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U.S. Relations With the Philippines

Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

February 23, 2023

More information about Philippines is available on the Philippines Page and from other Department of State publications and other sources listed at the end of this fact sheet.

U.S.-PHILIPPINES RELATIONS

The United States established diplomatic relations with the Philippines in 1946.

U.S.-Philippine relations are based on strong historical and cultural linkages and a shared commitment to democracy and human rights. The 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty provides a strong foundation for our robust post-World War II security partnership. Strong people-to-people ties, and economic cooperation provide additional avenues to engage on a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues. The U.S.-Philippine Bilateral Strategic Dialogue (BSD) is the annual forum for forward planning across the spectrum of our relationship. The most recent BSD took place in January 2023 when senior Philippine and U.S. foreign affairs and defense officials convened in Manila.

More than four million Filipino-Americans live in the United States, and almost 300,000 U.S. citizens reside in the Philippines, including a large number of U.S. military veterans. Additionally, Manila is home to the only Veterans Administration regional office outside the United States, and the American Cemetery in Manila is the largest American military cemetery outside the United States. Pre-COVID, more than one million U.S. citizens visited the Philippines each year. People-to-people exchange programs between the United States and the Philippines include the longest continuously running Fulbright program in the world, the International Visitor Leadership Program, and the Kenney-Lugar Youth Exchange and Study program.

U.S. Assistance to Philippines

The U.S. government’s goals in the Philippines are to strengthen democratic governance and support Philippine government efforts to promote inclusive development and contribute to security and development cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. assistance to the Philippines helps expand inclusive, market-driven growth; foster strong democratic systems and good economic, health, and education governance; promote responsible natural resource management; and enhance resilience for communities and the environment.

For the past 60 years, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has worked with the Philippine government and local organizations to achieve shared development goals, investing more than $5 billion to support the Philippines since 1961. Current development priorities include responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, mitigating and adapting to climate change, promoting renewable energy, preventing and mitigating conflict, bolstering economic recovery, advancing democratic values, fighting corruption, and advocating for human rights. The Departments of State, Defense, and USAID also implement programs in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao that aim to create a sustainable foundation for peace and stability in areas at risk from terrorism and violent extremism. U.S. assistance seeks to intensify cooperation through a whole-of-government approach that supports a free, open, and resilient Indo-Pacific. The United States has had a Peace Corps program in the Philippines for over 50 years.

Over the last decade, disaster relief and recovery has also become a vital area of assistance to the Philippines. The U.S. government, through USAID, works year-round to help communities in the Philippines prepare for and respond to natural disasters. In total, since 2010, USAID has provided more than $342 million in disaster relief and recovery aid and strengthened the disaster risk reduction capacity of over 100 cities and municipalities in the Philippines. This includes relief and recovery efforts after Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda devastated the country in 2013 and after Super Typhoon Rai/Odette made landfall in 2021. The United States continues to support long-term reconstruction and rebuilding efforts and has allocated over $60 million to support ongoing humanitarian assistance and stabilization funding after the siege of Marawi.

The United States has been the Philippines’ strongest partner in countering the COVID-19 pandemic, contributing nearly $38 million in pandemic-related assistance and providing more than 32 million vaccines through the COVAX facility (out of more than 69 million total vaccines delivered to the Philippines via COVAX) as of March 2022.

Bilateral Economic Relations

The United States and the Philippines have a strong trade and investment relationship, with over $18.9 billion in goods and services traded during 2020. The Philippines’ third-largest trading partner, the United States is one of the largest foreign investors in the Philippines.

Key imports from the Philippines are semiconductor devices and computer peripherals, automobile parts, electric machinery, textiles and garments, wheat and animal feeds, coconut oil, and information technology/business process outsourcing services. Key U.S. exports to the Philippines are agriculture goods, machinery, cereals, raw and semi-processed materials for the manufacture of semiconductors, electronics, and transport equipment. The two countries have a bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, signed in 1989, and a tax treaty.

Philippines’s Membership in International Organizations

The Philippines and the United States belong to many of the same international organizations, including the United Nations, ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. The Philippines is also an observer to the Organization of American States. The Philippines served as chair and host of ASEAN for 2017. The United States strongly supports Philippine government efforts to fully implement the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, an important multilateral tool to protect Filipino and U.S. children and families.

Bilateral Representation

Principal embassy officials are listed in the Department’s Key Officers List.

The Philippines maintains an embassy in the United States at 1600 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036 (tel. 202-467-9300).

More information about Philippines is available from the Department of State and other sources, some of which are listed here:

CIA World Factbook Philippines Page U.S. Embassy USAID Philippines Page History of U.S. Relations With Philippines Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Countries Page U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics Export.gov International Offices Page Millennium Challenge Corporation Library of Congress Country Studies Travel Information

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Public Views on the Anti-Terrorism Act (formerly Bill C-36)

3.0 detailed findings (cont'd), 3.3 reactions to the anti-terrorism act.

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Table of Contents

After participants were asked about terrorism in general and their awareness of the Anti-terrorism Act was gauged, they were introduced to specific provisions of the Act . For each provision, a handout was distributed (see Appendix C) and was read by the participants, and a discussion followed.

3.3.1 Overview of the Anti-terrorism Act

Participants were first given a brief description of the Anti-terrorism Act (see handout 1 in Appendix C).

This description triggered a wide range of reactions, depending on the participants' views on foreign politics and terrorism. Qualitatively, opinions appeared to be divided along the following five lines:

A small number of participants felt that the Canadian legislation is probably not tough enough. ( "Classic Canadiana: sounds tough, but not enough to stop anything." )
Some participants were somewhat reassured and comforted that Canada is doing something to fight terrorism. ( "I'm willing to give up something to be safer." ) There appeared to be more participants with this opinion than with the first one, but fewer than those with the third one. Those who felt this way were mostly English-speaking participants from Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa, Halifax, Regina, Calgary, and Vancouver. These participants could be further divided into two groups: those who thought the Act might deter terrorism and those who were sceptical because "there is nothing that will stop those people."
The largest number of participants felt that the description was too vague and did not tell them enough to allow them to form an opinion . Those who felt this way were mostly English-speaking participants from Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa, Halifax Group 1, Regina Group 1, Calgary, and Vancouver. These participants asked: "What investigative tools? What do they mean by ensuring that Canadian values are preserved? This sounds great, but how does it work? How far does it go?"
Some participants were concerned that this law is "a knee-jerk reaction" which may lead to the authorities becoming "paranoid." These people tended to express concerns about privacy and/or racial discrimination. ( "The media made out terrorists as Middle Eastern" ). This opinion was only expressed by a few French-speaking participants, particularly in Montreal and Quebec City.
Some participants were opposed to the law because they saw it as driven by the United States and considered it a serious threat to the rights of Canadians. Typically, these participants did not think that terrorists should be treated any differently from other criminals and they had serious concerns about the potential for abuse by the police or the authorities in general. ( "I find it aberrant to use the word terrorism to qualify people as though they were different from people who commit crimes." ) However, only a few French-speaking participants from Montreal and Quebec City and a few Group 2 participants in Regina and Halifax were of this opinion, although they were very vocal about it.

Generally, participants across both age groups and in all cities felt that the description was "very vague," "very broad," and they questioned some of the terminology used in the description. "Sounds good, but what does it mean?" Participants needed more information on the Act before they could give their full opinions.

All sounds good, but it is general and all-encompassing. (Calgary, Group 2) Terrorism is a reality in our lives. This sounds very good, but it is vague and non-committal. (Regina, Group 1) What does it allow police to do? (Toronto, Group 1) I need details. (Montreal, English Group 2)

One of the primary questions participants asked was "How does it work?" Some participants suggested that the inclusion of vague terminology contributed to the feeling that the description itself is weak. For example, many would have liked further explanation of the 'new investigative tools' that can be used to fight terrorism. Some concern was expressed that these 'new investigative tools' could be used by authorities to take away individual civil rights. The statement "Canadian values of respect and fairness" was reassuring to some participants; however, it appeared to contradict the idea of 'new investigative tools.'

Ambiguous - "deter" and "identify" are not specific enough. (Regina, Group 2) Talks about stronger laws, but it doesn't say what they are. (Vancouver, Group 1)

Some participants acknowledged that balancing individual rights and freedoms and fighting terrorism is a difficult task, and they were not sure the description of the Act reflects such a balance. They agreed that we live in "scary" times and that individuals may have to sacrifice some of their rights for the greater good, safety, and protection of the country as a whole.

It's scary, but so is terrorism. We live in a scary world. (Calgary, Group 1) I agree very much in principle, but the trick lies in obtaining a proper balance. (Montreal, English Group 2)

The reference to 'hate crimes and propaganda' was also found by some participants in Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City to require a better explanation; the word propaganda, in particular, was interpreted by some as a threat to the freedom of expression. One participant suggested that the reference to stronger laws against propaganda could be used to target legitimate groups.

That could apply to Greenpeace or any labour union. (Quebec City, Group 1)

Some participants, particularly in the older groups in Winnipeg and Halifax, wondered what the new 'safeguards' for fighting terrorism were; they felt that the term required more explanation.

A significant minority of participants in Winnipeg, Regina, and Vancouver felt that the Act would only be as good as the funding and manpower that was devoted to it. In their opinion, the Canadian government does not have either in place to support the implementation of the activities referred to in the description.

Do we have the infrastructure in place to enforce this law or is it just lip service? (Vancouver, Group 2) Are they going to act on it? How much money and resources are being put into it? (Regina, Group 1)

Other participants in Winnipeg and Regina wondered who actually controls and enforces the 'new investigative tools.' Is it the Government, CSIS, or the police? They expressed some concern that if the power was left in the wrong hands, these 'tools' could be abused.

Some participants felt that the existence of the Act represented a step in the right direction. They saw the Act as something positive because it indicated that Canada had something in place in the event of an attack by terrorists. Just knowing that it exists brought a measure of comfort to some participants. The Act was also perceived in a positive light because it responded to United Nations requirements.

