artificial nature of these clinical trials.

Greater participation can also highlight those concerns that remain in the public interest but which are simply unknown by scientific experts. Brian Wynne’s examination of Northern English Sheep farms possibly affected by the Chernobyl nuclear accident revealed how farmers remained sensitive to other possible sources of radiation and had relevant knowledge about sheep farming absent from scientists. This issue can be further framed in terms of the nature of expertise and expert knowledge. Expertise can come in many forms, and the public may exhibit a type of expertise conducive to scientific advance that is lacking in the scientific community. The sociologists Harry Collins and Robert Evans have offered a taxonomy of different types of expertise in order to clarify meaningful forms of participation in the hopes of yielding a greater knowledge egalitarianism. Another approach to combining different kinds of expertise involves what philosopher Philip Kitcher calls an ‘ideal of well-ordered science’. (4) According to this model, scientific research is well-ordered when the problems it addresses are selected by a diverse set of representatives that are fully informed about what science has established, what areas remain open, and who are committed to addressing the perceived needs of the public. These ideas have been used in developing democracies such as South Africa where attempts at ‘civic science’, the active dialogue between scientists, engineers and other community members, are seen as effective means for resource management. (5) This interaction supports democratic processes through recognition of diverse sources of expert knowledge, and further creates an environment favorable to the promotion of democracy through science.

The key problem with any deference to the authority of scientific expertise within democratic society stems from its apparent threat to citizen rule. The challenge becomes one of attempting to carefully situate expertise within an ongoing commitment to democratic values.

Such examples have led to greater insight into how public participation in technical decision making improves the value and quality of science and technology. Participatory processes are especially effective when they are representative of those interested, encourage fair deliberation, provide sufficient resources for informed debate, remain transparent and accountable, and are conducted efficiently. This democratization of science and technology has taken many forms including ‘Consensus conferences’ originating in Denmark and further used in other parts of Europe, Canada, the United States and more recently in Asia. Consensus conferences consist of citizen panels responsible for making non-binding recommendations to government concerning a specific technical issue of broader social concern. These panels can hear from experts but retain sole responsibility for their recommendations. Consensus conferences have had notable successes in terms of their ability to increase public participation without loss of clarity or rationality within the decision making process. In Taiwan their use has demonstrated the effectiveness of interaction between experts and the lay public by increasing scientific literacy concerning controversies in science. The lay public is further able to identify the biases and positions of scientific experts, and also raise important points not clearly suggested by scientific experts. The use of consensus conferences in Korea and Japan has led to exploration of other models of public participation, where an important guiding theme focuses on clarifying the precise ways in which local community contexts impact the process of public deliberation over technical decisions. Such citizen panels provide clear examples of how informed citizens can identify scientific bias and introduce significant issues not suggested by scientific experts. (6) What this then suggests is that the relationship between scientific expertise and democratic citizenship can be less antagonistic, as increased citizen participation can help to forge a more cooperative alliance between scientific experts and citizens.

1. For a helpful overview seeRoy Macleod, “Science and Democracy: Historical Reflections on Present Discontents” Minerva v.35 (1997).

2. Further details on the scientific democrats can be found in Andrew, Jewett. Science, Democracy, and the American University: From the Civil War to the Cold War . New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. The main lines of Dewey’s varying views on science and democracy can be seen in his Reconstruction in Philosophy , Beacon Press,1920 and “Science and Free Culture.” In Freedom and Culture , 102- 118. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1939.

3. These issues are further examined in Edward J. Hackett, Olga Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch, and Judy Wajcman, eds. The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies 3rd Edition . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. See especially the chapters by Bucchi and Neresini, Irwin, Sismondo, and Turner.

4. Further details are found in H.M. Collins and Robert Evans. Rethinking Expertise . Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2007 and Philip Kitcher. Science in a Democratic Society . Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2011.

5. Further details can be found in E. van Wyk, C. M. Breen, T. Sherwill and D. Magadlela. “Challenges for the relationship between science and society: developing capacity for ecosystem governance in an emerging democracy.” Water Policy 9: Supplement 2 (2007): 99-111.

6. These issues and cases studies are treated in the following articles: Jill Chopyak and Peter Levesque. “Public participation in science and technology decision making: trends for the future.” Technology in Society 24(2002): 155–166; Dung-Sheng Chen and Chung-Yeh Deng. “Interaction between Citizens and Experts in Public Deliberation: A Case Study of Consensus Conferences in Taiwan.” East Asian Science, Technology and Society: an International Journal 1(2007): 77–97; Kohta Juraku, Tatsujiro Suzuki and Osamu Sakura. “Social Decision-making Processes in Local Contexts: An STS Case Study on Nuclear Power Plant Siting in Japan.” East Asian Science, Technology and Society: an International Journal 1(2007): 53–75; Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner and Seyoung Hwang. “Governance of stem cellresearch: Public participationand decision-making in China,Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.” Social Studies of Science 42: 5 (September 2012): 684–708.