A few participants wondered why they had never heard of the Act prior to the session, and others wondered if anyone had been charged under the Act since its inception.

Why don't I know about this? (Halifax, Group 2)

Moreover, Group 2 participants in Vancouver expressed some concern that they never seemed to hear any news from the Government about fighting crime and said that they would like more information in this regard.

Participants in both Toronto groups and in Winnipeg Group 2 questioned why there was no reference to the rights of visible minorities in the brief description of the Act. More specifically, they wondered if the 'new investigative tools' and the Act itself would lead to racial profiling of visible minority groups. This reaction did not appear to come up in other cities.

It doesn't mention ethnicity. What about the rights of visible minorities? (Toronto, Group 1)

The sentence "Bill C-36 is not just a reaction to events…" was not believed by most participants in Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City, who wondered why it was passed in the fall of 2001; they suspected that it was passed under pressure from the United States to secure borders.

I'd say that Canada was influenced by the States. (Ottawa, French Group 1) After 9/11, the perception in the States was that there were terrorists in Canada and that it was easy to go through the border. (Ottawa, English Group 1) Canada has had to do it under pressure from the States. (Montreal, French Group 1)

However, as mentioned previously, many participants in the other cities took comfort in knowing that the Act was created/passed in response to a United Nations request and that Canada adhered to a United Nations obligation.

The general reaction among participants in both age groups and in all cities demonstrates that if this brief description were presented to the public, it would most likely generate more questions than answers.

Comparative Toughness

Most participants indicated that they thought that the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act was less severe than similar anti-terrorism laws in the United States, but they did not know for certain. This was not primarily based on knowledge of the laws or personal experience, but rather on the perception that the United States has extremely harsh and tough anti-terrorism laws. While some participants believed that the anti-terrorism laws of the United States and Canada are similar, enforcement of the laws was thought to be more severe in the United States than in Canada.

A few participants felt that Canada would give offenders under the Act a "slap on the wrist" compared to the perceived harsher 'justice' that would be dealt out in the United States. Canada was perceived by some to have rather lenient laws generally, in relation to other countries.

Ours are less severe. The Government doesn't back what they say they are doing. (Halifax, Group 1)

With regard to the anti-terrorism laws of the United Kingdom, even if several participants could not tell and/or would not hazard a guess, once again, the perception was that the Canadian laws are less severe. One reason given by participants for this perception was that the United Kingdom was instrumental in the 'War on Terrorism' carried out by the United States and other coalition countries in Iraq.

3.3.2 Definition of a Terrorist Activity

A handout introducing the definition of a terrorist activity was distributed to participants (see handout 2 in Appendix C).

Most of the participants were satisfied with the definition of a terrorist activity and claimed that it was necessary, that it seemed "comprehensive," and that it "explained well" what terrorism is.

However, it was not clear to some that all three criteria have to be met (i.e. the act is motivated by political, religious, or ideological purposes; the act is intended to intimidate the public or compel the government not to do something; and the act is intended to harm through violence/death or to interfere with an essential service) in order for something to be considered an act of terrorism. When this was not properly understood, participants were much more likely to be wary of the definition. When they understood it, they typically reacted as follows:

I think it is very fair; it has to be all three criteria. (Halifax, Group 2)

Many participants who were receptive to the definition felt that the fact that it was very broad and all encompassing worked to its advantage. That is, if the definition was narrowed down any further, it might exclude actual terrorist groups. Indeed, a broad definition appeared to be key for these participants.

Pretty broad, as it should be. (Regina, Group 1) This has a wide scope. It needs to have one. (Vancouver, Group 2)

Some participants, however, took issue with the definition. Mainly, they found that the definition was far too broad, that it could apply to "pressure groups" such as environmentalists, anti-globalization activists, and even demonstrating labour union members, although the law specifically excludes work stoppages, protests, advocacy, or dissent.

You could jail environmentalists with this on the grounds that they are ideologically motivated, intend to compel the government to do something, and may interfere with an essential service. (Montreal, Group 2)

French-speaking participants, who remembered the War Measures Act being invoked during the October crisis, when hundreds of individuals were jailed, including well-known politicians, singers, and artists, expressed serious concerns.

Just reading, the union groups could be considered terrorists; they go against the law when they occupy a minister's office. (Quebec City, Group 2) I've been a terrorist several times in my life, according to this definition; it's unclear. (Quebec City, Group 1)

In the particular instance described by the last comment, the participant was concerned about the interpretation that a judge could give to a protest group.

Some participants in Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec City, Halifax, Regina, and Vancouver were trying to find 'loopholes' in the definition, using the examples of Greenpeace, the Hell's Angels, seal hunters, and anti-globalization protestors, and trying to figure out if these groups fit this description. They were still unclear as to whether or not these groups might be described as 'terrorists' under the definition. Some of them concluded that the definition was dependent on the discretion of those who have the power to charge someone with an offence. They hoped that the definition would be applied fairly.

Almost everyone is a terrorist under this definition. Could legitimate groups be targeted? (Vancouver, Group 2) It's still a bit general. Are there loopholes? (Halifax, Group 1)

With regard to the wording of the provision, "intimidate the public or a segment of the public" was believed to be very broad and vague, and "interfere with or seriously disrupt an essential service, facility, or system" was found to be very encompassing and was perceived as giving a lot of latitude to judges, who could label and consider as terrorists almost any activist group or protester.

Perceived Usefulness

Participants were divided on whether the definition of a terrorist activity was a useful tool in identifying who is a terrorist and who is not. Again, it appeared to come down to who was making this decision. More importantly, very few believed that it would be effective in preventing terrorist acts, since "there was no way to stop somebody who is prepared to die," someone who is prepared to be a martyr for a cause.

Many did not believe that this definition per se may have helped prevent terrorist acts or offences or may help prevent them in the future. This was mainly because many participants believed that the occurrence of terrorist acts in Canada is very unlikely and that, despite the existence of the definition, not much can be done to prevent a terrorist attack.

A few participants in Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City disagreed with the above point and claimed that the definition might be helpful in catching terrorists before they act. They tended to cite the cases of Ahmed Ressam and the 'shoe bomber' as examples that Bill C-36 and the definition of terrorist activity may prevent terrorist acts or offences. This opinion was not shared by some participants in other cities, who felt that the definition itself could not prevent terrorist acts but that it was "nice to have."

It's a little bit like the anti-suicide laws. It may not keep people from killing themselves, but it sure makes a lot of people think twice about it. (Quebec City, Group 1) I read that some terrorist attack against Jewish facilities in Ottawa was prevented. I immediately thought it could be a result of these measures (anti-terrorist). (Ottawa, French Group 2) It could prevent certain groups from getting together to plan terrorist acts. (Ottawa, French Group 2)

Desire for Information

Very few participants were aware of the definition prior to the focus group sessions. Although some claimed that it would be important for the public to know, most admitted that because they were not terrorists themselves or in contact with terrorists, it was unlikely to affect them in their daily life and it was not something that they absolutely needed to know. Indeed, for many individuals, the definition was considered to be quite technical and "legal," despite its simplified form. The exception would be the minority of participants who feared, to some degree, that it might affect them or people who share their views and engage in demonstrations. This was particularly true among French-speaking participants.

3.3.3 Listing of Terrorist Entities

Participants were given a handout on the criteria for listing terrorist entities (see handout 3 in Appendix C).

The overall reaction to the listing of terrorist entities was that it is probably a 'necessary evil.' Many participants agreed in general with the measure and felt it was straight forward. However, several questioned whether having the right to appeal being listed as a terrorist entity only after the fact goes against the traditional presumption of 'innocent until proven guilty.' Participants considered this presumption one of the cornerstones of our legal system. Some also questioned whether the listing of terrorist entities is against the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Participants across both age groups and in all cities thought that this provision changed the legal process to that of 'guilty until proven innocent.' Some participants commented that the provision might unfairly label legitimate individuals or organizations, which would cause them to be stigmatized and could potentially ruin lives.

Jumping the gun, labelling people. Once you're accused you are labelled forever. (Calgary, Group 2)

Participants also felt that there must be a "good reason" for an individual or an organization to be targeted as a terrorist entity. That being said, those wary of such measures also questioned the notion of "reasonable grounds," again citing the Maher Arar affair.

You have to do something to get on the list. (Vancouver, Group 2)

Some participants had concerns about the power of the Federal Cabinet to oversee "the list" of terrorist entities. In their opinion, this power is only as good as the sources used to gather information on terrorist entities, and if the sources used were unreliable, the potential exists for mislabelling groups or individuals as terrorists.

The provision was seen by many participants as being an effective tool for identifying terrorist organizations, if it is used properly. In their opinion, it is effective because it puts terrorist organizations "out in the open," thereby informing people that these organizations are terrorist entities. Many did not believe that the provision would prevent terrorism, since they felt that nothing could stop those who have their mind set on dying for their cause. Furthermore, some participants suggested that the provision might drive terrorist organizations further 'underground.' While these participants viewed the provision as slowing down organizations, they noted that "terrorists are resourceful" and would eventually find a way around this provision (e.g. by re-naming their organizations).

The fact that the list is public was considered to be a must, although some participants see in it the danger that somebody whose name was once on the list, even if it is taken off after appeal, might still have his/her reputation tarnished. (Winnipeg Group 1 participants, who fundamentally disagreed with the concept of "the list," felt particularly strongly about this.)

Some participants questioned the practice of sharing the list with other countries, wondering if when someone's name was taken off the list after an appeal, it would be taken off the International list as well as the Canadian one. On the whole, participants believed that the list would have considerably less power and influence if it was not made public.

Many participants wondered where the list was located and if it was available to the public, given that the Act has been in place since the fall of 2001. There was a strong sense that they would like to have access to the list to see which organizations are considered to be terrorist entities.

This provision gave rise to a certain number of questions. For instance, some participants asked why, if some organizations were already on the list, they had not yet been reprimanded by the federal government. Further, they wondered why, if these organizations have indeed been reprimanded by the Government, the public has not been informed. Participants seemed to feel that informing the public of how the provision has been used would add some legitimacy to the effectiveness of the tool and give credence to the existence of the Anti-terrorism Act as a whole.

If they are listed, why aren't they investigated and charged? (Regina, Group 1) Why haven't we gone after them? (Toronto, Group 2)

Whereas people admitted that they did not know about this provision, they also claimed that they somehow suspected that such a list existed and they believed that it would be a useful tool to disable organizations promoting terrorist activities. They expected that organizations such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, as well as some Middle Eastern charities, would be on this list. Several participants had indeed heard through the media that some Middle Eastern charitable organizations were funnelling money to terrorist groups.

3.3.4 Financing of Terrorism

A handout containing information on the financing of terrorism provision was given to participants (see handout 4 in Appendix C).

Participants generally agreed with the actions that can be taken under the provision of the Act that concerns financing of terrorism. These actions were viewed by participants in Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City as being very similar to the measures taken against the Hell's Angels under the anti-gang legislation. In the other cities, while participants considered that these two laws were similar to the financial suppression laws that already exist under the Criminal Code , they viewed this provision of the Anti-terrorism Act as different in that it specifically targets terrorists. Some participants questioned the fact that the right of appeal comes after action has been taken, which is in contradiction to the traditional presumption of 'innocent until proven guilty.'

This provision also generated some questions among participants. Some had concerns about how 'innocent' people would be treated under this provision. For example, participants wondered what would happen if a company did not know it was funnelling money to a terrorist group. If this company was reprimanded, what would the punishment be and would the company have a chance to clear its name? These participants also wondered how the organization would clear its name, given that its assets would be frozen. Moreover, if the organization was found to be innocent of the charges, would it then get its assets back?

What happens prior to 'appeal.' Am I in jail? What are the rights of the individual? (Toronto, Group 1)

The main issue with this provision for many participants was the reporting obligation. Several imagined themselves in a situation where they might see something suspect going on in their neighbourhood, for example, and be "scared" to report the person or persons committing this act.

What is the reporting obligation? Is it punished if you do not report something? (Vancouver, Group 1) People will be very afraid because they can get back at them. You can't ever be totally protected against those people. (Quebec City, Group 2)

A few participants found this section of the provision 'normal' and indicated that such a reporting obligation already exists under the Criminal Code. A few felt that it is an individual's ethical duty to report any wrongdoing for the overall good of society.

Still, some participants thought that there should be some exceptions to this reporting obligation, for example, when the life of the person reporting or the lives of his or her family are at risk. Clearly, this section of the provision concerned some participants and made them feel uncomfortable.

Many participants questioned the ten-year maximum penalty. For the most part, these participants viewed this penalty as too lenient, since, as far as they knew, most people convicted of crimes in Canada do not serve their full sentence. A few participants suggested that the penalty should reflect the nature of the crime, while others suggested that the minimum sentence be ten years, thus increasing the maximum sentence.

Maximum sentence of 10 years? This should be harsher. (Vancouver, Group 2) 10 years max? Need more; it should equal the severity of the offence. (Halifax, Group 2) 10 years, here, with probation and all that can turn into 2-3 years only. It's ridiculous. (Quebec City, Group 1)

Perceived Effect on Charitable Organizations

Many participants had thought that charitable organizations could potentially be linked to terrorist groups. None of the participants had been deterred, however, from donating money because of this. Most of those interviewed said that they donated to 'legitimate' or 'mainstream' charitable organizations (e.g. the Heart and Stroke Foundation, the United Way), if at all. In Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City, the association was clearly made with Middle Eastern groups. Thus, most did not think that it would make it more difficult for 'legitimate' charitable organizations to receive donations, unless they were charitable organizations with Middle Eastern ties.

In the other cities, participants felt that this provision could affect donating practices to smaller "fringe" organizations or religious organizations. They thought that it was up to individuals to "do their homework" with regards to charitable organizations prior to making a donation, if they did not wish to become accidentally affiliated with a terrorist group.

Many thought that the provision regarding the financing of terrorism was a useful approach to preventing terrorism, and although some did not specifically know about the provision, they expected that something like it would exist, again using the anti-gang and financial suppression laws as models. Some participants were aware of the provision and felt that stopping the flow of money to terrorist organizations was a big step towards slowing them down and reducing their ability to fund their 'missions,' thereby preventing terrorism to some extent. Nevertheless, participants suspected that terrorist organizations would adapt and find other ways to fund their operations.

Most important aspect is to take away the money from terrorists. (Calgary, Group 1)

Some participants had heard of this provision when they were made aware of the Anti-terrorism Act as a whole; therefore, they did not feel they needed any more information on the provision. The general feeling was that information about the provision regarding the financing of terrorism should be communicated as part of the Act as a whole. Participants felt that any communication plan should include all five provisions, as introducing or explaining the provisions separately might confuse the general public.

3.3.5 New Investigative and Preventive Arrest Powers

After reading a handout on the new investigative and preventive arrest powers (see handout 5 in Appendix C), many participants stated that these new powers were reasonable overall. Some participants called the provision "powerful,"while a few believed that the new investigative and preventive arrest powers are "tough measures!" Participants commented that the provision strikes a good balance between individual rights and the collective rights of the general public.

These keep me and my family safe. (Winnipeg, Group 2)

Group 2 participants in Regina and Halifax as well as a minority of respondents in the French groups in Montreal and Quebec City took exception to the provisions and saw them as a violation of individual rights and freedoms. As they were reading about these provisions, they recalled the era of "McCarthyism" and thought that the police might use these new investigative tools and powers to detect crimes other than terrorism.

The reason why they made a law is not necessarily the same as the reason why they're going to enforce it afterwards - that's my worry. (Quebec City, Group 1)

A few Group 2 participants in Calgary said that these laws were "nothing new" and that Canadians have "very few rights to begin with." It should be noted that these particular participants seemed to be familiar with the law and the Criminal Code, as their stated educational background and experience indicated.

Some participants had some concerns about the wiretapping disposition. While they agreed that suspected terrorists should be wiretapped without their knowledge ("that's just common sense"), they would like some kind of reassurance that if the wiretapping uncovered other infractions unrelated to terrorism (for example, smoking marijuana), such evidence would not be allowed to lead to prosecution.

Some participants questioned the use of wiretapping in general. ( "Isn't wiretapping out of date? I would hope that they would monitor computer use as well." ) The perception among some participants was that, in this day and age, many terrorists communicate via e-mail or instant messenger technology, and they would hope that the Government and the police have the infrastructure and measures in place to monitor these avenues as well as telephone lines.

Only a small minority took issue with the fact that it is an offence to refuse to give information, especially since the provision specifies that such a refusal is not a terrorist offence.

Some of the participants who agreed in general with the investigative and preventive arrest powers did not agree, however, with the notion that a person could be arrested without a warrant if police felt the situation was urgent. According to these participants, "that is intrusive; it gives the Government and the police carte blanche," and making an arrest without a warrant is contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . As expressed with regard to other provisions, here too there is an assumption that people are "guilty until proven innocent." However, only a small minority felt this way; many of the participants were reassured by the fact that the person had to be brought before a judge within 24 hours if they were arrested. Some Group 1 participants in Halifax pointed out that someone who is not a Canadian citizen could be held for an indefinite period of time, based on very little prior evidence.

Qualitatively, a significant minority, mostly among French-speaking Group 2 participants in Montreal and Quebec City and Group 2 participants in Halifax and Regina, felt that these investigative and preventive arrest powers "go too far" and threaten our civil rights. Again, the word McCarthyism was used, as were the terms military state and police state , which reminded participants of Nazi Germany during World War II. Basically, these participants did not consider these provisions to be very useful.

(This provision) could nail people on any offences. It is another way to detect crime, McCarthyism. (Halifax, Group 2) Military State - do we not learn from history? (Regina, Group 2) You're forgetting that there have been fascist, dictatorial regimes throughout history, and humans can get back to there anytime. This is what this legislation allows. (Quebec City, Group 1)

In addition, despite the earlier discussion on the definition of a terrorist activity, a few participants expressed concern about what constitutes a terrorist offence. These participants wondered if one could be charged with terrorism as a result of using verbal threats or "jokes" (e.g. "I am so mad at my employer that I am going to blow up the office" ) or affiliation with a terrorist group. This provision put participants on their guard.

You have to be careful what you say in public. (Halifax, Group 1)

These lines of thinking also called into question the perceived usefulness of the new investigative and preventive arrest powers.

Attitudes towards Risk of Abuse

Many participants stated that they trusted the Government and the police not to abuse these powers and did not feel threatened as citizens. Most pointed out that as Caucasian and Canadian citizens, they were not particularly worried about being labelled as terrorists.

Look at me, I'm white, I'm Canadian, and I'm not a terrorist. (Vancouver, Group 2) This (provision) will not affect 99.5% of the population. (Calgary, Group 1) No, because we are not racist here. (Quebec City, Group 2)

Participants who belong to a visible minority group were clearly more cautious and pointed out that people of Middle Eastern descent were the most at risk of being the object of profiling.

Some claimed that even though they themselves may not be a target, people of Middle Eastern descent could become victims of abuse under the new investigative and preventive arrest powers. They feared that it might give rise to a form of racism, given that there have been reported cases of 'racial profiling' of other visible minority groups by the police in some cities. Furthermore, based on the experience of friends or relatives at the border or at airports since September 11, 2001, a few participants claimed that this profiling is already taking place.

If I walk through security at the same time as someone wearing a turban, who is going to get searched? (Halifax, Group 1)

Participants also commented that the images used by the media to portray terrorism further perpetuate stereotypes and are not helpful. Most of the terrorist incidents that participants had heard of seemed to involve attacks perpetrated by persons of Middle Eastern descent. The Maher Arar affair has been a major contributing factor to that point of view.

A few participants were concerned that the police might unfairly target Canadians who are part of visible minority groups but who are not of Middle Eastern descent.