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The proletarianization of biological thought, ana m soto and carlos sonnenschein, science in the storm 4 – agnotology, artificial intelligence, and democracy, giuseppe longo.

Essay on Election and Democracy for Students and Children

500 words essay on election and democracy.

A democratic government is said to be the best kind of government. It ensures the active participation of the people where the citizens get the chance to choose their government. The candidate or party whom the people choose is through elections.

Therefore, we see how elections play a pivotal role in a democracy. The party which secures the highest number of votes in the election process forms the government for the next term. That is why we see how elections are greatly crucial for a democracy.

Election Process in a Democracy

The election process in a democracy is usually similar in most ways. It is responsible for shaping the government of a democracy. Elections are conducted at regular intervals. In a democracy like India, they take place every five years. A committee is set to monitor the whole electoral procedure from the voters’ list to the results.

During the election process, various parties enroll themselves to contest in the elections. After thorough campaigning and more, dates are decided on which voting happens. People turn up in great numbers to cast their votes to make their candidate or party win.

Most importantly, in a democracy, the election process follows the method of a secret ballot. It is very beneficial for maintaining the fairness of the contest. Moreover, they also protect the privacy and safety of the voter as they are not liable to answer to anyone regarding their vote. It is one of the fairest ways to decide who wins the election.

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Importance of Election in Democracy

The election procedure just shows how important and crucial it is for a democracy. The process is very grand and takes place on a great level. As it requires a lot of work and attention, there are certain people who specifically get the responsibility of handling and managing the entire process.

Elections form the basis of democracy. They are very important as they help the people in getting a chance to contest the elections. It allows people to get a fair chance to work for their country and make a brighter future. Moreover, it also ensures that any person can become a part of the government without any discrimination on the basis of caste, creed, sex, religion or more.

Most importantly, elections entrust a big responsibility on the shoulders of the citizens. It helps in empowering the citizens of a democracy. You see that when a person earns the right to vote, they choose their government responsibly as they realize the power that lies within their hands.

Above all, the election process ensures fair play. They are a great way of preventing dishonest people from rigging the procedure. In short, fair and regular elections are a vital part of a democratic government. Similarly, they empower the common citizens of the nation to elect their government and also change it after a period of time to ensure everyone works for the best in the country.

FAQs on Election and Democracy

Q.1 What is the election process in a democracy?

A.1 The election process takes place at a regular period of time. People cast their vote to whomever they think id serving of being in power. Thus, the party with the majority of votes wins and serves the term.

Q.2 Why are elections important in a democracy?

A.2 Elections form the basis of any democracy. It ensures that the power resides within the people. It also ensures fair play and stops any unfair means from taking place. They are important to strengthen the essence of democracy.

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Essay on Democracy for Students and Children in 1000+ Words

Here, you will read Essay on Democracy for Students and Children in 1000+ Words. It will include meaning, importance of democracy in India.

Table of Contents

Introduction (Essay on Democracy)

This is a very simple word known by all nowadays. Mostly in all countries democracy system is available. Public administration is called a democracy because the election of the people forms it.

Therefore, there is no system without an election. Democracy is the representative system of the people. It shows the goodwill of the entire community.

Meaning of democracy 

Democracy is a governance system under which the people have the right to choose their own ruler on their own.

Under this, every adult citizen, using his vote, chooses a ruler who will help in the development of the country. Along with it, it will maintain the unity and integrity of the country, and protect it from all wars. 

Under which every citizen of India was given the right to choose his ruler on his own free will, while under democracy, permission to use his vote by removing the feeling of inequality spread on caste, religion, gender, color, sects etc. 

Democracy in India

India is one of the world’s largest democratic countries, where people have the right to choose their favorite representatives.

In a democratic system, the people hand over the reins of the country for the benefit of their country and for the development of the country in the hands of a person who deserves it and helps in maintaining the unity and integrity of the country.

At the same time, India’s democracy works on five main principles, such as sovereign, that there is no interference of any foreign power in India; it is completely free. Socialists, vote is to provide social and economic equality to all citizens.

Secularism, whose vote ball is the freedom to adopt or refuse to adopt any religion. Democratic, which means the citizens of the country elect the government of India. Republic, which means the head of the country, is not a single hereditary king or queen.