Participants appeared to be divided on whether or not targeting minorities is an acceptable risk. For some, racial profiling is something they viscerally oppose; they view it as morally wrong and believe it should not be practiced or condoned. Others, who claimed to be "realists," pointed out that most, if not all, terrorists involved in suicide bombings and major attacks against civilians were of Middle Eastern descent. They expected that the police might, therefore, pay more attention to people of Middle Eastern descent. According to these participants, if the power was misused, it was for the 'greater good.'

There will inevitably be some misuse, but the public good takes precedence. (Toronto, Group 1)

Many participants across both age groups and in all cities thought that these new investigative and preventive arrest powers should be communicated to the public. This would demonstrate that the Government was doing something to combat terrorism, and it might increase the level of public confidence.

If we knew more about this, we would have more respect for the Government because at least we would be aware that they were doing something. (Toronto, Group 2)

3.3.6 Mechanisms Associated with Investigative and Preventive Arrest Powers

The sunset clause.

Participants were informed that the investigative and preventive arrest powers will disappear after five years unless the House of Commons and the Senate pass a resolution to extend the provision for another five years. This sunset clause brought a certain measure of reassurance to some participants, and they expected that the provision would indeed be extended for another five years, especially given the serious nature of terrorism. While a vast majority understood the sunset clause, a few participants mistakenly thought that after five years the provision would go away, thereby making us vulnerable to a terrorist attack.

The terrorists could just wait until the end of five years and then attack. (Halifax, Group 2)

When it was explained that the sunset clause meant that the provisions of the Act would be reviewed after five years, these participants then agreed that it was a good idea.

Participants noted that the clause was a useful tool in case any revisions to the new investigative and preventive arrest powers need to be made. It promotes the 'checks and balances' of the process.

Reporting Obligation

Participants were also informed that the Solicitor General and the Minister of Justice must report annually to Parliament on the use of these new powers and that this annual report is available to the public on departmental Internet sites. Some participants were reassured and commented that it may ensure that the police do not abuse the new powers they have been given under the Act. Many participants wondered what type of information this Parliamentary report contains, and a few said that they were going to try to find the report on their own time.

Other participants, particularly in Toronto and Regina, thought that the new investigative and preventive arrest powers should initially be reviewed more often by Parliament in order to reduce and/or eliminate any potential abuse by police.

A significant minority across both age groups and in all cities were not convinced that the sunset clause or the annual reporting to Parliament will curb abuse. They felt that if a police officer was pre-disposed to abuse these powers, then he or she will do so and that "it only takes one person accused of abusing the power to ruin the whole process." A few participants, particularly in Halifax Group 2, were of the opinion that the police are already "drunk with power" and that these new investigative tools give the police "too much power."

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A program of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) . CISAC is a research center at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies .

Organization

Major Attacks

Interactions, communist part of the philippines - new people's army, key statistics, profile contents.

Organizational Overview

Formed: December 26, 1968

Disbanded: Group is active.

First Attack: August 21, 1971: Three members of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) threw four grenades onto the stage of a Liberal Party rally in Manila’s Plaza Miranda. Then-President Ferdinand Marcos was initially blamed for the attack, which had killed much of his opposition. (9 killed, 95 wounded). [1]

Last Attack: August 15, 2015: A CPP-NPA unit launched two attacks on the same day in the province of Agusan del Sur. The fighters destroyed a truck using an improvised explosive device and later attacked two men, one a civilian, and one a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) auxiliary forces. (1 killed, 1 wounded). [2]

Executive Summary

The Communist Party of the Philippines–New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) seeks to overthrow the Philippine government in favor of a new state led by the working class and to expel U.S. influence from the Philippines. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) formed in 1968, and its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), was founded in 1969. Because the CPP and NPA are so closely intertwined, they are often jointly referred to as the CPP-NPA. The CPP-NPA has historically focused on building support among the rural peasantry, although it has operated throughout the Philippines. While it peaked in size and influence in the 1970s and 1980s, the CPP-NPA still engages in significant levels of violence and is the world’s oldest existing Communist insurgency.

Group Narrative

The CPP-NPA was established by Jose Maria Sison, a popular former student activist. Sison previously led a Maoist-oriented youth faction within the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), which was established in 1930. For decades, the PKP participated in electoral boycotts and used a guerrilla army to fight Japanese colonialism, U.S. colonialism, and Filipino elites. In 1957, Republic Act No. 1700 banned the PKP and any of its successors, which would later include the CPP-NPA from participating in politics. Even after PKP elites largely gave up on the idea of armed struggle, Sison argued for continuing the violence. Beginning in 1967, in what he called the First Great Rectification Movement, Sison proposed major changes within the PKP. Allegedly, Sison called to reestablish the Communist movement properly in the Philippines. [4] Sison criticized PKP leaders and was forced out of the party. On Mao Zedong’s birthday, December 26, 1968, Sison established the CPP with his supporters. Sison was chosen as the CPP’s chairman and adopted a pseudonym, Amado Guerrero. [5] Also in December 1968, Sison met Bernabé Buscayno, another former activist who had commanded an armed group during a Communist-led uprising in the 1950s called the Huk Rebellion. Together with Buscayno, who still commanded his armed group, Sison set up the NPA on March 29, 1969. Buscayno became the NPA’s first commander, bringing his fighters into the newly established militant wing. [6]

The CPP-NPA was originally based in the city of Capas on the Philippines’ largest island, Luzon, and it began with sixty combatants and thirty-five rifles. Although it clashed with government forces, the CPP-NPA initially concentrated on furthering its own growth and strengthening its support among the peasantry. Party activists actively sought to rally peasants to its cause. [7] The CPP-NPA gained members and momentum from the First Quarter Storm, a leftist wave of student demonstrations, rallies, and marches that occurred between January and March 1970. During those protests, held against then-President Ferdinand Marcos, student leaders demanded constitutional change. Outrage after Marcos’ brutal crackdown on the demonstrations boosted the CPP-NPA’s ranks. Participants in the protests joined the CPP-NPA, causing it to surpass the PKP in popularity. [8]

Also in 1970, Sison outlined the CPP-NPA’s guiding principles in a book called Philippine Society and Revolution . He identified three major problems in the Philippines: bureaucrat capitalism, feudalism, and U.S. imperialism. Sison called for major transformation in Philippine society and advocated for the Maoist concept of a protracted people’s war to achieve this change. [9] In the same year, the Philippine government conducted a large military offensive against the CPP-NPA, decimating its small central group of fighters. [10]

In February 1971, Sison met with CPP-NPA Central Committee members to discuss his plan to attack a rally held in Manila by the Liberal Party, which opposed President Marcos. The purpose of the attack was to provoke another government crackdown and ideally gain support for the CPP-NPA. On August 21, three CPP-NPA members threw four grenades onstage at the rally in Manila’s Plaza Miranda before fleeing the city to a CPP-NPA camp. Liberal Party members blamed President Marcos for the attack, which had killed much of his opposition. Marcos, who blamed the CPP-NPA for the bombing, responded by suppressing leftist political activity and suspending habeas corpus. These measures marked an increase in Marcos’ power. In response to Marcos’ repression, hundreds of student recruits joined the CPP-NPA. [11] Meanwhile, Sison denied that the CPP-NPA had been involved in the attack. [12]

In July 1972, the Chinese government continued its support of the CPP-NPA by supplying arms to the insurgents. The group received its first shipment of weapons from China in a continuation of patronage that originated with the establishment of the CPP-NPA in 1969 . The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was able to seize most of the weapons, and in response conducted additional massive military operations against the CPP-NPA. [13]

In September, the Philippine government accused the CPP-NPA of attempting to assassinate the defense minister; many viewed this accusation as part of an effort to justify Marcos’ declaration of martial law in the same month, which further consolidated Marcos’ power and restricted political freedoms. [14] Under martial law, thousands of Marcos’ opponents were arrested. CPP-NPA activists living in Philippine cities fled to the organization’s bases in the countryside, and some of the activists ultimately became fighters. Other student activists also left the cities and joined the CPP-NPA. During the time of martial law, the CPP-NPA successfully established relationships with local leaders in the countryside. [15]

In 1974, Sison published Specific Characteristics of Our People’s War , in which he outlined the CPP-NPA’s first five years and set out policies for continued armed struggle. One policy was the decentralization of armed operations. Sison directed CPP-NPA units to stay independent of one another, to conduct attacks from mountainous areas, and to limit their offensives to small police and military ambushes. [17]

In 1976, the CPP-NPA lost the Chinese government’s support. The Philippines and China normalized their relations and repaired diplomatic ties which had been severed by the Chinese Communist Party’s rise to power in 1949. [18] Throughout 1976, the Philippine government captured and jailed many important CPP-NPA members, including Buscayno. After Buscayno’s capture, Rodolfo Salas served as the NPA’s commander, and, when Sison was captured the following year, Salas also assumed chairmanship of the CPP. [19] Despite the removal of key figures, the CPP-NPA was able to spread beyond Luzon to Visayas and Mindanao, the Philippines’ other major regions. At the time, the Philippine military was fighting both the CPP-NPA and the Muslim separatist rebels in the south; their strategic priority was the latter. [20]

The 1978 Philippine elections caused major tensions within the CPP-NPA. While the CPP-NPA’s Manila-Rizal committee, based in the Philippine capital, was mobilizing support for candidates opposed to Marcos, the central leadership insisted on a total boycott of the elections and emphasized the importance armed struggle. The overtly fraudulent election results in favor of Marcos’ government again increased the CPP-NPA’s membership. [21]

On January 17, 1981, Marcos formally ended martial law, thus allowing some room for political expression by the opposition and alleviating pressure on the CPP-NPA. Although Marcos intensified extrajudicial executions and other forms of domestic repression, the CPP-NPA was able to return to urban areas and form relationships with legal opposition organizations. While Philippine forces achieved victories against Muslim separatist rebels in the south, on which the government’s efforts were focused, the CPP-NPA conducted increasingly successful attacks against the government throughout the country. A surge in recruits allowed the CPP-NPA to attempt tactics beyond small guerrilla units, eventually forming military battalions in Luzon and Visayas. Additionally, the CPP-NPA maintained so-called “sparrow” units, which consisted of one to five operatives who assassinated government forces in urban areas. The Philippine army began its largest military offensive against the CPP-NPA in 1984. In 1985, CPP-NPA-related violence reached its height with 1,282 military and police deaths, 1,362 civilian deaths, and 2,134 CPP-NPA deaths. The CPP-NPA conducted especially deadly campaigns in Mindanao using urban-based guerrilla tactics. However, rising paranoia concerning the infiltration of the group by Philippine government agents led to massive purges within the organization, especially in Mindanao, in which hundreds of members suspected of collaborating with the state were killed. In addition to its militant activity, the CPP-NPA continued to build relationships in rural communities throughout the 1980s. Members taught and worked alongside peasants, as well as served as guards against bandits. [22]

The 1986 elections caused major tensions within the CPP-NPA when Corazon Aquino—widow of a popular oppositional senator who had been assassinated—ran against Marcos. As in 1978, the central leadership ordered a boycott of elections, but many CPP-NPA members ignored the command. After days of mass protests c——alled the People Power Revolution, which were held in support of Aquino and against Marcos, Aquino won the election and Marcos left the country. Later that year, Aquino ordered the release of political prisoners, including Sison and Buscayno. Only Sison returned to CPP-NPA-related activities; however, soon after his release, he went into self-exile in the Netherlands, from which he continued to play a leading role in the movement. He became chief political consultant to the NDF but denied continued involvement with the CPP-NPA. However, at around the same time, Salas was replaced as CPP chairman by Armando Liwanag, widely considered an alias for Sison. [23]

Beginning in December 1986, the Aquino administration and the CPP-NPA engaged in short-lived peace negotiations and a ceasefire. However, in January 1987, CPP-NPA members—hoping to force a brutal government action that would justify ending talks—infiltrated a group of peasants who were protesting in support of agricultural reform outside Malacañang Palace, the official presidential residence. Government forces shot at the protesters, killing thirteen. [24] At the urging of the United States and domestic elites, Aquino declared total war on the CPP-NPA. In response to this declaration of war, the group conducted attacks, especially in Manila, that alienated moderate supporters and led to a decline in membership. [25]

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the CPP-NPA suffered various organizational losses. The Philippine government captured key leaders, and internal purges again resulted in the deaths of dozens of CPP-NPA members. Internal debate over the organization’s future further weakened it. On December 26, 1991, under the name Armando Liwanag, Sison published a document with the title, “Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors.” He insisted that the CPP-NPA reaffirm its commitment to the protracted people’s war, armed struggle, and a rural-based strategy rather than waste resources on negotiations or legal action. Sison’s publication sparked the Second Great Rectification Movement, which divided the CPP-NPA into rejectionists (RJs) and reaffirmists (RAs); the former disagreed with Sison’s ideas, and the latter supported those ideas. Some rejectionists were forced out of the CPP-NPA, while others voluntarily left. This expulsion of rejectionists stemmed from their belief in at least some role for lawful protest and their disagreement with what they termed Sison’s “Stalinism.” Rejectionists established their own political parties or participated in other legal organizations promoting societal reform, such as trade unions or nongovernmental organizations. Some rejectionists engaged in local militant activity, but rejectionist groups generally remained small and easily dismantled. One exception was the Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB), which had been established as a CPP-NPA urban guerrilla force in the mid-1980s; the ABB broke away from the CPP-NPA in the early 1990s along with other rejectionists and continued its militant activities. On the other hand, the reaffirmists—who comprised most of the CPP-NPA—supported the principles espoused by Sison, and the CPP-NPA consequently returned its focus to the countryside. Additionally, the CPP-NPA’s Central Committee approved Sison’s policies in its July 1992 plenum. [26]

There is conflicting information about the official leadership of the CPP-NPA after the early 1990s. After the Second Great Rectification Movement, Benito Tiamzon may have assumed the formal position of chairman. Some sources have continued to list Liwanag as CPP-NPA chairman from the 1990s onward, while others have listed Tiamzon as chairman for the same time period. Regardless of who held the formal title of chairman, Tiamzon and his wife Wilma directed the CPP-NPA’s activities from within the Philippines since the early 1990s, while Sison – under the alias Liwanag – allegedly continued to influence the organization’s strategic direction from the Netherlands. [27]

Throughout the 1990s, the CPP-NPA regained some of its strength. According to its own statements, the group returned to the same level of popular support that it had enjoyed in the 1980s due to its revival of a rural, mass-based strategy. The Philippine military blamed other factors for the CPP-NPA’s resurgence, such as the 1992 repeal of Republic Act No. 1700. The repeal allowed the CPP to become a legal political party, although the group continued to express its opposition to electoral participation. Despite the group’s nominal rejection of anything less than armed struggle, the CPP-NPA has engaged in peace talks with the Philippine government, usually through the NDF. Even after the 1992 repeal of Republic Act No. 1700, the NDF has continued to represent the CPP-NPA in official talks with the government. [28]

In 1995, under the administration of President Fidel Ramos, negotiations culminated in the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG), signed by NDF leadership. The JASIG paved the way for future peace talks by guaranteeing free and safe movement—without fear of search, surveillance, or arrest—throughout the country for those involved with negotiations, whether Philippine government officials, CPP-NPA members, or other NDF members. [29] The parties signed another significant agreement in 1998, the Comprehensive Agreement to Respect Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL), which was an attempt to protect civilians from the violence between the government and the CPP-NPA. [30] However, talks broke down soon after CARHRIHL, and conflict resumed at high levels when Joseph Estrada assumed the presidency. [31]

The pattern of alternating between negotiations and violence continued throughout the 2000s. When Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo replaced Estrada in 2001, she held some negotiations with the CPP-NPA, but those negotiations stalled after the United States listed the CPP-NPA as a terrorist organization at Arroyo’s request in 2002. Philippine forces increased their operations against the organization throughout the 2000s and claimed in 2010 to have drastically reduced its ranks. [32] When Benigno Aquino III assumed the presidency that year, the government again attempted talks with the CPP-NPA. However, a ceasefire broken by the CPP-NPA, continued fighting, and alleged human rights violations by both sides have hindered the talks. The CPP-NPA has continued to conduct attacks and clash with Philippine forces, and the parties have been unable to agree on conditions for the resumption of negotiations. Within the organization, a rift between Sison in the Netherlands and the local CPP-NPA leadership has increased due to the former’s growing willingness to engage in peace talks and the latter’s continued reluctance. [33]

On July 24, 2018, the Philippine House of Representatives passed the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), the final name of the former BBL. [34] This replaced the former Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and created a Muslim regional entity in Mindanao. With the bill’s passing, another insurgent group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) , declared its support. MILF leader Ebrahim declared that 30-40,000 fighters would be decommissioned. [35] Although to date there has been no such response by the CPP-NPA, Philippine politicians have begun calling for the CPP-NPA to follow in the same direction and strike a peace deal with the government. [36]

[1] Tiglao, Rigoberto. “Days of Shame: August 21, 1971 and 1983.” The Manila Times, 20 Aug. 2013. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Jones, Gregg. “ExCommunists Party Behind Manila Bombing.” The Washington Post, 4 Aug. 1989. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[2] Pates, Karlo Paolo R. “NPA burns truck, kills civilian.” Sun.Star, 17 Aug. 2015. Web. 17 Aug. 2015.

[3] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., “Program For A People’s Democratic Revolution.” Communist Party of the Philippines, 26 Dec. 1968. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[4] Rosca, Ninotchka, and Jose Maria Sison. Jose Maria Sison: At Home In the World—Portrait of a Revolutionary. Greensboro: Open Hand Publishing, LLC, 2004. Print.

[5] Abinales, P.N. “Jose Maria Sison and the Philippine Revolution: A Critique of an Interface.” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 8.1 (1992). Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[6] “Republic Act No. 1700: An Act to Outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and Similar Associations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and for Other Purposes.” Philippine Government. 20 June 1957., “The Philippines: The Philippine Communist Party (PKP) to Celebrate 75th Year.” Philippines Communist Party (PKP), 6 Nov. 2005. Web. 17 Aug. 2015., “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., Datinguinoo, Vinia M. “Bernabe ‘Kumander Dante’ Buscayno.” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2 Feb. 2006. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[7] Guillermo, Artemio R. Historical Dictionary of the Philippines. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2012. Print., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., Datinguinoo, Vinia M. “Bernabe ‘Kumander Dante’ Buscayno.” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2 Feb. 2006. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Philippines (New Peoples Army) (1972- ).” Modern Conflicts: Major Violent Conflicts Since the End of the Cold War. Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[8] Abinales, P.N. “Jose Maria Sison and the Philippine Revolution: A Critique of an Interface.” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 8.1 (1992). Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Santos, Jr., Reynaldo. “TIMELINE: First Quarter Storm.” Rappler, 27 Feb. 2014. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Rodis, Rodel. “Remembering the First Quarter Storm.” Inquirer, 30 Jan. 2015. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[9] Abinales, P.N. “Jose Maria Sison and the Philippine Revolution: A Critique of an Interface.” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 8.1 (1992). Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Guerrero, Amado. Philippine Society and Revolution.