There are many types of political parties in the country that stand to contest elections at the state and national levels every five years. But only that political party is ruled by the people who get the maximum vote of the people.

Role of democracy in election and voting system of India

Elections are an essential and important system in India’s universal, socialist, secular, and democratic republic. The election is an important system to form a government and to elect a representative.

Elections to the Lok Sabha or to the Legislative Assembly, in which all citizens of the country unite and exercise their franchise and elect their representative, every citizen over 18 years of age in the country can use his vote. 

The citizens of the country are also made aware of giving their votes from time to time. Let us tell you that elections are held every five years in our country, in which the citizens of the country use their votes to elect their representatives for the country’s development and progress.

India is a democratic country with 29 states and seven union territories in which elections are held every five years. At the same time, in these elections, political parties form their government by getting more votes of the people in the center and the state.

As we know, during elections, political parties make many promises to the people and encourage them to vote for their party. In such a situation, it is a challenge to choose the right and deserving candidate in front of the public. This is the fact that there are many political parties in India.

Democratic Principles of India

India is a democratic country that primarily works on five democratic principles – such as sovereign, socialist, secularism and democratic which are below –

The Democratic Republic of India operates on the sovereign’s principle, which means that India is free from interference by any foreign power, its rules, and regulations.

Socialists are also a democratic principle of India, whose vote is to provide economic equality and sociality to every citizen of our country by ignoring caste, religion, sect., gender, color, and creed.

India is a secular republic whose vote is that all citizens of India have the freedom to adopt and practice any religion as per their choice and choice, as there is no official religion in India.

India is a democratic republic, which means that India’s government is elected by the citizens of India without any caste discrimination and economic inequality.

Here, all citizens are given the right to vote in the same manner so that they choose the government of choice so that the country’s development can be strengthened and the country can become financially strong.

Ever since our country’s constitution came into force, India has been declared a secular and democratic republic; that is, the head of our country is not a hereditary king or queen, but it is elected by the Lok Sabha. The Rajya Sabha, which is decided by the people of Janardan, Is in hand.

10 Lines on Democracy

• Abraham Lincoln has told the meaning of democracy – for the people only- the people’s rule.
• Democracy consists of folk loyalty and folk spirit.
• In this, the importance of elections is first and foremost. This reflects public welfare.
• The Constitution has given place to democratic governance.
• The parliamentary system has been adopted in India and UK.
• In this, the elected representatives of the people run the country’s rule, keeping the public interest in view.
• There is a kind of representative democracy, in which clean and fair elections take place.
• It is difficult to give a completely correct and acceptable definition of democracy.
• Our Country India is well known in the world as the biggest democracy
• The age of casting a vote, and using its democratic right is 18 years.

At last, we can say that democracy system is the most popular and accepted of governance. Our country India’s democratic system is appreciated all over the country.

However, in India’s democracy, all the factors like illiteracy, poverty, and unemployment need to be eradicated to strengthen the country’s democracy and strengthen the country’s development.

But, still there a need for the improvement in the current democratic system of India. I hope you liked this informative essay on democracy.

Thanks for reading.

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• A fall quarter course uses Ancient Athens as a case study to explore practical and philosophical questions about how democracy functions.
• For ancient Athenians, political participation was intertwined with leading an ethical life; being part of a well-run society was seen as essential to human flourishing.
• At the heart of the decision-making process was the “demos” – the Greek word for people – and the “kratos” – the Greek word for rule.
• Knowing they would be called upon to deal with difficult issues had a profound effect on the way Athenian citizens related with the world around them.

With over 4 billion citizens in some 65 countries participating in an election in 2024, the year is being heralded as a historic period – and test – for democracy . In a winter quarter course at Stanford, students examined another important time for self-government: the fifth century BCE, when democracy first emerged.

Each week, Stanford political scientist and classicist Josiah Ober conjured what political life was like in the Greek city-state of Athens to the mix of undergraduate, graduate, and postdoctoral students taking POLISCI 231A: Democracy Ancient and Modern: From Politics to Political Theory . Ober drew on texts by contemporary Greek historians and political theorists who focus on ancient democracy to explore with students some of the issues ancient Athenians grappled with as they put self-government into practice.

For Ober, who has studied ancient and modern political thought for over four decades, ancient Athens makes for an interesting case study for students and scholars to examine how democracy functions and the different forms this mode of government can take.