[10] Abinales, P.N. “Jose Maria Sison and the Philippine Revolution: A Critique of an Interface.” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 8.1 (1992). Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[11] Tiglao, Rigoberto. “Days of Shame: August 21, 1971 and 1983.” The Manila Times, 20 Aug. 2013. Web. 11 Aug. 2015. Jones, Gregg. “ExCommunists Party Behind Manila Bombing.” The Washington Post, 4 Aug. 1989. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[12] Sisante, Jam. “Before Ninoy’s death, there was Plaza Miranda.” GMA News, 21 Aug. 2009. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[13] Jones, Gregg. “ExCommunists Party Behind Manila Bombing.” The Washington Post, 4 Aug. 1989. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Lim, Benito. “The Political Economy of Philippines-China Relations.” Philippine APEC Study Center Network, Sept. 1999. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., Jones, Gregg. “ExCommunists Party Behind Manila Bombing.” The Washington Post, 4 Aug. 1989. Web. 11 Aug. 2015. “The new breed of Philippine communists: 1969-84.” The Christian Science Monitor, 27 Sept. 1984. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[14] Tiglao, Rigoberto. “Days of Shame: August 21, 1971 and 1983.” The Manila Times, 20 Aug. 2013. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Declaration of Martial Law.” Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. Philippine Government.

[15] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[16] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., “National Democratic Front of the Philippines: Revolutionary united front organization of the Filipino people.” National Democratic Front of the Philippines, International Information Office. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “People’s War: Crisis and revolution in Philippine society.” National Democratic Front of the Philippines, International Information Office. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Fonbuena, Carmela. “NDF proposes 6-month, time-bound peace talks.” Rappler, 19 Apr. 2015. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Statement of Sec. Teresita Quintos Deles on the recent atrocities of the CPP-NPA-NDF.” Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 31 Dec. 2014. Web. 11 Aug. 2015. Fonbuena, Carmela. “Finish insurgency, AFP chief tells commanders.” Rappler, 11 July 2013. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[17] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Rosca, Ninotchka, and Jose Maria Sison. Jose Maria Sison: At Home In the World—Portrait of a Revolutionary. Greensboro: Open Hand Publishing, LLC, 2004. Print.

[18] Lim, Benito. “The Political Economy of Philippines-China Relations.” Philippine APEC Study Center Network, Sept. 1999. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Philippines (New Peoples Army) (1972- ).” Modern Conflicts: Major Violent Conflicts Since the End of the Cold War. Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Philippines communist spokesman Ka Roger.” Jane’s Intelligence Review/Terrorism & Security Monitor (October 2007). Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[19] “The new breed of Philippine communists: 1969-84.” The Christian Science Monitor, 27 Sept. 1984. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[20] “The new breed of Philippine communists: 1969-84.” The Christian Science Monitor, 27 Sept. 1984. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[21] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Abinales, P.N. The Revolution Falters: The Left in Philippine Politics After 1986. Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2003. Print.

[22] “The new breed of Philippine communists: 1969-84.” The Christian Science Monitor, 27 Sept. 1984. Web. 11 Aug. 2015. “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015. Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., “Terrorist Organization Profile: Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB).” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, n.d. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[23] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Abinales, P.N. The Revolution Falters: The Left in Philippine Politics After 1986. Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2003. Print., “4 Key Communists Freed by Manila; Military Objects; Jose Maria Sison: A Mission Remains.” The New York Times, 6 Mar. 1986. Web. 11 Aug. 2015, Jones, Gregg. “ExCommunists Party Behind Manila Bombing.” The Washington Post, 4 Aug. 1989. Web. 11 Aug. 2015, Datinguinoo, Vinia M. “Bernabe ‘Kumander Dante’ Buscayno.” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2 Feb. 2006. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Mickolus, Edward F., and Susan L. Simmons. Terrorism, 1992-1995: A Chronology of Events and a Selectively Annotated Bibliography. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997. Print., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[24] Curaming, Rommel A. “The End of an Illusion: The Mendiola Massacre and Political Transition in Post-Marcos Philippines.” State Violence in East Asia. Ed. N. Ganesan and Sung Chull Kim. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2013. Print., “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[25] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[26] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Abinales, P.N. The Revolution Falters: The Left in Philippine Politics After 1986. Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2003. Print., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., Liwanag, Armando. “Celebrate the 25th Anniversary of our Party and Lead the Philippine Revolution from Victory to Victory.” Philippine Revolution, 26 Dec. 1993. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Terrorist Organization Profile: Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB).” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, n.d. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[27] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Domingo, Francis. “The Leadership Crisis in the Communst Party of the Philippines—New People’s Army.” Small Wars Journal (12 Feb. 2013). Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “CPP chief, wife nabbed in Cebu—military.” Rappler, 23 Mar. 2014. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Listing statements (by Armando Liwanag).” Philippine Revolution. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[28] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[29] Sarmiento, Rene V. “Facilitating dialogue with armed insurgents in the Philippines.” Accord 16 (2005): 72-75. Conciliation Resources. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees.” 24 Feb. 1995.

[30] “Comprehensive Agreement to Respect Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines.” 16 Mar. 1998., Muyot, Alberto T., and Vincent Pepito F. Yambao. “Steps taken to ensure implementation of international humanitarian law in the Philippines.” International Review of the Red Cross 834 (30 June 1999). Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[31] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[32] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” United States Department of State. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[33] “Philippines-CPP/NPA (1969 - first combat deaths).” Project Ploughshares, June 2015. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Aquino is obstacle to peace negotiations, say Reds.” Inquirer, 19 Apr. 2015. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[34] Diaz, Jess. “House ratifies Bangsamoro Organic Law”. Philstar, 25 July, 2018. Web. 24 July, 2018 (Manila time is +1 day). < https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/07/25/1836632/house-ratifies-ba… ;.

[35] Associated Press, “Philippine rebel chief: 30,000 rebels to be disarmed in deal”. Philstar, 25 July, 2018. Web. 24 July, 2018 (Manila time is +1 day). < https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/07/25/1836474/philippine-rebel-… ;.

[36] Morallo, Audrey. “Senators hope Bangsamoro Organic Law will bring peace to Mindanao”. Philstar, 27 July, 2018. Web. 15 Aug., 2018. < https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/07/27/1837312/senators-hope-ban… ;.

Organizational Structure

The CPP has a chairman, while the NPA has its own commander and a National Operational Command; however, the leadership of the party and its armed wing is effectively the same. The Central Committee, composed of twenty-six members, is the CPP-NPA’s highest governing body. Information about the CPP-NPA’s specific hierarchical structure is deliberately obscured. [1]

Jose Maria Sison (1969 to Present): Sison, who has written under the names Amado Guerrero and Armando Liwanag, serves as the NDF’s chief political consultant. He founded the CPP and, with Bernabé Buscayno, the NPA. He also helped establish the NDF. Sison served as the CPP-NPA’s first chairman and continues to play an influential role in the strategic direction of the CPP-NPA and the NDF from his self-exile in the Netherlands, where he has lived since 1986. Beginning in the late 2000s, Sison showed greater inclination for allowing the CPP-NPA to engage in peace negotiations and electoral politics as temporary support-building measures within the context of armed struggle. [2]

Bernabé Buscayno (1969 to 1976): Buscayno, also known as Kumander Dante, founded the NPA with Sison and served as its first commander. He was captured and jailed by government forces in 1976. He was released by then-President Corazon Aquino in 1987, but he entered legal politics instead of returning to the CPP-NPA. [3]

Rodolfo Salas (1976 to 1986): Salas, also known as Kumander Bilog, became NPA commander after Buscayno’s capture in 1976. He also took over the position of CPP chairman after Sison’s capture in 1977. He was arrested in 1986 and released in 1992, after which he decided not to return to the CPP-NPA. [4]

Romulo Kintanar (Unknown to Unknown): Kintanar, sometimes called Rolly, served as NPA commander for some time in the 1980s. He was active in developing the group’s fighting tactics, including urban assassination as well as conventional attacks through the regularization of units. Sison criticized him for the latter approach. Kintanar was arrested several times, and after his 1992 release, he did not return to the CPP-NPA. [5]

Benito Tiamzon (Unknown to Unknown): Benito served as the nominal CPP chairman and NPA commander. His wife was Wilma Tiamzon, another important CPP-NPA figure. Benito played a leading role within the CPP-NPA since at least the early 1990s, when he and Wilma joined Sison in leading the reaffirmist movement. Beginning in the 1990s, the Tiamzons have overseen the CPP-NPA from within the Philippines. However, the Tiamzons and Sison began to disagree about the movement’s strategy in the 2000s. The Tiamzons continue to oppose engagement in peace negotiations and electoral politics except when such engagement directly contributes to the armed struggle. On March 22, 2014, the Tiamzons were arrested. They remain in custody, although the CPP-NPA assert that their detention is illegal under the JASIG. An NDF spokesman noted that the CPP-NPA has likely already replaced Tiamzon as chairman, but this statement has not been confirmed. [6]

Wilma Tiamzon (Unknown to 2014): Wilma served as the CPP-NPA’s secretary general and as a member of the CPP-NPA’s central executive committee. Her husband was Benito Tiamzon, another important CPP-NPA figure. Wilma played a leading role within the CPP-NPA since at least the early 1990s, when she and Benito joined Sison in leading the reaffirmist movement. Beginning in the 1990s, the Tiamzons have overseen the CPP-NPA from within the Philippines. However, the Tiamzons and Sison began to disagree about the movement’s strategy in the 2000s. The Tiamzons continue to oppose engagement in peace negotiations and electoral politics except when such engagement directly contributes to the armed struggle. On March 22, 2014, the Tiamzons were arrested. They remain in custody, although the CPP-NPA assert that their detention is illegal under the JASIG. [7]

Adelberto Silva (2014 to Unknown): Silva allegedly succeeded Wilma Tiamzon as the CPP-NPA’s secretary general after her 2014 arrest. He also led the CPP-NPA’s National Organization Department and served as an NDF peace consultant. Silva was arrested in 2015, after which his leadership status has remained unclear. [8]

[1] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[2] Abinales, P.N. “Jose Maria Sison and the Philippine Revolution: A Critique of an Interface.” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 8.1 (1992). Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[3] Datinguinoo, Vinia M. “Bernabe ‘Kumander Dante’ Buscayno.” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2 Feb. 2006. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[4] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., Cervantes, Ding. “Mabalacat mayor padlocks power coop; Kumander Bilog retaliates.” Philstar, 2 Dec. 2003. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Rodriguez, Jon Carlos. “Ex-NPA chief pursues unfinished revolution.” ABS-CBN News, 13 Mar. 2012. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Ex-NPA chief: C. Luzon ‘crucial’ in fight vs. martial rule.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 Sept. 2008. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[5] Branigin, William. “Philippine Police Catch Top Rebel.” The Washington Post, 6 Aug. 1991. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Deane, Daniela. “Romula ‘Rolly’ Kintanar, the powerful commander of the communist….” United Press International, 30 Mar. 1988. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Gloria, Glenda. “Kintanar: At home in a new life.” Philstar, 24 Jan. 2003. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[6] The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Gloria, Glenda M. “Benito Tiamzon: Writer, organizer, party man.” Rappler, 23 Mar. 2014. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Panares, Joyce Pangco. “Reds pick new chief to replace Tiamzon.” The Standard, 31 Dec. 2014. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[7] Romero, Alexis. “The communists’ power couple.” Philstar, 24 Mar. 2014. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[8] Romero, Alexis. “Second-highest CPP-NPA leader, two others nabbed in Cavite.” Philstar, 2 June 2015. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Ong, Czarina Nicole O. “AFP Offers statement on Arrest of Adelberto Silva.” Manila Bulletin, 4 June 2015. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

There are no recorded name changes for this group.

1969: 60 (Encyclopedia of the Developing World) [1]
1987: 25,200 (Armed Forces of the Philippines) [2]
1994: 6,000 (International Crisis Group) [3]
2009: 4,874 (Armed Forces of the Philippines) [4]
2018: 3,700 (Channel News Asia) [5]

[1] Leonard, Thomas M. Encyclopedia of the Developing World, Volume 1: A-E, Index. New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2006. Print.

[2] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[3] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[4] Chalk, Peter. “The Philippines’ Continued Success Against Extremists.” CTC Sentinel 2.8 (Aug. 2009). Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[5] Chew, Amy. "A Resurgent Communist New People's Army in Southern Philippines Raises Security Threat in Mindanao." Channel NewsAsia. October 18, 2018. Accessed January 26, 2019. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/communist-new-peoples-army-philippines-security-threat-mindanao-10841242.

From its 1969 establishment until the 1976 normalization of Philippine-Chinese relations, the CPP-NPA received support, weapons, and funds from China. The CPP-NPA also sought support, weapons, funds, and training from like-minded groups overseas, including the Japanese Red Army (JRA), the Maoist factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, the Communist Party of El Salvador, and many other organizations. The CPP-NPA’s efforts to build ties with these groups were partially successful. [1]

Generally, the CPP-NPA has not received much financial support from outside entities. It principally finances itself by collecting “revolutionary taxes,” a form of extortion in which businesses submit payments to the CPP-NPA in exchange for protection from CPP-NPA attacks. The CPP-NPA also sells campaign permits to political candidates who wish to campaign in areas that the group controls. [2]

The CPP-NPA allegedly acquires its weapons—including pistols, assault rifles, machine guns, and grenade launchers—mainly from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through raids, battles, or illegal purchases. Political candidates have also contributed small arms in lieu of funds for permission to campaign in CPP-NPA-dominated areas. Additionally, the CPP-NPA produces its own anti-tank mines. [3]

[1] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., Jones, Gregg. “ExCommunists Party Behind Manila Bombing.” The Washington Post, 4 Aug. 1989. Web. 11 Aug. 2015, Lim, Benito. “The Political Economy of Philippines-China Relations.” Philippine APEC Study Center Network, Sept. 1999. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[3] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

The CPP-NPA operates throughout the Philippines. It is strongest in Luzon, Visayas, and Southern Tagalog, but it has also conducted significant attacks in Mindanao’s Davao City. [1]

The CPP-NPA seeks to overthrow the Philippine government in favor of a new people’s democratic state led by the working class, and the group also seeks to expel U.S. influence from the Philippines. Its other goals include redistributing land to the landless poor and initiating a cultural revolution. The CPP-NPA primarily models its armed struggle on China’s Maoist movement, focusing especially on the idea of a protracted people’s war and mobilizing the masses in rural areas. [1]

[1] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., “Program For A People’s Democratic Revolution.” Communist Party of the Philippines, 26 Dec. 1968. Web. 11 Aug. 2015

Passed in 1957, Republic Act No. 1700 banned the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and any of its successors, including the CPP-NPA. [1] CPP-NPA leaders have often expressed opposition to engaging in political activity, including negotiations and electoral politics, and have instead emphasized armed struggle. However, despite verbally rejecting legal mechanisms for reform, the CPP-NPA has also sporadically engaged in peace talks with the Philippine government.

In 1973, a commission created by the CPP-NPA founded the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDF or NDFP). Attempting to unify and coordinate various leftist groups, the NDF served as an umbrella organization for the CPP-NPA and other mass revolutionary organizations. The NDF has engaged in talks and signed agreements with the Philippine government. Historically, the CPP-NPA has influenced the activities of NDF, and media and academic sources have sometimes described the NDF as the CPP-NPA’s political wing. The Philippine government, among others, has used the name “CPP-NPA-NDF” or “CNN” to refer to the whole entity formed by the interconnected CPP-NPA and NDF. Republic Act No. 1700 was repealed in 1992, thus legalizing the CPP-NPA. Regardless, the CPP-NPA has continued to verbally reject legal politics and still does not directly put forward its own political candidates in elections. The NDF has continued to represent the CPP-NPA in official negotiations. [2]

In 1995, under the administration of President Fidel Ramos, NDF and Philippine government leaders signed the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG). The JASIG paved the way for future peace talks by guaranteeing free and safe movement—without fear of search, surveillance, or arrest—throughout the country for those involved with negotiations, whether Philippine government officials, CPP-NPA members, or other NDF members. [3] The parties signed another significant agreement in 1998, the Comprehensive Agreement to Respect Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL), which was an attempt to protect civilians from the violence between the government and the CPP-NPA. [4] However, talks broke down soon after CARHRIHL, and conflict resumed at high levels when Joseph Estrada assumed the presidency. The pattern of alternating between negotiations and violence continued throughout the 2000s. When Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo replaced Estrada in 2001, she held some negotiations with the CPP-NPA, but those negotiations stalled after the United States listed the CPP-NPA as a terrorist organization at Arroyo’s request in 2002. [5]

The CPP-NPA has also allegedly helped establish political parties, which are publicly not linked to either group. Some of those parties have performed well in congressional elections. For example, Bayan Muna, Gabriela, and Anakpawis – three parties thought to be fronts for the CPP-NPA and NDF – won a total of six congressional seats in 2004. [6]

When Benigno Aquino III assumed the presidency in 2010, the government again attempted talks with the CPP-NPA. However, continued fighting and alleged human rights violations by both sides have hindered the talks. The CPP-NPA has continued to conduct attacks and clash with Philippine forces, and the parties have been unable to agree on conditions for the resumption of negotiations. Within the organization, a rift between Sison and the local CPP-NPA leadership has grown due to the former’s growing willingness to engage in peace talks and the latter’s continued opposition. [7]

[1] “Republic Act No. 1700: An Act to Outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and Similar Associations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and for Other Purposes.” Philippine Government. 20 June 1957., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[2] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., “National Democratic Front of the Philippines: Revolutionary united front organization of the Filipino people.” National Democratic Front of the Philippines, International Information Office. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “People’s War: Crisis and revolution in Philippine society.” National Democratic Front of the Philippines, International Information Office. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Fonbuena, Carmela. “NDF proposes 6-month, time-bound peace talks.” Rappler, 19 Apr. 2015. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Statement of Sec. Teresita Quintos Deles on the recent atrocities of the CPP-NPA-NDF.” Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 31 Dec. 2014. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[3] Sarmiento, Rene V. “Facilitating dialogue with armed insurgents in the Philippines.” Accord 16 (2005): 72-75. Conciliation Resources. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees.” 24 Feb. 1995.

[4] “Comprehensive Agreement to Respect Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines.” 16 Mar. 1998., Muyot, Alberto T., and Vincent Pepito F. Yambao. “Steps taken to ensure implementation of international humanitarian law in the Philippines.” International Review of the Red Cross 834 (30 June 1999). Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[5] The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” United States Department of State. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[6] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Cayabyab, Marc Jason. “Ex-Red groups tag Makabayan party lists as CPP fronts, seek their disqualification.” GMA News, 30 Oct. 2012. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.

[7] “Philippines-CPP/NPA (1969 - first combat deaths).” Project Ploughshares, June 2015. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Aquino is obstacle to peace negotiations, say Reds.” Inquirer, 19 Apr. 2015. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

The CPP-NPA has generally focused on building support in rural areas, aiming to inspire a people’s democratic revolution among the peasantry. It deploys Sandatahang Yunit Pampropaganda (SYPs), which are armed propaganda units consisting of eight to fifteen fighters. The organization is guided by the Maoist idea of a protracted people’s war (PPW), which consists of three stages: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic offensive. The CPP-NPA considers itself to be still in the first stage.

The CPP-NPA has historically used rural-based guerrilla tactics against small police or military units. It has also assassinated several individual Philippine and U.S. government soldiers, police officers, and officials. In the 1980s, it set up “sparrow” units, which consisted of one to five operatives, for urban assassinations. Especially beginning in the 1980s, the CPP-NPA has also engaged in urban guerrilla warfare and attempted more regularized military formations, such as battalions, to engage in large-scale, conventional attacks. In some regions, the CPP-NPA fought in groups of up to two hundred. [1] However, in the early 1990s, Sison’s criticism of these divergences from the strategy of rural-based guerrilla warfare led the CPP-NPA to return largely to its earlier tactics in the countryside.