In a winter quarter course, political scientist and classicist Josiah Ober teaches students about the foundations of democracy. | Andrew Brodhead

“It gives you these possibilities of the different ways democracy could be done,” said Ober, the Markos & Eleni Kounalakis Chair in Honor of Constantine Mitsotakis in the School of Humanities and Sciences . “History gives you some advantages to test a political theory and find out if it could possibly work.”

Other ways to do democracy

In running their democracy, ancient Athenians did many things differently that students considered closely throughout the course.

For one, the political life of its citizens was incredibly active.

Unlike the American system of representative democracy, where citizens vote for elected officials to represent their concerns in government, rule in Ancient Greece was direct: Participation was not a choice but a civic duty.

For ancient Athenians, being political was intertwined with leading an ethical life: Being part of a well-run society was seen as essential to human flourishing.

As Ober explained, by the time an Athenian citizen was 30 years old, it was highly likely they had already participated in the Assembly – the governing body where 5,000 or 6,000 citizens regularly met to vote on important issues of the day – or even served on the Council, a group of 500 citizens randomly chosen by lottery to serve 10-month terms to help set the Assembly’s agenda (ancient Athenians frequently drew on lotteries to distribute civic responsibilities among its citizens; in the U.S., they are scarcely used – the only thing close is jury duty).

For Athenian citizens, knowing they would be called upon to deal with difficult issues and decisions – like whether to go to war – had a profound effect on the way they related with the world around them.

“The way in which Athenians conducted their lives was highly influenced by the fact that they were going to have some real responsibility for their community,” Ober said. “When an Athenian went to the Assembly and voted for war, he was sending himself to war.”

Democracy isn’t something that is inherent or is going to be given to you. It’s something that you need to work at.” Cameron Adams, ’24 Senior majoring in political science

At the heart of the Assembly’s decision-making process was the “demos” – the Greek word for people – and the “kratos” – the Greek word for rule (the etymological root of democracy comes from these two words).

In a class seminar devoted to deliberation, Ober described how the citizen Assembly made decisions and how those decisions represented the will of the demos, the collective judgment of the people about the best available course of action. The class then discussed some of the tensions that arise when conceptualizing a large, diverse population as a monolithic entity.

They also debated questions about accountability. If the decisions made by the Assembly were that of the demos, did that mean that individuals were no longer responsible for the decisions they contributed to making? Which raised another question: What does a democracy look like when officials are accountable to the people, but “the people” are accountable to no one?

Tackling complex questions like these – which are political, philosophical, and practical in nature – formed the basis of many of the students’ discussions.

For Michael Thomas, a second-year PhD student who took the course, examining how the ancient Greeks approached civic engagement and education has made him think about what could happen if American society did something similar.

Michael Thomas is a second-year PhD student in the Department of Political Science. | Andrew Brodhead

“We ask ourselves a lot about how to do democratic education and a great deal of it for the Greeks was by doing, such as governing through the Assembly and holding office,” Thomas said. “I think people would feel more committed to democracy if they experienced it in their own lives through participating in collective action.”

Learning from limitations

But not everyone in ancient Athens was able to participate in political life.

Excluded from the franchise were women and slaves – not too dissimilar to the limitations America’s Founding Fathers set when they wrote the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and the Bill of Rights in the late 18th century.

For political science major Cameron Adams, ’24, learning how Athenians restricted democratic participation has helped them better understand barriers in American democracy.

“We modeled our democracy after Athenian democracy, which was flawed, so it makes sense that our system is flawed,” said Adams, who took two of the courses Ober taught in winter quarter.

I think people would feel more committed to democracy if they experienced it in their own lives through participating in collective action.” Michael Thomas Second-year PhD student in the Department of Political Science

Even with a series of reforms in the 20th century that expanded and protected U.S. voting rights to include women and people of color, there are still groups of Americans today who are ineligible to participate in an election. For example, people with a criminal conviction may be blocked from voting in their state. People have also become disenfranchised by being forced to face long wait times at polling stations or not being provided enough places to vote .

While learning how ancient Athenians grappled with who was and was not able to participate in democratic life, Adams considered contemporary problems like these. One essay Adams read that they found particularly relevant examined the ways in which women and slaves in ancient Athens found ways to speak out against the injustices they faced.

“It illuminates that democracy isn’t something that is inherent or is going to be given to you,” Adams said. “It’s something that you need to work at.”

Home — Essay Samples — Government & Politics — Voting — The Importance of Voting for Strengthening Democracy

The Importance of Voting for Strengthening Democracy

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Published: Sep 5, 2023

Words: 630 | Page: 1 | 4 min read

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Shaping government policies, promoting representation and inclusivity, fostering civic participation, challenges and the importance of overcoming them.

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