The CPP-NPA generally targets politicians and government forces—using assassinations, bombs, or other means—but it has also attacked companies that do not pay “revolutionary taxes” to the CPP-NPA. [2] Because of its opposition to U.S. intervention and influence in the Philippines, the CPP-NPA has also attacked U.S. interests in the country. It conducted attacks against U.S. military installations before U.S. bases in the Philippines closed in 1992. After 1992, the CPP-NPA continued to target U.S. soldiers, embassy employees, and other personnel. [3]

[1] “The new breed of Philippine communists: 1969-84.” The Christian Science Monitor, 27 Sept. 1984. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[2] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Philippines-CPP/NPA (1969 - first combat deaths).” Project Ploughshares, June 2015. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[3] Ereli, Adam. “Foreign Terrorist Organization: Redesignation of Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army.” Washington, D.C. 9 Aug. 2004. Press Statement., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

Disclaimer : These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization’s history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

While there is not much information on individual attacks, the CPP-NPA is one of the most active militant organizations in the Philippines and has waged the world’s longest Communist insurgency. [1] The Armed Forces of the Philippines has identified the CPP-NPA as the nation’s most serious threat, and, in 2013, the CPP-NPA claimed responsibility for nearly a third of the fatalities caused by terror attacks that year. [2]

August 21, 1971 : Three members of the CPP-NPA threw four grenades onto the stage of a Liberal Party rally in Manila’s Plaza Miranda. Then-President Ferdinand Marcos was initially blamed for the attack, which had killed much of his opposition (9 killed, 95 wounded). [3]

April 21, 1989 : CPP-NPA operatives assassinated Colonel James Rowe, who led a U.S. Army division providing military assistance to the Philippine government (1 killed, 1 wounded). [4]

August 21, 2010 : Approximately forty CPP-NPA fighters ambushed a police vehicle outside the city of Catarman, using two improvised explosive devices and gunfire. They killed all occupants of the vehicle (8 killed, 0 wounded). [5]

August 6, 2011 : Approximately thirty CPP-NPA fighters kidnapped Henry Dano—mayor of Lingig, Surigao del Sur—and two of his bodyguards. The CPP-NPA released the captives in October after Dano publicly apologized for his alleged human rights violations (0 killed, 0 wounded). [6]

October 3, 2011 : Three CPP-NPA units, totaling approximately two hundred fighters, attacked three mining companies in Surigao del Norte. The targeted companies allegedly had not paid the so-called revolutionary taxes to the CPP-NPA. CPP-NPA fighters took four hostages, who were released shortly, and caused around $1 billion in damage (3-4 killed, unknown wounded). [7]

January 27, 2013 : Approximately thirty CPP-NPA fighters fired on a truck carrying policemen and civilians in the town of La Castellana (9 killed, 12 wounded). [8]

August 15, 2015 : A CPP-NPA unit launched two attacks on the same day in the province of Agusan del Sur. The fighters destroyed a truck using an improvised explosive device and later attacked two men, one a civilian, and one a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) auxiliary forces. (1 killed, 1 wounded). [9]

[1] Mydans, Seth. “Communist Revolt Is Alive, and Active, in the Philippines.” The New York Times, 26 Mar. 2003. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[2] “Global Terrorism Index 2014.” Institute for Economics & Peace., Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., Fonbuena, Carmela. “Finish insurgency, AFP chief tells commanders.” Rappler, 11 July 2013. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[3] Tiglao, Rigoberto. “Days of Shame: August 21, 1971 and 1983.” The Manila Times, 20 Aug. 2013. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Jones, Gregg. “ExCommunists Party Behind Manila Bombing.” The Washington Post, 4 Aug. 1989. Web. 11 Aug. 2015

[4] “Today marks 22nd anniversary of McAllen war hero’s assassination.” The Monitor, 21 Apr. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “Rebels Admit Slaying of U.S. Colonel.” The Inquirer, 23 Apr. 1989. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[5] Desecada, Miriam. “8 police officers killed by rebels in Northern Samar ambush.” Philstar, 22 Aug. 2010. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[6] “NPA frees mayor, aides.” Inquirer, 9 Oct. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[7] “NPA rebels attack 3 mining firms in Surigao del Norte.” GMA News, 3 Oct. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Gallardo, Froilan. “NPA rebels attack 3 mining firms in Surigao Norte.” MindaNews, 3 Oct. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Dizon, David. “Extortion behind NPA raids in Surigao: PNP.” ABS-CBN News, 4 Oct. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., “NPA hits 3 Surigao mines.” Inquirer, 3 Oct. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[8] “New People’s Army rebels admit perpetrating Negros massacre.” GMA News, 4 Feb. 2013. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[9] Pates, Karlo Paolo R. “NPA burns truck, kills civilian.” Sun.Star, 17 Aug. 2015. Web. 17 Aug. 2015.

U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist Organizations: August 9, 2002 to Present. [1]
European Union Terrorist List: October 28, 2002 to Present. [2]
Government of the Philippines: December 5, 2017 to Present. [3]

[1] “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” United States Department of State. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[2] “Council Common Position of 28 October 2002 updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Common Position 2002/462/CFSP.” Council of the European Union, 30 Oct. 2002., “Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/521 of 26 March 2015.” Council of the European Union, 26 Mar. 2015.

[3] "Duterte Declares CPP-NPA a Terrorist Group – Presidential Communications Operations Office." Presidential Communications Operations Office. December 5, 2017. Accessed January 26, 2019. https://pcoo.gov.ph/news_releases/duterte-declares-cpp-npa-terrorist-group/.

The CPP-NPA has traditionally depended on rural peasants as its main support base. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, CPP-NPA members focused on building their support in the countryside. They taught and worked alongside peasants, as well as served as guards against bandits. Additionally, CPP-NPA members established important relationships with local leaders in the Catholic Church, leveraging the church’s network to reach even more potential supporters. In the 1970s and 1980s, many educated young people from urban areas joined the CPP-NPA’s rural bases, especially after President Marcos’ 1972 declaration of martial law that curtailed political activity. While the CPP-NPA eventually cultivated some support in urban areas, especially in Manila, the countryside has remained its greatest source of support. [1]

During the 1986 election, CPP-NPA urged the continued rejection of political reform mechanisms through an electoral boycott. However, the organization was sidelined by the People Power Revolution that swept Aquino into office. In the late 1980s, the number of moderate CPP-NPA supporters decreased after a new eruption of violence between the CPP-NPA and the Philippine government that derailed peace talks. [2]

In 2001, in contrast with its strategy in the 1986 election, the CPP-NPA supported the movement to oust then-President Joseph Estrada from office in favor of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In the same year, Bayan Muna – a political party connected to the CPP and other groups in the Communist movement – was the most successful party in the congressional elections. [3]

[2] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Datinguinoo, Vinia M. “Bernabe ‘Kumander Dante’ Buscayno.” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2 Feb. 2006. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

[3] “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis Group, 14 Feb. 2011. Web. 11 Aug. 2015., Llamas, Ronaldo M. “The 2001 Party-List Elections: Winners, Losers and Political/Legal Contradictions.” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Sept. 2001. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

In its early years, around the 1970s, the CPP-NPA sought support, weapons, funds, and training from like-minded groups overseas, including the Japanese Red Army (JRA), the Maoist factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Sandinistas, the Communist Party of El Salvador, and many other organizations; the CPP-NPA’s efforts were partially successful. The CPP-NPA has been linked to several Communist or leftist groups in the Philippines through the NDF, which serves as an umbrella for many organizations, including the Cordillera People’s Democratic Front (CPDF), the Revolutionary Council of Trade Unions (RCTU), and the Liberated Movement of New Women (MAKIBAKA). [1]

The Second Great Rectification Movement in the early 1990s split the CPP-NPA into reaffirmists and rejectionists, creating splinter groups like the Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB). The relationship between the CPP-NPA and the ABB has been hostile, with clashes between the groups. The ABB has also cooperated in government operations against the CPP-NPA. [2]

The CPP-NPA has allegedly cooperated tactically with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); their cooperation has mainly involved avoiding clashes with each other and the safe movement of CPP-NPA operatives through MNLF- or MILF-controlled areas. The CPP-NPA has never collaborated in attacks with these groups, and the CPP-NPA viewed the MNLF’s 1996 peace agreement with the Philippine government as a betrayal of a revolutionary cause. There have been no reported relationships between the CPP-NPA and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) or other militant groups in the Philippines. [3]

[1] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., Cordillera People’s Democratic Front. “Message of the Cordillera People’s Democratic Front on the 42 nd NDFP Anniversary.” National Democratic Front of the Philippines, International Information Office, 14 May 2015. Web. 20 Aug. 2015., Revolutionary Council of Trade Unions. “Revolutionary workers hold rally, hail CPP’s 46 th anniversary.” National Democratic Front of the Philippines, International Information Office, 19 Dec. 2014. Web. 20 Aug. 2015., Libertad, Malaya. “MAKIBAKA calls on women to join the revolution to end oppression.” National Democratic Front of the Philippines, International Information Office, 27 Mar. 2014. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.

From its 1969 establishment until the 1976 normalization of Philippine-Chinese relations, the CPP-NPA received support, weapons, and funds from China. However, even though the CPP-NPA modeled its armed struggle on China’s own Maoist movement, Chinese support for the CPP-NPA seems to have been limited. The CPP-NPA also sought support, weapons, funds, and training from like-minded groups overseas, including the Japanese Red Army (JRA), the Maoist factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, the Communist Party of El Salvador, and many other organizations. The CPP-NPA’s efforts to elicit support from these groups were only partially successful. The extent of the group’s connection with other foreign groups is unknown. Although the CPP-NPA attempted to expand its presence and support abroad from the 1970s onward – for example, by dispatching representatives throughout Europe and the Middle East – those efforts appeared largely ineffective, especially after the general decline of Communist groups in the late 1980s and 1990s. [1]

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COMMENTS

Is the anti-terrorism law beneficial to the Filipino people?Why?
TThis can also help the governement to protect the people, liberty, and property from acts of terrorism and to condemn terrorism and those who support and
are you in favor of the anti-terrorism bill?
yes because it will punish those terrorist groups and anti-government groups that undermine the democracy of this nation. And this law have enough safety
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